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LAND USE
I. INTRODUCTION*
In Virginia and throughout the United States, pressures have been
building which are forcing the law of land use planning to a watershed in
its development. In response, governments at all levels have been striving
to find means of ensuring that the resulting change be in a direction that
benefits the greatest number of their citizens. Likewise, the attorney prac-
ticing in this area of the law needs to recognize the possibility of fundamen-
tal changes, to understand the pressures precipitating an altered legal
framework, and to appreciate the complex ramifications of his decisions
involving questions of land use. Only through this process will he be able
to structure legal advice that realistically represents the interests of his
client and of society.
The pressures on the use of land within our state and nation can
arbitrarily be categorized within five nebulous and overlapping areas.
First, the populations of the United States and Virginia are increasing.
Even if the birth rate were to stabilize immediately at Zero Population
Growth (ZPG), the number of Americans and Virginians would continue
to grow for another generation.' With such an increase comes the need for
new housing, new structures of industry and commerce, new governmental
services, and a commensurately accelerating demand on the available re-
sources of land. Secondly, the economics of land use are changing. For
example, land values have so appreciated and building costs so escalated
that the single family detached dwelling is now priced beyond the reach
of a majority of Americans. Meanwhile, the inner cities have generally
decayed while the suburbs on a relative basis have prospered. From such
pressures a demand has arisen that attractive, clean, affordable, and effi-
cient housing be made available through a reduction of construction costs,
the rehabilitation of existing substandard structures, and a restructuring
of land use that frees property for residential development. At the same
time, a shortage of capital confronts those private developers and govern-
* Introduction by David Stephen Cohn, Assistant Professor of Law, T. C. Williams School
of Law, University of Richmond; A.B. University of Pennsylvania 1967; J.D. Harvard Law
School 1971; special student Harvard Business School 1970-71; member of Pennsylvania and
Virginia Bar. The Review would like to acknowledge the assistance of Professor Cohn in the
preparation of this note.
Professor Cohn wishes to express his appreciation to the Faculty Research Committee of
the University of Richmond for a grant that aided in the preparation of this note.
The student contributors are David B. Beach, Albert D. Bugg, Jr., Wayne R. Hairfield,
Benjamin Lacy, Joseph R. Mayes, Burke F. McCahill, Daniel R. McGarry, John H. McLees,
Jr., Dennis J. McLoughlin, Louis A. Mezzullo, Thomas P. Olivieri, Michael S. Shelton, Gayle
D. Tarzwell, Thomas W. Williamson, Stephen M. Yost.
1. See Section XI, infra.
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ments that attempt to meet these needs and necessitates their having to
act with imagination and political savvy in order to locate sufficient
sources of funds.
Thirdly and closely linked to the economic question are problems fos-
tered by a radically altered energy situation. The fuels that have been vital
to our past patterns of growth will henceforth be available only at increased
cost or in possibly decreased quantities. This phenomenon will demand a
more coordinated effort to develop real estate in a manner that reduces the
need to rely on energy consuming elements of modern technology. For
example, pressures will increase for a more efficient use of that land near-
est to the centers of shopping and jobs, a reduction in the use of the
automobile, and an increase in the reliance on the various forms of mass
transit. Moreover, building codes may have to be amended to require
designs of future structures that waste less energy. Recently implemented
programs to develop new and less costly energy sources and to provide coal,
oil, gas, and electricity at the lowest possible costs will have to be more
actively pursued.
Fourth, pervading the population, economic, and energy questions are
social pressures. The poor and the minorities, like the more affluent, want
their share of the good life. They have sought, and may more aggressively
seek in the future, the relatively good schools, parks, municipal services,
open space, comfort, and safety of the suburbs. However, they are cur-
rently blocked in their efforts at upward mobility by certain tools of land
use planning law, such as zoning and private restrictive covenants. Their
frustration adds to this impetus for change.
Finally, the environmental movement nurtured the seed of an awareness
in many that our planet of once seemingly boundless resources has inher-
eift limitations which necessitate that all actions of its people be seen as
interrelated and interdependent. Thus, there has been a growing recogni-
tion of a need to husband precious natural resources such as clean water,
clean air, and critical areas such as mountainsides and wetlands in order
to prevent a further deterioration of the current relationship between man
and the environment.2 When these ecological factors lead to demands that
growth be slowed and land be preserved in a condition as close as possible
to its natural state, they conflict directly with the four areas of pressure
outlined above.
Considering the intricacy of the pressures and the problems, it is logical
that the response of society should be complex. In fact, a hierarchy of
institutions did develop above the citizen property owner in the United
2. See Sections VII, X, infra.
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States with each of its levels assigned certain functions that are designed
to alleviate the aforementioned problems. Yet, these levels of bureaucracy
at times seem to have been created to work through overlapping regula-
tions toward competing goals. An outline of the framework of this response
with examples of actions taken at each level will demonstrate the need for
a comprehensive reevaluation of this mechanism through which the law
attempts to provide order in land use.
First, the individual owner of real property might feel that he alone can
understand and serve both his personal interests and the interests of his
land. Thereby he is in the optimum position to resolve the demands fos-
tered by the aforementioned pressures.3 On the one hand, he has a sensitive
economic interest in the use to which his land and that of his neighbors
can be put. On the other hand, he has a social concern for the identity of
his neighbors and for the manner in which land use in his neighborhood
might affect his life style. While the private owner lacks the organization
of a unit of government, he relies heavily on the existence of property rights
guaranteed him by the Constitutions of the United States and Virginia and
acts to promote his interests through private legal devices such as restric-
tive covenants and the formation of political pressure groups.
At the second level, local governments have traditionally maintained the
deepest institutional involvement in land use law.4 They function closest
to the people, are in a position to appreciate the unique characteristics of
land within their jurisdictions, and arguably can best recognize, articulate,
and serve local needs. By the year 1980, every county and city within
Virginia will be required by state law to become involved in this process
through the use of the standard governmental land use tools of comprehen-
sive planning, subdivision control, and zoning.
Third, it has been argued that giving planning powers to localities cre-
ates an artificial division of responsibility in the land use area.' In other
words,
[t]he effective development of a region should not and cannot be made to
depend upon the adventitious location of municipal boundaries, often pre-
scribed decades or even centuries ago, and based in many instances on con-
siderations of geography, of commerce, or of politics that are no longer signifi-
cant with respect to zoning.6
Cognizant of this factor, the Virginia General Assembly recently created
3. See Section II, infra.
4. See Section III, infra.
5. See Section IV, infra.
6. Borough of Cresshill v. Borough of Dumont, 15 N.J. 238, 104 A.2d 441, 446 (1954).
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twenty-two Regional Planning District Commissions in the Common-
wealth with the jurisdictions of each transcending the boundaries of local
governments. These Commissions were charged with the duty of analyzing
issues of regional importance such as housing and sewage, but they were
given only advisory roles.
Fourth, the states are deeply involved in this response.' For example,
Virginia has established its own agencies for the regulation of water, air,
highways, and other areas affecting land use within its borders, and has
adopted comprehensive land use statutes such as the Virginia General
Condemnation Act.' In addition, the legislature has passed enabling acts
granting to localities the above mentioned power to regulate land use. At
the same time, the state is in a position to advocate a restructuring of local
government in order to provide more effective control at a regional level
or possibly to enact land use planning on a comprehensive, state-wide
basis. However, its legislators have to date consciously refused to become
involved to such a degree in these questions. While the state has a broader
perspective than its localities from which to conduct a comprehensive
evaluation of the desirability of further land use control, it has not defined
the role through which it can most effectively function at the level between
the local and national governments.
Fifth, the federal government stands at the pinnacle of this hierarchy in
the sense that it is in a position to influence the land use planning decisions
of the greatest number of Americans and to resolve conflicts among the
several states.' Recognizing this opportunity, Congress has enacted com-
prehensive acts that regulate, to the extent allowable by the United States
Constitution, the cleanliness of water and air, the deep shaft mining of the
earth, the drilling of oil on the continental shelf, and numerous other areas
of concern to land use. The National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
is currently the most comprehensive manifestation of this involvement. In
the not too distant future, the possible passage of a Federal Land Use
Planning Act may greatly increase the federal role in the resolution of these
problems.
Lastly, the aforementioned interests that compete to provide solutions
to these problems collide intermittently. At such points, the vehicle for
conflict resolution becomes the courts before which the problems of the five
pressures, the five levels of the hierarchy, and the framework of our case
law, statutes, and constitutions meet with the plea that order and justice
be found. However, when the judicial forum is reached, it can be argued
7. See Sections VI, VII, infra.
8. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 25-46.1 et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1974).
9. See Sections X, XI, infra.
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that the judges lack the time, expertise, resources, and power to review
effectively the available alternatives and to structure appropriate reme-
dies. If this is an accurate observation, then there is a need to relieve the
judiciary of a great portion of this burden. Towards this objective, a two-
fold effort should be undertaken. First, the problems of land use planning
must be defined. Then the problems should be matched to that level of
governmental involvement that can most efficiently and equitably struc-
ture and implement a solution. Such a system could minimize the
possibility of conflicts between the individual and government, result in
an enlightened balancing of the demands of the five pressures, and reduce
society's need to seek assistance from the courts.
The practicing lawyer in Virginia has a crucial role to play in the devel-
opment of this system. This note recognizes this role. While it does not
attempt to provide the attorney with an exhaustive treatise on the law of
land use planning, it does endeavor to outline for him the parameters
within which he can expect to work and thereby bring a degree of order to
a mass of materials. The note will first introduce him to the point to which
this body of law has evolved in Virginia and review the process of its
evolution. At the same time, it will review the voluminous cast of partici-
pants involved in land use at all levels of government and elaborate the
role and procedures of each. Finally, it will give him a glimpse of those
forces affecting the direction of land use law in Virginia, and a basis upon
which he might anticipate the direction of its future maturation. To this
goal of so educating the practicing attorney in Virginia this note is dedi-
cated.
II. PRIVATE LAND USE CONTROLS
No discussion of land use controls would be complete without mention
of those more traditional legal principles which allow a private landowner
some control over future uses of his presently owned land, and the uses of
the lands of others which affect his interests in land. These principles
involve covenants, equitable servitudes, easements, licenses, and the cause
of action in private nuisance.'
The substantive law of private controls on land use is, for the most part,
extensively discussed elsewhere. 2 The purpose of the following analysis is
1. Another private control, or perhaps a "quasi-private" control, exists in situations where
a private individual is given a statutory cause of action or appeal based on zoning laws. See
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-496, -497, and -503.2(c) (effective June 1, 1975); Brown, Zoning Laws:
The Private Citizen as an Enforcement Officer, 9 U. RicH. L. REv. 483 (1975). See also Section
HIC2, 7, 8, infra.
2. See, e.g., Bohannon, Airport Easements, 54 VA. L. Rzv. 355 (1968); Newark, The Bound-
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to illustrate the current viability of this body of law in terms of the interac-
tion of private and public controls and the advantages and disadvantages
of private controls.
A. A PREFERRED METHOD?
Based on an elementary knowledge of private controls, one might make
certain tentative generalizations about their function, their virtues, and
their vices. Public controls are instituted for the general well-being of the
whole community.3 Private controls, typically instituted to serve only the
well-being of the parties and their property, supplement public controls,
especially local zoning,4 by providing ad hoc remedies for specific situa-
tions.
Private controls are consonant with our traditional concepts of private
property ownership and the freedom of individuals to make reasonable
agreements governing their property.' Private controls are largely deline-
ated by an existing body of precedent. Conceding the necessity of judicial
enforcement, private controls are otherwise largely self-executing, requir-
ing no new government agencies, no large tax expenditures, and relatively
simple, if any, enabling legislation. Private controls can be tailored to meet
the precise needs of the parties, their land, and their environment, avoid-
ing the unnecessarily broad restrictions that may conceivably result from
public controls. In all, private controls constitute a form of self-government
of the most direct and most efficient type.
Private controls also have vices. Although instituted for the benefit of
all or some of the parties, they may be detrimental to the community at
large, and they are sometimes difficult to terminate once their usefulness
has passed. Most of all, private controls are limited by the ability of the
parties to enforce them. A limited knowledge of land use principles and
aries of Nuisance, 65 L.Q. REv. 480 (1949); Prosser, Private Action for Public Nuisance, 52
VA. L. REv. 997 (1966); Spies, Annual Survey of Developments in the Virginia Law of Prop-
erty, 1967-68, 54 VA. L. REv. 1244, 1255-59 (1968); Note, Private Land Use Restrictions in
Virginia, 49 VA. L. REV. 1047 (1963); Note, Annual Survey of Developments in the Virginia
Law of Torts, 1971-72, 58 VA. L. Rav. 1349, 1358-59 (1972).
3. See, e.g., Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Board of Supervisors v.
Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959); Young v. Commonwealth, 101 Va. 853, 45 S.E.
327 (1903); VA. CONST. art. I, § 3, and art. XI, § 1. See also VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-489 (effective
June 1, 1975).
4. See Deitrick v. Leadbetter, 175 Va. 170, 175, 8 S.E.2d 276, 278 (1940).
5. The early zoning ordinances aroused much public resentment. 1 YOKLEY, ZONING LAw
AND PRACMCE § 13 (2d ed. 1953). To whatever extent the employment of private controls can
obviate the necessity for new and exotic forms of public controls, further bitterness of this
sort may possibly be avoided.
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environmental needs may result in inadequate control provisions; while
limited funds and investigative resources, as well as the difficulties of
litigation, may result in undependable enforcement.
B. PRIVATE AGREEMENTS
Private land use controls instituted by agreement of the parties include
covenants,' easements, licenses, and profits. Although there are differences
in the substantive law and the specific uses of these several devices, their
general roles in the overall framework of land use control are similar be-
cause their general objectives are the same. These devices serve to preserve
or increase the value or the utility of privately owned lands to the owner.
1. Interaction with Public Controls
For various reasons, an aspiring developer of a tract of privately owned
land may believe that it is in his own economic interest to develop the land
in such a way that it will retain its value and attractiveness indefinitely.7
If the tract is large enough, the owner will have to plan a balanced com-
munity in order to preserve the value of the land. Business and industry
must be included so there will be convenient sources of employment. Resi-
dence complexes for people of various ages and economic levels are neces-
sary to promote adequate division of labor among the local population.
Schools and recreation facilities must be provided. Comprehensive con-
trols on all land uses are essential in order to protect the environment and
attractiveness of the community. All these are necessary simply because
no large, inhabited area can prosper for an extended period of time without
them. It becomes apparent that the developer's objectives in constructing
a plan of private controls for his development become, to some extent, the
same as those of the local government in imposing zoning and other land
use restrictions. In such a case, to what extent could private controls sup-
plant public controls?
Since 1963 such a development, Reston, has been under construction on
a 6750 acre tract in Fairfax County, Virginia. The purported objectives of
6. Hereinafter, "covenants" should be understood to encompass covenants running with
the land at law and covenants enforceable in equity, i.e., equitable servitudes, unless the
context indicates otherwise.
7. For example, he may feel that land subject to far-sighted use controls and environmental
safeguards is the most appealing on the current market; he may wish to retain title to portions
of the developed land or expect that he will be marketing the land for many years, and wish
to protect his investment; or he may wish to establish a reputation for excellence in planning
to assure the success of future similar developments.
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the developers in planning this community include, in general terms, the
requirements stated above.8
The envisioned development of Reston would not have fit into the exist-
ing zoning ordinances, so Residential Planned Community (RPC) zoning9
was adopted in June 1962 by the Fairfax County Board of Supervisors. The
purpose of this zoning "is to permit a greater amount of flexibility to a
developer of large communities by removing many of the restrictions of
conventional zoning."'" The ordinance tacitly recognizes that, if the devel-
oped area is large enough" and if the developer's objectives include long-
term preservation of property values for varied uses, the developer's objec-
tives may become largely those of the county in imposing zoning restric-
tions.12
The developer must submit comprehensive plans for his proposed com-
munity to the Board of Supervisors. "The plans for such planned commun-
ities, when approved, shall constitute a part of the comprehensive plan of
the County .... ,,,3
8. A Brief History of Reston, Virginia 9-10 (July, 1973) (promotional pamphlet published
by Gulf Reston Inc.).
9. FAmFAX CouNTY, VA., CODE § 30-2.2.2 (1965).
10. Id. § 30-2.2.2 A.
11. The minimum size development which qualifies for RPC zoning is 750 contiguous acres.
Id.
12. This flexibility is intended to provide an opportunity and incentive to the developer
to strive for excellence in physical, social, and economic planning. To be granted
this zoning the developer will demonstrate throughout the period of development in
all of his planning, design and development the achievement of the following objec-
tives: (1) the reservation of adequate permanent common open space for the use of
all residents, (2) the location of buildings to take maximum advantage of the natural
and man-made environment, (3) a variety of types of housing to achieve a balanced
community, (4) the separation of pedestrian and vehicular traffic, (5) the provision of
cultural, educational, medical, and recreational facilities for all segments of the com-
munity, and, (6) an orderly and creative arrangement of all land uses with respect to
each other and to the entire community, including residential, commercial, industrial,
and governmental, school sites, parks, playgrounds, recreational areas, parking areas,
and other open spaces, (7) the provision of dwellings within the means of families of
low and moderate income. Id.
13. Id. The prescribed process for submission and approval of plans is very similar to that
recently adopted in VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-473, -475 (effective June 1, 1975). The RPC district
concept differs from the concept of special use permits in that it allows the developer, with
the approval of the county, to in effect write his own zoning ordinance rather than merely
allowing him an exception to existing zoning. The distinction is arguably quantitative rather
than qualitative. See also Section IIICS, infra. The RPC district is basically the same as
one type of Planned Unit Development (PUD) District. See R. BABCOCK, D. McBRxE, & J.
KRASNOWIECKI, LEGAL ASPECTS OF PLANNED UNrr REsmENTLAL DEVLOPMENT 86-94 (Urban
Land Institute Technical Bulletin 52, 1965); F. So, D. MOSENA, & F. BANGS, PLANNED UNrr
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The RPC district permits mixed residential and commercial uses, and
provides for three types of commercial complexes in order of increasing
variety of permitted uses: the planned convenience center, the village cen-
ter, and the town center. It also provides for a convention center/conference
center, in which hotels, cultural and educational facilities, and various
commercial activities are permitted. The sizes and locations of all these
centers are to be designated by the developer on the submitted plans.
Elaborate regulations requiring the integration of low and moderate in-
come housing into the community are included.
The RPC district imposes an overall population density maximum
throughout the district of thirteen persons per acre. Residential uses are
divided into low (maximum 3.8 persons per acre), medium (maximum 14
persons per acre), and high (maximfim 60 persons per acre) density areas.
Few mechanical restrictions are imposed on residential structures. Open
spaces in the community must be established by "adequate covenants
running with the land, conveyances or dedications,"14 and an organization
must be established by covenants running with the land for maintenance
and ownership of open spaces. Ways of access between single family dwell-
ings and public streets may be over land owned by an association of home-
owners.
The Reston community is bisected by a 1300 acre belt of land reserved
for the use of industry and government agencies, and zoned under conven-
tional industrial zoning. The remainder of Reston is zoned as an RPC
district. Directly north of the industrial belt is the convention cen-
ter/conference center. North and south of the central belt are intersper-
sions of high, medium, and low density residential areas, open spaces, and
lakes and ponds. Throughout these areas, placed with regard for terrain
and traffic patterns, are the village centers, convenience centers, schools,
and major recreational facilities. As permitted by the RPC district ordi-
nance, residential and commercial uses are closely integrated in the village
and convenience centers, so as not to leave these areas deserted after
normal business hours.
The industrial area is subject to a Declaration of Protective Covenants
and Restrictions,'" which establishes an architectural review board to rule
DEvEOPzaETr Owm~ANcEs 9-10 (Planning Advisory Service Report No. 291, May 1973). For
discussion of a PUD district based on exceptions to existing zoning, see So, et at, id. at 10.
14. Id.
15. Recorded in Deed Book 2562, p.34, in the Clerk's Office of Fairfax County. Regardless
of whether the Reston covenants would be held to run with the land, notice of their existence
is surely sufficient to enforce them in equity, if they are reasonable and the intention behind
them is clear. See generally Minner v. Lynchburg, 204 Va. 180, 129 S.E.2d 673 (1963); Renn
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on proposed new structures, structural additions, changes in use of existing
structures, and proposed signs and exterior lighting. The covenants inure
to the benefit of the developer, the property owners, and lessees during
tenancies in excess of five years.
Land use throughout the remainder of Reston is controlled by an elabo-
rate system of general covenants,'" which is set out in the Deed of Dedica-
tion of Section One, Reston, 7 and the Deed of Dedication of Section Two,
Reston.'" In addition, these deeds contain special covenants which apply
only to residential property.'9 As in the industrial area, proposed changes
in use of buildings or structural additions must be approved by an archi-
tectural board of review (ABR). The covenants inure to the benefit of the
Reston Home Owners Association (RHOA), a non-stock corporation of
which the developer and all property owners are members. RHOA owns
and maintains the open space land as directed by the RPC district ordi-
nance, owns and maintains the major recreational facilities, and maintains
a covenants committee, which exists to assure compliance with the cove-
nants and with ABR decisions.
Many of the residential complexes in Reston consist of townhouses built
in the "cluster" pattern. For each cluster a non-stock corporation known
as a "cluster association" exists, comprised of the developer and all prop-
erty owners in that cluster. As permitted by the RPC district ordinance,
the cluster association owns and maintains common lands within the clus-
ter, such as walkways, parking spaces, access to public roads, and small
playgrounds. It also maintains liability insurance covering the cluster
lands and informally aids RHOA in enforcement of the covenants.20
v. Whitehurst, 181 Va. 360, 25 S.E.2d 276 (1940); Springer v. Gaddy, 172 Va. 533, 2 S.E.2d
355 (1939); Cheatham v. Taylor, 148 Va. 26, 138 S.E.2d 595 (1927).
16. The general covenants deal with external maintenance and appearances, prohibition
of subdividing, utility easements, slope control, preservation of open space, and a covenant
against noxious or offensive activities which sounds very much like a public nuisance ordi-
nance. See text accompanying notes 47-50 infra.
17. Recorded in Deed Book 2431, p.319, in the Clerk's Office of Fairfax County. This covers
all of Reston north of the industrial belt.
18. Recorded in Deed Book 2499, p.339, in the Clerk's Office of Fairfax County. This covers
all of Reston south of the industrial belt.
19. The residential covenants restrict use in the applicable areas to residential purposes,
forbid keeping of animals other than household pets not kept for commercial purposes, and
impose additional use restrictions directed toward maintenance of external appearances.
20. The Reston cluster associations have qualified for exemption from federal income taxes
as "communities" under the Internal Revenue Code Rulings. This ruling defines a "com-
munity" as "a geographical unit bearing a reasonably recognizable relationship to an area
ordinarily identified as a governmental subdivision or a unit or district thereof." MERTE s
LAW OF FED. INcomE TAXATiON, [1974 transfer binder] RULINGS 126 at 127-28.
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In Reston, private agreements perform not only functions which are
typically performed by private agreements elsewhere,2" but also functions
which typically are performed by either private agreements or public re-
strictions22 as well as functions which are typically performed only by
public controls.? It is this extensive performance of public functions by
private agreements that makes Reston an important case study in the use
of private agreement restrictions.
2
There are, of course, limitations on the possible uses of private agree-
ments to control land use. Although motivated by the same considerations
that prompted the development of Reston, the developer cannot fully an-
ticipate the effect of his development on the community at large, nor is
this his primary concern. His primary concern is with the land and resi-
dents within his community, not tho~e without.? Recognition of these facts
is embodied in the RPC district ordinance's provision for county review of
proposed development plans. Furthermore, private agreements are en-
forced only through lawsuits brought by private parties (i.e., the developer
and the residents). Such suits will naturally be brought only for private
benefit. The interests of the general public are protected only when they
coincide with the interests of the developer or residents of the develop-
ment. In other cases, protection of the community at large is left to public
authorities.
21. E.g., providing ways of access to public roads, restricting uses and external modifica-
tions of residential property, and easements for maintenance of underground utilities.
22. E.g., set back requirements, prohibition of subdivision of property, maximum lot cover-
age, or building height restrictions.
23. E.g., control over population density, abatement of public nuisances, maintenance of
open spaces, control over the integration of residential and commercial uses, and designation
of the locations where the categories of permitted uses established by the RPC district ordi-
nance shall apply.
24. Also noteworthy is the example of Houston, Texas, where there is no zoning. The zoning
function in Houston is performed entirely by private covenants. However, by statute (TEx.
Rv. STAT. ANN. art. 974a-1,2 (1969)), the city is empowered to enforce the private covenants.
The covenants are thus made more effective because they have the financial, investigative,
and litigative resources of the city behind them. See Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J.
LAW & ECON. 71, 77-79 (1970). Even if one is satisfied that private controls have adequately
supplanted zoning in Houston, this does not mean that public land use controls are not
necessary, since local zoning is only one of a number of public land use controls which are,
or perhaps should be, effective over a given area. Public controls other than zoning are
currently in effect in Houston. Id. at 72-75.
25. The same faults can be found with land use controls at all but the highest levels, e.g.,
county government protects only the interests of the county, etc. See Section IV, infra.
Carried to a logical but extreme conclusion, this argument would support the institution of
federal, continental, or even world-wide controls of land use and the environment. The major
question is, at what level, if any, does the argument lose its cogency?
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2. Analysis
The essence of private agreement controls is the parties' dominion over
their own property. This is evident from cases requiring strict adherence
to the parties' intentions in interpreting covenants"6 and defining rights
created by implication27 or prescription.3 However, in communities such
as Reston, where both the developer and neighbors exert considerable in-
fluence over the homeowner's use of his land, resentment of private con-
trols may be as great or greater than resentment of public controls.2 9 Be-
cause the homeowner has agreed to abide by the covenants, in law the
controls are self-imposed. In practice, however, the homeowner may not
appreciate the meaning and pervasiveness of the controls until it is too
late. In such a case, it makes little difference to him that these controls
are enforced by private agreement instead of governmental action.
Private agreements seldom require new governmental agencies, tax ex-
penditures, or enabling legislation." On the other hand, elaborate private
agreements to control land use may involve expenses to the parties in
addition to property taxes.2 '
As noted above, one possible vice of private agreement controls is that
they may be entered into for the benefit of the parties or some of the
parties, to the detriment of surrounding properties or the community at
large. The raison d'etre of private agreements is to benefit private parties
and not the community as a whole. The abuse of private controls takes two
possible forms: a detrimental effect of the agreements on the community
at large, and an inequitable distribution of benefit from the agreements
26. See, e.g., Carpenter v. Camp Mfg. Co., 112 Va. 300, 71 S.E. 559 (1911).
27. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Edgewood Water Works Co., 151 Va. 274, 144 S.E. 452 (1928);
Smith v. Virginia Iron, Coal & Coke Co., 143 Va. 159, 129 S.E. 274 (1925).
28. See, e.g., Robertson v. Robertson, 214 Va. 76, 197 S.E.2d 183 (1973); Rives v. Gooch,
157 Va. 661, 162 S.E. 184 (1932).
29. One example is the case of a current Reston homeowner who maintains a flagpole in
open and knowing violation of a decision of the architectural board of review. Interview with
Mr. Robert M. Perce, Jr., attorney for Gulf Oil Real Estate Development Co. Inc., Jan. 3,
1975. Another example was Baker v. Magness, Chancery No. 31217 (Circuit Court of Fairfax
County, June 22, 1970). This was a derivative action brought by members of Reston Second
Homeowners Association (later consolidated into RHOA) in an unsuccessful attempt to cur-
tail the power of the developer to control the association.
30. Even the RPC district ordinance is a relatively simple legal structure, leaving much in
the way of detailed controls to the developer.
31. Reston homeowners pay county property taxes. They also pay membership charges to
RHOA and to their cluster association. These charges, when due, become a lien on the
property. Deeds of Dedication of Sections One and Two, Reston (hereinafter cited as Deeds)
supra notes 17 and 18, at art. II, para. 8, 9. Residents thus pay three tax-type assessments,
rather than one, for services which are essentially of a local governmental nature.
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among the parties thereto. As the Reston example illustrates, private
agreements may perform many of the traditional functions of public con-
trols if the developer demonstrates an intention not to abuse private con-
trols in either of these ways.
Certainly Reston, with its objectives, inter alia, of maintaining a bal-
anced population and controlling environmental pollution, does not seem
to be detrimental to the surrounding communities. Although some pri-
vately planned communities have benefited the developer to the abject
neglect of the residents,32 at present there is no apparent reason to believe
this will be the case in Reston. Some Reston residents have felt that too
much control is in the hands of the developer, to the detriment of the
residents. In Baker v. Magness,3 the court held that the actions of the
developer's representatives were in substantial compliance with the arti-
cles of incorporation, the by-laws of the Home Owners' Association and the
Deed of Dedication. If the private controls in Reston are not adequately
beneficial to the residents, the result may be a future adjudication that
they are unreasonable and therefore unenforceable. In any event, it would
certainly be reflected in the future saleability of Reston homes. The abuse
of private agreement controls is curbed, in theory at least, by rules that
restrictive covenants be strictly construed against enforcement,34 that re-
strictions must be reasonable and not against the public interest,35 and
that a plaintiffs interest in enforcement must be substantial in order to
justify enforcement in equity.35
Once instituted, private agreements may outlive their usefulness. Re-
strictions imposed in deeds of fee-qualified estates are troublesome to ter-
minate, due to the difficulties of finding the owner of the reversion and
obtaining a grant of his interest. Equitable servitudes are also quite diffi-
cult to terminate because of the large number of potential plaintiffs in-
volved. Although in order to meet the requirement of reasonableness, an
automatic termination date is often included in the instruments creating
such agreements,3 termination before that date can prove very difficult. 9
32. See, e.g., STONE, CLARENCE DARow FOR THE DEFENSE 39-42 (1941).
33. See note 29 supra.
34. State-Planters Bank v. Standard Cary Corp., 208 Va. 298, 156 S.E.2d 778 (1967).
35. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Hercules Powder Co. v. Continental Can Co.,
196 Va. 935, 86 S.E.2d 128 (1955).
36. McCue v. Ralston, 50 Va. (9 Gratt.) 430 (1852) (dealing with an easement).
37. Interview with Mr. Fred A. Crowder, of Christian, Barton, Epps, Brent, & Chappell,
Richmond, Virginia, February 3, 1975.
38. See, e.g., Booker v. Old Dominion Land Co., 188 Va. 143, 146, 49 S.E.2d 314,316 (1948);
Deeds, supra notes 17 and 18, at art. IV, para. 4; Reston Center for Industry and Government
Declaration of Protective Covenants and Restrictions, supra note 15, at art. IT, para. 3.
39. "No hard and fast rule can be laid down as to when changed conditions have defeated
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This may be necessary in order to make such restrictions binding, and
whether it is thought to be a vice or a virtue depends on whether one is
seeking to enforce or to violate such a restriction.
In summary, private agreements constitute a viable tool for small scale
land use control for the ordinary landowner, and have provided an alterna-
tive to detailed public controls for a new Virginia community. By their very
nature, however, private agreements operate in a piecemeal fashion. The
interests they protect are primarily those of the parties. They can provide
neither long range, large scale planning, nor controls modern environmen-
tal protection may require.
C. NUISANCE
When a private landowner seeks to impose use controls over land which
is not his, and cannot accomplish his purpose by an agreement with the
owner of the land sought to be restricted as to use, he may have a remedy
in private nuisance. Both public and private land use controls are sub-
sumed under the generic term "nuisance." Nuisance "extends to every-
thing that endangers life or health, gives offense to the senses, violates the
laws of decency, or obstructs the reasonable and comfortable use of prop-
erty."40 "Nuisances are of two kinds-public or common nuisances, which
affect people generally, and private nuisances which may be defined as
anything done to the hurt of the lands, tenements, or hereditaments of
another."'"
Public nuisance is a crime, and can be remedied at the instance of the
state, by indictment, injunction or both.42 Cities and towns in Virginia are
authorized by statute43 to assume the power to abate public nuisances.
Although this power need not be assumed, if it is, its exercise is manda-
tory.44 It is exercised by local ordinances that typically do not define public
nuisance, leaving such definition to the common law.
1. Interaction with Public Controls
Private action for nuisance supplements rather than supplants the func-
the purpose of restrictions, but it can be safely asserted the changes must be so radical as
practically to destroy the essential objects and purposes of the agreement." Booker v. Old
Dominion Land Co., 188 Va. 143, 148, 49 S.E.2d 314, 317 (1948), quoting Rombauer v.
Compton Heights Christian Church, 328 Mo. 1, 40 S.W.2d 545, 553 (1931).
40. Bragg v. Ives, 149 Va. 482, 497, 140 S.E. 646, 660 (1927), quoting 20 R.C.L. 380.
41. White v. Town of Culpeper, 172 Va. 630, 636, 1 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1939), quoting 2
DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 8 (5th ed. 1911).
42. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 672-73 (1887).
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-14 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
44. Edwards v. Town of Pocahontas, 47 F. 268 (W.D. Va. 1891).
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tion of the public power to abate nuisance, providing an ad hoc remedy
for the wronged individual when public action provides no remedy or is
unavailable for other reasons. A public nuisance can also be a private
nuisance if it causes damage peculiar in nature or degree from that suffered
by the public at large to the plaintiffs interest in land. To have a cause of
action in private nuisance, the plaintiff's interest must be of a more partic-
ular nature than the "interest" which everyone has in the use of public
streets, parks, and other public areas. 5
A clear analogy exists between the respective objectives of public and
private nuisance and those of zoning and private land use agreements. The
objective of public nuisance abatement, like that of zoning, is the protec-
tion of the public welfare,46 whereas the objective of the private cause of
action in nuisance, like that of a private land use agreement, is the preser-
vation of the value and enjoyment of private property interests. 7
In a large scale private development, can private controls supplant pub-
lic nuisance abatement power to any appreciable extent? The commercial
and residential property in Reston is subject, inter alia, to the following
covenant:
No noxious or offensive activity shall be carried on upon any portion of the
property, nor shall anything be done thereon that may be or become a nuis-
ance or annoyance to the neighborhood. No exterior lighting shall be directed
outside the boundaries of a lot or other parcel of the property. 8
The Supreme Court of Virginia in Stokely v. Owens49 indicated that such
a covenant would be enforced only against either a nuisance per se or
against activities which the plaintiff has proved constitute a nuisance or
annoyance in factA0 Apparently enforcement would be on a covenant
45. Bowe v. Scott, 113 Va. 499, 75 S.E. 123 (1912).
46. A public nuisance conviction is a judicial determination that a certain present or
pending activity or use of land at a certain place is against the public interest. A zoning
restriction is a legislative determination, either retroactive or prospective, that certain uses
of land within a given area are against the public interest. See Note, 17 VA. L. REV. 202 (1930).
47. The analogy here, of course, is not exact. Private land use agreements, unlike private
nuisance litigation, may also be used to enhance the value of property.
48. Deeds, supra notes 17 and 18, at art. I, para. 5.
49. 189 Va. 248, 52 S.E.2d 164 (1949).
50. The result is that, if other covenants do not specifically forbid non-residential develop-
ment, such uses will be allowed unless they are shown to constitute a nuisance. In Stokely,
the plaintiffs sought an injunction against a frozen custard establishment contained in an
addition to the defendants' home, on the basis of a similar "anti-nuisance" covenant com-
bined with one which prohibited erection of any structures except "detached single family
dwellings ... and appurtenant outbuildings. . . ." With the issue of the residential nature
of the structural addition itself not before it, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the
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theory, and not on the theory of private abatement of a public nuisance '
or of private nuisance. Enforcement as a covenant and not as a private
action in nuisance arguably makes the definition of "nuisance" herein that
of a public nuisance rather than a private nuisance, particularly in view
of the alternative phrase, "or annoyance to the neighborhood."
It thus appears that, if applied on a large scale, private controls can, to
a certain extent, serve the same function as the public nuisance power,
while the private action in nuisance supplements the public power.
2. Analysis
Since any lawful business, if it interferes with the plaintiffs interest in
land, constitutes a nuisance, private nuisance would seem to be a useful
legal tool for environmentalists, and is unquestionably a major concern for
anyone who contemplates a new use of property or the financing of such a
project.12 It is important to note, however, that land uses authorized by the
Commonwealth will only constitute a private nuisance if unreasonably or
negligently carried on 3 and that remedies against activities useful to the
public may be limited.54
Private nuisance, although it limits uses to which private property may
be put, is entirely consonant with our most traditional private property
concepts, because integral to those concepts is the reservation that
"[e]veryone must so use his own property as not to injure another's. 5 5
Conceding the necessity of judicial enforcement, private nuisance is other-
wise self executing, being a private tort action and no function of govern-
ment.56 If wisely applied by the courts, nuisance doctrine avoids unneces-
sarily broad restrictions on land use, because a real interference with the
effect of the two covenants together was to permit only "dwellings . . . etc.," but to allow
commercial uses therein unless such uses were shown to be nuisances per se or nuisances in
fact. Id. at 256, 52 S.E.2d at 169. Since other Reston covenants control uses as well as the
nature of permissible structures, presumably the Reston anti-nuisance covenant will be relied
on only when an objectionable use is not covered in any other covenant.
51. For the limits of private authority to abate public nuisances in Virginia, see Smart v.
Commonwealth, 68 Va. (27 Gratt.) 950 (1876).
52. Crowder, supra note 37.
53. Virginia Beach v. Virginia Beach Steel Fishing Pier Inc., 212 Va. 425, 184 S.E.2d 749
(1971).
54. "An injunction will not issue on every case of nuisance or continuing trespass, for in
determining the relief to be granted, the chancellor must consider the interests of the parties
and of the public." Seventeen Inc. v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 215 Va. 74, 79, 205 S.E.2d 648, 653
(1974).
55. Akers v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 151 Va. 1, 144 S.E. 492 (1928).
56. Public nuisance is also a relatively simple type of control, involving usually only simple
statutes enforced by an already existing agency, the public prosecutor.
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plaintiffs interest must be shown,17 and because of the restraint shown by
the courts in granting injunctive relief when dealing with activities of value
to the community." A permanent injunction issuing from nuisance litiga-
tion may outlive its usefulness, but it can then be modified or vacated upon
a proper showing, 9 and in any case the limited effects of res judicata make
this disadvantage a minimal one. A great disadvantage of nuisance as a
private control is its limited availability to the impecunious plaintiff with
a good cause of action. It is not known how many plaintiffs wronged by a
nuisance are deterred by the possible expenses of litigation although the
number may be high. Arguably, the cost of litigation is less an obstacle to
the party contemplating establishment of a private land use control agree-
ment. The costs of establishing controls by agreement will be limited, and
the mere existence of such agreements will likely accomplish the objective
without the necessity of judicial enforcement; on the other hand, costs of
litigation are more difficult to measure in advance. The expenses of private
nuisance litigation are particularly problematic because the peculiar dam-
age requirement limits the number of plaintiffs who may join in an action."
Private nuisance is obviously severely limited, in comparison to public
nuisance and other public controls, by the relative lack of investigative
resources of the potential plaintiff.
Private nuisance and private controls in general are piecemeal remedies
by nature, and are limited by the abilities of the parties to use them. In
comparison to other private controls, nuisance would seem to be a flexible
but expensive device.
D. CONCLUSION
Far from being antiquated, private controls of land use provide economi-
cal answers to the small scale needs of the modem landowner. For those
in a position to use them, they may provide a powerful weapon in the cause
of environmental protection. Private controls afford a challenging oppor-
tunity to the large scale developer and the future residents of his com-
munity for social improvement and environmental protection through pri-
vate enterprise and small scale local self-government. Concededly, to pro-
tect the interests of a wider portion of the population, and to institute
large scale coordinated planning, public controls are necessary. The Reston
57. Bragg v. Ives, 149 Va. 482, 140 S.E. 656 (1927).
58. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
59. Edlis Inc. v. Miller, 132 W. Va. 147, 51 S.E.2d 132 (1948).
60. See Prosser, supra note 2, at 1001-02, 1010. Some thought might be given to legislation
which would authorize the awarding of costs and reasonable attorney's fees, in addition to
damages and equitable remedies, to the successful plaintiff in private nuisance.
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example provides a challenge for lawmakers imaginatively to integrate
private controls into the overall land use plan.
III. LOCAL CONTROL OVER LAND USE
The local governing bodies in Virginia possess a substantial amount of
statutory control over land use development. The following is a brief survey
of the role of the counties and municipalities in land use control including
the areas of zoning, planning, subdivision control, local property taxation,
and land acquisition for open-space use. Emphasis will be placed on the
powers over land use granted to the local governing bodies by the General
Assembly of Virginia and the interpretation and limitations imposed on
those powers by the Supreme Court of Virginia.
A. LOCAL PLANNING
The primary responsibility for regulating land use rests with the local
county boards of supervisors and municipal councils. The principal powers
are granted to these legislative bodies under Title 15.1 of the Virginia Code
of 1950, Chapter 11, "Planning, Subdivision of Land and Zoning." The
first section expresses the legislative intent behind the measures that fol-
low:
This chapter is intended to encourage local governments to improve public
health, safety, convenience and welfare of its citizens and to plan for the
future development of communities to the end that transportation systems
be carefully planned; that new community centers be developed with ade-
quate highway, utility, health, educational, and recreational facilities; that
the needs of agriculture, industry and business be recognized in future
growth; that residential areas be provided with healthy surrounding for fam-
ily life; and that the growth of the community be consonant with the efficient
and economical use of public funds.'
The statutory provisions establish the framework; it is up to the local
governing bodies to implement these provisions with detailed ordinances.
The local ordinances will vary greatly from locality to locality.
The local governing bodies are directed to create a planning commission
to act in an advisory capacity in accomplishing these goals.2 The duties of
the planning commission include the preparation of a comprehensive plan
for the purpose of:
[G]uiding and accomplishing a coordinated, adjusted and harmonious de-
velopment of the territory which will, in accordance with present and proba-
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-427 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (effective June 1, 1975).
2. Id. § 15.1-427.1 (effective June 1, 1975). The Virginia General Assembly in 1975 made
the creation of a local planning commission mandatory by July 1, 1976.
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ble future needs and resources best promote the health, safety, morals, order,
convenience, prosperity and general welfare of the inhabitants. 3
Among the items that comprise the comprehensive plan are: (1) the desig-
nation of areas for various types of public and private development; (2) the
designation of a system of community service facilities; (3) the designation
of transportation facilities; and, (4) the designation of historical areas and
areas for urban renewal or other treatment.4 Before making recommenda-
tions to the governing body, the planning commission must hold a public
hearing with notice provided by advertisement in a local newspaper having
general circulation and the meeting must be held not less than six days
nor more than twenty-one days after the notice has been published for two
successive weeks.
The comprehensive plan may be implemented by the following tools: (1)
an official map, which sets out the present and proposed public streets,
waterways and public areas;' (2) a capital improvements program, revised
annually;7 (3) a subdivision control ordinance;8 and, (4) a zoning ordinance
and zoning districts map.' The comprehensive plan must be reviewed every
five years by the planning commission for possible amendment."
The governing body of every county or municipality must adopt an
ordinance to ensure the orderly subdivision of land and its development."1
The Code permits each locality to determine its own definition of subdivi-
sion if it desires, thereby establishing the coverage of its own subdivision
ordinance. 2 Otherwise, the definition in the statute would control. 13
3. Id. § 15.1-446.1 (effective June 1, 1975). The 1975 General Assembly made the adoption
of a comprehensive plan mandatory by July 1, 1980.
4. Id.
5. Id, § 15.1-431 (Cum. Supp. 1974), as amended, (effective June 1, 1975). The 1975 amend-
ments changed the period from not less than twelve days nor more than twenty-eight days.
6. Id. §§ 15.1-458 to -463 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
7. Id. § 15.1-464 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (effective June 1, 1975).
8. Id. §§ 15.1-465 to -485 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, § 15.1-478 (Cum. Supp. 1974), as
amended, §§ 15.1-465 to -482.1 (effective June 1, 1975).
9. Id. § 15.1-447(2)(d) (Re l. Vol. 1973), as amended, (effective June 1, 1975). The 1975
amendment eliminated detailed plans of specific projects included on the official map as a
method of implementation of the comprehensive plan.
10. Id. § 15.1-454.
11. Id. § 15.1-465. The 1975 amendment to this section made the adoption of a subdivision
ordinance mandatory by July I, 1977.
12. See Board of Supervisors v. Georgetown Land Co., 204 Va. 380, 131 S.E.2d 290 (1963),
where the court stated, concerning the predecessor to the present statute:
The legislature, in enacting the Virginia Land Subdivision Act, delegated to each
locality a portion of the police power of the state, to be exercised by it in determining
what subdivisions would be controlled, and how they should be regulated. The legisla-
ture left much to the discretion of the locality in making such determination, relying
upon the local governing body's knowledge of local conditions and the needs of its
individual community. Id. at 383, 131 S.E.2d at 292.
13. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-430(1) (effective June 1, 1975) defines subdivision as follows:
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B. ZONING: THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
The most frequently used power over land use granted to the local gov-
erning bodies is zoning. The governing body may divide the territory under
its jurisdiction or any substantial portion thereof into districts and in each
district it may "regulate, restrict, permit, prohibit, and determine" (a)
uses, (b) structural dimensions, (c) the amount of land, water and air space
to be occupied, and (d) the use of natural resources.'4 Such regulation must
be uniformly applied within each district, but may vary from one district
to another.'5 Zoning ordinances "shall be for the general purpose of pro-
moting the health, safety or general welfare of the public and of further
accomplishing the objectives of [Title 15.1, Chapter 11].""1 The Code
enumerates seven specific purposes for which zoning ordinances may be
enacted, embracing public safety; the reduction of traffic congestion; the
improvement of the community; the development of adequate health, rec-
reation and transportation facilities; the preservation of historic areas; and
the encouragement of economic development to provide desirable employ-
ment and to enlarge the tax base. 7
Zoning ordinances and districts must be drawn in line with the following
considerations: the present use and character of the property; the existing
land use plan; the suitability of the property for various uses; the trends
of future growth; the present and future requirements of the community
for transportation, housing, schools, parks, recreation areas and other pub-
lic services; conservation of natural resources and property values; the
preservation of flood plains; and the encouragement of the most appropri-
ate use of the land.'" The ordinance may include "reasonable regulation
and provisions" for (a) variations in or exceptions to the general regula-
tions; (b) temporary ordinances for annexed areas; (c) granting of special
exceptions and use permits; (d) the administration and enforcement of the
[Tihe division of a parcel of land into three or more lots or parcels of less than five
acres each for the purpose of transfer of ownership or building development, or, if a
new street is involved in such division, any division of~a parcel of land. The term
includes resubdivision and, when appropriate to the context, shall relate to the process
of subdividing or to the land subdivided.
14. Id. § 15.1-486.
15. Id. § 15.1-488 (Repl. Vol. 1973); Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653,
107 S.E.2d 390 (1959), decided under the predecessor to the present statute.
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-489 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (effective June 1, 1975). See
note 1 supra and accompanying text.
17. Id.
18. Id. § 15.1-490 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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ordinance; (e) the imposition of penalties;" (f) the collection of fees to
cover administrative costs; (g) amendments to the regulation or zoning
district maps;" (h) the submission and approval of a plan of development
prior to the issuance of building permits to assure compliance with zoning
regulations.2' The ordinance may also provide that property owners reveal
any interests that a member of the planning commission or governing body
may have in the property under consideration. 2
The governing body must refer ordinances or amendments to the plan-
ning commission for its recommendation." Both the planning commission
and the governing body must hold public hearings before acting on ordi-
nances or amendments." The public hearings enable local residents to
voice their opinions concerning measures that will affect the use and enjoy-
ment of their property.
C. ZONING: CASE LAW
1. General Principles
The exercise of the zoning power by the local governing bodies has led
to clashes between the property owners whose use of land is thereby af-
fected and the local governments, as well as between residents of zoning
districts who desire to maintain the status quo and the local governing
bodies that have refused to restrict development or have permitted amend-
ments in order to allow development. The clashes have led to litigation in
the courts of Virginia, and a body of case law has developed in the zoning
area defining the scope of the zoning power as well as interpreting its
statutory framework. The following is an analysis of the present state of
this decisional law in Virginia, interposing applicable statutory provisions
where pertinent.
19. Id. § 15.1-491(a)-(e) (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (effective June 1, 1975). "Any such
violation shall be a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not less than ten dollars nor more
than one thousand dollars." Id. § 15.1-491(e). The 1975 amendment increased the maximum
from two hundred fifty dollars.
20. Id. § 15.1-491(f)-(g). "Any such amendment may be initiated by resolution of the
governing body, or by motion of the local commission, or by petition of any property owner
addressed to the governing body .... Id. § 15 .1-491(g).
21. Id. § 15.1-491(h).
22. Id. § 15.1-491. This provision insures that the members of the governing body and the
planning commission will be held accountable for decisions that may be based on personal
profit motives.
23. Id. § 15.1-493 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (effective June 1, 1975).
24. Id.
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Zoning ordinances are legislative enactments and are valid exercises of
the police power delegated to the local governments by the General Assem-
bly of Virginia." The rationale that supports zoning regulations holds that
every property owner must "use and enjoy his own as not to interfere with
the general welfare of the community in which he lives."2 As an exercise
of the police power, such ordinances will not be struck down by the courts
unless they conflict with the provisions of the state and federal Constitu-
tionsYn Such a conflict must be plain and clear.28 Therefore, the actions of
the local governing bodies are usually presumed valid, and the burden of
proving otherwise rests with those who challenge the validity of the zoning
ordinance .2 However, as will be shown, the presumption in favor of the
actions of the local officials may not be present at all times, particularly
where those actions are closely akin to administrative decisions."
Zoning should be designed to protect the present character of an area
by preventing the incursion of prejudicial uses. Zoning should also provide
for the future development of an area in a manner consistent with the
present use of land in that area.' Zoning ordinances should promote the
furtherance of the public health, safety or general welfare of the com-
munity. 2 The decisions of locally elected officials, based on their peculiar
knowledge of the area, are given great deference by the courts.33 Further-
more, federal courts are apt to abstain from premature rulings on such
legislation when the plaintiff has failed to exhaust his remedies under state
25. Blankenship v. City of Richmond, 188 Va. 97, 49 S.E.2d 321 (1948); West Bros. Brick
Co. v. City of Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881 (1937), appeal dismissed, 302 U.S. 658
(1937), rehearing denied, 302 U.S. 781 (1938); Nusbaum v. City of Norfolk, 151 Va. 801, 145
S.E. 257 (1928); Gorieb v. Fox, 145 Va. 554, 134 S.E. 914 (1926), cert. granted, 273 U.S. 687
(1927), aff'd, 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
26. Wood v. City of Richmond, 148 Va. 400, 407, 138 S.E. 560, 562 (1927), quoting from,
Bowman v. Virginia State Entomologist, 128 Va. 351, 362, 105 S.E. 141, 145 (1920). The court
went on to state that zoning laws were regulations, and as such did not constitute a taking.
27. See, e.g., Buck v. Bell, 143 Va. 310, 130 S.E. 516 (1925).
28. Id.
29. Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
30. See notes 107 to 130 infra and accompanying text.
31. Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959).
32. See, e.g., Boggs v. Board of Supervisors, 211 Va. 488, 178 S.E.2d 508 (1971); City of
Alexandria v. Texas Co., 172 Va. 209, 1 S.E.2d 291 (1939), where the court found a restriction
on using floodlights at a service station was not related to the public health, safety or general
welfare and therefore was invalid.




law .3  Zoning ordinances are usually either exclusive, that is, they
designate certain uses as prohibited in a particular district, or inclusive,
that is, they specify certain permissible uses and exclude all others.3 Both
types of zoning ordinances have been upheld as valid in Virginia. 6
2. Access to the Courts
A property owner dissatisfied with the application of a particular zoning
ordinance to his property has no statutory right of appeal from the decision
of the city council or board of supervisors. 37 As a legislative act, the ordi-
nance or refusal to rezone is presumed valid, and the court will not ordinar-
ily alter the judgment of elected officials.3 However, there are at least eight
ways that zoning controversies reach the courts in Virginia. First, a prop-
erty owner may seek an injunction lireventing the enforcement of the zon-
ing ordinance as to his property. 9 Second, he may obtain a writ of manda-
mus ordering an official to issue a requested permit." Third, he may seek
a declaratory judgment at law to have a particular ordinance declared
unconstitutional.' Fourth, the most frequently used method of obtaining
a judicial review of zoning decisions is to sue on the equity side for a
declaratory judgment and injunctive relief from the zoning ordinance.2
34. Fralin and Waldron, Inc. v. City of Martinsville, 370 F. Supp. 185 (W.D. Va. 1973),
alf'd, 493 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1974).
35. Wiley v. County of Hanover, 209 Va. 153, 163 S.E.2d 160 (1968).
36. Fairfax County v. Parker, 186 Va. 675, 44 S.E.2d 9 (1947), where a provision in a zoning
ordinance that excluded junk yards from residential areas was held valid.
37. Prichard, The Fundamentals of Zoning Law, 46 VA. L. Rlv. 362 (1960) [hereinafter
cited as Prichard]. This concise but thorough article, published in 1960, is the most recent
comprehensive exposition of Virginia zoning law.
38. Id.
39. City of Alexandria v. Texas Co., 172 Va. 209, 1 S.E.2d 296 (1939); Standard Oil Co. v.
City of Charlottesville, 42 F.2d 88 (4th Cir. 1930). For the Virginia statutes concerning
injunctions, see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-610 to -626 (Repl. Vol. 1957). See also Prichard, supra
note 37, at 363.
40. Planning Comm'n v. Berman, 211 Va. 774, 180 S.E.2d 670 (1971). For the applicable
statutes concerning mandamus proceedings, see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-704 to -714 (Repl. Vol.
1957), as amended, § 8-711.1 (Cum. Supp. 1974). See also Prichard, supra note 37, at 363.
41. Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959); Board of
County Supervisors v. Davis, 200 Va. 316, 106 S.E.2d 152 (1958). For the applicable statutes
on declaratory judgments in Virginia, see VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-578 to -585 (Repl. Vol. 1957),
as amended, § 8-581.1 (Cum. Supp. 1974). See also Prichard, supra note 37, at 363.
42. See, e.g., Board of Supervisors v. Cities Service Oil Co., 213 Va. 359, 193 S.E.2d 1
(1972). See also Prichard, supra note 37, at 363. Such a procedure enables the plaintiff to
enforce his rights in the same suit, once the act is declared illegal. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8-
581 to -583 (Repl. Vol. 1957), as amended, § 8-581.1 (Cum. Supp. 1974), which require the
plaintiff to petition the court for further relief if he desires an injunction.
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Fifth, a property owner may appeal under section 15.1-497 of the Virginia
Code from decisions of the board of zoning appeals.43
Sixth, a citizen of the district may be entitled to bring suit seeking to
enjoin a local governing body from granting a use permit, variance, or
zoning amendment to a property owner." There must be an actual contro-
versy, and the party must be an aggrieved party in the sense that he has
some interest that is going to be affected by the decision of the local
officials.45 The courts refrain from giving advisory opinions where there
appears to be no real adverse claim involved."
The seventh and eighth ways that litigation arises in zoning matters
occur when the local governing body seeks to prevent property owners from
violating the local zoning ordinances. The local government can prosecute
the property owner for violation of the ordinance.4" The burden of proof
concerning the application of the zoning ordinance shifts in criminal cases
to the local officials because they must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
that the defendant has violated the ordinance." The local government can
also seek enforcement of its zoning code through an injunction, and injunc-
tive relief will be granted, although not expressly provided for in the local
ordinance, because of the provisions in sections 15.1-491 and -499 of the
Virginia Code.49
3. Constructional Problems
Zoning ordinances often present problems in discerning the proper
meaning that should be given to their provisions. The provisions will be
interpreted with the legislative intent in mind, according to the customary
meaning of the language used, and in the context of the overall structure
of the zoning code."0 The vidws of the local legislative and administrative
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-497 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (effective June 1, 1975),
discussed infra at notes 91 to 95 and accompanying text.
44. Wilhelm v. Morgan, 208 Va. 398, 157 S.E.2d 920 (1967).
45. See The "Aggrieved Person" Requirement in Zoning, 8 WM. & MARY L. REv. 294, 302-
06 (1967).
46. City of Fairfax v. Shanklin, 205 Va. 227, 135 S.E.2d 773 (1964). "The plaintiff's case,
revealed in its true nature, is but a wholesale, broadside assault upon the city's zoning
ordinance, bereft of a single real complaint of injury or threatened injury." Id. at 230, 135
S.E.2d at 776.
47. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-491(e) (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (effective June 1, 1975),
discussed supra note 22. See Wiley v. County of Hanover, 209 Va. 153, 163 S.E.2d 160 (1968).
48. See Wiley v. County of Hanover, 209 Va. 153, 163 S.E.2d. 160 (1968); Washington &
Old Dominion R.R. v. City of Alexandria, 191 Va. 194, 60 S.E.2d 40 (1950).
49. McNair v. Clatterbuck, 212 Va. 532, 186 S.E.2d 45 (1972); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-491
and -499 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, § 15.1-491 (effective June 1, 1975).
50. Mooreland v. Young, 197 Va. 771, 91 S.E.2d 438 (1956); Vinton-Roanoke Water Co. v.
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officials concerning the meaning and application of zoning provisions are
factors that are considered by the courts in resolving interpretation prob-
lems." Clarity of meaning becomes more important in criminal prosecu-
tions where the burden of proof shifts to the local governing body; a convic-
tion will be overturned when the law is ambiguous.2
Zoning ordinances that delegate some discretionary authority to admin-
istrative officials are not invalid as long as definable standards provide
guidelines sufficient to enable the administrator to act in a nondiscrimi-
natory manner, that is, not arbitrarily or capriciously. 3 An administrator
may have the authority to make decisions based on findings of fact when
the proper criteria for reaching a decision are included in the ordinance.'4
An ordinance regulating the use of land must apply equally to all property
within a reasonably broad area and should be readily understandable to
the average citizen. 5 While citizen participation is considered desirable at
some stages of the land use planning process, for instance at hearings held
by the planning commission prior to the adoption of a comprehensive plan,
local property owners cannot be given the sole power to regulate the use of
land in their area as private citizens because of the possibility that they
would use such power capriciously. 8
Powers exercised by local municipalities and counties must be granted
by legislation enacted by the General Assembly." When a local governing
body fails to follow the statutory procedures in adopting a zoning ordi-
nance and attempts to regulate land use under some other power, the court
will closely scrutinize the reasonableness of the ordinance. 8 The courts will
City of Roanoke, 110 Va. 661, 66 S.E. 835 (1910).
51. Belle-Haven Citizens Ass'n v. Schumann, 201 Va. 36, 109 S.E.2d 139 (1959).
52. Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 198 Va. 454, 94 S.E.2d 537 (1956); Carroll v. Arlington
County, 186 Va. 575, 44 S.E.2d 6 (1947).
53. Andrews v. Board of Supervisors, 200 Va. 637, 107 S.E.2d 445 (1959); Gorieb v. Fox,
145 Va. 554, 134 S.E. 914 (1926), cert. granted, 273 U.S. 687 (1927), aff'd, 274 U.S. 603 (1927).
54. Ours Properties Inc. v. Ley, 198 Va. 848, 96 S.E.2d 754 (1957); Thompson v. Smith,
155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579 (1930).
55. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
56. See Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912). In this case a zoning ordinance
was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court because the ordinance
gave two-thirds of the abutting property owners the power to establish a building set-back
line on their side of the street. See Section 11 B, supra.
57. National Realty Corp. v. City of Virginia Beach, 209 Va. 172, 163 S.E.2d 154 (1968).
58. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Charlottesville, 42 F.2d 88 (4th Cir. 1930). The court stated:
In this case steps had been taken toward the zoning of the city, but there had been
no report by the zoning commission; and, in the absence of such report, the council
had no power to pass a zoning ordinance. It certainly had no power to pass a substitute
for a zoning ordinance in face of the express provision of the statute governing the
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allow the local governing body to enact temporary ordinances pending
adoption of a comprehensive zoning code." Municipalities can be granted
the power to regulate land use in adjacent areas by express authority from
the state legislature." A local governing body cannot violate the zoning
ordinance of another county or city by using land located therein in a
prohibited manner.'
4. Special Exceptions
Zoning ordinances customarily provide for special exceptions or special
use permits allowing certain enumerated uses in a zoning district otherwise
prohibited by the applicable provisions of the zoning code.2 Special excep-
tions, usually granted by the local governing body, impose conditions on
the property owner. 3 The courts recognize the need for deferring to the
judgment of the locally elected officials when they make decisions on appli-
cations for use permits, although such a power is more administrative than
legislative."' It would be impossible for an ordinance to deal with every
conceivable situation that might arise in the future; therefore, the power
to regulate certain uses is often reserved to the local officials to be exercised
on a case by case basis.6 5 This procedure adds flexibility to the local zoning
code. The power to approve special exceptions will be upheld by the courts
unless exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner.6 In acting on re-
quests for special exceptions, the city council or board of supervisors acts
administratively, and the ordinance granting this authority must provide
a standard or rule of guidance. The grant of a special exception cannot
matter. (Citations omitted). Id. at 90.
59. Downham v. City Council, 58 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1932).
60. Murray v. City of Roanoke, 192 Va. 321, 64 S.E.2d 804 (1951). See VA. CODE ANN. §
15.1-467 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (effective June 1, 1975), providing for application of
municipal subdivision regulations beyond the corporate limits of the municipality.
61. See City of Richmond v. Board of Supervisors, 199 Va. 679, 101 S.E.2d 641 (1958),
holding that, although Richmond had the right to establish a jail beyond its corporate limits,
such a power did not authorize Richmond to build a jail in an area where prohibited by the
zoning ordinance of Henrico County.
62. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-430(i) and 15.1-491(c) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
63. Id.
64. See National Maritime Union of America v. City of Norfolk, 202 Va. 672, 119 S.E.2d
307 (1961).
65. Id. The court in National Maritime Union of America v. City of Norfolk upheld the
validity of a zoning ordinance requiring a special use permit for the establishment of union
hiring halls.
66. Id.
67. City of Winchester v. Glover, 199 Va. 70, 97 S.E.2d 661 (1957).
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be coupled with an unconstitutional restriction on the use of the appli-
cant's property."
Once a person has complied with the necessary provisions of a zoning
ordinance pursuant to obtaining approval of a site plan and the issuance
of a building permit, the local body cannot subsequently amend the zon-
ing ordinance so as to prohibit the requested use."9 The applicant can
require the approval of the plan and the issuance of the permit through
mandamus proceedings." When a developer has incurred expenses in reli-
ance upon a prior grant of a special use permit, he has a vested right that
cannot be defeated by subsequent action of the governing body,7" although
he may lose his right if the permit expires before he commences
construction.
5. Non-conforming Uses
The Code states that vested rights shall not be impaired, although the
zoning ordinance may provide that non-conforming uses "may be contin-
ued only so long as the then existing or a more restricted use continues and
such use is not discontinued for more than two years. . . ."I' Any altera-
tion of the buildings on the property must conform to the regulations, and
no "'nonconforming' building may be moved on the same lot or to any
other lot which is not properly zoned to permit such 'nonconforming'
use."" The Virginia Supreme Court defines a nonconforming use as "a
lawful use existing on the effective date of the zoning restriction and con-
tinuing since that time in nonconformance to the ordinance."75
Nonconforming uses should be few in number if the zoning for a particu-
lar area is truly reflective of the present uses in that area. There have been
no cases in the Virginia Supreme Court involving nonconforming uses.
Under the present statute there is no provision for amortizing such uses.
It is unclear whether the Virginia courts would allow a local governing body
to enact an ordinance calling for a cessation of all nonconforming uses
68. City of Alexandria v. Texas Co., 172 Va. 209, 1 S.E.2d 296 (1939), holding that a
restriction on the type of lighting to be used at a service station was void and unenforceable.
69. Planning Comm'n v. Berman, 211 Va. 774, 180 S.E.2d 670 (1971).
70. Id.
71. Board of Supervisors v. Cities Service Oil Co., 213 Va. 359, 193 S.E.2d 1 (1972); Board
of Supervisors v. Medical Structures, Inc., 213 Va. 355, 192 S.E.2d 799 (1972).
72. McClung v. County of Henrico, 200 Va. 870, 108 S.E.2d 513 (1959).
73. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-492 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (effective June 1, 1975).
74. Id.
75. C. & C. Inc. v. Semple, 207 Va. 438, 439 n.1, 150 S.E.2d 536, 537 n.1 (1966), citing 2
YOKLEY, ZONING LAW AND PRAcTicE § 16-2 (3d ed. 1965).
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within a specified period of time. This procedure has been utilized in other
states to eliminate nonconforming uses."
6. Variances
A variance permits a property owner to use his property in some way
prohibited by the zoning ordinance in order to alleviate conditions peculiar
to the particular property." This procedure adds flexibility to the zoning
code and prevents unjust results when there is no corresponding benefit to
the community. The granting of a variance differs from rezoning in two
respects. First of all, when an area is rezoned, the local governing body is
admitting that the present zoning does not relate to the furtherance of
health, safety, or general welfare; whereas the granting of a variance
merely indicates that the zoning ordinance imposes a severe hardship on
a particular property owner. Secondly, if an area is rezoned, all uses proper
according to the new zoning classification are available; whereas a variance
allows only incidental variations from the present zoning regulations.
A variance should be granted when the proposed use will not be detri-
mental to the general public and a refusal would cause a severe hardship
to the property owner." For example, a property owner should be granted
a variance where he has purchased in good faith a parcel of land which can
not be used for any reasonable purpose because the shape of the lot pre-
vents him from constructing a building in conformance with the set-back
restrictions in the zoning ordinance. The board of zoning appeals can au-
thorize variances on appeal from the decisions of the administrative offi-
cials or on original application." This authority is discretionary, but must
not be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously." On appeal to the courts, the
board's decision is presumed to be correct and will not be set aside unless
the decision is plainly wrong.8 '
Self-inflicted hardship, for example where the property owner proceeds
to construct a building in violation of the zoning ordinance without apply-
ing for a variance, will not be sufficient basis for granting a variance."2
76. This procedure is referred to as amortization, and such provisions in zoning ordinances
set time limits within which all nonconforming uses must terminate. See generally, HAGMAN,
URBAN PLANNnG AND LAND DEvELoPMENT CONTROL LAw 154-159 (1971).
77. C. & C. Inc. v. Semple, 207 Va. 438, 439 n.1, 150 S.E.2d 536, 537 n.1 (1966), citing 101
C.J.S. Zoning § 273 (1958).
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-495(b) (Cum. Supp. 1974), as amended, (effective June 1, 1975).
79. Id. The 1975 amendment allows original applications to the board.
80. Board of Zoning Appeals v. Fowler, 201 Va. 942, 114 S.E.2d 753 (1960).
81. Id.
82. Board of Zoning Appeals v. Combs, 200 Va. 471, 106 S.E.2d 755 (1959).
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When the hardship claimed is imposed on other noncontiguous property
owned by the applicant, relief will not be granted. s3 Such a situation would
arise where someone owns two lots in the same zoning district that are not
adjacent to one another and desires to use one lot in a prohibited manner
in order to alleviate some hardship imposed on the other property (e.g., the
use of one lot for a parking facility to serve a nearby office building). Where
strict application of a zoning ordinance causes undue hardship to one
property owner that is not shared by others in the same district, and the
requested variance will not adversely affect the health, safety or general
welfare of the neighborhood nor change the character of the surrounding
area, the variance should be granted." Although financial loss by itself is
not enough to justify a variance, it is one of the factors that should be
considered. 5
7 The Board of Zoning Appeals
The board of zoning appeals hears and decides appeals from decisions
of zoning administrators, hears and decides on applications for interpreta-
tions of the district zoning map and for special exceptions, and authorizes
variances upon appeals or original applications."8 Public hearings are re-
quired before special exceptions and variances are granted by the board."
A person who had no actual notice of the issuance of a building permit may
file a suit within fifteen days after the start of construction, even though
no appeal to the board was taken, to challenge the validity of the permit.88
The board of zoning appeals should state the reasons for its decisions to
inform the parties and to provide a basis for review if a decision is ap-
pealed." The board cannot legislate, repeal or amend the provisions of a
zoning ordinance or statute.0
83. C. & C. Inc. v. Semple, 207 Va. 438, 150 S.E.2d 536 (1966).
84. Tidewater Utilities Corp. v. City of Norfolk, 208 Va. 705, 160 S.E.2d 799 (1968).
85. Azalea Corp. v. City of Richmond, 201 Va. 636, 112 S.E.2d 862 (1960).
86. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-495 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1974), as
amended, (effective June 1, 1975). The statute provides for an appeal "by any person ag-
grieved or by any officer, department, board or bureau of the county or municipality affected
by any decision of the zoning administrator." The board consists of five residents of the
county or municipality, appointed by the circuit court of the county or city, who serve five
year terms. Id. § 15.1-494.
87. Id. § 15.1-495(b)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1974), as amended, (effective June 1, 1975).
88. Id. § 15.1-496.3 (effective June 1, 1975). See Brown, Zoning Laws: The Private Citizen
as an Enforcement Officer, 9 U. OF RiC. L. REv. 483 (1975).
89. Burkhardt v. Board of Zoning Appeals, 192 Va. 606, 66 S.E.2d 565 (1951). VA. CODE
ANN. § 15.1-496.2 (effective June 1, 1975), which provides that the board "shall keep minutes
of its proceedings and other official actions which shall be filed in the office of the board and
shall be public records."
90. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-495(e) (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (effective June 1, 1975).
See also Belle-Haven Citizens Ass'n v. Schumann, 201 Va. 36, 109 S.E.2d 139 (1959).
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A right of appeal to the circuit court is granted to an aggrieved party
who must file a petition with the clerk of court within thirty days after the
filing of the decision." Although the decisions of the board are presumed
correct, the actions of the board will be overturned if the board acted
arbitrarily or capriciously.2 The board cannot deny a special use permit
(in a jurisdiction that reserves that power to the board of zoning appeals)
in an effort to prevent an applicant from exercising a right already granted
under a valid permit issued by a zoning official. 3 On appeal from the
board, additional evidence may be presented to the trial court. 4
8. Limitations on the Court's Power
The courts in Virginia will refrain from substituting their judgments for
those of the local governing bodies, and will remand a case to the proper
officials for final determination rather than rewrite the zoning ordinance."
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Virginia recently held that:
[W]hen the evidence shows that the existing zoning ordinance is invalid and
the requested use reasonable, and when, as here, the legislative body pro-
duces no evidence that an alternative reasonable use exists, then no legisla-
tive options exist and a court decree enjoining the legislative body from
taking any action which would disallow the one use shown to be reasonable
is not judicial usurpation of the legislative prerogative. (citations omitted)."
In other words, the court may, in certain circumstances, issue a decree that
orders the local governing body to rezone the property.
9. Confiscatory Zoning
The Virginia Supreme Court has adopted the rule that when a zoning
ordinance deprives the property owner of all beneficial uses of his land such
an ordinance will be held invalid as a taking without just compensation."
The power to enact zoning ordinances does not carry with it the power to
arbitrarily or capriciously deny a person any legitimate use of his prop-
erty.99 There is no justification for inflicting great financial loss on a prop-
91. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-497 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (effective June 1, 1975). See
also Ross v. County Bd., 197 Va. 91, 87 S.E.2d 794 (1955).
92. Hopkins v. O'Meara, 197 Va. 202, 89 S.E.2d 1 (1955).
93. Id.
94. Wicker Apartments, Inc. v. City of Richmond, 199 Va. 263, 99 S.E.2d 656 (1957);
Hopkins v. O'Meara, 197 Va. 202, 89 S.E.2d 1 (1955).
95. Boggs v. Board of Supervisors, 211 Va. 488, 178 S.E.2d 508 (1971).
96. City of Richmond v. Randall, - Va. _, 211 S.E.2d 56, 61 (1975).
97. Boggs v. Board of Supervisors, 211 Va. 488, 178 S.E.2d 508 (1971).
98. Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E. 2d 390 (1959).
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erty owner when the benefit to the general public is minimal.9 A zoning
ordinance is not invalid merely because it prevents the property owner
from using his land for the particular purpose he desires, as long as he is
left some reasonable use for the land."'
10. Improper Uses of the Zoning Power
In attacking the validity of an ordinance, the challenger might show that
the reasons for adopting the zoning ordinance were not relevant to promot-
ing the health, safety or general welfare of the community. The motives of
individual members of a governing body cannot be scrutinized because of
the legislative nature of such actions,"'. although the ordinance will be held
invalid if the whole council or board of supervisors were to adopt a zoning
ordinance in an effort to achieve a goal not reasonably related to the
health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the community. In other words,
the motive of the individual is not subject to attack, while the purpose of
the law may be found invalid.
For example, a zoning ordinance cannot be used to encourage low in-
come housing,"2 nor to control the manner in which a property owner is
compensated for the use of his land.' 3 Restricting competition among simi-
lar businesses in a district is not a proper goal of zoning.' Virginia has
adopted the rule that a zoning ordinance enacted to promote some private
interest rather than that of the whole community will be struck down as
illegal spot zoning."' Although aesthetic reasons may be one of the factors
99. Cherrydale Cement Block Co. v. County Bd., 180 Va. 443, 23 S.E.2d 158 (1942), citing
West Bros. Brick Co. v. City of Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881 (1937).
100. Southern Ry. v. City of Richmond, 205 Va. 699, 139 S.E.2d 82 (1964).
101. See, e.g., Blankenship v. City of Richmond, 188 Va. 97, 49 S.E.2d 321 (1948), where
the court concluded that evidence concerning the motivation of members of a legislative body
was not relevant in determining the validity of an ordinance passed by that body.
102. Board of Supervisors v. DeGroff Enterprises, Inc., 214 Va. 235, 198 S.E.2d 600 (1973).
103. Board of Zoning Appeals v. Columbia Pike Ltd., 213 Va. 437, 192 S.E.2d 778 (1972),
striking down a decision of the Board of Zoning Appeals prohibiting the leasing of parking
spaces separate from the leasing of office spaces in a high rise office building because the
ordinance attempted to control the compensation derived from the use of the land.
104. Board of County Supervisors v. Davis, 200 Va. 316, 106 S.E.2d 152 (1958).
105. See, e.g., Board of County Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959),
where the court struck down an amendment to a zoning ordinance requiring a minimum of
two acres per lot because "[tlhis would serve private rather than public interests." Id. at
661, 107 S.E.2d at 396. See also Wilhelm v. Morgan, 208 Va. 398, 157 S.E.2d 920 (1967), in
which the court adopts the following test:
If the purpose of a zoning ordinance is solely to serve the private interests of one or
more landowners, the ordinance represents an arbitrary and capricious exercise of
legislative power, constituting illegal spot zoning; but if the legislative purpose is to
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considered in adopting a zoning ordinance, they alone will not justify re-
stricting the use of property.0 8
D. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Three recent decisions by the Virginia Supreme Court demonstrate the
limitations that have been placed on the local governing body in the exer-
cise of the zoning power.' 7 These decisions affected the power to rezone an
area from a less restrictive to a more restrictive classification;' 8 to deny
use permits without a sufficient showing that the denial related to the
health, safety, or general welfare of the community; ' and to restrict the
present use of land based solely on a phased development approach to land
use. ' These decisions did not foreclose any of these powers altogether;
rather they shifted the burden of going forward with the evidence to the
governing body to establish the reasonableness of rezoning enacted on the
motion of the zoning authority and denials of use permits and requests for
rezoning from property owners. Once the property owner whose request has
been denied established a prima facie case by showing that the requested
use was reasonable, the local governing body had to show that the denial
was reasonably related to the health, safety, or general welfare of the
community.
In Board of Supervisors v. Snell,"' property owners sought a declaratory
judgment that a zoning ordinance adopted by the Board of Supervisors of
Fairfax County reducing the permissible density of part of a zoning district
was arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable, and therefore void."' The
court noted that under traditional case law a presumption of validity gen-
erally attached to comprehensive zoning ordinances."' The ordinance in-
further the welfare of the entire county or city as a part of an overall zoning plan, the
ordinance does not constitute illegal spot zoning even though private interests are
simultaneously benefited. Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 173, 131
A.2d 1, 11 (1957). Id. at 403-04, 157 S.E.2d at 924.
106. Kenyon Peck, Inc. v. Kennedy, 210 Va. 60, 168 S.E.2d 117 (1969); West Bros. Brick
Co. v. City of Alexandria, 169 Va. 271, 192 S.E. 881 (1937).
107. City of Richmond v. Randall, - Va. , 211 S.E.2d 56 (1975); Board of
Supervisors v. Allman, __ Va. , 211 S.E.2d 48 (1975); Board of Supervisors v. Snell,
214 Va. 655, 202 S.E.2d 889 (1974).
108. Board of Supervisors v. Snell, 214 Va. 655, 202 S.E.2d 889 (1974).
109. City of Richmond v. Randall, - Va. , 211 S.E.2d 56 (1975).
110. Board of Supervisors v. Allman, - Va. , 211 S.E.2d 48 (1975).
111. 214 Va. 655, 202 S.E.2d 889 (1974).
112. The court termed such action as a form of "downzoning," defining it in this case as
"a zoning ordinance, enacted on motion of the zoning authority, which effects a piecemeal
reduction of permissible residential density. . .. " Id. at 656, 202 S.E.2d at 891.
113. Id. at 658, 202 S.E.2d at 892-93.
[Vol. 9:513
LAND USE
volved in this case was a piecemeal downzoning ordinance;' therefore,
once the property owner showed that "there had been no change in circum-
stances substantially affecting the public health, safety, or welfare" since
the adoption of the previous ordinance, the burden of going forward with
the evidence shifted to the local governing body to justify the rezoning."'
The burden shifts because a rezoning that denies the property owner of
uses that were formerly permissible must be reasonably related to the
public interest. If the previous ordinance was enacted because of mistake
or fraud, or circumstances in the area have substantially changed to war-
rant a more restrictive use, then rezoning may be justified. An example of
such a change in circumstances suggested by the court in Snell would be
the reduction of sewer capacity or the lack of police and fire protection."'
The court rejected the contention of the board of supervisors that a change
in membership of the board was a change in circumstance sufficient to
support a rezoning. The court stated that the "changed circumstance"
must be "one substantially affecting the public health, safety, or wel-
fare.""' The change must be "objectively verifiable from evidence.""' The
board failed to produce "probative evidence of mistake or fraud in the prior
ordinance or of changed circumstances . . . ."I" The court affirmed the
decree of the circuit court declaring the downzoning invalid and void.
On January 20, 1975, the Supreme Court of Virginia again found an
action of the Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County void. In Board of
Supervisors v. Allman,'2' property owners sought a declaratory judgment
that a denial by the Fairfax Board of Supervisors of an application to
rezone their land to a higher density classification was illegal. The court,
after determining that the evidence indicated that there were ample public
facilities to support the proposed development, concluded that the appli-
cation was denied "primarily because of its timing, rather than because of
its impact on public facilities."' 2 ' Testimony revealed that the board of
supervisors, by approving rezoning requests, was encouraging growth
around already developed projects, while denying the same requests for
land outside the periphery of these projects, even though located in the
same area and serviced by the same facilities. It was this policy that the
court found to be inconsistent and discriminatory, and therefore arbitrary
114. Id. at 658-59, 202 S.E.2d at 892-93.
115. Id. at 659, 202 S.E.2d at 893.
116. Id. at 660, 202 S.E.2d at 894.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 661, 202 S.E.2d at 894.
120. - Va. , 211 S.E.2d 48 (1975).
121. Id. at , 211 S.E.2d at 52.
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and capricious, bearing no relation to the health, safety or general wel-
fare. 122
On the same day, the court held a denial of a special use permit unrea-
sonable in City of Richmond v. Randall.12 In that case two owners of a
tract of land sought a declaratory judgment that the zoning classification
for their property was invalid and that the refusal of the city council to
approve a special use permit for the construction of an office building was
arbitrary and capricious. The Virginia Supreme Court affirmed the hold-
ing of the circuit court that the existing ordinance as it applied to the
plaintiffs' property was unreasonable and confiscatory, and therefore un-
constitutional.' 4 The property owners offered evidence that the requested
use was reasonable, and that the existing classification prohibited all
practical uses for the property. The city council failed to show that the
denial of the use permit was related to the health, safety, or welfare of the
community. In other words, the city did not meet the burden of going
forward with the evidence.
In each of the three cases, the court emphasized the detrimental eco-
nomic effect that the actions of the local governing bodies would have on
the property owners. In Snell, the court cited the Virginia Code sections
that stated that one purpose of zoning was to "encourage economic devel-
opment activities that provide desirable employment and enlarge the tax
base,"' ' N and that "zoning ordinances. . . shall be drawn with reasonable
consideration for . . . the conservation of properties and their values.'12
The court concluded that "[p]rospects [of profit] are reasonable only
when permissible land use is reasonably predictable.""' In Allman, the
court noted that the value of the property would be almost two and a half
million dollars greater if the rezoning were granted.'2 In Randall, the court
stressed the confiscatory result of the city council's action because the
refusal to grant the use permit completely deprived the landowners of all
practical uses of their property. 29
The Virginia Supreme Court overturned the actions of a local governing
body three times in nine months. These decisions have several possible
122. Id. at - 211 S.E.2d at 55.
123. - Va. -, 211 S.E.2d 56 (1975).
124. Id. at ----, 211 S.E.2d at 57.
125. Board of Supervisors v. Snell, 214 Va. 655, 657-58, 202 S.E.2d 889, 892 (1974), citing
VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-489 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
126. Board of Supervisors v. Snell, 214 Va. 655, 658, 202 S.E.2d 889, 892 (1974), citing VA.
CODE ANN. § 15.1-490 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
127. Board of Supervisors v. Snell, 214 Va. 655, 658, 202 S.E.2d 889, 892 (1974).
128. Board of Supervisors v. Allman, - Va. _, 211 S.E.2d 48, 50 (1975).
129. City of Richmond v. Randall, - Va. , 211 S.E.2d 56, 58 (1975).
[Vol. 9:513550
LAND USE
implications for the future of local control over land use in Virginia. Under
the "changed circumstances" test enunciated in Snell, local governments
may be precluded from adjusting their zoning codes to correspond with
new concepts in land use planning. This would depend upon whether the
court would accept new concepts in land use planning as sufficiently
changed circumstances to justify rezoning. In Snell, the court focused on
such things as the public health, safety, and welfare. If the local governing
body could establish that the rezoning, based on new ideas in the land use
area, was related to the public health, safety or welfare of the community,
the court might be willing to uphold it. In all these cases, the court stressed
the economic loss that would result to the property owner if the actions of
the local governing bodies were upheld. This may mean an expansion of
the confiscatory zoning doctrine to situations where the landowner is
merely deprived of the one use that is most appropriate to the property,
rather than all possible uses.
One of the reasons why the government may have lost the case in each
instance may have been the failure to present adequate evidence to sup-
port the action taken. The local governing body did not show that the
action taken related to the furtherance of the health, safety or general
welfare of the community. The court may be demanding a greater showing
on the part of the governing body that the measures are part of a compre-
hensive plan that has been carefully designed in the public interest. The
1975 General Assembly, in line with such a trend, passed legislation requir-
ing the creation of a planning commission in every city or county by mid-
1976, the enactment of a local subdivision ordinance by mid-1977, and the
establishment of a comprehensive plan by mid-1980. 10 All of these
measures are intended to increase the amount of planning that goes into
the enactment of local zoning ordinances. Unfortunately, a requirement
that no zoning ordinance be passed without the prior adoption of a compre-
hensive plan was defeated.
E. THE OPEN-SPACE LAND Acr
In 1966 the General Assembly enacted the Open-Space Land Act which
authorized public bodies, including counties and municipalities,'31 to ac-
quire land for the purpose of preserving open-space land in urban and
urbanizing areas. 3 Real property already owned by the public could also
be designated as open-space land."' Open-space land includes land that
130. See notes 2, 3, and 11 supra.
131. VA. CODE ANN. § 10-156(a) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
132. Id. §§ 10-152, -156(b) (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, § 10-152 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
133. Id. § 10-152.
1975]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
is set aside for park or recreational services, for conservation of land or
other resources, for historic or scenic purposes, for assisting in community
development, and for wetlands as provided in the Wetlands Act of 1972.'11
The public bodies were given the power to borrow funds and make expendi-
tures, accept grants from the federal government and other public and
private sources, and cooperate with other public bodies in projects to pre-
serve open-space land.'35 The public bodies were also given incidental pow-
ers needed to carry out the purposes of the Act.'36
Once acquired or so designated, the real property cannot be converted
or diverted from open-space land use unless the public body determines
that such action would be essential to the orderly development and growth
of the urban area and in accordance with the official comprehensive plan
for the urban area in effect at the time.'37 Unless no longer needed, the
public body must substitute land of equal value within a year of the con-
version. If open-space property is conveyed to a private party, the property
must be sold subject to contractual restrictions designed to maintain its
open-space character, unless the land is no longer needed for that pur-
pose.'38 A 1974 amendment enabled the public body to acquire less than a
fee simple interest if the interest did not terminate within thirty years.'39
F. REAL ESTATE TAXES AND LAND USE
In 1971, the General Assembly passed the Use-Value Assessment Tax Act
authorizing the local governing bodies that had adopted a land use plan
to enact ordinances designed to encourage the preservation and proper use
of real estate devoted to agricultural, horticultural, forest and open-space
uses by lower taxation on land devoted to those uses.' In localities where
such an ordinance has been adopted, a property owner can apply for a
special use assessment.'' The local assessing officer determines whether
the real estate in question meets the criteria for a special assessment."' If
the property meets the criteria, then its value is assessed using only those
134. Id. § 10-156(c). See also id. § 62.1-13.2(f).
135. Id. § 10-154 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
136. Id.
137. Id. § 10-153.
138. Id.
139. Id. § 10-152 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1974).
140. Id. §§ 58-769.4 to -769.6 (Repl. Vol. 1974), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1974). See gen-
erally Section IXA, infra.
141. Id. § 58-769.8.
142. Id. § 58-769.7 (Repl. Vol. 1974). The property qualifies if it is at least five acres in
area and is used for agriculture, horticulture or open-space purposes, or at least twenty acres
and is used for forestry. Id. § 58-769.8 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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indicia of value that the property has for the stated use.' In other words,
land located on the fringe of heavily populated surburban areas may be
very valuable as a potential site for a housing development; but if used as
a farm, the land would be assessed at a much lower value.
The property owner who receives this special assessment is subject to
roll-back taxes if the property is used for a non-qualifying use.'4 The roll-
back tax is the difference between what the property owner would have
paid if he had not received the special assessment and what he actually
did pay. The roll-back tax is charged for the year of the change in use and
the preceding five years."15 A person failing to report a change in use will
become liable for the roll-back taxes and such penalties and interest pro-
vided for in the local ordinance.' If a person makes a material misstate-
ment of fact in applying for a special use assessment, he becomes liable
for the roll-back tax plus penalties and interest, and an additional penalty
of 100% of the unpaid taxes."' If the property is sold, but still used by the
new owner for a qualifying use, the roll-back tax is not imposed."'
Because the Act did not take effect until 1973, it is too soon to evaluate
its impact on land use in Virginia. Only four jurisdictions, Loudoun, Fau-
quier, and Prince William Counties and the City of Virginia Beach, had
adopted the ordinances authorized by the Act as of January, 1974."' The
Virginia Advisory Legislative Council (VALC) studied the effects of tax
and economic considerations on land use. Although the VALC believed
that it needed more information before making specific recommendations,
the council was convinced that real estate tax assessment practices have
a substantial impact on land use."'
Unfortunately use-value assessment can be utilized by land speculators
143. Id. § 58-769.9 (Repl. Vol. 1974). The Act establishes the State Land Evaluation Advi-
sory Committee to assist the local assessing officers in determining whether the real estate
meets the criteria for the special assessment. Id. § 58-769.7 to -769.11. The Act also requires
the Directors of the Departments of Conservation and Economic Development and of the
Commission of Outdoor Recreation and the Commissioner of Agriculture and Commerce to
provide standards to be applied uniformly throughout the state to be used in making such
determinations. Id. § 58-769.12. A property owner who receives an unfavorable opinion or no
opinion at all may appeal to any court of record that has jurisdiction over the county or city
wherein the real estate is located. Id.
144. Id. § 58-769.10 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
145. Id. There is also a six per cent interest charge on the difference.
146. Id. § 58-769.10:1 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
147. Id.
148. Id. § 58-769.10 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
149. See REPORT OF Tim VsGINA ADvIsoRY LEGisLATIVE COUNCIL: LAND USE POLICIS 35
(1974).
150. Id. at 39.
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to keep their real estate taxes reduced until they are ready to develop the
property. The six per cent charge on roll-back taxes, in a period of high
interest rates, would not sufficiently discourage this practice. Suggestions
were offered to the VALC to meet some of these problems, including mini-
mum periods of ownership before eligibility, contracts between the prop-
erty owner and the local government, and ineligibility for land owned by
corporations or persons not residing on the land.'5 '
The difficulty in designing an effective tax incentive program is the
probability that by encouraging one desired goal, other desirable develop-
ments are discouraged. For instance, if tax benefits are provided to those
landowners who do not improve their property as an inducement to main-
taining open-space use, the same policy may discourage other landowners
from improving deteriorating structures on their property. In urban areas,
such improvements are impeded by the assessment policies that increase
the assessed value whenever the property owner makes improvements.
Perhaps some relief in the form of freezing the assessed value of the prop-
erty, as long as the use is not changed, until the property changes hands
would result in less urban blight.'52
G. CONCLUSION
The actions of the local governing bodies do play a predominant role in
land use policy today. Many have criticized this role and have pointed out
the shortcomings inherent in such a situation. Some critics believe that the
local governing bodies are primarily interested in increasing the tax base
in their jurisdictions. Others note that decisions in zoning matters often
affect areas outside the territorial boundaries of the county or city making
the decision. There are pressures for greater regional, state, and federal
roles in land use policy making. However, it is doubtful if the local govern-
ing body could be completely eliminated from playing any part in the
process of land use planning. First of all, there is a need for the knowledge
of local officials. Secondly, input from local residents would appear to be
desirable in any land use planning scheme. After all, the real purpose of
zoning and planning is to benefit the public. It is the balancing of the
interests of the person as a property owner against the interests of the
person as a member of the community that presents the difficult problems
in land use planning.
151. Id. at 36.
152. Id. at 37.
[Vol. 9:513
LAND USE
IV. REGIONAL LAND USE PLANNING
The results of the traditional domination of local governments over land
use decisions have demonstrated their inability to solve problems of re-
gional scope.' Ostensibly a regional perspective is required to overcome the
inability of local governments to solve regional problems. Regional land
use planning is defined as a device "to guide and control physical develop-
ment in a multi-jurisdictional area."'2 At least 38 states have enacted
some sort of regional planning legislation in an effort to combat areawide
problems.3 However, there is no unanimity as to the utility of this ap-
proach. One critical evaluation states that:
The extraterritorial legislation in most states ... renders little more than
"lip service" to the concept of coordinating land use among municipalities.
The power of extraterritorial planning has had little effect in remedying
regional land use problems since most states have failed to provide munici-
palities with the additional capacity to enforce the plans.'
The typical enabling statute authorizes the local governments to operate
regional planning agencies, but only with the consent of all the governmen-
tal units within the region. Further, most statutes provide that any govern-
mental subdivision may join or withdraw at will. The initial reason for the
voluntary nature of these statutes was to reduce local resistance to the idea
of regional planning.5 Such a scheme "in reality gives each constituent
local government a veto power over the decisions of the regional board."'
Even where formation and participation are required by statute, the plans
which regional agencies produce are usually only advisory. They are de-
signed to "simply provide enlightenment and nonmandatory guidance."'
In general, the advice of the regional agency can be ignored and the plan
bypassed.
With the above in mind, an analysis of Virginia's approach to regional
land use planning as set out in the Virginia Area Development Act of 1968
1. Among the factors contributing to local governments' inability to cope with regional
problems are jurisdictional restrictions, a lack of cooperation caused by fragmentation,
intergovernmental squabbles, rivalries and competition to attract development. Further-
more, local governments are usually financially unable to underwrite the large scale programs
necessary to solve areawide problems.
2. R. ANDERSON, 3 ArPaCmN LAW OF ZONING § 18.02 (1968).
3. Note, State Land Use Control: Why Pending Federal Legislation Will Help, 25 HAST.
L.J. 1165, 1171-72 (1974).
4. Id. at 1169.
5. Id. at 1172.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. VA. CoDE ANN. §§ 15.1-1400 et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1973).
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(VADA) is undertaken to measure its success as compared to the "typical"
state response to problems of regional scope.
A. DEVELOPMENT OF VADA
Within the last two decades, rapid urbanization in Virginia has rendered
ineffective the traditional allocation of functions among state, county and
municipal governments. Once rural counties have become densely popu-
lated by urban sprawl and once distinct cities and towns are becoming
huge megalopolises. By the mid-1960's the problems caused by this rapid
urbanization had become visible and serious, and were spreading beyond
local boundaries. Among these problems were "air pollution, crowded
schools, traffic congestion, inadequate water supplies, polluted recreation
areas, and wasted or destroyed natural beauty."9
Recognizing that accelerating, growth of metropolitan areas was causing
"special and urgent governmental problems" to "both cities and surround-
ing urban counties," the General Assembly in April, 1966 authorized crea-
tion of the Virginia Metropolitan Areas Study Commission to consider
these problems, develop solutions, and make recommendations.'" After an
extensive study lasting 18 months the Hahn Commission, so named after
its chairman, T. Marshall Hahn, Jr., concluded that the establishment of
areawide agencies and procedures would be the most effective means for
solving areawide problems. In support of this conclusion were cited the
advantages of a broader financial base and a large pool of administrative
and planning talent aided by the benefits of exchanging information. Fur-
ther, cooperation on areawide problems would enhance local governments
by freeing resources to be devoted to purely local needs."
The Hahn recommendations were prefaced by the general goals of dis-
couraging fragmentation of governmental units, reducing conflict among
local governments, and stimulating and encouraging intergovernmental
cooperation." Among the specific recommendations presented to the Gov-
ernor and the General Assembly in a report dated November 15, 1967, was
the creation of Planning Districts designed to supersede existing voluntary
regional planning commissions composed largely of private citizens, inade-
quately financed, and poorly staffed in the area of professional planning
personnel.'3
9. THE VIRGINIA METROPOLITAN AREAS STUDY COMMISSION, THE REPORT BY THE VIRGINIA
METROPOLITAN AREAS STUDY COMMISSION 6 (1967) [hereinafter cited as AREAS STUDY
COMMISSION].
10. Va. Acts of Assembly 1966, ch. 479, at 659.
11. AREAS STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 8.
12. Id. at 18.
13. Id. at 14. At the time, there were 16 such commissions, only nine of which were staffed.
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In essence, the Hahn Commission was recommending that Virginia initi-
ate what the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations 4
(ACIR) has labelled "regional confederalism.' 5 This arrangement is de-
fined as a "voluntary interlocal compact or covenant to promote common
interests without the individual member units subordinating any of their
essential powers or autonomy to the areawide body."'" The agencies cre-
ated are designed to stimulate joint action on areawide needs and to en-
courage implementation of comprehensive plans, but cannot bind their
members nor compel them to take implementing action. Further, because
regional planning agencies lack the power to tax, legislate, or exercise
eminent domain, they cannot be considered units of government. "Their
powers are mainly advisory, and their services or assistance to members
are usually limited to 'software' functions such as planning, technical as-
sistance, and joint purchasing."' 7 Though apparently similar to the volun-
tary agencies which were replaced, the Planning Districts have a number
of advantages which will be discussed later.
B. THE PLANNING DISmICT COMMISSION
Pursuant to the Hahn Commission recommendations, the new planning
districts were authorized by the Virginia Area Development Act of 1968.
Thereafter, the boundaries of twenty-two planning districts were drawn by
the Division of State Planning and Community Affairs (DSPCA) based on
"the community of interest among the subdivisions in the areas, the ease
of communication and transportation, the geographic factors and natural
boundaries and other measures which indicated a similarity in history and
culture among and between the various jurisdictions."' 8 The first map of
2 ADvISORY COMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REGIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROMISE
AND PERFORMANCE 330 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 2 ACIR]. In the report of the Areas Study
Commission, these existing commissions were criticized as being dependent on adoption by
local governmental bodies and thus lacking a close "relationship between the regional plan-
ning function and the political decisionmaking process," a situation which constituted a
"serious deterrent to implementation of areawide planning." Such commissions were charac-
terized as having only a "limited potential in the orderly development of metropolitan areas."
AREAS STUMY Co MIsSION, supra note 9, at 14.
14. ACIR is a federal agency created by Congress in 1959 to monitor the operation of the
American federal system and to recommend improvements. 42 U.S.C. § 4271 et seq. (1970).
15. 1 ADvIsoRY COMMISSION ON INTERGOvERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REGIONAL DECISION MAING:
NEW STRATEGIES FOR SUBSTATE DIsTRICTS 2 (1973) [hereinafter cited as 1 ACIR].
16. Id. at 51.
17. Id.
18. DIVIsION OF STATE PLANNING AND CoMMUNITY AFFAIRS, PROFILES ON VIRGINlA'S PLANNING
DISTRICTS, -i- (1973). According to an ACIR study, "[tihe method used by DSPCA may be
considered an excellent model for other States to use in drawing substate district bounda-
ries." 2 ACIR, supra note 13, at 330. To obtain ideas and information on districting, the
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substate districts was drawn in September, 1968, and thereafter discus-
sions of the plan took place with representatives of 159 local governments.
Local officials were asked to draw logical districts on blank maps and
discuss the consequences of particular boundaries with the DSPCA staff.
Finally, plans were released to the news media and public hearings were
held from which changes were made affecting only four of the districts.
Despite the foregoing process and the recognition it has received, some
discontent exists with the boundaries as delineated.'9
By statute, a planning district commission (PDC) is organized through
the governing bodies of the jurisdictions encompassing 45% of the popula-
tion within the district." Presumably as a stimulus to participation, gov-
ernmental subdivisions2' which are not a party to the agreement charter
are not represented in the membership of the PDC, although they continue
to be a part of the planning district.22 One of the traditional barriers to
formation of regional planning agencies has been lack of participation by
the governmental subdivisions. However, this has not been a problem in
Virginia. Spurred by the DSPCA announcement that PDCs formed within
three months of the boundary delineations would receive a full fiscal year's
appropriation of funds, nine PDC's were organized within that time. By
1973, 21 PDCs were organized and all but two were staffed and operating.2
Also encouraging participation are federal requirements that localities
must participate in a regional planning agency to be eligible for certain
federal funds. This situation "almost forces local governments to 'volun-
teer.' ",24
At least a majority of the membership of the Commission must be com-
DSPCA met with state agencies using multi-jurisdictional districts, existing regional plan-
ning commissions, universities, utilities companies, the State Chamber of Commerce, various
federal agencies, research institutions, and others. Id.
19. One planner who fails to see the rationale of her district boundaries analogized the
result to "a kid with a crayon," finding it difficult to show a "community of interest" or a
"similarity of culture" between rural Loudoun County and suburban jurisdictions of Arling-
ton, Fairfax, and Alexandria. Interview with Martha A. Schmitz, Human Resources Planner
and A-95 Coordinator for the Northern Virginia Planning District Commission, in Fairfax
County, Jan. 17, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Schmitz].
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1403(a) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
21. The term subdivision refers to "governmental subdivision" which is defined in the
VADA as "the counties, cities and towns of this State." VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1402(c) (Repl.
Vol. 1973). It should not be confused with the same term used to connote a neighborhood built
by a particular developer. Also to be distinguished is the term "governmental body" which
includes city councils, county boards of supervisors and or other boards or bodies "in which
the powers of a political subdivision are vested by law." Id. § 15.1-1402(e).
22. Id. § 15.1-1403(a) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
23. 2 ACIR, supra note 13, at 331.
24. Id. at 336.
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posed of elected officials from the governing bodies of the participating
municipalities and counties. 5 The remaining members need only be "qual-
ified voters and residents of the district, who hold no office elected by the
people." 6 The rationale for these provisions is three-fold: 1) to ensure
representation, 2) to improve intergovernmental communication and un-
derstanding, and 3) to encourage area citizen participation. 7 Beyond this
bare statutory outline, qualifications for membership are flexible and vary
among jurisdictions u
In choosing the type of agencies that Virginia's PDCs would be, the
Hahn Commission seems to have combined the traditional attributes of a
council of government and a regional planning commission. Councils of
government are generally defined by ACIR as:
[M]ulti-functional voluntary regional associations of elected officials ...
of the member political jurisdictions .... [They are] a device for bringing
together, at regular intervals and on a voluntary basis, representatives of the
local governments within a given area to discuss common problems, exchange
information and develop consensus on policy questions of mutual interest. 2
By comparison, regional planning commissions are public planning bodies
authorized by the state legislatures, having a membership of appointed
citizens, which are "primarily responsible for comprehensive planning,
traditionally with an emphasis on land-use planning or the coordination
of local plans."" The hybrid agency has the advantage of combining the
policy determination and information-exchange functions with the plan-
ning and coordination functions.
Beyond the general requirements regarding commission membership,
the enabling statute leaves the internal structuring of the PDC to be for-
mulated by the needs of each district. From an overall perspective, there
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1403(b)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
26. Id.
27. AREAS STUDY CoMMMsIoN, supra note 9, at 22.
28. For example, the citizen representatives serving on the Northern Virginia Planning
District Commission (NVPDC) are appointed by the governing bodies of the jurisdictions
they represent. In some cases they are members of citizen groups, and to this extent the Hahn
recommendation of citizen involvement is being implemented. Interview with Ralph J. Basil,
Environmental Planner, Northern Virginia Planning District Commission, in Fairfax County
Jan. 17, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Basil]. The Richmond Regional Planning District Com-
mission (RRPDC) has, in addition to its citizen members, representatives of a few state
agencies participating on its committees. Interview with David W. Shaw, Acting Assistant
Director of the Planning Section, Richmond Regional Planning District Commission, in Rich-
mond, Jan. 21, 1975 [hereinafter cited as Shaw].
29. 1 ACIR, supra note 15, at 50.
30. Id.
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are two levels of organization-the commissioners and the staff. The com-
missioners attend the commission meeting which is scheduled monthly in
the more urbanized districts and less often in the rural districts. They are
the policy makers of the PDC and have the voting power on proposals
which come before the commission. In addition, they are members of com-
mittees which prepare proposals and resolutions to be considered by the
full commissions.3
1
The staff level in the larger PDCs is also separated into sections such as
physical planning, intergovernmental relations, criminal justice, and pub-
lic safety. The size of the staff varies according to the degree of urbaniza-
tion in the district.32 Most of the staff members have graduate degrees in
planning or related fields such as economics or public administration. The
staff in larger PDCs may include engineers, an attorney, and a few research
assistants with B.A.s. The work programs of the larger PDCs are deter-
mined by the staff, rather than by the commissioners, who are often preoc-
cupied with their local problems.
Once organized, the PDCs are eligible to receive annual state aid not to
exceed $5000 per 25,000 persons residing in the subdivisions which are
participating, but in any event, no less than $10,000 per PDC.33 Total state
assistance to the PDCs amounts to approximately $775,000 per year.34 This
sum is equally matched by funds from the local governments. Among the
proposed revisions of the VADA considered by the 1973 General Assembly
was an increase in funding to 25 cents per capita (up 5 cents) with a
minimum of $30,000 per planning district. This increase, which would be
matched by funds from local jurisdictions, was based on the premise that
"experience has shown that to maintain an effective program a typical
planning district requires a minimum annual budget of $50,000." How-
ever, the proposed amendment was not passed and there are those who
suspect that this is yet another manifestation of local government fears
that regional decisionmaking is inconsistent with their interests.
3 T
31. In RRPDC there are four such committees: (1) Intergovernmental; (2) Physical Devel-
opment; (3) Transportation Policy; (4) Citizen Involvement. Shaw, supra note 28.
32. In NVPDC there are approximately 34 staff members including secretarial help. Basil,
supra note 28. In RRPDC the number is 24 and the number is much lower in rural PDCs.
Shaw, supra note 28.
33. VA. CODE ANm. § 15.1-1412 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
34. 2 ACIR, supra note 13, at 333.
35. Id.
36. THE GOVERNOR's AD Hoc COMMITTEE TO REVIEW THE VERGINIA AREA DEVELOPMENT Acr,
REPORT OF THE Governor's AD Hoc COMMrITEE TO REVIEW THE VmGIN AREA DEvELoPMENT Acr
11 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COMMrrTEE TO REVIEW VADA].
37. One planner explains the low funding by saying: "Local governments don't want a
regional staff bigger than their own planning staff, fearing that they would generate bigger
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Besides state and local revenue, the PDCs have various sources of federal
funds including the Federal Highway Administration, the Department of
Housing and Urban Development, and the Justice Department under the
Safe Streets Act." The estimated federal contributions to the PDCs for
fiscal year 1973 was about $1.8 million. 9
According to the statute, the purpose of the PDC is purely one of plan-
ning on an areawide basis by encouraging and assisting governmental bod-
ies to plan for the future."0 It is specifically not the duty of the commission
to implement plans and policies, nor to furnish governmental services. 1
According to the Hahn Commission, planning and implementation of a
purely local nature "should continue to be the responsibility of local plan-
ning commissions and governing bodies.""2 Thus, the mission of the PDC
was envisioned, and continues to be, advisory only, and this necessitates
a "high threshold for frustration" among PDC planners."3 However, many
PDCs are performing necessary and useful functions in their capacity as
advisory and study agencies."
C. PROBLEMS WITH COMPREHENSIVE PLANNING
It appears from the statute that one of the more important functions of
the PDC is to prepare a comprehensive plan 5 concerning matters of im-
and better proposals. Rather, they [local governments] just want to keep it [regional plan-
ning] on a low profile." Basil, supra note 28.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 3701 et seq. (1970).
39. 2 ACIR, supra note 13, at 335.
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1405(a) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
41. Id.
42. AREAS STUDY COMISSION, supra note 9, at 22. A later commission to review VADA,
which was also headed by T. Marshall Hahn, Jr., has recommended that the PDCs be given
implementing powers in supplying services. CoMMITuE TO REVIEw VADA, supra note 36, at
7. These recommendations were rejected by the 1973 General Assembly.
43. Shaw, supra note 28.
44. For example, the NVPDC has been active in the planning aspects of METRO, the new
Washington, D.C. area subway system. By doing one comprehensive impact study on the
marketing pressure around each proposed site for suburban stations, the PDC saved the
jurisdictions the increased expense of having to subcontract out to separate consultants.
Another Northern Virginia project is an impact study on the Occuquan reservoir and wat-
ershed. Upstream siltation has threatened the usefulness of the reservoir as a water supply.
According to a NVPDC planner, "[1local governments are coming to us more and more
because we've built up a little bit of credibility and they can see we are capable of doing the
kind of study they want done." Basil, supra note 28.
45. The general statutory provisions regarding the comprehensive plan are set out in VA.
CoDE ANN. § 15.1-446 et seq. (Repl. Vol. 1973). The purpose of the plan is to guide and
accomplish "a coordinated, adjusted and harmonious development of the area which will...
best promote the health, safety, morals, order, convenience, prosperity or general welfare of
the inhabitants." Id. § 15.1-446(4). The plan shall consider existing development, land uses,
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portance to more than one governmental subdivision (as distinguished
from matters of purely local concern) for the guidance of the overall devel-
opment of the district." The adoption and application of such a plan are
important aspects of an effective land use scheme since mere plans are of
little value unless implemented. By statute, the comprehensive plan be-
comes "effective" through a number of steps which include submission of
the plan to local planning commissions or governmental bodies, presenta-
tion at a public hearing in the localities, recommendations back to the
PDC, and approval by the PDC.7 Finally, the plan must be "adopted" by
a majority of the subdivisions." Even if adopted by the majority, the plan
will not be effective in subdivisions which have not adopted it." In contrast
to this adoption scheme are the general terms of the Hahn report which
provided for the plan to become "binding" when approved by the local
governing bodies." This stronger language is conspicuously absent in the
statute, thus minimizing the effect and application of the comprehensive
plan. The statute merely precludes local governments from building public
improvements or facilities, or acquiring or disposing of public lands in a
manner conflicting with the district plan." Thus, adoption of the plan is
completely voluntary and once adopted its effectiveness is limited since it
has little or no control over the private sector.
In practice, formulation and adoption of comprehensive regional land
use plans have met with difficulties not experienced in other areas of
comprehensive planning:52
Regional plans superimpose a future land use pattern over individual juris-
diction plans; the regional plan, in most instances, is not reflective of local
desires. As a result, the local governments rarely recognize the areawide land
use plan as an official guide for future regional growth.53
trends, and probable future economic and population growth. Id. § 15.1-447(1)(a),(b). The
plan shall show long range recommendations for the general development of the area, includ-
ing designation of: 1) area for various types of public and private development and uses, 2)
transportation systems, 3) community service facilities such as parks, schools, public build-
ings and institutions, etc. Id. § 15.1-446(1),(2),(3).
46. Id. § 15.1-1406(a) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
47. Id. § 15.1-1406(b).
48. Id. § 15.1-1406(c).
49. Id.
50. AREAs STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 22.
51. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1407 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
52. In explaining the lack of progress in this area, a RRPDC planner believes that land use
planning "is not the least developed area, its the least appreciated." Shaw, supra note 28.
53. RICHMOND REGIONAL PLANNING DIsTRICr COMMISSION, LAND USE-INTERGiOVERNMENTAL




Three years ago the Richmond Regional Planning District Commission
(RRPDC) developed a comprehensive land use plan but it was never
adopted by the local jurisdictions. The result in the Richmond Region is a
"comprehensive" plan which is just a composite of the various plans of the
localities. However, RRPDC has recently taken a new approach that has
met with a warmer reception from the localities. Designed as a "response
to the realities" of planning problems at the regional level, the new process
involves selecting ten "critical issues" for the region. The localities have
been polled regarding the areas they think are most important and three
critical issues have been selected on which work is to begin immediately.
The process combines all the local plans and identifies conflicts, overlaps,
gaps, and the impacts of one jurisdiction's plans on the others'. Under this
approach the PDC avoids the resentment and resistance caused by impos-
ing plans on unwilling localities. 4 This new approach in RRPDC is part of
an overall search to redefine its role in land use 'planning and will be
considered again later.
The idea of a regional planning agency is not based merely on its sound-
ness as a local approach to areawide problem solving. Such an agency also
fulfills the need to coordinate state and federal programs. Often a prere-
quisite for receiving funds from a federal agency is review or planning by
a regional agency. 5 For example, HUD requires a "certified" areawide
planning agency which necessitates preparation and adoption of a regional
land use plan.56 Similarly, a prerequisite for approval of federal aid for
highway projects and mass transit is comprehensive transportation plan-
ning which is often done by a regional agency.57 Also requiring an approved
regional agency is the "A-95" review process regarding applications for
federal and state funding of local projects.
54. The process was characterized by a RRPDC planner as "a mechanism to deal collec-
tively with the problems; a rational and practical approach rather than the elitist attitude of
saying, 'This is where we will go in the future.' We say 'Look. Here are these critical issues.
The only way they can be solved is from a regional perspective.' You can't deal with air
quality on a local level, nor transportation, nor public facilities. You can't just put together
the local plans and have it work out. Some kind of trade-off is going to have to be made by
each jurisdiction." Shaw, supra note 28.
55. Nationally in 1964, there were five federal programs which were using the areawide
approach. By 1973, there were 24 such programs, involving 11 different federal departments
or agencies. 1 ACIR, supra note 29, at 168.
56. RRPDC LAN USE, supra note 53, at 8.
57. 23 U.S.C. § 134 (1970). The statute calls for "a continuing, comprehensive transporta-
tion planning process carried on cooperatively by states and local communities." The RRPDC
is responsible for carrying out this "3-C process" in the Richmond region. Further, RRPDC
has been charged with the responsibility of preparing a long-range mass transit plan which
is a prerequisite for obtaining Urban Mass Transit Administration funds.
19751
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
D. A-95 REvIEw
The term "A-95" refers to U.S. Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) Circular A-95 (revised) which was designed to implement § 201 and
Title IV of the Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968,8 and § 204 of
the Demonstration Cities and Metropolitan Development Act of 1966."9
The A-95 function of the PDC involves review of applications for state and
federal aid to finance needs and projects of local jurisdictions. The stated
purpose of the process is "to facilitate coordinated planning on an intergov-
ernmental basis for certain Federal assistance programs.""0 In performing
A-95 review, "[a]n areawide comprehensive planning organization or
state agency officially recognized by the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) [is] to notify other affected local and state governmental units of
proposed federal aid," to review the project to be funded, and to comment
on its consistency with area or state policies." In Virginia, the recognized
"clearinghouses" to perform this function at the regional level are the
PDCs. 2 According to the VADA, the PDC is to advise the local government
whether the proposed project has district wide significance and, if so, the
PDC shall determine if the project conflicts with the district plans and
policies.13 Among the OMB's suggested comments and recommendations
to be made by the PDC are the consistency of the project with comprehen-
sive planning; whether the project duplicates, runs counter to, or lacks
coordination with other projects; and how the project might be revised to
increase its effectiveness or efficiency."
The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) has
recognized the "quasi-compulsory quality"65 which regional planning com-
missions gain from being clearinghouses for state and federal funds and
that "nonparticipation could result in a loss of eligibility for certain
grants."66 Even in this function the PDC's role is little more than advisory
since the "element of voluntarism remains as long as no sanction in policy
decisions or action programs can be secured." 7 However, in most cases the
58. 42 U.S.C. § 4201 (1970).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 1453 et seq. (1970).
60. OFFCz OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, CmcULAR A-
95 (revised) (1973).
61. RRPDC LAND USE, supra note 53, at 6, n.8.
62. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1410 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
63. Id. § 15.1-1410(b).
64. DIVISION OF STATE PLANNING AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, VRGINIA PROJECT NOTIFICATION
AND REVIEW SYSTEM PROCEDURES GUIDE FOR LOCAL, AREAWIDE, AND STATE AGENCIES 3 (1973).
65. 1 ACIR, supra note 15, at 51.
66. Id.
67. Id. It seems that the Hahn Commission envisioned the funding review process as having
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PDC recommendations are followed and the A-95 review process is experi-
encing success in avoiding duplication and reducing conflicts between ju-
risdictions."
In addition to its areawide coordinating function, A-95 has particular
value as a source of regional information. The Northern Virginia Planning
District Commission (NVPDC) sends out a weekly list of projects under
review which goes to approximately 80 people, reaching all of its jurisdic-
tions, its planning departments, citizen groups and commissioners. It
alerts them that a particular grant is under review and it solicits any inputs
they may have. The loan applicant and other interested parties are kept
informed concerning committee schedules so they can come to the PDC
and present the pros and cons of funding the project. With this kind of
communication, the localities are able to keep abreast of what is happen-
ing in the communities around them, increasing the chance for coordina-
tion and cooperation, and decreasing duplication and conflict. 9
With respect to volume, the majority of grants reviewed in NVPDC are
concerned with public safety (e.g., police and emergency equipment). In
terms of dollars, the biggest review item involves transportation and mass
transit since these programs are among the most expensive. The review
process encompasses a whole spectrum of other projects including HEW
housing grants and sewage treatment projects. The NVPDC reviews be-
tween 200 and 300 applications in a year, while a more rural PDC averages
between 40 and 50 per year.7"
more of a determinative effect on local action than it has in actuality. According to the
recommendations, a PDC was to indicate its approval or disapproval of a project and its
reasons for the action taken. AREmS STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 22. Further,
"[a]ppeal from actions taken by the PDC [would] be to the Commission on Local Govern-
ment." Id. This language, which is absent from the statute, indicates an aura of finality which
has not materialized. The fact is that PDCs do not want an absolute say. Rather, the key to
the effectiveness which A-95 has experienced lies in the fact that it is a recommendation only.
In the words of the NVPDC A-95 coordinator:
If we became that kind of a threatening agency we would alienate all of our jurisdic-
tions .... We have never said, 'We recommend disapproval,' because there is really
no value in that. Rather, we recommend that it be revised, and this is done early
enough that these changes can be made and the project can get funded .... We're
not here to knit-pick. We're trying to give the localities as much flexibility as possible.
After all, it's their program. Schmitz, supra note 19.
68. For example, an emphasis on projects which can be shared on a regional basis has led
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E. SERVICE DISTRICTS
The ACIR believes that one of the faults of Virginia's substate districting
plan is that PDCs are prohibited from engaging in functional activity.7'
According to ACIR, "[r]egional activity would seem to depend upon the
integration of planning and functional authority."7 The Hahn Commis-
sion was well aware of the need for effective control beyond the mere
planning and advisory functions, and provisions for such an authority were
included in their recommendations for service districts.13 In essence the
Hahn Commission envisioned creation of a new governmental unit.7 It was
to be an actual political subdivision of the state75 with its own independent
electoral base,76 "enjoying the status, general powers. . . and the strength
of Virginia's other units of local government."7 Service districts were seen
as a "mechanism to meet areawide needs while leaving local governments
undisturbed in the performance of their vital roles." 8 Their purpose would
be to "undertake a significant number of major governmental functions
and services of both a revenue producing and non-revenue producing na-
ture.""9 Among the services contemplated were water supply, sewage dis-
posal, and air and water pollution abatement.
The Hahn recommendations regarding service districts were partially
codified in the VADA. ° The statute requires that a service district be
coterminous with and succeed to the powers of the PDC. 1 A service district
may be created by a favorable vote in a referendum in each of the partici-
pating jurisdictions in the district." The proposed service districts are
slated to be governed by a commission, the majority of which would be
71. 2 ACIR, supra note 13, at 336.
72. Id.
73. AREAs STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 22-23.
74. Id. at 22.
75. Id. at 23.
76. Id. at 24.
77. Id. at 23.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 24.
80. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 15.1-1420 to 1449 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
81. Id. § 15.1-1432.
82. Id. § 15.1-1425. However, the Hahn recommendations also provided that if the subdivi-
sions had not requested such an election within two years of the preparation of a service
district plan, then "a single, general referendum for the entire area" could be imposed in
which "[a] favorable majority vote shall constitute approval of the proposed Service Dis-
trict." AREAS STUDY COMMISSION, supra note 9, at 26. The Hahn Commission realized that
the effect of such a provision was that ". . . the wishes of an individual governmental subdivi-
sion within the District ... could be overridden." Id. at 28. This provision elicited strong




composed of "elected officials" from single member election districts." The
remainder of the commission would be "official members" who are elected
officials of the local governmental subdivisions making up the district. 4
The enabling legislation calls for a chairman of the commission, elected
by the members, with each commissioner entitled to one vote."0 Among
the important powers which distinguish a service district from non-
authoritative agencies are its ability to make ordinances, rules, and regula-
tions and to enforce them by a fine up to $1000 or imprisonment up to a
year, or both. Further, service districts are authorized to establish a fiscal
base by pro-rata tax levies on'the value of the real estate within the govern-
mental subdivisions. 8 The district may collect fees, rents, and charges for
services provided, such as sewage disposal and water supply.8 To finance
construction projects and the acquisition of land, the district may issue
bonds. 0 State aid is provided for in the same amount as received by plan-
ning districts.'
Before the service district was authorized by VADA, a number of other
approaches had been tried in Virginia to supply services on a multi-
jurisdictional basis.2 The simplest approach occurs when one jurisdiction
provides a single service to another jurisdiction for an agreed price. Such
an agreement offers the economies of scale and does not require a new
administrative organization. The contract approach is easy to implement
and does not pose a threat to jurisdictional independence. However, the
shortcomings of this arrangement are impermanence and inflexibility, and
it may result in an inequitable sharing of costs because the providing
jurisdiction often has the stronger bargaining position.
Another approach has been the single purpose authority, defined as a
"special agreement among governments to provide a service jointly." 3
Such agreements have a number of advantages over the contract approach.
Not only are these single purpose authorities more permanent and more
83. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1427(a) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
84. Id. § 15.1-1427(b).
85. Id. § 15.1-1429.
86. Id. § 15.1-1427(c).
87. Id. § 15.1-1431(b)(7).
88. Id. § 15.1-1436(a).
89. Id. § 15.1-1437.
90. Id. § 15.1-1438. The bonds shall be secured by a mortgage on the project or any other
property of the service district. Id. § 15.1-1438(c).
91. Id. § 15.1-1433.
92. RiCHMomN REGIONAL PLANNING DISTRICT CoMMIssIoN, ADVANCING COOPERATIVE MUNICI-
PAL SERVICES IN TE RIcHmoND REGION 3-1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as RRPDC COOPERATIVE
SERVICES].
93. Id. at 3-3.
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flexible, but they also offer the participants an equal voice in service poli-
cies. On the other hand, authorities have the disadvantages of requiring a
separate administrative structure and loss of complete control over the
service by the local participating governments. Further, the fragmentation
caused by numerous organizations supplying but one service contributes
to inefficient and ineffective local government.
In realizing the benefits of cooperative service delivery, the service dis-
trict concept has the greatest potential."4 It offers the economies of scale
and reduces overhead expenses because of its multi-service character. This
approach ensures equitable decision making and can address problems on
a regional basis. However, the service districts authorized by the General
Assembly in 1968 have some disadvantages that render their creation im-
probable in the near future." The VADA in effect requires participating
jurisdictions to release any annexation rights which they have." The City
of Richmond is particularly wary of such a program unless it can be as-
sured that the benefits beyond its existing single service contracts would
balance against the loss of its right to approximately 23 square miles of
Chesterfield County with its added tax base and lure for industrial devel-
opment. Moreover, creation of service districts are impractical because of
the current statutory provisions regarding commission membership. Ac-
cording to an ACIR study, "if a service district were to be established in
the Richmond district, it would have at least 110 members on its commis-
sion, an exorbitant number for such a function."97 The strongest objection
by far is based on the fear that local governments will lose control to a
stronger regional authority. Specifically, local officials fear that the service
district, especially one which provides sewage treatment and water supply,
would usurp local control over the rate of development in the local jurisdic-
tions,98 thus leaving the future of the governed localities in hands less
responsive to local needs.
According to the Hahn report, the creation of service districts was "ex-
pected to evolve naturally following a period of areawide planning involv-
94. Id. at 3-5 to -6.
95. Id.
96. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-1439 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
97. 2 ACIR, supra note 13, at 331.
98. RRPDC COOPaRATIs SERVICES, supra note 92, at 3-6. To illustrate, the counties of
Fairfax, Loudoun and Prince William are now engaged in controversy with the State Water
Control Board regarding a proposed regional sewage treatment plant to be located at Dulles
Airport in Northern Virginia. The plant is designed to anticipate 50 years of growth, causing




ing citizens and elected officials in a Planning District."99 For the reasons
mentioned above, this evolution has not taken place. In the few districts
which have expressed an interest, the service district has not progressed
beyond the planning stage. Even if it reaches the referendum stage, local
misgivings toward another layer of government would likely prohibit its
creation.
Recognizing the localities' reluctance in moving toward the service dis-
trict approach, and the need for some areawide mechanism short of the
service district, the Governor's Ad Hoc Committee to Review the Virginia
Area Development Act set forth some recommendations to the 1973 Gen-
eral Assembly in the hopes of "making the service district concept more
acceptable to local governments.""' The Committee proposed that PDCs
should be given an "operational capability, if local government agrees, and
not be limited by law to exercise of only a planning function." ' Again, the
criticisms that caused defeat of the measure focused on the threat to the
domain of local government. '
F. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
With the creation of service districts unlikely and the amendment giving
the PDCs an operational capability defeated, the existing PDCs are the
only agencies authorized to do land use planning at the regional level.
Ratings of the effectiveness of the job being done by the PDCs vary with
the perspective of the viewer. The Committee to Review VADA, chaired
by T. Marshall Hahn, Jr., and composed of such notable state officials as
Andrew Miller, T. Edward Temple, and Robert H. Kirby, has predictably
praised the successes of the PDCs:
Despite their relatively recent development, planning district commissions
in Virginia appear to be well organized, are generally accepted by local gov-
ernments, and are performing valuable services in the best interests of the
citizens of the Commonwealth. 13
99. AREAS STUDY COMUnSSION, supra note 9, at 25.
100. Cohmirrr TO REVIEW VADA, supra note 36, at 6.
101. Id. at 14.
102. According to Henry L. Marsh, Hm, in his dissenting statement to the committee report:
The power of local governments to make critical governmental decisions will be surren-
dered to an authority-type group, unanswerable to the electorate .... (5) The exist-
ence of a new layer of government, far-removed from the control of the people, possess-
ing the power to compete with existing local government is a consequence so frighten-
ing that it should not be made available as an alternative to local government. Id. at
24.
103. Id. at 2.
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On the other hand, Edward G. Councill, Il, pointed out the "apparent
contradiction"'' 4 between the above quoted paragraph and statements
made at the public hearing conducted by the committee. At that meeting,
according to Councill:
Five of the eight PDC's represented were criticized directly and the concept
[of the VADA] was in general severely questioned in the following terms:
1) that PDC's have not reflected or been responsive to the needs and
desires of local governments;
2) that PDC's have not communicated well with local governments or
their officials;
3) that PDC's in their planning efforts are ineffective and inefficient;
4) that PDC's are expensive and add delay to projects;
5) that PDC's may be the forerunners of regional governments.'0
It should be observed that these criticisms were formulated from com-
ments received mainly from mayors, chairmen of boards of supervisors,
county/city managers, and generally, officials who represent the views of
the localities. Although from DSPCA Director Robert H. Kirby's point of
view "the Planning and Service District concepts and the resulting provi-
sion of services on a regional basis are the biggest thing to happen to local
government in the free world since Jamestown,""' it seems clear that these
concepts have not been warmly received by the local governments them-
selves.
Aside from local resistance, effective planning at the regional level is
curtailed by the failure of the state to set forth an explicit, coordinated
land use policy." 7 In this context, state agencies must operate "under an
umbrella of implicitly stated policies and procedures which are vaguely
defined, contradictory, and illusive.""' State land use policies and pro-
grams "are formulated in a fragmented, piecemeal fashion by most state
agencies not directly involved in land use planning per se."1o Furthermore,
all of the state agencies which have programs with land use ramifications
have a direct link to local governments, but not all such agencies deal with
the PDC in the performance of their function. Of the 19 state agencies
104. Id. at 20.
105. Id. at 18.
106. Id. at 20.
107. RRPDC LAND USE, supra note 53, at 2.
108. Id. [emphasis in the original].
109. Id. at 11. The confusion was furthered by the fact that the multi-jurisdictional dis-
tricts used by many state agencies did not conform to one another or to PDC boundaries.
However, pursuant to Governor Holton's Executive Order 15, the DSPCA expects soon to
have all such agency boundaries conforming to the 22 official PDC districts, thus simplifying
coordination between state agencies. 2 ACIR, supra note 13, at 331-32.
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having land use related programs which affected the Richmond region in
1973, only three participated on RRPDC committees. Seven had no rela-
tions whatsoever with the PDC. The relations between the PDC and the
remaining agencies were based on such tenuous grounds as consideration
of RRPDC plans, use of RRPDC information, or supplying information to
the RRPDC."0° Those agencies which do have functional relationships with
the PDCs also interact independently with the local jurisdictions, thus
further complicating matters.
Faced with these problems, the RRPDC has described itself as an agency
in search of a new role. ' In its own assessment, its role "in land use
planning activities is minimal compared to the responsibilities possessed
by state agencies.""' Recognizing "its land use planning limitations within
the context of strong state and local governments""' RRPDC proposes to
remedy the lack of "lateral and vertical coordination between state agen-
cies and local governments""' by acting as a "coordinator and evaluator""'
to resolve the conflicts between the programs of various agencies and levels
of government.
However, local resistance and lack of a clear state policy are not the only
threats to effective regional planning. A report by the RRPDC cites
changes in the federal government indicating that regional agencies may
have diminished influence as a source of areawide guidance in the future."'
Because of a freeze on categorical grant assistance"' programs of the De-
partment of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), this agency will
have a declining influence on matters involving comprehensive planning
at the regional level. In addition the report cites the growing influence of
the Environmental Protection Agency which "advocates strong state in-
volvement" as opposed to regional."' Indeed, the overall national trend
indicates an increasing federal government and state role "resulting in an
encroachment on local authority over land use.""' From the federal
110. RRPDC LAND Us E, supra note 53, at Appendix A.
111. Id. at 9.
112. Id. at 12.
113. Id. at 28.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 29.
116. Id. at 9.
117. Such grants concern one specific functional area (such as housing, water supply,
sewage treatment, etc.) and are subject to very specific planning requirements and other
conditions on the use of funds. The new policy is one of general revenue sharing with no
specific requirements and no special conditions. Id. at 8, n.14.
118. Id. at 9.
119. Id. at 5.
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perspective, there is a gap caused by increasing expectations of recent
legislation assigning responsibilities to areawide organizations and the fail-
ure of state legislatures to grant authority to such organizations., The
resistance of local governments to the regional concept is frustrating the
federal government's "expectation that national goals will be carried out
in substantial coordination with other Federal, State, and local objec-
tives.''2 Perhaps the stage is set for an increasing federal role in land use
planning.22
It is clear that the problems and needs of the localities require the
resources and coordinated efforts of all levels of government. Advocates of
the regional approach believe that a regional agency with substantive pow-
ers could be an effective coordinator because of its unique ability to view
local problems from an areawide perspective. Perhaps when Virginia initi-
ates a coordinated state land use scheme the regional agency will play an
integral part in its implementation.
V. WETLANDS
Among the threatened areas in Virginia are the low-lying coastal areas,
the wetlands,' which include the marshes and beaches of Virginia's tidal
rivers, the Atlantic coastline and the Chesapeake Bay. The following dis-
cussion will examine the pertinent statutory provisions regulating land use
in these areas, point out some of the problems inherent in them, and
suggest ways in which each may be expanded to deal more adequately with
the problems of rapid development.
Virginia's adoption of the Wetlands Act in 1972, made it one of the last
eastern coastal states to enact wetlands protective legislation. The Act was
the result of a 1969 report of the Virginia Institute of Marine Sciences3
120. 1 ACIR supra note 15, at 174.
121. Id.
122. "The land use bills which have been introduced in both the Senate and the House of
Representatives indicate that the Nixon administration and the Congress now recognize the
intolerably slow pace of the states' movement toward effective land use control." Note, State
Land Use Control, Why Pending Federal Legislation Will Help, 25 HAST. L.J. 1165, 1195
(1974).
1. Approximately 175,000 acres of tidal marshes come within the ambit of the Virginia
Wetlands Act.
2. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-13.1 to -13.20 (Cum. Supp. 1972), as amended, §§ 62.1-13.2 to
-13.18:1 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
3. M. Wass and T. Wright, Coastal Wetlands of Virginia (Virginia Institute of Marine
Sciences 1969) (hereinafter cited as VIMS).
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emphasizing the complexity, fragility, and importance of the wetlands,4
and the consequences of continued indiscriminate alteration. 5
The Wetlands Act enables each locality containing defined wetland
areas to set up a local board which, with certain exceptions, is empowered
to pass on all proposed uses of such land. The Act establishes a decision-
making process administered through a zoning act, which the localities
must adopt if they are to exercise autonomous authority,' and which re-
quires the consideration of a broad range of possible effects of wetlands
alteration.7 The structure of the Act reveals a legislative policy choice that
primary authority for wetlands protection be concentrated at the local
level.' The General Assembly felt that the state level approach was unac-
ceptable,' and was no doubt swayed by traditional Virginian distrust of
central control and by a desire to maximize citizen participation."0 The
zoning approach was used presumably because neither the state nor the
localities could afford to purchase the threatened wetland areas, thus mak-
ing eminent domain impractical.
Virginia's definition of wetlands, and thus the Act's delineation of those
areas affected by its provisions, is a flexible combination of other ap-
proaches." Section 62.1-13.5 (2)(e) of the Act defines wetlands as "[a]ll
that land lying between and contiguous to mean low water and an eleva-
tion above mean low water equal to the factor 1.5 times the mean tide
range at the site of the proposed project. . . " and upon which any one
of an enumeration of grasses is growing. This approach insures adequate
4. VIMS 17-55. Some of the crucial wetlands functions in the ecological process are nu-
trient recycling, providing nursery areas for aquatic animals, provision of wildlife habitat,
protection of upland areas and shorelines, erosion and sedimentation control, and water
purification. Id.
5. The study showed the wetlands to be one of the most productive and vital of natural
areas. For example, ninety-five percent of the annual harvest of commercial and sport fish
in Virginia depends on the wetlands in some way. Id. at vii.
6. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.5 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
7. This will be the subject of extensive discussion, infra.
8. The Wetlands Zoning Ordinance is intended for adoption by the localities. VA. CODE
ANN. § 62.1-13.5 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
9. The General Assembly rejected H.D. 1102-18, Va. Gen. Assem., 1970 Sess., which would
have established a central state agency to regulate wetlands control. H.D.J. RES. 60, Va. Gen.
Assem., 1971 Extra Sess., endorsed the local approach.
10. For a discussion of these and other factors considered in the preparation of the Act,
see Brion, Virginia Natural Resources Law and the New Virginia Wetlands Act, 30 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 19, 44-46 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Brion].
11. Wetlands may be defined in three discrete ways: the generic description, N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 13:9A-1(b) (Cum. Supp. 1975-75); by tidal range with the high water mark as the
upper limit, Mn. ANN. CODE art. 66c § 719 (a) (Repl. Vol. 1970); by floral definition, CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-29(2) (Cum. Supp. 1974-75).
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coverage of all areas by responding to local tidal conditions, while avoiding
the under and over-inclusiveness which results from rigid tidal limits. In
addition, the floral provision insures that unimportant areas (i.e. those
areas not involved in crucial wetlands functions)'2 will not be unnecessarily
regulated.
A. STANDARDS, POLICIES AND GUIDELINES
Crucial keys to interpreting the land use policies expressed in the Wet-
lands Act are found in its provision for standards, policies, and guidelines.
Principally these provisions highlight the areas and accent the problems
with which the Wetlands Zoning Ordinance, the crux of the Wetlands Act,
is intended to deal.
Section 62.1-13.1 sets out the legislative policy behind the Act. Through
an enumeration of resources and problems, this section emphasizes the
physical significance of the wetlands and the practical results of their
indiscriminate alteration. The importance of this enumeration is that it
may serve as a checklist for local boards to assess the impact of proposed
development and changes in these areas. 3 The avowed public policy of the
Act is "[t]o preserve the wetlands and to prevent their despoliation and
destruction and to accomodate necessary economic development in a man-
ner consistent with wetlands preservation.""
The standards which the Act applies to the use and development of
wetlands are found in section 62.1-13.3, wherein a two-tiered evaluatory
scheme is set up: (1) "[w]etlands of primary ecological significance shall
not be altered so that the ecological systems in the wetlands are unreasona-
bly disturbed;"' 5 (2) "[D]evelopment in Tidewater Virginia, to the maxi-
mum extent possible, shall be concentrated in wetlands of lesser ecological
significance, in wetlands which have been irreversibly disturbed. . . and
in areas . . . apart from the wetlands."'" Section 62.1-13.4 provides that
the Virginia Marine Resources Commission (VMRC), with the assistance
of the Virginia Institute of Marine Sciences (VIMS), must promulgate
guidelines for the categorization of the various types of wetlands and prob-
able damage resulting from any disturbance of their natural state.'7
The most obvious problem presented by these policies, standards, and
guidelines is that many of the terms employed in the statute remain am-
12. See note 4 supra.
13. Brion at 48.
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.1 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
15. Id. § 62.1-13.3(1).
16. Id. § 62.1-13.3(2).
17. For a discussion of the organization and function of VMRC, see Section VII G, infra.
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biguous and undefined.'8 It is not at all clear whether these standards are
scientific or legislative in nature, or if they are mere generalities. Although
the resolution of these questions must await judicial interpretation and the
development of administrative practice, the standards do show that devel-
opment is not per se prohibited. While section 62.1-13.1 ostensibly embod-
ies a presumption that development will not be permitted without a com-
pelling reason and that wetlands of primary ecological significance'9 may
not be unreasonably disturbed, apparently development will take preced-
ence in wetlands not enjoying that classification (i.e. wetlands of lesser
ecological significance may be disturbed). In addition, the provision that
wetlands of primary ecological significance may not be unreasonably dis-
turbed does evidence a legislative intent that the Act not prohibit all
development in these areas. The determination of what is reasonable lies
at the heart of the Wetlands Act, and its resolution is the chief regulatory
function to be performed by local boards. Ultimately the answer depends
on balancing the ecological and scientific value of the wetlands against the
social and economic value of the proposed alterations.
Another rather obvious problem with the expressed standards of the Act
is that the decision-making framework or regulatory function requires a
scientific judgment. In spite of this, the Act provides only definitions and
VMRC-VIMS guidelines to assist the localities, with no other process by
which technical assistance can be obtained. Wetlands local boards will in
many cases be unable, or at least unwilling, to provide the sums necessary
to obtain this expensive and indispensable assistance; thus important de-
cisions may turn on an inadequate factual basis. Additionally, the Act does
not provide that these guidelines be adopted in the manner of administra-
tive rule making, thus making it unclear whether the legislature even
intended that the guidelines be binding on the local wetlands boards.
Clearly this aggravates the aforementioned problems.
The foregoing standards, policies and guidelines, and the considerations
involved in their interpretation set out the crucial question of wetlands
development: what is necessary economic development and to what extent
will it be accommodated? The decision-making process set out in the Wet-
lands Zoning Ordinance is to provide the answer to this question, and, as
seen in the general provisions of the Wetlands Act, an analysis of the
18. These terms and their ostensible definitions will be the subject of extensive discussion,
infra.
19. The sole reasonable definition of "wetlands of primary ecological significance" which
can be found within the Act is those wetlands fitting the statutory definition and whose
alteration would yield the disastrous results set out in section one of the Act. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 62.1-13.1 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
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ordinance again turns on a definition of terms. Whether the zoning ordi-
nance, the crux of the Wetlands Act, adequately handles these problems
is, at this point in time, a matter of speculation.
B. THE WETLANDS ZONING ORINANC 2
In an uncharacteristic departure from established practice2' the Virginia
General Assembly set forth a complete local ordinance regulating wetlands
which a locality must adopt verbatim if it chooses to exercise regulatory
authority over the wetlands in its jurisdiction." Because the ordinance is
dictated and the localities are unable to vary either the area which it
embraces or the standards by which its terms will be applied, the activities
of the localities are administrative rather than legislative.
The ordinance expressly excepts certain non-commercial private uses,2
commercial harvesting activities, and governmental uses from compliance
with its terms. The applicant whose use is not excepted must file an
application for approval setting forth the public benefit to be derived from
the project and the steps he expects to take to reduce deleterious external
effects32 In addition, the application must be made a matter of public
record, 2 and adjoining land owners must be notified." The board must
hear the applicant within sixty days, and render a decision within thirty
days thereafter or approval is automatic 3 These steps insure compliance
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.5 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
21. This constitutes a significant departure from Virginia zoning and land use statutes
which traditionally provide only general standards and guidelines for localities to follow in
enacting their own zoning ordinances. The manifest purpose for such a change is to promote
uniformity in wetlands control. See, e.g., Virginia Zoning Enabling Act, VA. CODE ANN. §
15.1-486 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
22. Failure to so adopt will vest absolute regulatory authority in VMRC. VA. CODE ANN. §
62.1-13.5 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
23. Private uses such as piers, boathouses and duckblinds are excepted provided they are
open pile, permit a reasonably unobstructed flow of the tide, and preserve the natural contour
of the marsh. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.5 § 3 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
24. Id. These exceptions are necessary for two reasons: (1) to avoid the constitutional
challenge of interference with private property rights; (2) to avoid the deluge of permit
applications which any other policy would precipitate.
25. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.5 § 4 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
26. Id. § 4 and § 5.
27. Id. § 6 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
28. .Id. § 7 (Repl. Vol. 1973). This provision apparently resulted from testimony at the
wetlands hearings as to the lengthy waiting periods inflicted by the Army Corps of Engineers
for uses below mean low water. Brion, supra note 10, at 46 n.123. For a discussion of the




with constitutional due process as a valid exercise of the state's police
power.29
How, then, does the local wetlands board decide whether to grant or
refuse a use permit? The answer to this question is found in section 9(b)
of the Zoning Ordinance:
If the board, in applying the standards above, finds that the anticipated-
public and private benefit of the proposed activity exceeds the anticipated
public and private detriment and that the proposed activity would not vio-
late or tend to violate the purposes and intent. . . [of this Act], the board
shall grant the permit, subject to any reasonable condition or modification
designed to minimize the impact of the activity on the ability of this...
[locality] to provide governmental services and on the rights of any other
person and to carry out the public policy set forth in . . . [this Act].
Will development be allowed to take place in wetlands of primary ecologi-
cal significance, or will the apparent presumption found in section 62.1-
13.1 (i.e., that development will not be permitted unless there is compel-
ling reason to do so) be overcome? In order to understand the above provi-
sion as it relates to these key issues an examination of the factors which
wetlands boards may consider is in order.
Three factors are of significant importance in the wetlands board's con-
sideration: (1) the "accommodation of necessary economic development"
provision set forth in section 62.1-13.1; (2) the implied policy of constitu-
tional fairness: wetlands regulation should not involve unnecessary inter-
ference with private property rights; and (3) the balancing of public and
private benefit and detriment set out in the ordinance.
The "accommodation of necessary economic development" has two pos-
sible meanings. Arguably the legislature may have intended the accommo-
dation of industries displaying a high degree of economic efficiency." Since
the developer is usually heavily armed with concentrated analyses of the
benefits of his proposal, while the harm which may result will be suffered
cumulatively to the detriment of countless entities without organization
and without ready access to fact gathering processes, such an interpreta-
tion would be weighted heavily in favor of the developer. This is clearly
contrary to the overall tenor and expressed goal of the Act. The more likely
meaning of this provision is that the locality may be faced with a situation
where, for example, unemployment is high, the proposed development will
greatly alleviate this problem, and although the wetland on which it is
29. See note 31 infra.
30. While the term "economic efficiency" is self explanatory to a certain degree, many
considerations are involved. See Brion, supra note 10, at 59 n.165.
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built will be destroyed, the far reaching effect of the alteration will not be
severe. Under these circumstances this language would condone such a
trade-off as acceptable. It is not apparent that the legislature intended by
this language alone to accomodate extensive and highly damaging heavy
industry (e.g., oil exploration) on the basis of its utility, since such an
interpretation would make the consideration of a wide range of factors, a
key aspect of the Zoning Ordinance, unnecessary.
The second of the factors which wetlands boards may consider in their
decision, the implied policy of constitutional fairness, is, while rather dif-
fused, crucial to an understanding of the functioning of the zoning ordi-
nance. The ordinance provides for what can best be characterized as an
impact study on all private individuals who may be affected by the pro-
posed use. This approach is more constitutionally palatable since it places
the burden of local development, or the refusal thereof, upon a broad
section of the community rather than a few individuals.3 ' This is achieved
by the requirement that all entities be allowed to participate, 2 and that
the broad criteria of balancing public and private benefit and detriment
be employed. 3 This treatment opens the inquiry to the broadest possible
range of factors from all segments of the affected area (a function quite
similar to the environmental impact statement), thus minimizing the
tendency to fix upon the readily available benefit analyses mentioned
above. The clear implication is that the local board should be receptive to
relevant factors from all quarters, and that its decision must reflect a fair
consideration of each, without deference to highly organized and com-
pacted pro-development expertise.
The final and perhaps most important of the factors which local wet-
lands boards may consider is the balancing of public and private benefit
and detriment expressed in section 9(b) of the zoning ordinance. This
language is unique in these Virginia statutes," and on that basis alone
perhaps evidences an intent on the part of the legislature that traditional
31. Significantly, the decisions finding constitutional difficulties with wetlands acts have
found too much concentration of economic burden on a few people to advance the public
welfare as a whole. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 265 A.2d 711 (Me. 1970). Contra, Candlestick
Prop. Inc. v. San Francisco Bay Conservation and Dev. Comm'n, 11 Cal. 3d 557, 89 Cal.
Rptr. 897 (1970). For an exhaustive survey of the constitutional problems with wetlands
legislation see Note, State and Local Wetlands Regulation: The Problem of Taking Without
Just Compensation, 58 VA. L. REv. 876 (1972).
32. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62 .1-13.2(c), 62.1-13.5 § 2(c) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
33. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.5 (b) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
34. Usually the expression "public health, safety, and Welfare" is employed. See, e.g., VA.




norms be discarded in interpreting it. Section 9(b) sets out three matters
which are relevant in the interpretation of the Act. These matters are: (1)
the minimization of the impact of the proposed activity on the ability of
the locality to provide governmental services (i.e. growth control); (2) pro-
tection of the rights of persons affected by the proposed use; and (3) in-
sured adherence to the basic public policy of the Act.
The minimization of the impact of the proposed activity on the ability
of the locality to provide governmental services focuses the inquiry upon
the net economic benefits of the proposal as measured by its tax revenue
consequences. If the proposed development will generate more demand for
services than tax revenues to pay for them, this provision exposes such a
plan and presumably allows severe restriction thereof through conditional
approval or rejection.
The provision for the minimization of the impact of the new develop-
ment on the rights of any person embraces the question of standing, and
includes the broad statutory definition of "person" found in the Act and
in the Zoning Ordinance.3 5 However, there is no statutory definition of
rights or words limiting rights, and the presumption is strong that the
"injury-in-fact" test developed by the United States Supreme Court in
similar cases" is intended to apply. Thus, tortious and economic injury as
well as injury to property is included. This interpretation is consistent with
the implied policy of constitutional fairness discussed above, and the im-
plication is clear that a vast range of private rights which may potentially
be harmed by the proposed development should be considered in any deci-
sion by a wetlands board.
The final matter expressed as revelant to the balancing of public and
private benefit and detriment is the importance of carrying out the public
policy of the Act. Presumably this means two things. First, that the spe-
cific types of direct injury set forth in the policy section of the Act37 are to
be avoided if at all possible. Secondly, so long as the injury is expressed
as a specific, direct effect on individuals and not just on the general public
welfare, then any injury is relevant to the inquiry. This provision under-
35. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-13.2(c), 62.1-13.5 § 2 (C) (Cum. Supp. 1974). These entities
include any corporation, association, partnership, one or more individuals, or any unit of
government or agency thereof. Id.
36. Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organiza-
tions, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970). The cases require that for the constitutional require-
ment of standing under Article mI of the Constitution the aggrieved parties need only fall
within the "zone of interests" sought to be protected, e.g., economic injury. See also, Sierra
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
37. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.1 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
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scores the premium placed on wetlands preservation, the accommodation
of private rights by the Wetlands Act, and the intent of the legislature that
proposed wetlands alteration be given intensive scrutiny.
In summary, the wetlands decisional process is two-tiered. First the Act
asks whether the wetlands involved are of lesser ecological significance or
are already irretrievably altered. If so, development will presumably be
approved of, since such a condition would not justify an exercise of the
police power to rehabilitate them. If the wetland in question is of primary
ecological significance the Act requires that the development be reasona-
ble. In answering this question the board must balance public and private
benefit and detriment considering all interests and effects to the greatest
extent possible. The inescapable conclusion is that the accommodation of
necessary economic development is to be of secondary importance, that the
wetlands are to be protected and that indiscriminate alteration must end.
This result is justified by the urgent need to preserve the crucial wetlands
functions."
C. REvIEw AND APPEAL
The Wetlands Act provides that an appeal may be sought by VMRC on
its own initiative, by the applicant, by the locality, or by any twenty-five
freeholders in the locality." The standards on which the review is based
are two: (1) does the decision adequately achieve the ends of the Act; (2)
is it ultra vires, unconstitutional, arbitrary or capricious? 0
These standards for review are mandatory, and unlike the discretionary
language found in the General Administrative Agencies Act,4' the Wet-
lands Act provides that the Commission shall modify, reverse or remand
the case if they are not met. This mandatory language gives VMRC a
broadly based tool by which it can insure that the intent of the legislature
is carried out in the administrative decisions of the local boards and that
the application of the Act will be uniform (thus avoiding constitutional
issues of arbitrariness and capriciousness). Perhaps an even more impor-
tant consideration is that these provisions give VMRC power to minimize
the effect of local arm twisting and back scratching.
D. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
While the Virginia Wetlands Act reveals a suitable concern for the pro-
38. See note 4 supra.
39. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.10,11 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
40. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.13 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
41. "The court may affirm ...... VA. CODE ANN. § 9-6.13(g) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
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tection of private property rights, the accommodation of absolutely essen-
tial economic development, and, above all, the importance of protection
of the wetlands and the preservation of its vital ecological systems, there
are three problem areas which require further elaboration and study.
The first is the extreme degree of decentralization of authority which the
Act embraces. While placing the responsibility for ecological protection on
the individual citizenry and relying on the affected populace to counterbal-
ance the intense political and economic pressure to develop is a worthy
scheme by traditional democratic standards, a crucial ecological area is
thereby jeopardized to a degree which, when thrown into the balance, far
outweighs the potential benefits of such a method. Can the public ade-
quately protect itself in such a manner? It is submitted that the answer is
almost certainly in the negative. If the direct participation of VMRC can-
not be initiated, then at least some method of constant monitoring of
wetlands development employing more intense scrutiny than the self-
initiated appeals provision should be implemented. Closely related to this
proposal is the need for coordination of wetlands development control.
Research has demonstrated that ecosystems do not function in a vacuum,
and that a cause may yield an ecological effect at a great distance, both
geographically and biologically. In spite of this problem the Wetlands Act
provides for decisions on a local level, without attention to what may be
happening in other parts of Tidewater Virginia or even in the next county.
It is submitted that these considerations outweigh the merits of marked
decentralization and require regional agencies, or perhaps a central wet-
lands board.
The second problem area is the passive role played by VIMS. The insti-
tute is to develop guidelines only," and, as shown above, it is not clear that
even these must be adopted by the localities. The decisional process in the
Act calls for considerable scientific judgment in addition to the considera-
tion of practical effects. In so crucial an area the availability of scientific
expertise is highly desirable, and some means of expanding the role of
VIMS, should be implemented43 to offset the natural tendency of the oppo-
nents of wetlands development to be less organized and less financially
able to afford expert assistance than the prospective developer.
Finally, it is strongly urged that the Wetlands Act be expanded to con-
trol the extensive and virtually rampant development of second home
waterfront recreational sites. Virginia's wealth of tidal rivers and water-
42. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.4 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
43. The Act does provide that the locality must supply to the wetlands board consulting
services as may be needed. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.8 (Repl. Vol. 1973). But it is unlikely
that local budgets would be able to accommodate more than limited assistance.
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front property has made her acutely susceptible to this growing problem.
The definition of wetlands found in the Act" already embraces the beaches
on which these developments are taking place, and thus requires no further
expansion. However, it is suggested that the definition of wetlands pro-
posed in the 1970 bill be incorporated into the present definition, so as to
protect land contiguous to the Wetlands areas. That definition provided:
"Coastal wetlands" shall mean any bank, marsh, swamp, flats, beach, or
submerged shallow between the vertical bounds of mean higher high water
and mean lower water and such contiguous lands and water as the Commis-
sion of Marine Resources reasonably deems necessary to insure the physical
stability of the wetland, adequate quality of the water and adjacent bottoms
and the wellbeing of its fauna and flora. 5 [emphasis added]
The inclusion of these lands within the natural watershed and the expan-
sion of participation by VMRC, would give that body the authority to
control second-home development by declaring certain higher grounds
upon which such development would take place contiguous lands crucial
to the stability of the wetlands. Such a decision would place approval of
these developments before wetlands boards and subject to the present
VMRC review or preferably the proposed direct administration. The con-
trol of these developments must be initiated to avoid disruption of wildlife
habitats and fouling of the marine environment which will inevitably re-
sult from recreational crowding.
The Wetlands Act is a welcome response to a pressing need in Virginia.
Judicial decision and the development of administrative practice will an-
swer the question of whether it is indeed an adequate one. While the Act
may adequately dispose of the bulk of present wetlands development prob-
lems, as expansion becomes more pronounced, it is submitted that the
suggested changes will yield an act more responsive to the attendant reali-
ties and thereby insure the continued existence of these ecologically stra-
tegic areas.
VI. STATE ACTIvmIEs TANGENTIALLY AFFECTING LAND USE
No agency in Virginia is specifically authorized or directed to perform
land use functions, so in a sense all state activity which affects land use is
tangential to some other main purpose. However, a number of state agen-
cies exist primarily to serve environmental ends and in that sense may be
said to directly affect land use. On the other hand, the State Board of
Housing, Department of Highways and Transportation, and the State Cor-
44. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-13.2 (f) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
45. H.D. 1116, Va. Gen. Assem., 1970 Sess.
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poration Commission perform functions and exercise control in areas
which can only be said to affect land use tangentially.
A. BUILDING AND HOUSING CODES
1. Building Codes and the Virginia Uniform Statewide Building Code
Regulations governing building construction are as ancient as the Ham-
murabi Code (2100 B.C.) and address such problems as fire hazards, build-
ing collapse and health conditions.1 As distinguished from housing codes,
building codes regulate new construction by setting structural standards. 2
Building codes have so long been a function of local government that they
are often defined only in terms of local ordinances.' The justification for
this reposal of power in municipalities is based on the theory that citizen
protection is the responsibility of the lowest level of government.4 Local
codes also permit allowances for characteristics peculiar to the locality.
However, where local codes are permitted a lack of uniformity among
jurisdictions results which can hamper the efficiency of the construction
industry.
Building codes which have uniform statewide application permit build-
ers to adopt standardized construction procedures and are particularly
helpful in promoting industrialized housing,5 but are somewhat inflexible
and tend to discourage new methods and products.' Whether uniform or
local codes are most satisfactory for a particular state may depend on the
degree of geographical and climatic diversity in the state and the state's
goals with respect to new construction. Either type of code can be used as
a land use tool to influence growth and in time to alter the character of a
community.7 This can be accomplished by favoring one use over another
or by making the code so strict that industries find the area unattractive
and seek other locations, thereby hampering growth.8
1. Thompson, Preparation and Revision of Building Codes, in URBAN LAND UsE POLicy: THE
CENTRAL Crry 133 (R. Andrews ed. 1972).
2. Comment, Building Codes, Housing Codes and the Conservation of Chicago's Housing
Supply, 31 U. Cm. L. Rzv. 180, 182 n.9 (1963).
3. See Sussna, Building Codes and Housing Codes, 45 CoNN. B.J. 401 (1971). Sussna
defines a building code as "a locally adopted ordinance enforceable by the police powers
controlling the design, construction, alteration, repair, quality of materials, and related fac-
tors of any structure within its jurisdiction." Id.
4. Note, Building Codes: Reducing Diversity and Facilitating the Amending Process, 5
HARv. J. LEGis. 587, 596 (1968).
5. Sussna, supra note 3, at 402.
6. See Rivkin, Courting Change: Using Litigation to Reform Local Building Codes, 26
RUTGERS L. Rav. 774, 782 (1973).
7. Thompson, supra note 1, at 136.
8. Id.
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Virginia has chosen to adopt a uniform code which has statewide appli-
cation and in furtherance of that decision the Virginia General Assembly,
in 1972, created the Office of Housing9 and within it the State Board of
Housing.'" The Board was directed to adopt a Uniform Statewide Building
Code which would supersede any existing state or local regulations and
building codes." The Board "selected a nationally recognized, performance
oriented code . . .[based on] the model code of Building Officials and
Code Administrators, International, Inc. (BOCA) .... ,,,2 Being a per-
formance oriented rather than specifications oriented code, its emphasis
is on functional aspects rather than specific materials, i.e., whether a
building will withstand certain heat, stress, weight, etc., rather than
whether it is constructed of materials of specified dimensions or quality.'
3
With a few exceptions,'4 the Code applies to "the construction, altera-
tion, addition, repair, removal, demolition, use, location and occupancy
and maintenance of all buildings and structures . . . in the State of Vir-
ginia . . . ."15 It does not override any local zoning ordinances or provi-
sions of the Code of Virginia,"6 or any regulations pertaining to mobile
homes or industrial housing prescribed by the State Corporation Commis-
sion.1 7 Historic buildings are not exempt per se, but do receive special
consideration and need not comply with the Code's provisions if found to
be safe by a building official."
9. Va. Acts of Assembly 1972, ch. 559, at 649-50.
10. Id. at 651-52.
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-98 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
12. VA. UNIFORM STATEWIDE BUIDING CODE 1 (Accum. Supp. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
VUSBC].
13. See Note, supra note 4, at 604. For example, a specifications code might require that
wood of a minimum grade and thickness be used for floor material and supports, whereas a
performance code would generally require that the floor be able to support a certain amount
of weight. Id. at 604 n.84.
14. A building could remain under existing regulations if a building permit had been
obtained for it, it was in existence or under construction, or if "working drawings [had] been
prepared in the year . . .prior to the effective date of the Building Code . . . ." VA. CODE
ANN. § 36-103 (Cum. Supp. 1974); VUSBC § 105.1 (1970), as amended, (Accum. Supp. 1974).
15. VUSBC § 100.1 (1970), as amended, (Accum. Supp. 1974).
16. Id. § 200.2. This seems to be both a wise and necessary policy. The Uniform Statewide
Building Code exists by mandate of the General Assembly and the General Assembly should
not be subservient to it. Zoning ordinances permit local governing bodies to exercise some
control over the pattern and extent of growth in their respective jurisdictions. Since a certain
amount of land use control was removed from the localities when the Uniform Statewide
Building Code was adopted, permitting the Code to override local zoning ordinances might
remove too much control from the local governing bodies. The present policy seems to strike
a better balance.
17. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-119 (Cum. Supp. 1974); VUSBC § 425.0 (Accum. Supp. 1974); see
VA. CODE ANN. § 36-73 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
18. VUSBC § 318.0 (Accum. Supp. 1974). The provisions of the Code are currently accu-
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A grandfather clause excluding buildings already in existence when the
Code became effective 9 is only partially applicable if such buildings are
later repaired or altered. If alterations9 or repairs exceed fifty per cent of
the building's physical value prior to the alterations or repairs, they must
comply fully with the Code." If the repairs or alterations are between
twenty-five and fifty per cent it is left to the building official's discretion
as to what extent the repairs or alterations must meet Code requirements."
Repairs or alterations less than twenty-five per cent need not comply with
the Code as long as the structure is safe.? The grandfather clause is also
inapplicable if the building's floor area or number of stories is increased,2 4
or if its occupancy or use is changed.?
When the Code became effective on September 1, 1973, approximately
fifty Virginia localities had no building codes at all. Forty-two localities
which already had building codes were given extensions during which they
could remain under their old codes.2" There are currently only nine locali-
ties not under the Code and they must comply by September 1, 1975.?
Although the Code itself is uniform throughout Virginia, its enforcement
is strictly a local matter for which each municipality's building depart-
ment is responsible.? Appeals from decisions of building officials are heard
by local boards of appeal. 29 Further appeal is permitted to the State Build-
mulated in ten pamphlets: BOCA Basic Building Code 1970, BOCA Basic Building Code
Accumulative Supplement 1973, BOCA Basic Mechanical Code 1971, BOCA Basic Plumbing
Code 1970, BOCA Basic Plumbing Code Accumulative Supplement 1972, One and Two
Family Dwelling Code 1971, One and Two Family Dwelling Code Accumulative Supplement
1973, National Electric Code 1971, Electrical Code for One and Two Family Dwellings and
Virginia Administrative Amendments 1973 Edition (merged with the 1974 Accumulative
Supplement), Id. at 3.
19. See note 14, supra.
20. In determining what percentage of a building has been altered, all alterations within a
twelve month period are considered. VUSBC § 106.1 (1970).
21. Id. §§ 106.0-106.2.
22. Id. § 106.3.
23. Id. § 106.4.
24. Id. § 106.5.
25. Id. § 106.6.
26. See VA. CODE ANN. § 36-101 (Cum. Supp. 1974); VUSBC at 37 (Accum. Supp. 1974).
27. Telephone interview with Mr. Edward A. Ragland, Executive Director of the Office of
Housing, Richmond, Virginia, January 6, 1975.
28. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-105 (Cum. Supp. 1974). If a locality has no building department
"the local governing body [must] enter into an agreement with the local governing body of
another county or municipality or with some other agency, or a State agency approved by
the State Board, for [code] enforcement." Id. Violation of the Code is a misdemeanor
carrying a fine of up to one thousand dollars. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-106 (Cum. Supp. 1974), as
amended, VA. CODE ANN. § 36-106 (effective June 1, 1975).
29. VUSBC § 127.1 (1970). "Application for appeal may be made when it is claimed that:
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ing Code Technical Review Board." Appeal from decisions of the Review
Board is to the Supreme Court of Virginia.3' Local enforcement has not
been a problem in large jurisdictions but in small towns and rural counties
where no code previously existed, assistance is needed and the Office of
Housing hopes to initiate training programs for local building inspectors.
There is also the possibility that some local building officials might inten-
tionally refuse to enforce the Code. The Code does not provide a remedy
for such a situation and apparently mandamus would be the only recourse.
The Code's basic contribution to land use is its prohibition against using
land for the erection of shoddy or unsafe buildings. Uses which may have
been acceptable under local codes or in municipalities where no code ex-
isted at all, may disappear under the Uniform Code because compliance
with its standards makes construction economically infeasible. In addition
to this general effect, the Code's provision for fire district subdivisions
excludes various uses from certain areas. There are two classes of fire
district subdivisions and a designation for areas not within a fire district,
e.g., fire district one, fire district two and outside fire limits. 32 All three
areas are subject to some regulations, but in fire district one, which is
basically comprised of congested industrial and business uses,3 high haz-
ard uses are completely excluded unless approved by the local governing
body.34 Since small to moderate size cities and towns will generally have
only one fire district (to which fire district one restrictions would apply) , 3
such a city or town would probably exercise its authority to permit high
hazard uses in that fire district.
In response to the energy crisis, the Virginia General Assembly has di-
rected the State Board of Housing "to promulgate insulation standards
. . . for possible inclusion in . . . [the] Uniform Statewide Building
Code. '3 The Board's report to the Governor and General Assembly3 indi-
the true intent of the Basic Code . . . [has] been incorrectly interpreted, the provisions of
the Basic Code do not fully apply, or an equally good or better form of construction can be
used." Id.
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-114 (Cum. Supp. 1974); VUSBC § 127.6 (Accum. Supp. 1974). A
person, though not a party to the decision of the board of appeals, may appeal to the State
Building Code Technical Review Board if aggrieved by the decision. VUSBC § 127.6 (Accum.
Supp. 1974).
31. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-116 (Cum. Supp. 1974); VUSBC § 127.7 (Accum. Supp. 1974).
32. VUSBC §§ 301.1-.3 (1970), as amended, (Accum. Supp. 1974).
33. Id. § 301.1.
34. Id. 302.3 (1970). A high hazard use includes buildings "used for the storage, manufac-
ture or processing of highly combustible or explosive products or materials. . . which may
produce poisonous fumes or explosions . Id. § 203.0.
35. Id. § 301.0, Note A.
36. See Va. H.D.J. Res. 131, in REPORT OF THE STATE BOARD OF HOUSING 3 (1974).
37. REPORT OF THE STATE BOARD OF HOUSInG 4 (1974).
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cated that the Board is reviewing Design and Evaluation Criteria for En-
ergy Conservation in New Buildings (a National Bureau of Standards pub-
lication), and is going to work with the National Conference of States on
Building Codes and Standards to develop a national standard. Extensive
research is being done in this area on the national level and the State
Board of Housing does not intend to promulgate standards for Virginia
until a national standard is developed."
Whether the BOCA Code is an improvement over other building codes
is open to question and some Virginia localities would have preferred the
Southern Standard Building Code. The important aspect of the Code is its
statewide application which eliminates diversity and assures that all local-
ities have adequate building standards. Substantively the Code seems to
be an acceptable standard for Virginia. Procedurally, either the General
Assembly or the State Board of Housing should adopt some method for
insuring that local officials properly enforce the Code. If the Office of
Housing is exercising supervisory controls informally this should be codi-
fied so that an individual will have some recourse other than mandamus
if he feels that the Code's standards are not being enforced. The appeal
procedure seems to be adequate, but is of no assistance in the situation
where Code provisons are being ignored by both the builder and local
building official.
2. Housing Codes
Housing codes are related to building codes but address a different area,
i.e., the fitness of a building for occupancy." There is some overlapping,
of course, but a housing code affects structural aspects only to the extent
necessary to insure that minimum standards are maintained." Housing
codes are not common in Virginia; Richmond is one of the few jurisdictions
which has one." Richmond's housing code covers both residential housing42
and nonresidential accessory structures."
Richmond has made dramatic use of its housing code to obtain federal
aid in rehabilitating portions of its southside." This federal aid was made
38. Id.
39. See Comment, supra note 2.
40. Id.
41. Housing codes are not a function of the state in Virginia and are covered here only
because they are so closely related to building codes.
42. RICHMOND, VA. CODE .§§ 24-1 to -49 (1968), as amended, ICHMOND, VA. CODE §§ 24-1
to -49 (Supp. 1969).
43. Id. §§ 20-39 to -49 (Supp. 1969).
44. Bryan, Concentrated Code Enforcement, 27 J. OF HOUSING 300, 311-12 (1970).
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available under a 1965 amendment to the Housing Act of 1949,11 which
provides for such aid to communities to help pay for the cost of code
enforcement and certain public improvements." Code enforcement worked
well in south Richmond. While homes were brought up to code standards,
the city planned public improvements totalling approximately $1,050,262,
two-thirds of which was paid by the federal government." In addition, the
city on its own improved underground utility installations and streets bor-
dering the federally funded project area, and the Redevelopment and
Housing Authority made public improvements on abutting lands. 8 Osten-
sibly, the enforcement of housing codes is a viable alternative to urban
renewal in areas which have not reached a stage of severe deterioration.
Housing codes are also a desirable means of maintaining quality hous-
ing. A housing code has recently been proposed for Henrico County to
attain that goal. The proposal grew out of efforts to conform the county's
zoning ordinance to its land use plan.49 Perhaps this is a recognition of the
fact that an effective land use plan must coordinate a number of different
areas. Building standards are an integral part of the overall plan and can
only increase in importance as housing becomes more critical. The Uni-
form Statewide Building Code is a step in the right direction, but unless
standards are maintained after construction, deterioration is the ultimate
result.
B. DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS AND TRANSPORTATION
As the body designated by law to locate and establish state highways,"
the State Highway and Transportation Commission51 has a significant
effect on land use. The taking of land by condemnation, in and of itself
puts land to a new use, apart from any effect which the highway has. But
the highway is the important factor, especially with respect to develop-
ment patterns.52 In fact street patterns and land use are so interrelated that
45. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1468 (1969), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1468 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
46. Bryan, supra note 44, at 300. The legislation stemmed from a "concern for greater use
of code enforcement and rehabilitation to minimize the need for demolition and clearance in
urban renewal." H.R. REP. No. 365, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws
2641.
47. Bryan, supra note 44, at 312.
48. Id.
49. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Jan. 26, 1975, § D, at 1, col. 4.
50. VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-12(1) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
51. The State Highway and Transportation Commission and the Department of Highways
and Transportation are both generally referred to as the Highway Department and that
designation will be used in the remainder of this section except where distinction is impor-
tant.
52. S. MAKIELSKI, JR., LocAL PLANNING IN VmGINIA: DEVELOPMENT, POLITICS AND PROSPECTS
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there is disagreement over whether the land use results from the street
patterns or vice versa. 3
In a very broad sense, highways tend to economically integrate a region
more than any other mode of transportation, generally increasing demand
for the area's services and products." The highway's greatest influence on
land use is probably in an interchange area. This is due to the large amount
of acreage required for the interchange itself and to the intense develop-
ment in interchange areas. Historically the interchange has been a focal
point and therefore thought to be most valuable for commercial develop-
ment. This great pressure for commercial use has caused many planners
to lose sight of the primary function of the interchange-to carry traffic
from one road to another as part of a transportation system. Once an
interchange becomes clogged with local traffic because of the surrounding
commercial use, it no longer serves its primary function.
Basically, there are only three appropriate land uses for an interchange
area; those requiring convenient freeway access, those significantly bene-
fiting interchange traffic, and in some cases those uses which are aestheti-
cally pleasing, such as rest areas, golf courses and forest preserves. 5
Whether or not the land surrounding an interchange is put to an appropri-
ate use depends upon such factors as the area's land market, planning
objectives, pattern of land use and the location of the interchange and type
of traffic using it." With so many factors to consider, problems are inevita-
ble unless great care is taken in planning interchanges and use of the
surrounding land.57
The problems are often the result of zoning too much land around an
interchange for commercial or industrial use when there is already suffi-
cient acreage for such uses elsewhere." There may also be an actual con-
flict between the community's land use and that of the interchange, as
where an industrial trucking area develops in the interchange area while
the community is undergoing substantial residential expansion.59 More
37, 38 (1969).
53. Id. at 37.
54. G. KRAT, J. MEYER & J. VALE'rr, THE ROLE OF TRANSPORTATION IN REGIONAL ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT 40 (1971).
55. BARTON-ASChmAN AssocIATEs, HIGHWAY AND LAND-USE RELATIONSHIPS IN INTERCHANGE
AREAS 28 (1968).
56. Id. at 32.
57. Dale City, Virginia, has experienced one such problem where two large shopping cen-
ters are dependent on one inadequate interchange. REPORT OF THE VmGiNIA ADVISORY LEGISLA-
TIVE COUNCIL ON LAND USE POLICIES 33 (1974) [hereinafter cited as VALC REPORT].
58. BARTON-AScmAN AssocIATEs, supra note 55, at 13.
59. Id.
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significantly, a community may waste land in the interchange area by poor
planning."0 This lack of foresight, in extreme cases, may result in an
interchange area whose major features are hot dog stands and junkyards.6 '
This sort of loss prevents the interchange from ever being put to its fullest
use and adversely affects the state as well as the local community.2
With few exceptions, the Highway Department has little responsibility
for surrounding land once a highway has been constructed, and a great
burden is upon the local governing body to prevent some of the problems
which have been mentioned. On the other hand, the Highway Department
must decide where a highway will go and the factors considered in this
decision can be important. In spite of the great land use effect which
highways have, until recently highway planning had been based almost
exclusively on demand forecasting with only slight consideration given to
any other factors.6 3 Although environmental and economic factors are now
given greater weight, demand is still a key factor because the Highway
Department is understandably reluctant to construct a new highway un-
less it feels that there is a need for it.64 To adequately evaluate need, the
Department studies trip patterns, population and other highway use fac-
tors in a given area and works closely with local policy committees. In
planning where and what size highways are needed, the Department must
consider not only the present needs of an area, but also the additional
needs which will be generated by the new highway, and attempt to provide
for them. It is easy to see how this can spiral, with each factor increasing
the need for the other.
The Highway Department also considers local needs in setting standards
for acceptance of roads into the secondary system of highways. 5 These
standards were not codified until 1968,6 but the Department had had a
60. Id.
61. Id. at 14.
62. Id.
63. A. HOWARD, L. GROSENIcK, D. BARNES & J. MASHAW, VIRGINIA'S URBAN CORRIDOR, A
PRELMINARY INQUIRY 144 (1970).
64. See MAKIELSKI, supra note 52, at 37.
65. The streets must be at least forty feet wide, the county must recommend in writing to
the Highway Department that such streets be accepted into the secondary system and the
county must agree "to contribute from county revenue one half of the cost to bring the streets
up to the necessary minimum standards for acceptance." VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-72(c) (Cum.
Supp. 1974). The streets must also have been "shown on a plat which was recorded prior to
July one, nineteen hundred fifty-eight, at which time it was open to and used by motor
vehicles, and which, for any reason, has not been taken into the secondary system of State
highways and has on it at least three families per mile." Id. § 33.1-72(a) (Repl. Vol. 1970).
66. Va. Acts of Assembly 1968, ch. 601, at 905-06.
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similar policy since July 1, 1964.7 This policy was found to be necessary
because there had been subdivision development in counties where no
subdivision control ordinance existed, resulting in substandard roads
which were unacceptable to the Highway Department and thus would not
be maintained by it. 8 The subdivision residents found that they could not
afford to maintain the streets, and the resulting deterioration caused the
value of the lots and homes in the development to decline.69 The Depart-
ment's policy was designed to assist these homeowners and to encourage
adoption of subdivision control ordinances by the counties.
71
Another area of land use in which the Highway Department and local
jurisdictions must work together is the preparation of an official map.7 1 If
the proposed map includes streets under the Highway Department's juris-
diction, the commission preparing the map must consult the Department
for comment.72 Highway Department recommendations are incorporated
in the map or supplement it when the map is sent to the local governing
body for approval.73
A new and untested area of local participation with the Highway Depart-
ment respecting land use is in the design of urban highways which are
partially funded by the locality.74 A municipality may have a competent
67. Clark, Subdivision and Zoning Controls, in Twm-rouRTH ANNuAL VmGIAu HIGHWAY
CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS 53, 55 (1971). The Highway Department's policy pertained to devel-
opment between July 1, 1949, and November 15, 1959, or between July 1, 1949, and
the adoption of a subdivision control ordinance by the county which had certain
requirements which were equal to or greater than the requirements of the Department
of Highways for subdivision streets.
Streets developed as outlined in this policy can be considered for addition to the
secondary system provided:
1. The county has passed a subdivision control ordinance having street require-
ments meeting or exceeding the Department of Highways standards for subdivision
streets.
2. No more than 15 per cent of the lots along the street or streets are owned by a
subdivider, developer, or land speculator.
3. One-half of the Highway Department estimate of cost of developing the streets
to minimum rural standards is donated through the county and a certified copy of plat
indicating street right-of-way, drainage easements and place of recordation, and de-
tailed record of lot ownership along with the required donation is furnished with the
submission of the resolution from the County Board of Supervisors requesting the
addition of the streets to the secondary system. Id.
68. Id. at 54-55.
69. Id. at 55.
70. Id.
71. VA. CODE ANN. § 15.1-462 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. § 33.1-47.1 (effective June 1, 1975).
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authority conduct a study of the effect which the proposed highway could
have on the area's shrubbery and trees, and of the highway modifications
that would be needed to minimize possible damage. ' - After considering any
recommendations which the study proposes, the Highway Department
must make any reasonable modifications necessary to protect the area's
flora."6
Of great importance to the Highway Department with respect to land
use, is the increased national interest in protecting the environment. The
Department is particularly susceptible to criticism in this area because of
the great potential for pollution when highway work is being done." The
most important federal guidelines and requirements for the Highway De-
partment are in the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA)7 s
and the Federal-Aid Highway Act.7 9 The Federal-Aid Highway Act encom-
passes the construction of federal interstate highways for which the federal
government pays ninety percent. 0 When such a highway is to be con-
structed, the state's plan must first be approved by the Secretary of the
U.S. Department of Transportation.' This approval will only be given if
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Some of the sources of pollution noted by a research engineer for the Highway Depart-
ment are:
Potential sources of water pollution-1. Erosion of soil with resulting siltation of
streams, ponds, reservoirs, fields and yards, during construction. 2. Erosion from bare
spots on seeded slopes. 3. Erosion from unseeded slopes on secondary roads. 4. Erosion
from unpaved ditches on steep gradients. 5. Contamination of streams, ponds, reser-
voirs, and wells by deicing salts. 6. Improper maintenance of cut slopes. 7. Sediments
from wash water used in stone quarries and sand and gravel operations. 8. Cleaning of
construction equipment in streams. 9. Depositing of engine oil in streams near shops.
10. Cleaning of spray bar of asphalt distributor into streams. 11. Mud agitation during
marine construction. 12. Drainage from concrete batching and mixing operations.
Potential sources of air pollution-1. Burning of debris during clearing of right-of-
way. 2. Dust from drying operations of asphalt plants. 3. Dust from quarrying and
crushing operations. 4. Dust from detours on construction sites. 5. Dust from unpaved
secondary roads. 6. Fumes and particles from construction equipment. 7. Solvent
evaporation from volatile asphalt products and other volatile coatings such as concrete
curing compounds.
General-1. Noise from construction equipment. 2. Human waste at rest areas lack-
ing toilet facilities.
Dillard, Erosion Control Practices and Desired Results, in Tw'rY-rFrH ANNuAL VmoNIA
HIGHWAY CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGs 43, 45 (1971).
78. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1970); see Section XD, infra.
79. 23 U.S.C.A. §§ 101 et seq. (1966), as amended, 23 U.S.C.A. §§ 101 et seq. (Cum. Supp.
1975).
80. Id. § 103 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
81. Id. § 106(a) (1966).
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the state highway department certifies that an opportunity for public hear-
ings has been afforded in the localities through which the proposed high-
way will pass, and submits a report indicating what consideration has been
given to the various effects (including economic and environmental) of the
highway and any alternatives."
NEPA requires that all federal agencies submit an environmental im-
pact statement when making a report or recommendation "on proposals
for legislation and other Federal actions significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment" and that this statement receive comment by
"appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to
develop and enforce environmental standards . . . ."I As a result of this
legislation, the Highway Department established an environmental qual-
ity division in 1971.84 One of the most important functions of this division
is the preparation of environmental documents."'
There are a number of different procedures which the environmental
division follows in meeting federal requirements, depending upon the size
of the project and the effect it will have on the environment." The initial
investigation, however, is the same for all projects and includes, in addi-
tion to public hearings, a review of the proposal with representatives of
numerous federal and state agencies." If the project is major or will ad-
versely affect the environment, an environmental impact statement is re-
quired which will be reviewed and commented upon by twenty-seven fed-
eral and state agencies. 8 An additional document must be prepared if the
proposed highway will affect waterfowl or wildlife refuges, a public recrea-
82. Id. § 128(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975); see Arlington Coaltion on Transportation v. Volpe, 458
F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970). This statement is to include
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed actions, (ii) any adverse environmental
effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal be implemented, (iii) alternatives
to the proposed action, (iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be in-
volved if the proposed action should be implemented. Id.
For a study of environmental impact statements as they relate to highways, see Comment,
Environmental Analysis and Reporting in Highway System Planning, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 875
(1973).




87. Id. The agencies include "the State Water Control Board, the Commission of Game
and Inland Fisheries, the Air Pollution Control Board, the Historic Landmarks Commission,
and at least 10 additional state and federal agencies." Id.
88. Id. at 6.
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tion area or historic property. 9 The final approval or disapproval for a
project comes from the Council on Environmental Quality."0
These federal requirements have not been ignored by individuals and
groups in Virginia who have felt that an interstate highway was not desir-
able for their particular area. In Arlington Coalition on Transportation v.
Volpe,9' interested citizens in Arlington, Virginia, sought an injunction
against the continued construction of 1-66.92 Continuation was supported
by all of Virginia's congressmen and Governor Godwin, but was opposed
by various citizens groups, the governing bodies of Fairfax and Arlington
Counties and the cities of Alexandria and Falls Church.3 The Arlington
Coalition was successful in obtaining an injunction until the effect of the
highway on the environment could be evaluated even though the 1-66
project had been initiated prior to the enactment of NEPA. The court felt
that the project should properly be covered by the Act since the project
was a continuing one.
However, in James River & Kanawha Canal Parks, Inc. v. Richmond
Metropolitan Authority,94 the court found insufficient federal involvement
in the construction and planning of the Richmond Beltline for federal
environmental requirements to be applicable. But in that case the project
received federal funds only after rising costs had been encountered and for
only part of the project. It can be anticipated that the Virginia Highway
Department will encounter future litigation where there is a question of
federal involvement in the construction of a highway and proper considera-
tion has not been given to the environmental consequences of the proposed
highway.
Virginia's concern for land use and the environment in its highway policy
is not limited to bare compliance with federal mandates. The Highway
Commission is authorized, in conjunction with the Commission of Outdoor
Recreation, to designate a highway as a Virginia byway or scenic highway. 5
A scenic highway is one which is constructed through a scenic corridor, in
a manner which enhances and preserves the cultural value and beauty of
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972); see Section XD2a,
infra at notes 153-54 and accompanying text.
92. 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972); see ENv. REP. CuRR. Dzv.
1558 (1974).
93. Washington Star-News, Sept. 20, 1974, in Va. Dep't of Highways & Trans., HALmIS,
Vol. 8, No. 19, Oct. 1, 1974 (unpaginated).
94. 359 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va. 1973), aff'd mem., 481 F.2d 1280 (1973); see Section XD3,
infra at notes 171-73.
95. VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-62 (Repl. Vol. 1970), as amended, § 33.1-62 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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the area,96 while a Virginia byway leads to or is within an area of natural,
recreational or historical significance. When a road has been designated
as a Virginia byway, certain actions are possible:
Property owners can donate scenic easements and the highway department
can purchase land considered essential to preserving the road's scenic and
historic character.
Outdoor signs will be prohibited and "distinctive" signs will be erected
identifying the road as a scenic byway.
Special parking areas may be built where feasible to allow travelers to pull
off the road at areas of scenic beauty or historical interest.
Highway officials will investigate landscaping needs and confer with utility
companies to see whether utility lines can be buried or relocated away from
the roadside.
As desirable as such a designation may appear, the response by local
governing bodies and individuals is not always favorable. An example is
the attempt to designate Route 5 between Richmond and Williamsburg as
a Virginia byway. It was hoped that Route 5 could be protected and in
some cases partially relocated so as to bypass areas of development. How-
ever, in Charles City County the local governing body opposed the designa-
tion of Route 5 as a Virginia byway, fearing that such a designation would
restrict the county's growth.99 Residents along Route 5 also balked at the
idea, assuming that the Highway Department would buy up strips of right-
of-way to protect the road's character as a Virginia byway. However, it was
anticipated that the local jurisdiction would handle the protection aspects
through such means as setbacks, zoning and limited access to the byway."'
It was not intended that a locality's growth be stymied, but only that
growth occur in a planned and orderly fashion along the byway.10'
96. Id. § 33.1-64 (Repl. Vol. 1970).
97. Id. § 33.1-63. A scenic highway (such as the Blueridge Parkway) is one which is con-
structed as such from inception. A Virginia byway, on the other hand, is a designation given
a highway which is already in existence and which meets the requirements of section 33.1-
63. In June of 1974, Old Georgetown Pike in Northern Virginia was designated as the state's
first Virginia byway. Washington Star-News, June 26, 1974, in Va. Dep't of Highways,
HEAnLuNs, Vol. 8, No. 14, July 15, 1974, (unpaginated). The article mistakenly refers to the
road as a scenic byway.
98. Washington Star-News, supra note 97.
99. See VALC REPORT, supra note 57, at 34-35.
100. Interview with Mr. Robert L. Hundley, Environmental Quality Engineer, Virginia
Department of Highways and Transportation, in Richmond, Virginia, December 31, 1974.
101. Id. In fact, "[wlere [Route 5] to have been designated as was proposed, with devel-'
opment allowed to proceed according to the plan developed for the highway, there is reason
to believe land values along that highway would have been enhanced more than has been true
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A locality has the opportunity to oppose a scenic highway or Virginia
byway by requesting that the Highway Department hold a public hear-
ing. 0 This allows local governing bodies and citizens to express their views
on the proposed designation and helps the Highway Department deter-
mine if the designation is in the public interest. If the road is designated
in spite of opposition, the Highway Department is faced with a problem.
It does not wish to buy strips of right-of-way to insure that the highway's
character is maintained, but the locality is under no obligation to control
development. If scenic highways and Virginia byways are to serve their
intended purposes, the Highway Department must buy right-of-way land
to prevent unsightly development, or a statutory requirement must be
imposed upon local governing bodies to insure that development is consis-
tent with the highway's designation.
' The future role of the Highway Department in relation to land use will
increase as highway construction continues and available land decreases.
In mid-1950 Virginia had approximately 300 miles of divided, multilane
highways but it is anticipated that by mid-1980 that figure will exceed
3,000 miles.' 3 Undoubtedly, land use will be greatly affected by the mere
volume of highways and the accompanying development. Because of the
increasing environmental crisis in this country, greater state and federal
control over the Highway Department is likely. This usually involves more
paperwork and expense in the form of permits and other documents which
indicate the environmental effect of a proposed highway. In view of this,
the Highway Department is revising its procedures in an attempt to con-
vince the regulatory bodies that it will comply with environmental stan-
dards without having to prove it with paperwork for every project.' 4 This
attempt, combined with local pressure, undoubtedly will make the High-
way Department more conscious of local needs and land use problems.
C. STATE CORPORATION COMMISSION
Sometimes referred to as the fourth branch of government in Virginia,
with the relatively scattered unplanned strip development which has taken place." VALC
REPORT, supra note 57, at 35.
102. VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-62 (Repl. Vol. 1970), as amended, § 33.1-62 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
103. VA. HIGHWAY COMM'N, SixTY-SEvENTH ANNUAL REPORT 6 (1974).
104. Interview with Mr. Robert L. Hundley, supra note 100. Currently the Highway De-
partment is the only state agency that is not required to provide the Soil and Water Conserva-
tion Commission with a set of plans when disturbing the earth. The Soil and Water Conserva-
tion Commission examines the Highway Department's specifications, standards and proce-
dures annually, and if these are approved it merely checks for compliance with these stan-
dards. The Highway Department would like for this to be the procedure for complying with
other laws and agency regulations. Id.
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the State Corporation Commission (SCC) is a powerful agency whose juris-
diction covers a wide range of activities. The SCC is in a rather protected
position since it exists by constitutional authority' 5 and therefore can only
be eliminated by constitutional revision. The Commission is procedurally
similar to a court of record'0 ' and only the Supreme Court of Virginia may
"review, reverse, correct, or annul [its actions] or . . .enjoin or restrain
it in the performance of its official duties .. ."I", Thus, any determina-
tion which the SCC makes affecting land use carries great weight.
With respect to two corporations both having eminent domain power,"8
the SCC is the proper forum for any condemnation proceeding brought by
one against the other.'0 ' In Boulevard Bridge Corp. v. City of Richmond,"'
Richmond contended that the SCC's jurisdiction in eminent domain dis-
putes did not extend to municipal corporations and that in any case it
could not issue a declaratory judgment on the matter."' The Virginia Su-
preme Court sustained the Commission's authority against both chal-
lenges. In dealing with municipalities and eminent domain, the SCC inev-
itably became involved with zoning ordinances and their validity. Here the
court drew the line, finding that the SCC had no authority to decide issues
concerning the validity of a zoning ordinance."' Nevertheless, what is
today a municipal park may tomorrow be a railroad yard and if there is
a dispute between the railroad and municipality over condemnation, the
SCC will be the arbiter.
Public utilities ' 3 come under the regulatory authority of the State Cor-
poration Commission and are so tightly controlled that a public utility is
prohibited from operating in an area unless it receives a certificate of
public convenience and necessity from the Commission."' Unless the Com-
105. VA. CONsT. art. IX, § 1.
106. Id. art. IX, § 3.
107. Id. art. IX, § 4.
108. Since the Highway Department is not a corporation it is not covered. Tiller v. Norfolk
& Western Ry., 201 Va. 222, 225-26, 110 S.E.2d 209, 212 (1959).
109. VA. CODE ANN. § 25-233 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
110. 203 Va. 212, 123 S.E.2d 636 (1962).
111. Under attack was Rule 13 (currently Rule 5:3) of the SCC's Rules of Practice and
Procedure. The Rule provides, inter alia, that "[a] person having no other adequate remedy
may petition the Commission for a declaratory judgment under Code § 8-578." SCC R. OF
PR~c. & PRoc. 5:3.
112. City of Richmond v. Southern Ry., 203 Va. 220, 225, 123 S.E.2d 641, 645 (1962).
113. A public utility is any company owning or operating facilities in Virginia "for the
generation, transmission or distribution of electric energy for sale, for the production, trans-
mission or distribution, otherwise than in enclosed portable containers, of natural or manu-
factured gas for sale for heat, light or power, or for the furnishing of telephone service,
sewerage facilities or water." VA. CoDE ANN. § 56-265.1(b) (Repl. Vol. 1974).
114. Id. § 56-265.3.
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mission finds that the utility would be "in the public interest" a certificate
will not be granted."5
Electric utilities have received particular attention and in 1972 the Gen-
eral Assembly made it mandatory for the SCC, before approving the con-
struction of an "electrical transmission line of two hundred kilovolts or
more. . . .[to] determine that the corridor or route the line is to follow
will reasonably minimize adverse impact on the scenic and environmental
assets of the area concerned.""' In addition, the SCC must hold a public
hearing at the request of any interested person."7
One writer has seen this legislation as having little effect since in his
opinion the SCC has limited itself in this field; a fact which he feels the
statute does not change."' Others have seen the legislation as expanding
the power of the SCC over electric power facilities."' Even if it is assumed
that the former view was correct in 1972, that no longer appears to be the
case. Three new commissioners have been appointed who are apparently
much more concerned about the environment than were the former com-
missioners.'25 There have been two applications for transmission line exten-
sions since the enactment of section 56-46.1, one of which is still pending.'2'
The decided case involved Appalachian Power Company and the proce-
dure which was followed hopefully is indicative of the SCC's current atti-
tude. In determining what route, if any, the requested power lines should
take, the SCC was assisted by a group headed by a professor of biology at
Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University. A grid survey was done
of all possible routes, and factors such as land use, population and wildlife
were given various weights'2 2 and fed into a computer. With the computer
115. Id. If the applicant is seeking to provide water or sewerage service the requirements
are stricter. More detailed information is required on the application, and in addition to being
in the public interest, the SCC must also find that "no other publicly or privately owned
system is able to adequately provide service in the . . . area; .. .the applicant's proposed
facilities will provide proper and adequate service for the area; . . . the applicant's proposed
rules, regulations and rates, fees and charges for the service to be rendered are reasonable;
and. . . the applicant has the financial and managerial ability necessary to properly install,
maintain and operate the proposed facilities and to render the required service ... " Id.
116. Id. § 56-46.1.
117. Id.
118. See Willrich, The Energy-Environment Conflict: Siting Electric Power Facilities, 58
VA. L. Ray. 257, 288-92 (1972). Willrich's opinion is based primarily on a memorandum of
former Commissioner Catterall dated Jan. 6, 1971. Id. at 289.
119. See Brasfield, Regulation of Electric Utilities by the State Corporation Commission,
14 WM. & MARY L. REv. 589, 598 (1973).
120. Telephone interview with Mr. Bernard L. Henderson, Jr., Administrative Assistant
to the Commissioners, State Corporation Commission, Richmond, Virginia, January 28, 1975.
121. Id.
122. The weighted values ranged from one to ten with ten being the most critical. If the
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evaluating all the information given to it for the various routes, a route
which was least detrimental to the environment was established. The new
commissioners apparently do not feel bound by the past policy of the
Commission, and if this is the case, section 56-46.1 can be an effective land
use tool. But the effectiveness of the statute should not have to depend on
the composition of the SCC. More explicit guidelines and stricter stan-
dards would insure that the SCC does not exercise its discretion to weaken
the statute.
In connection with its authority over electric utilities, the SCC is the
licensing authority for all hydroelectric dams across waters of the state. 1 3
Waters "of the state" and "within the state" have different meanings in
Virginia and the SCC's power is different respecting them. As to waters of
the state (basically, those affecting interstate or foreign commerce) the
Commission has the licensing power for any dams."4 Concerning waters
within the state (those not affecting interstate or foreign commerce) it may
only license dams for the generation of hydroelectric power.Y,
Riparian land is obviously affected by dam construction not only be-
cause the flow of the stream or river is altered but because of pollutants
which are created. Consequently, jurisdictional conflicts have arisen be-
tween the SCC and the State Water Control Board. 26 A recent conflict
involved whether the SCC's or the Water Control Board's proposed mini-
mum release schedules should prevail for a power project on the North
Anna River.'1 Even though the Water Control Board had jurisdiction,
because power development was involved the SCC prevailed.12 To avoid
further conflicts, it has been suggested that "waters of the state" be rede-
fined or that the authority of the SCC and the State Water Control Board
be realigned to avoid overlapping jurisdictions.' 2'
The SCC also exercises regulatory authority over industrialized building
proposed power lines would pass through an area set aside for migratory birds, for example,
wildlife would receive a ten. Id.
123. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-83 (Repl. Vol. 1973). A hearing is required before such a dam
may be constructed and before a license is granted the SCC must determine "that the public
interest will be thereby promoted or will not be detrimentally affected," Id. See also id.
§ 62.1-89; Brasfield, supra note 119, at 598.
124. Vaughan v. VEPCO, 211 Va. 500, 501-02, 178 S.E.2d 682, 684 (1971). See VA. CODE
ANN. § 62.1-81 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
125. Vaughan v. VEPCO, 211 Va. 500, 501-02, 178 S.E.2d 682, 684 (1971).
126. See Miri, Some Problems of Water Resource Management in Virginia: A Preliminary
Examination, 13 WM. & MARy L. REv. 388, 401-07 (1971).
127. Id. at 410.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 406.
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units and mobile homes in a manner similar to that exercised by the State
Board of Housing over buildings in general. 3 ' The SCC is responsible for
establishing standards of health and safety for these units'3 ' and is also
responsible, along with local building officials,'32 for their enforcement.'3
The influence on land use is much more limited than that of the State
Board of Housing, of course, because the SCC's scope of authority is much
narrower. Nevertheless, within these limits, the Commission has estab-
lished detailed standards which affect land use to the extent that they
make industrial and mobile units more or less desirable than other alterna-
tives. This is especially true in the case of mobile homes, which require
little more in the way of land than what they actually occupy and often
result in dozens of families being clustered together in mobile home parks.
To aid enforcement of its regulations, the SCC keeps a list of approved
facilities which inspect industrialized and mobile units for compliance
with the Commission's safety standards. These facilities affix a permanent
label on units after they have passed inspection indicating compliance
with the SCC's regulations. ' After a unit has been labeled, the manufac-
turer applies the SCC's registration seal.' 5 Once a unit is labeled and
registered it is considered to be in complinace with all local requirements
and is subject to only minimal inspection by a local building official.' 3 On
the other hand, an unlabeled unit cannot be used in Virginia until it has
been fully inspected by the local building official for the locality in which
it is to be used.' 7 The labelling requirements are obviously for the protec-
tion of purchasers of industrial and mobile homes, but in the area of
unlabeled units a problem has arisen. Such units must carry a warning
that they are not labeled and that they must be "approved by the local
building official having jurisdiction." ' A person buying an industrial or
mobile home in one jurisdiction for use in another is faced with the possi-
bility that the unit could be inspected and approved in the jurisdiction of
130. See text accompanying notes 14-18, supra.
131. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-73 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
132. Id. § 36-81.
133. Id. § 36-82. The Office of the Chief Fire Marshall represents the SCC in enforcement
of its regulations. VA. INDUS. BLDG. UNrr & MOBILE HOME SAFETY REGS., § 102-2 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as INDUS. BLDG. REGS.]. Violation of any of the Commission's regulations
is a misdemeanor carrying a maximum fine of five hundred dollars. VA. CODE ANN. § 36-83
(Cum. Supp. 1974).
134. INDUS. BLDG. REGS. §§ 100, 500-1 to -4.
135. Id. §§ 501-1, -2.
136. Id. § 103-2.
137. Id. § 103-3.
138. Id. § 103-3.1.
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purchase and subsequently disapproved in the jurisdiction where it is to
be used. The SCC recognizes the problem but still requires that the unit
be approved by a building official in the locality where it will be used. 3
Whether the benefit of such a requirement is worth the possible problems
to an unsuspecting' purchaser is questionable. The problem would be
partially resolved by making it clear that the "local building official" refers
to the locality where the unit will be located. The buyer would certainly
be on notice but would still face the possibility that the local building
official where the unit is located would reject it. A better solution would
require inspection in the locality where the unit is purchased to be recog-
nized in any other locality as meeting all requirements.
The Commission has not been timid about enforcing its regulations even
where the federal government has been involved. In 1972 the Department
of Housing & Urban Development had purchased a large number of mobile
homes for assistance in flood relief.'4 Although these units were unlabeled,
the SCC felt that as long as HUD held title to them and charged no rent,
that it (the SCC) could take no action.' However, the SCC informed HUD
that if it were to sell, rent or give away units in Virginia it would be
considered a dealer and in violation of state law.'
As broad as the State Corporation Commission's authority is, it does not
appear that this authority will be narrowed in the near future. In fact with
respect to land use the contrary appears to be the case. The 1975 General
Assembly proposed legislation which would have given the SCC the power
to lease and sell land on Virginia's outer continental shelf for oil and gas
drilling. 44 Because the United States Supreme Court decided in United
States v. Maine that the Atlantic coastal states do not own land beyond
the three mile limit' the statute did not become effective.
The wisdom of placing considerable land use control with the SCC is
questionable. The involvement of corporations or power development does
not necessarily mean that the SCC has the staff with the greatest expertise
in the area. In some cases an environmental agency might more appropri-
ately control the area, in others the creation of a new agency should be
considered.'
139. VA. INDUS. BLDG. LAW INFO. BuLL. 12-74 (Oct. 3, 1974).
140. Unsuspecting, because in spite of the warning, the average buyer would probably feel
safe in having a unit inspected when it is purchased.
141. VA. INDUS. BLDG. LAw INFO. BuLL. 8-72 (Oct. 27, 1972).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See VA. S. 788, 1975 Gen. Assem.
145. Richmond Times-Dispatch, Mar. 18, 1975, § A, at 1, col. 1.
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D. CONCLUSION
State activities which tangentially affect land use exert an important
influence which can not be ignored in Virginia's land use goals. The need
for a state land use plan and a coordinating agency is even more apparent
in this area than with state activities which directly affect land use. Agen-
cies tend to view their particular area of concern as the most important
and to forget that other considerations must be balanced. The Highway
Department is particularly distressed over its coordination requirements
with numerous agencies and the imposition of negative requirements with
few or no positive goals.
A state agency empowered to promulgate and supervise a land use plan
could eliminate jurisdictional conflict and bureaucratic red tape which
currently exists among state agencies exercising land use influence, and
positive goals and objectives could be set. Coordination on the state level
would not have to be inconsistent with local planning. In fact state and
local authorities should work together more closely to insure that a proper
balance is maintained between state and local needs. Adequate provisions
for public hearings could also be maintained and strengthened so that
neither level of government would be permitted to act contrary to the
public interest or in disregard of individual concerns. The first step in such
a plan requires Virginia to establish an agency which would function exclu-
sively in the area of land use planning.
VII. STATE AGENCIES DIRECTLY AFFECTING LAND USE
Although Virginia has not developed a state program of land use regula-
tion or planning, the following state agencies affect growth and develop-
ment in the exercise of their present statutory powers. The current agencies
with land use responsibilities are primarily concerned with environmental
quality.
However, Virginia has shown a reluctance to initiate a coordinated and
effective plan for the development of the state's land resources. The ab-
sence of meaningful land use planning by the following agencies reflects
this reluctance.
A. COUNCIL ON T1 ENVIRONMENT
As part of the Virginia Environmental Quality Act,' and in furtherance
1. VA. CODE ANN. § 10-177 to -186 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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of a new constitutional mandate,2 the Governor's Council on the Environ-
ment was created in 1972. 3 The Council consists of ten members, three
appointed by the Governor and the balance consisting of chairmen of re-
lated state environmental agencies.' Serving as an advisory arm of the
executive, the Council is designed to insure uniform and coherent environ-
mental policies, coordination among state agencies, and implementation
of the overall environmental policy of the state.' Since numerous state
agencies play key roles in Virginia's environmental and natural resource
management, the Council has sought to establish a climate of cooperation
and coordination to facilitate information sharing and joint efforts by these
agencies. The Council holds annual public hearings throughout Virginia,
issues a report on its activities and the state of the environment, and makes
recommendations designed to strike a balance between environmental pro-
tection and the economic well-being of the state.'
The Council is empowered to conduct pre-construction environmental
impact review for certain state and federal projects,8 enabling it to insure
rational land use decisions. As the state liaison for communications with
federal agencies involving environmental problems,' the Council has as-
sumed the task of coordinating the review of environmental impact state-
ments with the federal government under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) for proposed major projects which are federally funded
2. To the end that the people have clean air, pure water, and the use and enjoyment
for recreation of adequate public lands, waters and other natural resources, it shall be
the policy of the Commonwealth to conserve, develop, and utilize its natural resources,
its public lands, and its historical sites and buildings. Further, it shall be the Common-
wealth's policy to protect its atmosphere, lands, and waters from pollution, impair-
ment, or destruction, for the benefit, enjoyment, and general welfare of the people of
the Commonwealth.
VA. CONsT. art. XI, § 1.
The 1971 Virginia Constitution elevated protection of the environment to a position which
may be termed "fundamental." Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58 VA.
L. REV. 193 (1972). It is an enduring "constitutional statement of public policy which serves
to bind state agencies and officials, as well as courts, and which gives meaning and substance
to Virginia's public trust in its lands, waters and other natural resources." Id. at 207.
3. VA. CODE ANN. § 10-180 (Repl. Vol. 1973). The Council on the Environment was first
established in 1970 by former Governor Linwood Holton, however, it was reconstituted and
given statutory standing in 1972.
4. Id. § 10-181 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1974). The 1975 Virginia Gen-
eral Assembly added a tenth member to the Council on the Environment. (H.B. No. 1762).
5. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-184.1 to -185 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1974).
6. THE CouNcIL ON THE ENvmoNMrEr, THE STATE OF Vsonmu's ENVIRONMENT 13 (Dec. 1973).
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 10-186 (Repl. Vol. 1973). The annual report is published and made
available for purchase by the public.
8. Id. § 10-17.108 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
9. Id. § 10-185 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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or licensed.'" In 1973, the Council was given the task of evaluating the
environmental impact of all state construction projects costing over
$100,000 with the exception of highways." Absent, however, is the author-
ity to require private developers to submit environmental impact state-
ments.
1. Environmental Impact Statements
The environmental impact statement (EIS) is instrumental in the Coun-
cil's review of a proposed project. Guidelines for preliminary environmen-
tal impact statements (PEIS) have been furnished to state agencies for use
when qualifying construction is proposed.' 2 The PEIS program represents
the Council's attempt through early warning and advanced planning to
obviate the need for a full scale EIS which would not only be time consum-
ing but also financially impractical for smaller projects. 3 Such statements
are to be submitted well in advance of construction 4 and are to detail the
following:
1. The environmental impact of the proposed construction;
2. Any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided if the pro-
posed construction is undertaken;
3. Measures proposed to minimize the impact of the proposed construction;
4. Any alternatives to the proposed construction; and
5. Any irreversible environmental changes which would be involved in the
proposed construction."
Upon receipt of the PEIS, the Council reviews it and if necessary solicits
the technical expertise of other state agencies competent to assess environ-
10. THE COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, PROCEDURES MANUAL FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
IMPACT STATEMENTS IN THE COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 1 (Dec. 1973). See also The National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970). The Council provides
state input for the federal review. Federally licensed projects such as nuclear power plants
licensed under the Atomic Energy Commission are reviewed although private in nature.
11. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-17.107 to .112 (Cum. Supp. 1974). "The environmental impact
statement is not merely a procedural matter which is to be treated as an appendix to decisions
already made; it is intended to affect and alter those decisions as necessary." VIRGINIA'S
ENVIRONMENT, supra note 6, at 12. "Highway projects are excepted because many are already
covered by federal requirements." THE COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENTS PROGRESS REPORT 1 (Dec. 1973).
12. PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 10.
13. The state agency usually sends an officer or its planner to discuss environmental
impact with the Council on the Environment.
14. This insures that sufficient time is allowed "to permit any modification of the proposed
construction which may be necessitated because of environmental impact." VA. CODE ANN.
§ 10-17.111 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
15. Id. § 10-17.108. Aesthetic considerations are left to the localities through such devices
as zoning. See generally Section I, supra.
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mental impact.'" At the conclusion of the review, the Council reports its
recommendations to the Governor who ultimately decides the fate of the
project." Prior to written approval of the Governor, the State Comptroller
is directed not to authorize payments of funds from the treasury for con-
struction.'" Through this informal review process ". . . which is a product
of the interaction between the State agencies preparing PEIS's and the
environmental review agencies and other interested parties. . . . ,"I the
Council hopes to avoid the necessity of a full scale EIS,25 at the same time
insuring the rational use of land."'
In Virginia, decisions relating to land use have traditionally been local
in nature." Localities which have the advantage of proximity to local prob-
lems and feelings, are generally free to implement zoning and other land
use schemes.Y Unfortunately, localities are often technically incompetent
and too compromising to local interests.2 Moreover, they lack the capabil-
ity to supervise projects which have a greater than local significance in
16. PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 10, at 13.
17. At the time of submission to the Governor, the statement of the Council is available
to the General Assembly and to the general public. The statement to the Governor is made
within 60 days of receipt of the environmental impact report. VA. CODE ANN. § 10-17.109
(Cum. Supp. 1974).
18. Id. § 10-17.110.
19. PROCEDURES MANUAL, supra note 10, at 17.
Each reviewing agency will examine the proposed project in view of its statutory
authority, policies and practices and report on any inconsistencies with the environ-
mental policies of Virginia and measures it plans to take to eliminate the inconsisten-
cies . . . . [Tihe commenting agencies may recommend modifications to the pro-
posed facility which will avoid or minimize adverse environmental impacts. Id. at 19-
20.
Each agency has thirty days to respond for state projects. Id. "The Council views public
participation in the review process as necessary and desirable." Id. at 8. Ideally, prior to
submission of a PEIS, a notice of intent should be filed with the Council indicating PEIS's
are being prepared and when they can be expected. Id. at 16.
20. Id. at 18.
21. [O]ur procedure will reflect and facilitate a unity of purpose and direction among
state environmental agencies that results in a review process that is efficient, compre-
hensive, consistent and open. We also hope to gain a fuller appreciation of the patterns
of development as a guide to assessing aggregate impacts and an overall picture of land
use trends. PROGRESS REPORT, supra note 11, at 5.
22. VIRGINIA ADVISORY LEGISLATIVE CouNcm, LAND UsE POLICmS, 13 (1974). See generally
Vestal, Government Fragmentation in Urban Areas, 43 U. COLO. L. REv. 155 (1971).
23. "Virginia and its political subdivisions have an impressive lot of good land use laws
and programs. .... However, the evidence shows the available land use planning mecha-
nisms are too often not put to good use." VIoINIA ADVISORY LEGISLATIVE CouNcIL, LAND USE
Poucms, 13 (1974).
24. Communities are often eager to increase their real estate tax bases and consequently
are anxious to attract development. Id. at 14.
1975]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
their impact upon the environment." The attendant "parochialism""8 and
disregard for effects on neighboring localities points to the need for a bal-
anced regional or state framework for land use decisions.Y
Although the Council on the Environment has initiated efforts to man-
age state or federal capital outlays affecting land,2" a roadblock to land use
management exists in traditional attitudes toward private ownership of
land.H Fear of government intervention into private land use decisions
impedes such involvement:
[O]ur legal and political structures are heavily biased toward resource de-
velopment through a free enterprise system. Government controls of land use
have been adopted in each instance only as absolutely necessary exceptions
in order to meet specific urgency problems, and even then, only after bitter
resistance. 0
25. "[E]nvironmental impact of many developments simply does not coincide with the
boundaries between political subdivisions." Id. at 13.
Surely it is naive ... to think the consequences of one property user's activities are
confined to his property. Property does not exist in isolation. Particular parcels are tied
to one another in complex ways, and property is more accurately described as being
inextricably part of a network of relationships which is neither limited to, nor usefully
defined by, the property boundaries with which the legal system is accustomed to
dealing. Frequently, use of any given parcel of property is at the same time effectively
a use of, or a demand upon, property beyond the border of the user. Sax, Takings,
Private Property and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149, 152 (1971).
26. See Feiler, Metropolitanization and Land-Use Parochialism-Toward a Judicial
Attitude, 69 MICH. L. REv. 655 (1971).
27. In Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 6 Cal. 3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972),
the California Supreme Court stated "that a municipality may no longer make land use
decisions that serve its own interests at the expense of the interests of neighboring nonresi-
dents." Comment, Judicial Limitations on Parochialism in Municipal Land Use Decisions:
Scott v. City of Indian Wells, 25 HAST. L. J. 739, 767 (1974).
28. See accompanying text and footnotes on Environmental Impact Statements (EIS).
29. The difficulty of operating an effective land use policy for the State of Virginia can be
perceived with the realization that, according to the most recent estimates, approxi-
mately ninety per cent of the land in the State is under private ownership. The situa-
tion is further complicated by the traditional attitude in the Commonwealth reflecting
a minimum amount of regulation for the use of private land. THE COUNCIL ON THE
ENVIRONMENT, LAND USE TASK FORCE REPORT 34 (Dec. 1971).
30. Id. at 10.
Since real property cannot be separated from its environment and since successive
generations will depend upon it for sustenance, the integrity of the land and its ecosys-
tems demands that the arbitrary personal use of any part of it be subject to social
interposition if the acts of an owner pose a threat to the continuing welfare of the
community. Caldwell, Rights of Ownership or Rights of Use?-The Need for a New
Conceptual Basis for Land Use Policy, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 759, 766 (1974).
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The Council on Environment is in theory charged with the duty of imple-
menting the state's policy of protecting the environment. However, such a
broad generalization is deceiving. Enabling legislation which would allow
supervision of private development is lacking as well as a state land use
plan which would furnish specific policies for implementation. As a result,
the Council has no authority to fill the vacuum on nonregulation existing
among localities nor can it reach private land use decisions." Cumbersome
state bureaucracy to achieve these ends is not advocated, but it is apparent
that additional state or federal input will be required in the future to
prevent the often myopic use of land.2
2. Conclusion
The Virginia General Assembly is exhorted by the Virginia Constitution
to work in concert with state agencies and private citizens to protect the
environment." The state, however, has not furnished its agencies or its
citizenry with a comprehensive land use plan or strategy to make this
mandate meaningful." Broad constitutional statements on environmental
protection, although certainly not without meaning, fail to provide specific
policies so essential to daily public and private decisions affecting land.
The EIS process is well conceived but is at best only a token effort due to
its limited scope.
A voluntary redefinition of rights arising out of and incident to private
land ownership is not likely to be forthcoming.35 Consequently, in the
31. See Comment, Environmental Law: State Land Use Statutes, 13 WASHBUN L.J. 232,
233 (1974). Attempts to make the environmental impact statement extend to private develop-
ment have failed. The 1975 Virginia General Assembly refused a bill (H.B. 923) requiring such
a statement for land use involving a high density development.
32. Interview with B.C. Leynes, Associate Director of the Commerce and Resources Section
of the Division of State Planning and Community Affairs, in Richmond, Virginia, Nov. 22,
1974. "[W]here these higher levels of government demonstrate the inability to act, munici-
pal police power can be an effective alternative until a uniform and coordinated policy is
formulated." Comment, Expanding the Role of Municipal Police Power in Pollution Control:
A Pragmatic Appioach, 21 BuFFAw L. Rzv. 139, 173 (1971).
33. VA. CONST. art. XI.
34. Land use control should not be viewed as an essentially negative mechanism that seeks
to prohibit certain specified uses. Such plans should also aid and encourage certain more
beneficial uses of land. Metropolitanization and Land-Use, supra note 26, at 658. A statewide
plan while insuring an even distribution of growth and providing local guidance would also
insure that policy decisions throughout the state would prevent the land from being ravaged.
Too often land use legislation comes in the wake of destructive development. Even if the focus
of land use control is to remain local, a master strategy would insure that the local adminis-
tration is effective and would require cooperative planning for development with a greater
than local significance.
35. The presistence of archaic conepts of ownership rights is possibly the principal
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absence of further state or federal initiatives, uniform land use manage-
ment will be slow in coming to Virginia.
B. STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD
The State Water Control Board is charged with the responsibility of
implementing the state's water policies. Although the Board has no au-
thority to institute direct land use controls, any forceful measures designed
to maintain the water quality of Virginia will affect the pattern of growth
in the state. Land use and water policy are inextricably related; thus, an
attempt to deal with the issue of water quality should be closely aligned
with a program of land use control. 8
Virginia has made a firm commitment to the protection of its water
resources." The Board was established in 194611 and the Division of Water
Resources was merged into it in 1972 creating one state agency to supervise
the preservation of Virginia water resources. 9
1. Effect of Federal Law
The recent advent of federal concern in the area of water quality has
resulted in the powers of the Board being grounded not only upon state
law, but also the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972.10 Under this Act, each state is required to promulgate water quality
standards which are acceptable to the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA).41
obstacle to effective land use planning. A redefinition of the rights flowing to an
individual from his ownership in land is thus a necessary concomitant to land use
planning, as well as to environmental management. Land law rooted in the conven-
tions of Tudor England cannot be expected to serve the needs of the post-industrial
society now emerging. Caldwell, Rights of Ownership or Rights of Use?-The Need for
a New Conceptual Basis for Land Use Policy, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 759-60 (1974).
36. W. R. WALKER, INTEGRATED STATE LAND AND WATER POLICY: COMPLEMENTS AND CON-
FL.cTS, IN LAND USE ISSUES, PROCEEDINGS OF A CONFERENCE 22 (Publication 629, Cooperative
Extension Service November 1974).
37. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-10 TO -13 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
38. The Board consists of seven members appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the
General Assembly. Id. § 62.1-44.8 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
39. Id. § 62.1-44.35 (1973).
40. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251 to 1376 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (often referred to by Pub. Law No. 92-
500). See also Section X, infra.
41. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313 (Cum. Supp. 1975). Under this section, if a state fails to establish
acceptable standards, the E.P.A. has the duty to prepare and publish regulations setting forth
water quality standards for the state. Acceptable standards for the control of the discharge
of pollutants are ones which require the application and enforcement of standards of perform-
ance to at least the same extent as those which are established by the E.P.A. Id. § 1316(c).
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Water quality standards are enforced by requiring a permit or certificate
as a condition precedent to conducting any activity which may result in
discharge into navigable waters.2 If a state establishes its own permit
program and its water pollution agency has adequate implementation au-
thority, the state program will supplant the federal permit requirements.43
Before acceptance, the state must have an approved continuing planning
process which sets forth the standards and plans to be used."
Another important aspect of the federal effect on the Board's power is
the extensive grant funds available to aid in the construction of waste
treatment plants.4 Before any sanitary district can receive federal assis-
tance to upgrade its sewage treatment facilities, it must meet Board ap-
proval and conform to state plans and standards." Because of the high
costs involved in meeting the current pollution standards, localities have
actively sought federal assistance to mitigate the expense of such facili-
ties.47 The Board's control of this funding allows it to play an influential
role in determining what measures the localities must take in order to meet
the strain on sewage treatment facilities created by urbanization and de-
velopment. 8
The federal statutes empower EPA to bring an action against persons
violating conditions or limitations on a permit issued by the Board,49 and
if a pollution source or combination of sources presents an imminent and
substantial danger to anyone's health or livelihood, EPA may seek an
injunction to restrain the pollution source." Furthermore, a private citizen
42. Id. § 1341.
43. Id. § 1342(b), (c).
44. Id. § 1313(e).
45. Id. § 1281.
46. Id. § 1284(2), (3). The plans and standards referred to by this section is the continuing
planning process required of the state under 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(e).
47. The Board in fiscal year 1973 allocated seventy-seven million dollars to thirteen Vir-
ginia communities for construction of facilities. STATE WATER CONTROL BoARD, FIRST ANNUAL
REPORT 5 (Fall, 1972-Winter, 1973).
48. See VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15:1 (Cum. Supp. 1974). If the Board commits itself to
provide financial assistance from federal and state funds to a locality or authority in control
of sewage treatment, then it has the power to require that sewage treatment facilities be
constructed to upgrade the present level of treatment and abate existing water pollution or
expand the system to accommodate additional growth. This represents an expansion of the
Board's power under its permit program which is discussed below.
49. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1319 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
50. Id. § 1364. This statute specifically mentions the marketing of shellfish as being an
endangerment to the livelihood of persons. This is of particular interest in Virginia because
the decisions of the Board in the tidewater area are often influenced by the possible harm to
shellfish areas caused by pollution discharges.
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may bring suit against any person alleged to be in violation of federal or
state water quality standards.'
Virginia possessed a permit system of regulating water pollution prior to
federal regulation and was one of the first states to be granted interim
permit authorization by EPA. 2 But the federal legislation has resulted in
a strengthening of the Board's authority because any curtailment of the
Board's power by the state would result in administration of the same
standards by EPA. The choice is no longer whether Virginia will have a
water quality control program -but who will administer it, the Board or
EPA.
2. State Statutory Provisions
The Board has a good deal of discretion in determining what is necessary
to preserve water quality in Virginia. It is authorized to establish and
change any standards of quality, to take all appropriate steps to prevent
water quality alteration contrary to the public interest or established stan-
dards,53 and to adopt any regulations it deems necessary to enforce its
water quality management program. 4
The Virginia definition of water pollution is broad and inclusive .5 Under
Virginia Code section 62.1-44.3 almost any change in the natural condition
of the land that produces an alteration of the physical, chemical or biologi-
cal property of water can constitute pollution. The land use implications
are substantial. For example, Attorney General Andrew Miller has stated
that this definition includes pollution caused by sediment runoff from the
land. Increased development and urbanization of land will inevitably
result in sediment runoff.
The Attorney General's opinion also indicates that the Board has au-
thority to control non-point source pollution57 which would give it potential
51. Id. § 1365.
52. STATE WATER CONTROL BOARD, VIRGINIA WATER 5 (April 1973).
53. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15(3)(a) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
54. Id. § 62.1-44.15(10).
55. Id. § 62.1-44.3(6). When this statute was amended, the framers intended to create a
definition broad enough to include thermal pollution and the loss of dissolved oxygen in the
water due to the constructions of dams. VA. CODE COMMISSION, REVISION OF TrrLE 62 OF THE
CODE OF VIRGINIA (1967). Virginia's definition is superior to that of most jurisidictions and is
believed to result in a tightening of common law nuisance. Note, Public Regulation of Water
Quality in Virginia, 13 WM. & MARY L. REV. 424, 444-46 (1971).
56. 1972 Op. ATr'Y GE. 374.
57. Non-point discharges are discharges that result from water running off the land. Point




power to regulate land use whenever activity on land results in water
pollution. 8 The Board has exercised restraint in the area of non-point
source pollution control, but a recent enforcement action against an or-
chard owner in Albemarle County illustrates the effect on land use of this
power. The orchard owner had sprayed his trees with a chemical which was
later discharged into a stream in the runoff froin the orchard. The result
was a fish kill and an action against the owner by the Board. 9 Although
the enforcement action was motivated by concern over water quality, fin-
ancial and other impairments created by the litigation impinged on the
owner's use of the land as an orchard.
3. Exercise of Authority
The Board's efforts to combat water pollution are centered largely
around the administration of its permit program. It consists of issuance of
certificates for discharge of sewage, industrial and other wastes." The
Board is also empowered to issue special orders to parties who permit or
cause pollution of state waters or violate the conditions of certificates of
discharge."
The Board's authority does not constitute a direct form of land use
planning because it is basically reactive. However, the active exercise of
its power in a conscientious effort to preserve water quality creates a re-
striction on the free use of the land. Anyone contemplating the construc-
tion of an industrial facility or a subdivision should be cognizant of the
requirement for a certificate to discharge industrial wastes or sewage. The
high costs of meeting the conditions imposed by the issuance of the certifi-
cate could make the planned development economically prohibitive for a
given location.
The Board has received pressure recently to become more involved in
actual land use control when issuing sewage discharge certificates in a
58. Neither the statutory definition of pollution nor the statutory powers of the Board draw
a distinction between point and non-point source pollution. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-
44.3(6), -44.15 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
59. Id. § 62.1-44.15(11).
60. Id. § 62.1-44.15(5). This section provides for certificate regulation of sewage, industrial
waste, and other wastes. The reason for the inclusion of "other wastes" was to provide a
"catchall" for appropriate control by the Board of all substances other than industrial wastes
and sewage which may cause pollution in the waters of Virginia. REviSiON OF TrrLE 62, supra
note 55, at 15. Pursuant to this statutory authority, there are presently 1200 permits regulat-
ing waste discharges in the state. In 1972-73, 182 old sewage certificates were revoked and
225 new ones were issued, and 72 old industrial waste permits were revoked with 121 new ones
issued, including 88 "non-discharge" certificates. SWCB, ANN. REP. supra note 47, at 6.
61. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15(8)(a) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
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region containing shellfish areas. Because shellfish can easily become con-
taminated and unsafe to harvest as a result of pollution,"2 development
which results in increased water pollution in the Tidewater area has met
with acute opposition from representatives of the shellfish industry.
When the Board grants a discharge certificate to a sewage treatment
facility, its concern is to insure that the facility itself does not emit a
dangerous level of pollution into state waters. However, the Board has been
requested to consider, not only the facility's effect, but also the resulting
pollution caused by future land development in the vicinity of the sewage
treatment plant. 3 It is unclear whether the Board has the statutory author-
ity to consider the factor of future growth in its permit program." With
increasing growth throughout the state endangering Virginia's water qual-
ity, more pressure may be exerted on the Board to engage in projections
of future land use in rendering its decisions.
The most controversial exercise of power by the Board with land use
implications is a moratorium on the building of sewers or new connections
62. See Memorandum to General P. McCarthy, Council of the Environment from Mack I.
Shanholtz, M.D., November 25, 1974.
63. Cabin Creek Pre-Hearing Order, at 14-15 (Nov. 1973) (on file at the Board). This order
involved a petition by developers for a discharge certificate to construct a sewage treatment
plant to service a planned development. Representatives of the shellfish industry intervened
seeking to restrain the issuance of a certificate.
64. A member of the Board's Enforcement Division expressed to this writer the opinion
that the Board's concern should only be whether the plant itself will result in pollution and
there should be no consideration of any future, indirect effects such as the development served
by the facility.
Although the specific powers of the Board may not encompass the consideration of such
extrinsic factors, the powers and duties of the Board, when viewed in the aggregate, may allow
such action. However, VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.15:1 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (Cum.
Supp. 1974) does impose certain limitations on such actions by the Board. It provides:
Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to empower the Board to require
the State, or any political subdivision thereof, or any authority created under the
provisions of § 15.1-1241, to construct any sewerage system, sewage treatment works,
or water treatment plant, wast6 treatment works or system necessary to (1) upgrade
the present level of treatment in existing systems or works to abate existing pollution
of State waters, or (2) expand a system or works to accommodate additional growth,
unless the Board shall have previously committed itself to provide financial assistance
from federal and State funds equal to the maximum amount provided for under § 8 or
other applicable sections of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act (P. L. 84-660, as
amended), or unless the State or political subdivision or authority agrees, or is directed
by the Board with the concurrence of the Governor, to proceed with such construction,
subject to reimbursement under § 8, or other applicable sections of such federal act.
The foregoing restriction shall not apply to those cases where existing sewerage
systems or sewage or other waste treatment works cease to perform in accordance with
their approved certificate requirements.
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to existing sewers. Under an administrative rule promulgated by the
Board, it can impose such a moratorium when a Sanitary District is failing
to treat sewage adequately and thus polluting state waters. 5 The effect of
this action is severe curtailment of construction in the affected area.
The Board's invocation of this measure has led to resistance and litiga-
tion. In 1970, such a moratorium was imposed on Fairfax County, one of
the fastest growing areas in the nation, because it had failed to improve
its sewage discharge treatment program to accommodate growth. In re-
sponse, the County prepared a plan to alleviate the problem and meet the
standards required by the Board. The protest from developers was vocifer-
ous and court actions were initiated to determine the moratorium's effect
on development planned before its imposition. 6
The Board sought to enforce its moratorium by obtaining an injunction
to stop additional sewage connections until permissible pollution limits
were met." The court refused to grant the injunction, basing its decision
on the good faith efforts of the County to implement its plan for improving
sewage treatment facilities. The detrimental economic effects of the mora-
torium were noted but development was allowed to continue because the
upgrading of sewage treatment would enable the County to accommodate
additional growth.6" The court temporarily lifted the moratorium and or-
dered periodic progress reports of the County's corrective actions."9
Perhaps the best illustration of the Board's role is provided in a series
of hearings held in 1973 to determine whether a moratorium should be
imposed on Hampton Roads Sanitation District."0 The situation arose
when local authorities failed to plan adequate sewage treatment facilities
capable of accommodating the area's growth. Since improvement of se-
wage treatment would mean higher rates for resident-users, there was a
reluctance to act until the Board threatened to impose a moratorium on
sewage hook-ups.7' The witnesses before the Board were representatives of
the different interests which must be balanced in land use decisions. Real-
65. State Water Control Board, Requirement No. 1 (1961). This and other regulations of
the Board are set forth in SWCB, State Water Control Law.
66. Board Files, Fairfax County July 1973 - September 1973.
67. State Water Control Board v. Board of Supervisors, Chancery No. 31671 (Fairfax
County, Va. Cir. Ct. July 28, 1970), 1 ENv. REP. 1482 (1970).
68. 1 ENv. REP. 1482 at 1483 (1970).
69. Id. at 1483 (1970).
70. These hearings are on file at the Board.
71. SWCB, Record of Hearing, Hampton Roads Sanitation District, James River Plant at
29-30 (Richmond, Va. April 23, 1973). According to Mr. John Buckley of the Newport News
Federation of Civil Organizations, "the city knew of the vast increase in demand because of
a record number of new building permits but did not plan for it." Id. at 69.
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tors and construction industry representatives spoke of the harmful eco-
nomic effects of a moratorium. Countering their testimony were spokes-
men for environmental groups and the shellfish industry who argued that
state water quality standards were being violated and the Board should act
accordingly.
The firm state and federal statutory base of the Board became apparent
in these hearings. When a state senator voiced opposition to the morato-
rium and stated that such actions could persuade the General Assembly
to reduce the Board's power,7" Chairman Cole of the Board pointed out that
due to federal law, such legislation would only shift control to EPA and
localities would still have to meet the standards.7 1
The Board is reluctant to impose a moratorium and if the locality is
making its best efforts to upgrade sewage treatment, such action will not
be used. Land use per se is not a concern of the Board and attempts to
implement a moratorium for purposes other than water quality have been
rejected by the Board as a misuse of water control law. 4
4. The Groundwater Act of 1973
Current concern over the preservation of Virginia's groundwater re-
sources may result in another conflict between the Board's exercise of
power and future development. As in the sewage waste issue discussed
above, the absence of effective growth planning has resulted in a water
quality problem, and the Board is intervening in the interest of preserving
water quality with remedial action that has the effect of curtailing land
development.
In many areas of Virginia, groundwater is the primary water resource
and with increasing urbanization, the supply has been severely taxed. In
1971, it was estimated that groundwater withdrawal in some areas was
forty times higher than thirty years earlier.75 When the withdrawal of
groundwater is too rapid, the ability of the aquifer, source of the groundwa-
72. Id. at 37-38.
73. Id. at 40. The effect of federal legislation on the Board's power is discussed in the
accompanying text and footnotes. The Board informed the local authorities that a failure to
meet the standards could result in suits by private citizens or the E.P.A. and fines and
possible imprisonment as a consequence.
74. See, SWCB, Record of Hearing, Boat Harbor Sewage Treatment Plant, (Richmond,
Va. September 17, 1973). In this instance, the Board stated certain officials in the Health
Department were desirous of having a moratorium imposed for reasons divorced from water
quality. Id. at 6-8.
75. Miri, Some Problems of Water Resource Management in Virginia: A Preliminary
Examination, 13 WM. & MARY L. Rav. 388, 413 (1971).
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ter, to replenish itself is endangered and the result is a possible exhaustion
of supply."
In 1973, the Groundwater Act was enacted giving the Board authority
to preserve and protect groundwater resources." As a result, the rights of
groundwater users in Virginia underwent a transformation from a protec-
tive common law policy to the implementation of government control. At
common law in Virginia, the owner of real property was considered to own
groundwater found on the property.78 The owner could, in the absence of
malice or negligence, appropriate such water for his own use even if such
use diverted groundwater from adjacent property to the extent of exhaust-
ing its supply.79
The Groundwater Act of 1973 represents a shift from the view of private
ownership of groundwater:
[Tihe right to reasonable control of all groundwater resources within this
State belongs to the public and that in order to conserve, protect and benefi-
cially utilize the groundwater of this State and to ensure the preservation of
the public welfare, safety and health, it is essential that provision be made
for control of groundwater resources. 0
State control of groundwater resources is centered around establishment
of critical groundwater areas in which the Board will enforce use
regulations.8" Proceedings may be initiated by the Board to declare a por-
tion of the state a critical groundwater area whenever there is an excessive
decline in the groundwater level, the wells of two or more groundwater
users interfere with one another, the available supply is in danger of being
76. Id. The diminishing of groundwater resources affects not only the quantity for use but
also results in quality deterioration because the pollution content increases due to salinity
and seepage into the water table of industrial and sewage wastes.
77. Groundwater Act of 1973, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 64.1-44.83 to .107 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
78. Heninger v. McGinnis, 131 Va. 70, 108 S.E. 671 (1921). It should be noted the rule
stated here applies only to subsurface waters which percolate. When subsurface waters flow
in a definite marked channel the owner is entitled to make only a reasonable use of the water
for his tract of land and cannot dispose of or interfere with the natural flow of the surplus.
Id. at 75. The groundwater which this article discusses is percolating water. See also 20
MICHIm'S JURISPRUDENCE, Waters and Watercourses §§ 8-9 (1952).
79. Miller v. Black Rock Springs Improvement Co., 99 Va. 747, 40 S.E. 27 (1901). The
concept of what the owner's use can be is broad. A coal mining operation which caused an
adjacent property owner's spring to cease flowing was considered a lawful use of property and
in the absence of negligence, the mine operator was not liable. C & W Coal Corp. v. Salyer,
200 Va. 18, 104 S.E.2d 50 (1958).
80. VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-44.84 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
81. A critical groundwater area is "a geographically defined area in which the Board has
deemed the levels, supply or quality of groundwater to be adverse to public welfare, health,
and safety." Id. § 62.1-44.85(6).
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overdrawn, or the area's groundwater has or is reasonably expected to
become polluted."2 If the Board finds that it is necessary for the public
health, welfare, and safety, it may declare the area to be a critical ground-
water area. 3
In such an area the common law rules are altered and the right to use
the groundwater is regulated by the issuance of certificates of groundwater
rights. Two exemptions are embodied in the certificate plan: (1) use or
supply of groundwater for agricultural and livestock watering purposes, for
human consumption or domestic purposes, or for any single industrial or
commerical purpose not exceeding fifty thousand gallons a day;85 (2) per-
sons using groundwater in the area or engaging in construction, alteration,
rehabilitation, or extension of a well prior to the declaration have a right
to apply the groundwater to the extent of their intended beneficial uses, 8
and obtain a certificate of groundwater rights by simply registering with
the Board.87
Any person who is not exempted must obtain a certificate from the
Board before using groundwater in a critical groundwater area., The issu-
ance of certificates is predicated upon the effect the applicant's use will
have on persons already engaged in groundwater use in the area." This
results in the alteration of the common law concept of groundwater use
without regard to diversion from other users. Instead, a priority system is
created based upon the idea of first in time, first in right. By making use
of the groundwater, the property owner acquires a vested right in the
groundwater supply which will be protected by the Board.
The Groundwater Act has been in force for a short period of time and
its impact on land use is not fully known. However, on January 24, 1975,
the Board declared a large portion of sou~theastern Virginia a critical
groundwater area and began to exercise its enforcement powers. 8
82. Id. § 62.1-44.95.
83. Id. § 62.1-44.96.
84. Id. § 62.1-44.97.
85. Id. § 62.1-44.87.
86. Id. § 62.1-44.93.
87. Id. § 62.1-44.97.
88. Id. § 62.1-44.99. This section requires any such user to register with the Board to
preserve his right to use the groundwater in a critical groundwater area. The Board will not
examine the effect of the use on the area groundwater supply but will automatically issue a
certificate to the registrant.
89. Id. § 62.1-44.100(e).
90. The background for this action by the Board is available in the Memorandum for




The absence of effective land use planning is a definite factor in produc-
ing strains upon water quality. The State Water Control Board, through
enforcement action, will often impose controls which curtail and restrict
an owner's use of his property. This indirect form of land use control should
diminish in the future if a program of controlled growth is developed for
Virginia.
If Virginia does initiate a state-wide land use plan, the Board is equipped
with statutory authority and expertise to supply needed information on
state water quality and resources. 1 Until the development of an effective
land use management program, however, the Board will be unable to pre-
serve fully Virginia's water resources.2
C. STATE AIR POLLUTION CONTROL BOARD
The dramatic increase in the pervasiveness and intensity of man-made
air pollution along with the failure of the states to initiate meaningful
programs designed to abate the problem prompted the federal government
to enact the Clean Air Act of 1970.11 The purpose of the Act is to eliminate
hazardous levels of air pollution by providing uniform standards, financial
assistance, and encouragement for states to implement individual plans
designed to achieve these standards. 4
The Act directs the Administrator of EPA to develop national primary
and secondary ambient air quality standards. 5 These standards establish
the maximum acceptable concentrations of air pollutants for ambient, or
surrounding air." The primary standards are those requisite to the protec-
tion of public health, while the secondary standards are for the protection
of the public welfare.9"
91. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-44.15(2), .36, .38, .39 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
92. According to WALKER, supra note 1, at 27, "Water-quality control, without land-use
control is doomed to failure, for alone it cannot insure a specific quality of water for our
surface streams. In a void, the economics of land-use development will determine the mini-
mum amount of [water] pollution .... "
93. Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-58 (1970). See generally Section X, infra.
94. Congress determined "that the prevention and control of air pollution at its source is
the primary responsibility of States and local governments . . . ... Id. § 1857(a)(3). "Each
State shall have the primary responsibility for assuring air quality within the entire geo-
graphic area comprising such State by submitting an implementation plan for such State
which will specify the manner in which national primary and secondary ambient air quality
standards will be achieved and maintained within each air quality control region in such
State." Id. § 1857c-2(a).
95. Id. § 1857c-4.
96. Id.
97. Id. The national primary ambient air quality standards require "that the concentration
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Each state has the primary responsibility for assuring its air quality and
is required to submit an implementation plan specifying the manner in
which the national primary and secondary air quality standards will be
achieved and maintained.98 Through its implementation plan, each state
retains authority to adopt and enforce standards provided they are not less
stringent than the federal regulations or those approved under the state
implementation plan.9 As a consequence, stricter state regulation is en-
couraged while insuring a minimum air quality level.' 0
The State Air Pollution Control Board of Virginia (SAPCB) was estab-
lished in 1966 and is empowered to conduct investigations and inspec-
tions; ' initiate research;' 2 formulate regulations for controlling air pollu-
tion;13 conduct public hearings;"4 institute legal proceedings;' 5 and issue
of pollutants in the air remain below levels known to cause danger to human health." Com-
ment, The Nondegredation Controversy: How Clean Will Our "Clean Air" Be?, 1974 U. ILL.
L.F. 314, 315 (1974). The national secondary ambient air quality standards require even lower
concentrations of air pollutants:
The goal of these standards is to protect the public welfare from the adverse effects of
air pollution. The concentrations of pollutants in the air can be low enough to eliminate
any danger to public health, yet high enough, nonetheless, to cause reduced visibility,
danger to plant life, and deterioration of paint and metals. The secondary air standards
require air that is pure enough to eliminate even these effects. Id.
98. 42 U..S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970). But see Comment, 1970 Clean Air Amendments: Use and
Abuse of the State Implementation Plan, 26 BAYLOR L. Rlv. 232 (1974) where the author
examines the proposition that state implementation plans allow sufficient latitude within the
state to obstruct the federal purpose.
99. 42 U.S.C. § 1857d-1 (1970). It has been suggested that implicit in the federal act is a
policy preventing deterioration of air presently cleaner than required by federal standards.
In Fri v. Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973), a 4-4 court affirmed a lower court decision [Sierra
Club v. Ruckelshaus, 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972)] granting an injunction which barred
the Administrator of the EPA from approving state plans that allow such deterioration. The
rules and regulations promulgated by the Virginia State Air Pollution Control Board "shall
not promote or encourage any substantial degradation of present air quality in any air basin
or region which has an air quality superior to that stipulated in the rules and regulations."
VA. CODE ANN. § 10-17.18 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, VA. CODE ANN. § 10-17.18(b) (Cum.
Supp. 1974). See Comment, The Nondegradation Controversy: How Clean Will Our "Clean
Air" Be?, supra note 97.
100. In a similar fashion, Virginia encourages stricter local ordinances but insures a mini-
mum standard. For new local ordinances, the State Air Pollution Control Board will not
approve any local ordinance "less stringent than the pertinent regulations of the Board." VA.
CODE ANN. § 10-17.30(b) (Repl. Vol. 1973).
101. Id. § 10-17.17.
102. Id. § 10-17.18(a).




special orders."' SAPCB administers the federally required state imple-
mentation plan' 7 and is one of the tools used to give meaning to Article
XI of the Virginia Constitution which makes preservation of the environ-
ment the stated policy of the Commonwealth.' 8 Significantly, the embodi-
ment of this policy in the Constitution not only signals an environmental
awareness but also "gives additional backing to the actions of agencies
whose statutory mandate it is to police the environment, such as. . . the
Air Polution Control Board.""' Through its regulations, SAPCB has estab-
lished a permit requirement for sources of air pollution."'
Since most land development produces air pollution either directly"'
(industrial development emitting pollutants) or indirectly 2 (development
inducing automobile traffic), SAPCB, through its permit requirement,
participates in the decision-making process for siting of such projects. The
pre-construction review undertaken by the Board must indicate that the
siting of the source and its operation will not impair air quality in the
106. Id. § 10-17.18:1. The failure to comply with SAPCB regulations or orders is a misde-
meanor punishable by a maximum fine of $1,000 for each violation. Each day of continued
violation after a conviction is considered a separate offense. Id. § 10-17.29. A private citizen
is allowed to seek damages or other relief on account of injury to persons or property by air
pollution. Id.
107. VA. CODE ANN. § 10-17.18 (Repl. Vol. 1973). "With the exception set forth in this
subpart, the Administrator approves Virginia's plan for the attainment and maintenance of
the national standards." 40 C.F.R. § 52.2423(a) (1974). "Because of the late submission of
Virginia's plan for review of new or modified indirect sources, the public has not had adequate
opportunity to comment on its approvability. Therefore, the Administrator disapproves this
portion of the plan pending completion of the public comment period and the Administrator's
evaluation of the plan."Id. § 52. 2448(a). The SAPCB information officer stated that the EPA
has informally indicated that the balance of the plan will be approved by July 1975. Tele-
phone Interview with Information Officer, State Air Pollution Control Board, Richmond,
Virginia, Jan. 31, 1975.
108. Article XI of the Virginia Constitution in part provides:
To the end that the people have clean air ... it shall be the policy of the Common-
wealth to conserve ... its natural resources .... Further, it shall be the Common-
wealth's policy to protect its atmosphere ... for pollution, impairment, or destruc-
tion, for the benefit, enjoyment, and general welfare of the people of the Common-
wealth. VA. CONST. art. XI, § 1.
109. Howard, State Constitutions and the Environment, 58 VA. L. Rlv. 193, 215 (1972).
110. Regulations for the Control and Abatement of Air Pollution, The Virginia State Air
Pollution Control Board 2.06 et seq. (1972), as amended, (Supp. 1974) [hereinafter cited as
SAPCB Reg.].
111. "Manufacturing and electric power plants produce about 21% by weight of the total
air pollution in Virginia." THE COUNCIL ON THE ENVIRONMENT, THE STATE OF VIRGINIA'S
ENVIRON MENT, 29.
112. "[E]xhaust emissions from cars, trucks and buses comprise 72% by weight of all air
pollution in Virginia." Id.
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area."' Performance standards, where applicable, must also be met.'"
SAPCB has designated seven air quality control regions in Virginia"5 in
an attempt to provide a decentralized yet coordinated system for reviewing
permit applications and monitoring air quality. The regional approach, by
vesting authority at a level higher than the municipality, facilitates non-
fragmented land use planning as means to pollution control especially for
development which has a greater than local significance." ' At the same
time, regional control is not so remote that it fails to harmonize problems
peculiar to a locality with the interests of the region. The regional approach
to air pollution represents a departure from the past:
Historically, land use authority in this country [and in Virginia] has been
delegated to local government with full autonomy to pass and administer
regulations. Air quality control has been delegated to the states subject to
federal criteria and while the states may in turn delegate powers of adminis-
tration to regional and local agencies, the basis for the exercise of pollution
control is regional and not local." 7
1. Sources of Air Pollution
Stationary sources of air pollution are either direct or indirect. A direct
source is defined as "[a]ny stationary source in which the points of emis-
sion of air contaminants originate directly from the source itself."" '8 A
classic example is the power plant."' With the exception of insignificant
direct sources,'2 ' all owners of direct sources are required, prior to com-
mencement or modification of such sources, to obtain a permit from
SAPCB.'2 ' An indirect source is defined as "a facility, building, structure,
or installation, which when completed will attract or may attract mobile
113. SAPCB Reg. 2.06(d) (Supp. 1974).
114. Id. 4.02.00 et seq. (1972).
115. The seven regions are: Southwest Virginia, Valley of Virginia, Central Virginia, North-
eastern Virginia, State Capital Region, Hampton Roads, and Northern Virginia. Air Quality
Control Region 7 (Northern Virginia), has its own regulations in recognition of the air pollu-
tion problems peculiar to the area. The SAPCB regulations for Region 7 should be consulted
for any questions pertaining to this area.
116. Mandelker and Rothschild, The Role of Land-Use Controls in Combating Air Pollu-
tion Under the Clean Air Act of 1970, 3 ECOL. L.Q. 235 (1973).
117. Id. at 273. The SAPCB may create air pollution control districts within a region to
aid in the administration of Board regulations. VA. CODE ANN. § 10-17.19 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
118. SAPCB Reg. 1.01 (Supp. 1974). See note 111 supra.
119. See Willrich, The Energy-Environment Conflict: Siting Electric Power Facilities, 58
VA. L. RFv. 257 (1972).




source activity. . ."'1 Here, air pollution levels are increased indirectly
by attracting automobile traffic which generates exhaust emissions. Al-
though a threshold which exempts minor development is provided,", most
commercial development of any size is affected by the permit requirement
for indirect sources of air pollution. 4 Naturally, some development quali-
fies as both a direct and indirect source. Owners of sources existing prior
to implementation of the state regulations must also apply to SAPCB for
a permit to operate such a source.'
Indirect source review is the method by which SAPCB can reach most
private development. Despite assurances that indirect source regulation is
not designed as a "no growth measure," commercial developers have not
been convinced.'26 EPA and SAPCB insist, however, that indirect source
review merely requires planning in order to maintain air quality in Virginia
and will be limited accordingly." 7 As a consequence, SAPCB could
conceivably prevail upon its permit applicants to follow a land use policy
or plan provided this policy somehow relates to the state air pollution
control strategy.'28
2. Permit Procedure
The permit application process is a pre-construction review designed to
take no more than ninety days.' Initially, a local or regional office of
122. Id. 1.01. "[I]ndirect sources include but are not limited to 1. Highways and roads 2.
Parking facilities 3. Retail commercial and industrial facilities 4. Recreation, amusement,
sports, and entertainment facilities 5. Airports 6. Office and Government buildings 8. Educa-
tion facilities." Id. With the attraction of vehicles to these facilities, the resulting pollution
leads to atmospheric stagnation and generally dangerous levels of pollutant concentrations.
See note 112 supra.
123. In a SMSA (standard metropolitan statistical area), a permit is not required when
the source will attract fewer than 700 vehicles to the roadways and parking facilities serving
the source over the one hour period during which the maximum number of vehicles is antici-
pated, and fewer than 1750 vehicles to the roadways and parking facilities during the eight
hour period when the maximum number of vehicles is expected. SAPCB Reg. 2.06(g)(2)(i) (a)
(Supp. 1974). The figures are 1400 and 3500 respectively outside a SMSA. Id. 2.06(g) (2) (ii) (a).
In Region 7 (Northern Virginia), the figures are 250 and 625 respectively. Id. 2.706(g)(2)(i)
(1974).
124. See note 122 supra.
125. SAPCB Reg. 2.04(b) (Supp. 1974).
126. SAPCB, Indirect Source Regulation Seminar, Richmond, Virginia (Nov. 15, 1974).
127. The SAPCB indicated that review of applications for permits will be limited to consid-
erations relating to air pollution. Id.
128. Even limited to air quality considerations, the resulting effect on land could be great.
Marcellus Wright, Jr., President of the Central Richmond Association suggests that in-
direct source regulation could put a ceiling on land values and cause spread versus concentra-
tion, as well as limit building heights. Richmond Mercury, Nov. 20, 1974, at 2, col. 1.
129. SAPCB Reg. 2.06(e)(1) (Supp. 1974).
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SAPCB is available to offer assistance in determining if a permit is re-
quired. There is no cost for a permit. Permit applications are prepared and
distributed to the main Richmond office, the regional office, and the local
office.'30 The local agency makes a review and forwards its recommenda-
tion to the regional office which in turn forwards its report and recommen-
dation to the Richmond office.'31 More detailed information may be sought
to aid in the review.
SAPCB's analysis consists of an independent review of the information
along with the recommendations of the regional office and local agency.,
SAPCB arrives at a tentative decision which is forwarded to the regional
office and made available for public comment at a hearing. 3' Upon receipt
of these comments, the final decision is made. Prior to the issuance of a
permit, SAPCB must be convinced that the design of the source will not
cause violation of its regulations and that its operation will not interfere
with the attainment or maintenance of air quality standards for Virginia.'3
"Any owner aggrieved by a final decision of the Board. . . is entitled to
judicial review thereof. . . in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond
"135
SAPCB involvement does not end with the issuance of a permit. The
Board may, if it deems necessary, require an owner to monitor emissions
and make periodic reports. 3 ' The mere existence of a permit is not a
defense to violation of applicable regulations. 3 '
3. Conclusion
The Clean Air Act of 1970 requires that state implementation plans
130. For the information required of applicants, see SAPCB Reg. 2.06(c) (Supp. 1974), and
SAPCB, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE COMPLETION OF REGISTRATION/PERMIT APPLICATION FORM
(SAPCB form 7) (1974).
131. SAPCB, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE COMPLETION OF REGIsTRAnTION/PERMrr APPLICATION FORM
(SAPCB form 7) (1974).
132. Id.
133. "Prior to approval, all permit requests must be subject to a public comment period
of at least 30 days. In addition, at the end of the public comment period, a public hearing
will be held." SAPCB Reg. 2.06(a)(3) (Supp. 1974).
134. The standards for granting permits are set forth in SAPCB Reg. 2.06(d) (Supp. 1974).
For information on variances, see SAPCB Reg. 2.01(h) (Supp. 1974).
135. VA. CODE ANN. § 10-17.23:2 (Repl. Vol. 1973). Challenges to a ruling will require expert
testimony since the SAPCB criteria as set forth in the SAPCB regulations is often technical
and not easily comprehended by the layman.
136. Id. § 10-17.21; SAPCB Reg. 2.07 (Supp. 1974). The SAPCB has a right of entry to
obtain this information. VA. CODE ANN. § 10-17.22 (Repl. Vol. 1973); SAPCB Reg. 2.13 (Supp.
1974).
137. SAPCB Reg. 2.06(i) (Supp. 1974).
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entail measures necessary to insure attainment and maintenance of federal
standards "including but not limited to land-use and transportation con-
trols."I' With the power to issue permits for construction and operation
of stationary sources of air pollution, SAPCB is potentially capable of
fostering at least one facet of an overall state land use strategy.'39 Its
influence is, however, likely to be limited to a land use policy which either
directly or indirectly produces and maintains air quality within the state.'4
Inasmuch as a balanced land use plan necessitates consideration of numer-
ous factors, environmental and aesthetic, SAPCB's role will only be a part
of a land use plan developed for Virginia. In the absence of a comprehen-
sive state land use plan, SAPCB as well as other state agencies will con-
tinue to make significant land use decisions on an ad hoc basis without the
benefit of specific guidelines based on a land use plan. This fragmented
approach is unfortunate since land use decisions often work irreparable
damage. Moreover, an ad hoc approach is itself contrary to the concept of
balanced land use planning.
D. SoIL AND WATER CONSERVATION COMMISSION
The Soil and Water Conservation Commission is responsible for imple-
menting the state policy of erosion prevention. Improper land use practices
are the primary cause of erosion and attendant consequences.' Urbaniza-
tion of land dramatically accelerates the rate and intensity of erosion. The
Commission has estimated the conversion of land from rural to urban use
can result in soil erosion increasing from as little as fifty tons per square
mile per year to more than fifty thousand tons per square mile per year.'
In 1973, the Erosion and Sediment Control Law was enacted directing
the Commission to supervise a state-wide coordinated erosion and sedi-
ment control program.'43 Pursuant to this Act, the Commission developed
138. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B) (1970). "The legislative history of the Act reveals that
Congress approved land-use controls as a general method for achieving air quality standards."
Mandelker and Rothchild, supra note 116, at 239. "The effectiveness of land use as a supple-
mentary air pollution control technique is vividly illustrated by considering the number of
state implementation plans that have failed because they do not include it." Comment, The
Nondegradation Controversy: How Clean Will Our "Clean Air" Be?, supra note 97, at 335.
139. A state land use policy does not exist in Virginia. As a result, any such policy would
generally reflect only the SAPCB's land use policy which is derived from air pollution consid-
erations alone.
140. See note 126 supra.
141. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-2 (REPL. VOL. 1960), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1974).
142. SOIL AND NVATER CONSERVATION COMMISSION, VIRGINIA EROSION AND SEDIMENT CONTROL
HANDBOOK 1-4 (1974).
143. VA. CODE Am. § 21-89.2 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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guidelines for erosion and sediment control and established minimum
standards.' These standards are enforced by requiring an erosion and
sediment control plan from any person engaged in a land disturbing activ-
ity.' Approval of the plan is a condition precedent to obtaining a building
permit.'46 The definition of a land disturbing activity is extremely broad:
"any land change which may result in soil erosion from water or wind and
the movement of sediments in State waters or onto lands in the State,
including, but not limited to, clearing, grading, excavating, transporting
and filling of land . .. .""'
Enforcement of the Commission's standards and approval of the erosion
and sediment control plans is primarily a local responsibility. In regions
of the state which are part of erosion and soil conservation districts,'48 the
districts will prepare a soil and erosion control program consistent with the
Commission's standards and guidelines.'49 In areas not within a district,
the county, city, or town will prepare a program.'50 Any county, city, or
town within a district has the option of adopting its own program and being
exempted from district supervision.' 1 In default of action by a district or
locality, the Commission will prepare a program for the area.' Localities
are currently in the process of adopting programs and submitting them to
the Commission for approval. Some localities have merely adopted the
model ordinance prepared by the Commission while others have studied
the situation closely and conceived their own program.'53
The authority preparing the plan for the locality has the responsibility
of evaluating erosion and sediment control plans for land disturbing activi-
ties in its jurisdiction.'" The decisions of districts are subject to review by
144. Id. § 21-89.4. The Board's standards, guidelines, and criteria are found in ERosION AND
SEDIMENT CONTROL HANDBOOK, supra note 142.
145. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-89.6(a) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
146. Id. § 21-89.7.
147. Id. § 21-89.3. This section also sets forth certain exempted activities such as farming,
small construction projects, and activities such as surface mining which are regulated by
other provisions in the Code.
148. The soil and water conservation districts are established by the Commission and are
composed of supervisors elected by the residents of each district. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 21-
12.1 to 21-65 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
149. Id. § 21-89.5(a) (Cum. Supp. 1974).
150. Id. § 21-89.5(b).
151. Id. § 21-89.5(c).
152. Id. § 21-89.5(d).
153. Interview with Commission staff, in Richmond, Va., January 30, 1975.
154. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-89.6 (Cum. Supp. 1974). If a land disturbing activity is located




the Commission. Final decisions of the Commission and the cities, coun-
ties, and towns may be challenged by filing an appeal in circuit court. 5 '
An erosion and sediment control plan must include proposed actions by
the landowner to insure minimal erosion from the construction. Under
Commission guidelines, the plan must contain a narrative report describ-
ing the project's purposes and construction schedule and seting out the
conservation practices, calculations and assumptions upon which they are
based. Moreover, the applicant must submit overlay maps which illustrate
proposed alterations of the area and location of control measures."6
These requirements do not per se severely alter growth patterns. Proper
engineering techniques can effectively dissipate erosion problems of a land
disturbing activity. According to the Commission, the additional expendi-
tures incurred as a result of control measures will not make a contemplated
construction project economically unfeasible." 7 The plan requirements
should improve the site location of builders and increase the pre-planning
of construction. As a consequence, the Commission predicts that enforce-
ment of the Erosion and Sediment Control Law will result in higher quality
housing."'
A second program of the Commission with an effect on land use planning
is the Soil Survey Master Plan. Enacted in 1970, the plan's goal is to
complete a soil survey and mapping of Virginia by 1990."' Primarily de-
signed for agricultural purposes, soil surveys also have extensive value in
non-agricultural use of land."' The identification of soil characteristics is
beneficial in deciding the best use which should be made of the land. The
information accumulated by the soil surveys will be readily available to
planners and governmental bodies. The data will aid reduction of erosion
and sediment damage, help overcome soil oriented problems in construc-
tion, as well as assist in the selection and preservation of prime agricultural
land. '6 The Commission contends that any long range land use planning
should consider the nature of the soil as a factor in assessing alternatives.
155. Id. § 21-89.10 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
156. Erosion and Sediment Control Handbook, supra note 142, at 11-7.
157. Interview, supra note 153.
158. Id.
159. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-5.2 (Cum. Supp. 1974). At this time, the state soil survey is behind
schedule and if it continues at the current rate, will not be completed until 2015. The Com-
mission has requested additional funding to enable the survey to get back on schedule. SOIL
AND WATER CONSERVATION COMMISSION, SOIL SURVEY MASTER PLAN PROGRESS REPORT.
160. SOIL AND WATER CONSERVATION COMIMSSION, SOIL SURVEY MASTER PLAN (1971).
161. Id. at 5-6.
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E. DEPARTMENT OF CONSERVATION AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
The Department of Conservation and Economic Development super-
vises the use and preservation of Virginia's natural resources."' Operations
and duties are delegated to departmental divisions including Forestry,
Parks, Mineral Resources, Mined Land Reclamation, and the Virginia
State Travel Service. 63
The Division of Parks and the Division of Forestry are actively involved
in purchasing land for creation of state forests and parks,'" under the
direction of the Commission of Outdoor Recreation as a part of the Virginia
Outdoors Plan.'65 In addition to purchasing land for state forests, the Divi-
sion of Forestry is responsible for the special classification of property
devoted to forest use subject to local tax assessment.'6' The purpose of this
special assessment is to create an incentive for owners to devote their land
to forest use."'
The land use activity with which the Department is most actively
involved is surface mining. In recent years, the practice of surface mining,
particularly coal strip mining, has become highly controversial due to the
adverse environmental results."' In 1973, surface mining constituted
eighty percent of the mining in the United States and coal stripping ac-
counted for forty-one percent of the surface mining."' Although safer and
more efficient than deep mining, surface mining renders land useless and
pollutes the surrounding water and air. Surface mining removes the topsoil
of the land and replaces it with a low grade soil called spoil. The process
of revegetating the land is thus slowed down and, in the interim, serious
erosion problems are created. 7'
162. The operation of the Department is the responsibility of a director appointed by the
Governor. He is assisted by a twelve-member board also appointed by the Governor. VA. CODE
AN. §§ 10-1, -3, -12 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
163. Id. § 10-8.1.
164. Id. § 10-21, -33.
165. See generally Section VII F, infra.
166. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-769.5(c) (Repl. Vol. 1974).
167. See Section VII F, infra.
168. Surface mining has been defined as the process of removing the overburden of topsoil,
rock and other material covering a mineral deposit, in order to extract the mineral. There
are five types of surface mining methods: strip, auger, open pit, dredging and hydraulic. A
RErTzE, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL PLANNING: LAW OF LAND AND RESOURCES 12-2 (1974).
169. Several reasons account for the predominance of surface mining over deep (subsur-
face) mining. The production costs of surface mining are much lower than deep mining, and
it allows for the recovery of many deposits which cannot be deep mined. It is also a much
safer operation than deep mining. Binder, A Novel Approach to Reasonable Regulation of
Strip Mining, 34 U. Prrr. L. REv. 339, 341-43 (1973).
170. Note, New Surface Mining in Wisconsin, 1973 Wis. L. REv. 234, 237-40.
[Vol. 9:513
LAND USE
The effects of surface mining operations are felt far beyond the mine site.
In addition to marred aesthetic qualities of the land the operation causes
the discharge of acidic water which upon entering the area's watershed is
capable of destroying the entire eco-system of its streams.' The damage
of surface mining can be mitigated through a program of land reclamation,
but the surface mining industry has refused voluntary measures to restore
the land and curtail pollution. 2 Since the industry has not considered the
social cost of their operations, governments have been forced to regulate
surface mining in those states with significant operations.' Virginia has
adopted a regulatory program similar to those found in other states.' This
program is the responsibility of the Department and is administered by its
Division of Mineral Land Reclamation.
The statutory provisions for surface mining regulations are set forth in
two distinct parts. One set of regulations applies only to coal mining opera-
tions, 7 5 while the other regulates all other surface mining operations.' The
control methods are essentially the same. Before any person engages in
surface mining in the state, a permit must be obtained from the Depart-
ment.'77 Before the Department will issue a permit, the applicant must
submit plans that describe the measures which the mine operator will take
to minimize environmental damage and to reclaim the land upon termina-
tion of the mining operation.7 8 To insure a reclamation effort on the mined
land the operator must furnish a bond.17' If the operator fails to complete
reclamation of the land satisfactorily, the bond is forfeited and the Depart-
ment will apply the funds to the completion of land reclamations."' Other
enforcement measures are injunctions"' and criminal sanctions for willful
violators of the coal surface mining regulations."2
Although the level of success of this type of regulatory program is debat-
able, it is certainly a better alternative than dependance upon the volun-
171. RErrZE, supra note 168, at 12-3.
172. See Wis. L. Rv., supra note 170, at 240.
173. See RErrE, supra note 168, at 12-11 to -12. Coal which is strip-mined is approximately
$4.00 per ton cheaper than deep-mined coal. Some observers believe this difference in cost
should be applied to the reclamation of strip-mined lands. BusnMss WEEK, Nov. 4, 1972, at
54.
174. RErmE, supra note 168, at 12-14 to -15.
175. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 45.1-198 to -220 (Repl. Vol. 1974).
176. Id. §§ 45.1-180 to -197.2.
177. Id. §§ 45.1-181, -202.
178. Id. §§ 45.1-181 to -182, -203 to -204.
179. Id. §§ 45.1-183, -206.
180. Id. §§ 45.1-186, -209.
181. Id. §§ 45.1-193, -210.
182. Id. § 45.1-214.
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tary efforts of the surface coal mining industry. Im While the current regula-
tions curtail the damage of surface mining, they do not seriously limit the
landowner's ability to exploit his property's mineral value.,"
F. VIRGINLA OUTDOORS PLAN
The Virginia Outdoors Plan is third in a series of comprehensive outdoor
recreational land use plans compiled through federal, state, and private
efforts.' 4 It serves as a guide for decisions and "provides current informa-
tion and a statement of broad policy for all agencies-federal, State and
local-concerning recreational needs of the Commonwealth."'8 6 Formula-
tion of the plan as well as its implementation is primarily the responsibility
of the Virginia Commission of Outdoor Recreation." 7
The Commission of Outdoor Recreation has created eleven recreational
planning regions within Virginia (each comprised of planning districts) in
183. Under the statutory provisions, the maximum bond the Department can require an
operator to post is one thousand dollars per acre. Id. §§ 45.1-183, -206 (Repl. Vol. 1974). Some
authorities would contend such an amount would not always be a sufficient allocation to
effectively reclaim the land. See Binder, supra note 169, at 350. Moreover, others (most
notably Congressman Ken Hechler (W.Va.)) believe there can be no effective reclamation and
the practice of strip-mining should be abolished. FORTUNE, May, 1974 at 217.
Reitze is critical of the effectiveness of the existing state regulations such as Virginia's
stating that much of the present reclamation effort is just meeting a legal test and the "result
is legally reclaimed land that looks like the surface of the moon." REmzE, supra note 168, at
12-15 to -16.
184. Binder, supra note 169. According to Binder, unreclaimed lands are worthless and
when the land is reclaimed the operator will have the land with a value possibly worth more
than the cost of reclamation. He continues, " About the only certainty is that the cost of
reclamation has seemingly little effect on the continued prosperity of surface mining." Id.
185. THE COMMISSION OF OUTDOOR RECREATION, THE VIRGINIA OUTDOORS PLAN, 1 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as THE OUTDOORS PLAN]. [The first was prepared in 1965 by the Virginia
Outdoor Recreation Study Commission by direction of the 1964 General Assembly. That
report, titled Virginia's Common Wealth, launched the State into a broad program of open
space conservation and recreational development. The second plan was published by the
Commission of Outdoor Recreation as the Virginia Outdoors Plan, 1970." Id.
186. Id. at 5. The plan is long range and comprehensive. It establishes the broad interest
of the state in outdoor recreation and a quality environment and provides a statement of
policy on public-private responsibilities, and information on recreational supply and demand.
Id.
18. The purpose of the Commission shall be, through the exercise of its powers and per-
formance of its duties . . . to create and put into effect a long range plan for the
acquisition, maintenance, improvement, protection and conservation for public use of
those areas of the State best adapted to the development of a comprehensive system
of outdoor recreational facilities in all fields . . . and to facilitate and encourage the
fullest public use thereof. VA. CODE ANN. § 10-21.4 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
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order to facilitate recreational supply and demand analysis. 88 Within this
framework, the plan includes recreational planning standards designed to
provide "general planning guides for local, regional, State, federal and
private recreation planning ... ."8 Specifically, area standards establish
the average acreage need for a given recreational purpose "' and manage-
ment standards establish the level of desirable use or capacity of an area."'
With such standards, the utility of recreational land is maximized and the
users are provided with "an optimal recreation experience.' ' 2
To aid the Commission in the planning process, a state-wide survey was
conducted in 1972 to ascertain present and projected public demand for
outdoor recreational services both from Virginians and out-of-state visi-
tors."8 ' Combining the information thus gathered with available invento-
ries' 4 of recreational land and facilities creates a planning tool capable of
insuring adequate resource allocation for efficient recreational land use.
The Virginia Outdoors Plan creates fifteen major outdoor recreation
systems' 5 each of which generally falls within the responsibility of a state
or federal agency."' For example, the Scenic Rivers Act of 1970, which
declares that the conservation and preservation of certain rivers in Virginia
possessing great natural beauty is in the best interest of the state, estab-
lished the Virginia Scenic River System.' 7 The Commission of Outdoor
Recreation is given the responsibility for studying Virginia's rivers and
making recommendations to the Governor and General Assembly for rivers
to be included in the system.'8 Once established, greater attention is fo-
cused on any proposals which may change the character of the river, and
188. TaE OUTDOORS PLAN, supra note 185, at 26.
189. Id. at 29.
190. Id. Area standards establish minimum acreage needs for recreational facilities as well
as the acres per thousand in population. Id.
191. Id. at 30.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 33.
194. See VmGINA POLYTECHNIC INSTITUTE AND STATE UNIVERSITY, VIRGINIA OUTDOOR RECREA-
TION INVENTORY (1972). The inventory is a comprehensive survey of available recreation facili-
ties created for the Commission of Outdoor Recreation and is available to the public.
195. The remaining outdoor systems are: National Parks, National Forests, National Wild-
life Refuges, Federal Areas, State Parks, State Wildlife Management Areas, State Forests,
Small Watershed Projects, Local and Regional Parks, Natural Areas, Trails, Scenic Highways
and Virginia Byways (See Section VI supra), Hostels, and the Private Sector. Id. at 61-89.
196. THE OurnooRs PLAN, supra note 185, at 59.
197. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-167 to -175 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
198. THE Oum ooRs PLAN, supra note 185, at 85. The 1975 Virginia General Assembly
designated the Staunton River (H.B. No. 72) and the Rivanna River (H.B. No. 1068) as scenic
rivers under the Scenic Rivers Act.
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an act of the General Assembly is required before a dam or other structure
impeding the natural flow of the river may be constructed, operated, or
maintained.' 9 Preservation techniques may include local zoning and plan-
ning, fee acquisition, land trusts, and open space easements in the river
corridor.ns
1. Virginia Historic Landmarks Commission
Although separately administered, the Virginia Historic Landmarks
Commission (VHLC) is a significant aspect of the Virginia Outdoors Plan.
VHLC was created in 196621 in recognition of the fact that Virginia leads
the states in the number of historic sites."' Its primary objective is to
"recognize and protect all structures and sites of historical significance
within the Commonwealth." ' To accomplish this, VHLC conducts sur-
veys20 4 to catalogue and designate as historic landmarks those buildings,
structures and sites which have a state-wide or national historical signifi-
cance." 5 Once designated as a certified landmark or established as an
historic district, the site or structure qualifies for preferential tax treat-
ment.26 This aids in inducing voluntary dedication of historic easements
to VHLC.207 As an advisor, VHLC reviews and comments on all proposed
199. After designation of any river or section of river as a scenic river by the General
Assembly, no dam or other structure impeding the natural flow thereof shall be constructed,
operated, or maintained in such river or section of river unless specifically authorized by an
act of the General Assembly. VA. CODE ANN. § 10-174 (Repl. Vol. 1973). A political subdivision
affected by such designation may prior to such designation request a public hearing, however
their approval is not required. Id. § 10-172.
200. THE OuTDooRs PLAN, supra note 185, at 85.
201. VA. CODE ANN. § 10-135 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
202. THE OuTDooRs PLAN, supra note 185, at 155.
203. THE RICHMOND REGIONAL PLANNING DISTRICT COMMISSION, LAND USE-INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN THE RICHMOND METROPoLrAN AREA, A-91 (1974).
204. [T]his survey is an ongoing activity whereby the VHLC . . . compiles photographs,
drawings, maps and written documentation on historical sites and structures ....
These materials are systematically catalogued and stored by the VHLC, providing an
expanding, usuable archival resource for the State. . . .Id.
205. VA. CODE ANN. § 10-138 (Repl. Vol. 1973). Properties listed in the Virginia Register
qualify for historic easements. Landowners interested in offering open space easements to
protect their historic properties obtain assistance from the VHLC which accepts and adminis-
ters such easements under the Open Space Land Act of 1966. LAND USE-INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, supra note 203, at A-93.
206. VA. CODE ANN. § 10-139 to -140 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
207. The present approach of the VHLC is ". . . to encourage and promote the acquisition,
permanent perservation and proper administration of historic landmarks by public and pri-
vate organizations and individuals, rather than to take on the potentially tremendous burden
of acquiring and administering such properties itself." LAND USE-INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELA-
TIONS, supra note 203 at A-92.
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state appropriations for historic preservation."°' It also recommends
methods of avoiding conflict with historic sites on plans submitted by state
and local agencies as well as private developers. 0°
2. Implementation of the Virginia Outdoors Plan
The Virginia Outdoor Foundation was created to promote the preserva-
tion of open space land and to encourage donations of money, land or other
property for the purpose of preserving the natural, scenic, historic, scien-
tific and recreational areas of the state.21 Scenic, historic or open space
easements211 offer a means for private owners to preserve their land for
future generations without giving up their ownership and with the possibil-
ity of certain tax advantages. 21
The Virginia Outdoors Fund, consisting of state and federal funds, "is a
major source of money for the acquisition and development of recreational
lands at the State and local levels. 2 12 Since available funds have been
inadequate to meet the objectives set forth in the Virginia Outdoors Plan,
the issuance of general obligation bonds has been advocated in the Plan.2 1 ,
Given the limited funds allocated to recreational needs, considerable
reliance on other sources such as voluntary acts is necessary to implement
the Plan.211 Fundamental to the success of the Plan is a "public willingness
208. Id.
209. Id. "The Virginia Department of Highways, VEPCO, and the Appalachian Power
Company voluntarily submit project plans for review by VHLC staff to identify potential
conflicts with historic properties." Id.
210. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-159 to -166 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
211.
Such an easement is simply a dedication of restrictions on the future use and develop-
ment of the property, given voluntarily to a public or semi-public agency in trust ....
The owner and his successors in ownership retain the right of continued ownership and
usage, not inconsistent with the restrictions. The donor is eligible for a one-time deduc-
tion in his federal and State income taxes and in the inheritance taxes on his estate.
He. . . may also receive a continuing tax benefit through the Land Use Assessment
Law. . . or the Open Space Land Act. . . . The easement is not a give-away of land
but rather a way to get an agency to enforce your restrictions for you. THE OUTDOORS
PLAN, supra note 185, at 147.
212. Id. See note 221 infra.
213. Id. See notes 219, 220, and 223 infra.
214. THE OUTDOORS PLAN, supra note 185, at 149. Virginia Constitution Article X, § 9(b)
authorizes the state to incur bonded indebtedness for capital expenditures at a much higher
level than was allowed by the previous constitution. The Virginia Outdoor Recreation Bond
Act of 1974 (S.B. 520) which would authorize the issuance of bonds for outdoor recreation
was not passed by the 1975 Virginia General Assembly.
215. State funds for the 1972 - 1974 biennium totaled $8,274,000 and federal funds totaled
$5,169,584. The Outdoors Plan, supra note 185, at 148.
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to control and protect the use of land in the public interest.""2 ' To lure
voluntary participation, the Open Space Land Act of 1966 provides a tax
incentive."' Open space easements granted to public bodies for a minimum
of thirty years"8 may lower the property assessment for purposes of prop-
erty tax by reflecting "any change in the market value of the property
which may result from the interest held by the public body."' 9 Additional
tax incentives are made available by the Land Use Assessment Law:2o
This ia a local option measure, authorizing each city and county to adopt a
taxing system in which certain lands that are devoted to agricultural, horti-
cultural, forestry or open space uses are taxed on the basis of their value for
that use, rather than the full market value otherwise required. The law has
some of the characteristics of both the "preferential assessment" and the
"deferred taxation" laws in other states, since it includes a roll-back payment
requirement in case of change of use."'
The federal government supplies financial assistance and direct assis-
tance2 2 through the National Forest Service and the National Park Serv-
ice.22 Similarly, the State of Virginia aids in implementation of the Plan
through direct and indirect assistance providing information, guidance,
planning, research, and grants-in-aid.24
3. Conclusion
Unlike many other state agencies whose activities concern the use of
land, the Commission of Outdoor Recreation acts pursuant to a land use
plan. Since such a preconceived plan provides an available policy resource,
it obviates the need for ad hoc land use decisions which are often made
without concern for their overall effect on land. The Outdoors Plan not
only insures that there will be orderly programs for planning, acquisition,
and development but also that government and private sectors assume
complimentary roles.12
216. Id. at 144.
217. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-151 to -158 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1974).
See generally Section IX, infra.
218. VA. CODE ANN. § 10-152 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1974).
219. Id. § 10-155.
220. Id. §§ 58-769.4 to .15. See also VA. CONST. art. X, § 2.
221. THE OuTDooRs PLAN, supra note 185, at 165. In 1974, six localities participated in this
program. Id.
222. Examples of indirect assistance programs include loan programs such as the Farmer's
Home Administration, outright federal grants from the Land and Water Conservation Fund,
and technical assistance in the form of counseling and advice. Id. at 145.
223. See note 197 supra.
224. THE OuTDooRs PLAN, supra note 185, at 145-46.
225. Id. at 56.
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Still lacking, however, is a state plan to harmonize the designated goals
of the Outdoors Plan with those of other state agencies. As noted, the
Commission of Outdoor Recreation has focused its attention on immediate
acquisition rather than actual development of recreational land in recogni-
tion of soaring costs and the relative paucity of suitable land. Since reve-
nue represents the most important tool of the Commission of Outdoor
Recreation, failure to provide adequate funds for implementation of the
plan will render much of the planning meaningless.
G. MAINE RESOURCES COMMISSION
The Marine Resources Commission is responsible for enforcing the Wet-
lands Act of 1972.226 The Commission was originally created to regulate and
promote the Commonwealth's seafood industry2 but by virtue of the Act,
it also functions as a source of land use control. The Act directs the Com-
mission to promulgate guidelines to assist the localities in the preservation
of the delicate ecology of the wetlands, 21 investing it with regulatory and
investigative powers to carry out this design.2
9
Land use in the wetlands areas is regulated by requiring the owner to
obtain a permit before using or developing his property in a manner which
is not specifically exempted by the Act."' The permit system can be ad-
ministered at the local level if the local governing body adopts the Act's
wetlands zoning ordinance, otherwise permit applications must be made
directly to the Commission.2'
When a locality adopts the wetlands zoning ordinance, a local wetlands
board is created to consider applications for wetlands land use permits. 2
However, the Commissioner of Marine Resources must review all decisions
of local boards and submit to the Commission any decision which he be-
226. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 62.1-13.1 to .20 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1974).
See Section V, supra.
227. VA. CODE ANN. § 28.1-1 to -36.12 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1974).
228. Id. § 62.1-13.4.
229. Id. § 62.1-13.16.
230. Id. § 62.1-13.9.
231. Id. § 62.1-13.9. The wetlands zoning ordinance which the locality must adopt in order
to have the power to issue permits for wetlands activity is set forth in VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-
13.5 (Repl. Vol. 1973), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1974).
232. Id. § 62.1-13.6 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
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lieves requires review"' by the full body. 34 In addition, the Commission has
the duty of reviewing any permit decision of a local board that is appealed
by the applicant or by the city, county, or town where the wetlands are
located.235 A review of a local decision is also required if twenty-five prop-
erty owners in the jurisdiction petition the Commission, setting forth in a
bill of particulars, alleged violations of Commission policy and rules by the
local board.236 Commission decisions are subject to appeal to the circuit
court having jurisdiction in the governmental subdivision in which the
wetlands are located.237 Because the Commission and the local wetlands
board can directly forbid a proposed use of land in a wetlands area, they
are engaged in the most stringent land use control on the state level at this
time. 8
H. DIVISION OF STATE PLANNING AND CoMMuNITY AFFAIRS
The Division of State Planning and Community Affairs is an extension
of the Governor's Office.239 As its title indicates, the Division has no en-
forcement powers but is designed to aid in the planning and development
of state policies. With the recent upsurge in interest in the state's present
and possible roles in the area of land use planning and control, the
Division has become actively concerned with the assessment of what state
activities affect land use and the form of future state involvement. The
Division's concern has centered primarily on two activities: the designation
of certain portions of the state as critical environmental areas and the
funding and staffing of the Land Use Council.
The critical environmental areas program represents an attempt by
Virginia to create state-level land use regulation.2 1 In 1972 the program
was initiated with the avowed purpose of singling out certain sections of
the state which needed special attention in order to preserve and protect
233. Id. § 62.1-13.13.
The Commission shall modify or reverse the decision of the wetlands board:
(1) If the decision of the wetlands board will not adequately achieve the policy and
standards of this chapter or will not reasonably accommodate any guidelines which
may have been promulgated by the Commission hereunder, or
(2) If the substantial rights of the appellant or the applicant have been prejudiced
because the findings, conclusions or decisions are
(a) In violation of constitutional provisions; or
(b) In excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction of the wetlands board; or
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure; or
(d) Affected by other error of law; or
(e) Unsupported by the evidence on the record considered as a whole; or
(f) Arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.
234. Id. § 62.1-13.10.
235. Id. § 62.1-13.11.
236. Id.
237. Id. 62.1-13.15 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
238. See Section V, supra, for an analysis of the land use implications of the Wetlands Act.
239. VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-38 (Repl. Vol. 1973).
240. Id. § 10-187 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
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their natural, historic and scenic value. A threefold task was given to the
Division. It was to develop criteria for identification of critical environmen-
tal areas"' and designate those areas within the state.242 These duties have
been completed by the Division.4 3
The Division also had the responsibility to recommend means by which
the development and use of land around critical environmental areas could
be controlled .2  A proposal was drafted by the Division and submitted to
the General Assembly but it was not enacted.241 Thus, Virginia has certain
portions of the state designated as critical environmental areas but no
regulatory measures to protect them from undesirable and harmful devel-
opment. According to a spokesman for the Division, it is unlikely the
proposed regulations will be passed in the future. 26
Although the critical environmental areas program failed to materialize
into state land use regulation, the Division has remained active in planning
the state's land use policy. Its current efforts are directed toward funding
and staffing the Land Use Council . 4 The Council is an ad hoc body com-
posed of representatives of state agencies, local and regional governmental
organizations, and legislative commissions. 4 Its purpose is described as
"the executive arm [of state government] . . . endeavoring . . . to pro-
vide a focal point for discussion on land use questions among the . . .
branches of state government and the private sector."2 49 The creation of the
Land Use Council is tacit recognition of the need for a unitary effort to
develop a state land use policy.
State Secretary of Commerce and Resources Earl J. Shiflet established
241. A critical environmental area is defined as "an area of natural, scenic and historic
value including but not limited to wetlands, marshlands, shorelands and flood plains of
rivers, lakes and streams, wilderness and wildlife habitats, historic buildings and areas." Id.
§ 10-189(b) (Cune. Supp. 1974).
242. Id. § 10-190, -191.
243. See DIVISION OF STATE PLANNING AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, A STUDY OF VmGINIA's CRM-
cAL ENVMONhMNTAL AREAS (1972) and VmGNIAL'S CRrICAL ENVIRONMENTAL AREAS, AN UPDATE
(1973).
244. VA. CODE ANN. § 10-193 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
245. S.B. 219. On Feb. 7, 1974, this bill was sent back to committee and no further action
was taken on it. SENATE JOURNAL 296 (Virginia 1974 Session).
246. Interview with B.C. Lynnes, Sec'y of the Land Use Council, in Richmond, Va. Nov.
22, 1974. However, Mr. Lynnes stated that some localities were considering the enactment of
the proposed regulations.
247. Id.
248. Land Use Council, State Land Use (Memorandum on file at Division of State Plan-
ning and Community Affairs).
249. DIVISION OF STATE PLANNING AND COMMUNITY AFFAIRS, AN APPROACH TO STATE LAND USE
DECISION MAKING 1 (1974).
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the Land Use Council to serve as a clearinghouse for information and to
prepare a unified policy which would represent all interests."' To ensure
that views of the private sector would receive consideration, the Land Use
Advisory Committee was formed. This committee is composed of repre-
sentatives of business, industry, and environmental groups and serves in
an advisory capacity to the Secretary of Commerce and Resources.2'
The Division, operating through the Land Use Council, is currently
analyzing the state role in land use and has been advising the Virginia
Advisory Legislative Council (VALC) Land Use Policies Committee on the
state's needs for future land use legislation. In July 1974, it recommended
that VALC emphasize the critical issues in Virginia in lieu of studying
additional material on approaches by other states.22 Further, it proposed
a three-tier process to be followed in the development of a future state
position on land use planning. First, major issues would be identified. 213
This would be followed by an assessment of the state interest involved in
each issue.254 If there were an interest, an anlysis of the extent and proper
expression of the state role would be made. 255
The Land Use Council has collected data from state agencies with an
interest in land use and solicited their opinions regarding the identity of
important state land use issues. Problems cited most often were the need
to preserve prime agricultural land, stronger local land use controls, and
coordination of transportation and land use planning. The most prevalent
issue raised was the absence of a state policy or plan.na
250. The chairman of the Land Use Council, in discussing the circumstances which led to
the establishment of the Land Use Council said:
... sixteen agencies, or divisions within agencies, assigned to the office [of Secretary
of Commerce and Resources] were engaged in the study of land use or in projects
directly affecting land use. There were four other state agencies outside the office...
so involved. I also learned that seven committees and commissions of the legislature
were engaged in one way or another in land use study. It was further noted that many
private organizations and groups were deeply involved in the subject of land use and
that all political subdivisions were either wrestling with the issue or dreading the day
when they could no longer avoid it.
Statement by Earl J. Shiflet, Sec'y of Commerce and Resources, to Land Use Council, in
Richmond, Va., Oct. 22, 1974.
251. State Land Use, supra note 248.
252. AN APPROACH TO STATE LAND USE DEcISION MAKING, supra note 249 at 1-2.
253. Id. at 2-3. Examples given of issues to be considered are the siting of key facilities,
preservation of prime agricultural land, and developments of greater than local impact. Id.
254.. Id. at 3-4.
255. Id. at 4. The Land Use Council views the state role determination in the context of a
sliding scale with a minimal involvement being a mere policy statement to a maximum
involvement of direct state regulation. Id.
256. Division of State Planning and Community Affairs, Results of a Questionnaire on the
Land Use Related Activities and Positions of Land Use Council Member Agencies (1974).
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With increasing demand for coordinated and effective land use planning,
it is highly probable that a unified state policy will soon be developed for
Virginia. Because the Division and the Land Use Council are closely re-
lated to the Governor's Office and the General Assembly (through VALC),
any state legislative action on land use will undoubtedly be influenced by
the Division.
I. CONCLUSION
Despite the widely acknowledged need for a comprehensive state land
use policy, the state response has been limited primarily to local zoning
measures and the efforts of environmentally related state agencies. As the
preceding text reveals, the concern of state agencies with respect to land
use if often secondary to their concern with achievement of a given environ-
mental standard. Admittedly, environmental management occupies a sig-
nificant part of land use policy, however, it is submitted that the needs of
Virginia dictate the fomulation of a policy broader in conception.
Few state agencies escape either a direct or indirect involvement with
land use. Consequently, numerous methods, such as licensing and permit
requirements, have been developed either through statute or administra-
tive regulation which are designed to regulate the use of land. Unfortun-
ately, a recurring problem among state agencies is lack of uniformity and
direction and the resulting duplication of effort. This situation stems from
the fact that agency interest in land use normally manifests itself as a
result of individual agency concern rather than as a response to specific
state land use policies or directives. Nevertheless, it is reassuring that
these agencies have acquired an impressive amount of technical expertise
and judgment which will serve to ease the implementation of a state land
use policy (if such is mandated), and which, in the interim, provide some
means to preserve Virginia's environment.
VIII. INITIATIVES BY OTHER STATES
A. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
Traditionally, state governments have had less effect upon land use than
either the federal government or the localities. The use of the police power
to control land use, although constitutionally the right of the states' has
historically been turned over entirely to city and county governments. The
1. U.S. CONST. amend. X. See also Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365
(1926).
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states' main role has been to present the local governments with enabling
legislation2 which necessarily foreclosed state or regional input.
The lack of state involvement is explained by a number of factors. Of
major significance is the fact that land has been viewed as an abundant
commodity, one which the nation would never exhaust. The only recog-
nized function of land was to enable its owner to make money3 thus the
law favored individual property rights. The cost and complexity of any
bureaucratic undertaking has also discouraged state involvement. Lastly,
there has been a powerful resistance on the part of localities to relinquish
exclusive control over the use of land within their jurisdictions. Controlling
land use has been, and largely continues to be, viewed by local officials as
primarily a local problem, best handled as a function of the local decision
maker.
Since 1961, however, many states have moved to reclaim from local
governments, or at least share with them, some of the control over the use
of land. An increasing number of states have implemented various versions
of land use control regulating major development projects, shoreline areas
and other areas of environmental significance. The recent involvement by
state government has led to what is being referred to as "the quiet revolu-
tion in land use control."' The first state to become actively involved was
Hawaii with the enactment of the "greenbelt law," 5 placing statewide zon-
ing power in the state land use commission.' Other states, while not as bold
as Hawaii, have begun to explore new directions in statewide planning and
control of land use. No longer do the states take the frontier stand that land
use is a purely local affair; they have begun to assume their constitutional
responsibility to set and enforce rational development patterns. The pro-
cess has been neither swift nor smooth, but is gaining recognition and
momentum.
2. A STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING AcT (U.S. Dep't of Commerce, rev. ed. 1926); A
STANDARD CITY PLANNING ENABLING Acr (U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 1928). These acts are
reprinted in ALI MODEL LAND DEVELOPMENT CODE 210, 220 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1968). Statu-
tory citations to the jurisdictions which have adopted various versions of these acts can be
found at id. at 206-09.
3. This attitude is exemplified by the phrase "unimproved land" to describe land in its
natural condition. Many areas, such as wetlands, which were incapable of intensive develop-
ment were therefore considered to be useless.
4. F. BossELmA & D. CALLIEs, THE QuImT REVOLUTION IN LAND USE CONTROL (1971)
[hereinafter cited as QuImT REVOLUTION].
5. HAw. REv. STAT. §§ 205-1, et seq. (1968), as amended, (1974 Supp.).




The variety of land use programs initiated thus far by several states
demonstrates the complexity and individuality of state interests and
needs. To a large degree, the design of a specific approach depends upon
the heritage of the state and how it has influenced the current status and
ability of the state to cope with land use questions. As already illustrated
in the treatment of Virginia agencies and programs with land use implica-
tions,7 tools such as tax policy, facilities placement and control, and envi-
ronmental monitoring can have significant practical application for imple-
menting an overall land use program. The most recent and innovative
efforts, however, have involved the direct exercise of the police power by
the state.' These efforts may be categorized into five approaches, listed
from strongest state involvement to weakest: (1) statewide comprehensive
land use control; (2) state control according to broad definitional criteria;
(3) statewide planning; (4) selective state control according to functional
criteria and specific geographical areas; and (5) state control of uncon-
trolled areas. These categories are not exclusive of each other. Just as no
state relies solely on the exercise of the police power to control land use,
no state's exercise of that power can be completely compartmentalized into
any single approach. The various approaches are worthy of note in that
each has distinctive characteristics, is designed to meet specific needs of
the state, and places a different burden upon the state and its existing
regulatory framework.
1. Statewide Comprehensive Land Use Control
The foundation of a comprehensive statewide approach is a system of
regulation and control which resembles that envisioned by the typical
zoning enabling act. Rather than rely on the plans and policies of the local
authorities, the state through this system exercises direct land use control
through a comprehensive plan of its own design. In this manner, the state
is able to exercise the police power that had once been exclusively dele-
gated to the local governments.
Hawaii is the only state which has adopted this approach.' Pursuant to
its legislation, the state land use commission is charged with classifying
7. See generally Sections VI and VII, supra.
8. Virginia has failed to exercise its police power in an effective manner as to land use
control on a state level. Its response has been to utilize other tools, namely environmental
monitoring, which affect land use indirectly and to delegate the direct exercise of the police
power to the localities under the zoning enabling act.
9. HAw. Rav. STAT. §§ 205-1, et seq. (1968), as amended, (1974 Supp.).
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the entire state into four districts: urban, rural, agricultural and conserva-
tion. The statute provides the general description of each district and the
characteristics by which land is to be classified. The state is given exclu-
sive control over the conservation districts while local authorities continue
to regulate land in the other districts, subject to restrictions detailed in the
statute.'" Input by local authorities and residents is assured by a public
hearing during the initial classification process and subsequently whenever
classifications are challenged or reviewed. Mandatory review of the entire
system is to occur every five years. A procedure whereby any state agency
or any property owner or lessee may petition the commission for a change
in classification is also provided.
To characterize the Hawaii legislation as a complete recapture of the
zoning power would be an overstatement. Rather the statute attempts to
duplicate the regulations existing at the local level without eliminating
them. Local authorities continue to have power to regulate land within
urban, rural and agricultural districts." Despite urban districting by the
land use commission, local authorities have no obligation to permit the
land to be used for urban development. The effect of the two-level zoning
power is to supersede local regulations unless they prove more restrictive
than those promulgated by the state.
In enacting a state-controlled zoning program, whether or not to leave
zoning power vested in the local governments presents a difficult dilemma.
On one side, elimination of local land use authority is politically impracti-
cal because local governments have become entrenched in this area and
have developed extensive bureaucracies to aid in administration. On the
other side, the application of zoning regulations from two levels of govern-
ment tends to make the controls extremely restrictive. In the case of Ha-
waii, protection of agricultural lands from urbanization was a major force
behind enactment of statewide land use control and the restrictiveness
10. Id. § 205-5 (1974 Supp.). These restrictions provide that as to agricultural districts,
minimum lot size shall be at least one acre, id. § 205-5(b), and uses are to include:
[Tihe cultivation of crops, orchards, forage, and forestry; farming activities or uses
related to animal husbandry, and game and fish propagation; services and uses acces-
sory to the above activities including but not limited to living quarters or dwellings,
mills, storage facilities, processing facilities, and roadside stands for the sale of prod-
ucts grown on the premises; and open area recreational facilities. Id. § 205-2.
As to rural districts, minimum lot size shall be at least one-half acre with but one dwelling
house per one-half acre. Permissible uses under section 205-5(c) include:
(1) Low density residential uses;
(2) Agricultural uses; and
(3) Public, quasi-public, and public utility facilities.
As to urban districts, there are no restrictions other than those provided by the locality.
11. Id. § 205-5 (1974 Supp.).
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caused by duplication serves that end. States whose economies are more
dependent upon urban development than agriculture would not find the
restrictive aspect of duplication as appealing.
Like most legislation enabling a governmental body to exercise zoning
power, the Hawaii statute does not provide for a development or capability
plan, but instead requires only a map or plat showing the existing classifi-
cation system.'2 The original classification process was by existing use. The
only thought to the future was the inclusion within the urban districts of
a reserve of land sufficient to accomodate the urban growth expected for
ten years.'3 The Hawaiian experience has demonstrated, however, that a
statewide land use control program can only be effective as a component
of a comprehensive land planning policy. The early approach of the land
use commission was reactive, concerned with control of existing urbaniza-
tion and protection of agricultural lands. A decision on a petition for reclas-
sification was largely made upon the basis of the present availability of
other properly classified land to accomodate the proposed use. Recent
developments indicate a more active role in directing a pattern and rate
of urban growth rather than trying to curtail it completely. 4
The emergence of a planning role for the land use commission has not
solved all the problems caused by the absence of a comprehensive plan.
The commission has begun to develop guidelines to be used in the decision
on petitions for reclassification. The guidelines, however, have been based
upon the map of existing uses rather than the developmental capability of
the land. 5 The lack of capability and development plan upon which to
base a pattern of future growth is a defect which would prove troublesome
to a more urban-oriented state.
Any statewide program of control must be accompanied by adequate
powers of implementation and enforcement in order to ensure effective-
ness. On this point as compared with its other provisions, the Hawaii land
use law provides an uncharacteristically weak role for the state. Enforce-
12. Id. § 205-3 (1968).
13. Id. § 205-2 (1974 Supp.). The statute requires "a sufficient reserve area for foreseeable
urban growth," which the Land Use Commission has interpreted to be ten years. Qumr
REVOLUTION, supra note 4, at 7 n.14.
14. See Mark, It All Began in Hawaii, 46 STATE Gov'T 188, 192 (1973).
15. The distinction is illustrated by the land use commission's decision to allow future
urbanization only within narrow limits adjoining present urban zones. While the higher
densities thus created would promote more efficient use of existing public facilities, reduce
the reliance on the automobile and create a more exciting urban environment, they would
also inflate the cost of housing and seriously affect its availability. This deterrent to low-cost
housing is further aggravated when new construction locations are selected more by adjoining
use than on the capability of the land.
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ment of the allowable uses within a particular classification district is left
to the appropriate local officer charged with administration of the county
zoning laws."6 State officials complain that it is difficult to discern whether
local authorities are enforcing the classifications properly." In the creation
of a statewide comprehensive land use program, there is a two-step proce-
dural requirement to ensure that the goals of the program are realized.
First, there must be a framework whereby the goals and policies articu-
lated by the legislature can be translated into regulations controlling land
use. Second, there must be an effective apparatus for enforcement to in-
sure compliance with the regulations.
The adoption procedure for a comprehensive state-level zoning program
usually requires that the entire system be formulated prior to implementa-
tion of any part thereof rather than make specific regulations effective as
the particular tract of land is considered. In the case of Hawaii, the classifi-
cation system was not ready for adoption until three years after the enact-
ment of the land use law.'" In addition to the burdens caused by this time
lag, a comprehensive classification process places an additional burden on
the state for manpower and operating funds.
2. State Control According to Broad Definitional Criteria
Rather than attempt to develop a land use control program which en-
compasses the entire state, several states have chosen to exercise their
police power only as to lands and developments which meet certain defini-
tional criteria. This approach allows a state to manage land resources and
control uses within specifically defined problem areas without necessarily
becoming involved in a more comprehensive program of statewide control.
The basic premise of the "less-than-comprehensive" state approach is the
belief that most land use decisions currently being made by local govern-
ment have no major effect on the state or national interest, and can best
be made by people familiar with the local social, environmental and eco-
nomic conditions." There is a balance between the need for expanded state
involvement and the desire for retaining local control. The result is state
participation in land use decisions only when they involve important state
or regional interests. Of course, even Hawaii, whose land use law is catego-
rized as a comprehensive state-level zoning program, leaves decision-
16. HAw. Rxv. STAT. § 205-12 (1968).
17. Interview with Walton Hong, Deputy Attorney General of Hawaii, April 5, 1971,
reported in QuIEr REVOLUTION, supra note 4, at 30-31.
18. Qumr REVOLUTION, supra note 4, at 8.
19. ALI MODEL LAND DEvELoPMENT CODE, Art. 7, Commentary at 286 (P.O.D. No. 1, 1974)
[hereinafter cited as ALI MODEL CODE].
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making in some areas to the sole discretion of local governments. The
difference, however, is that Hawaii's program requires urban classification
of an area as a condition precedent to exclusive local control, while the
definitional approach uses its definitional requirements as a condition sub-
sequent to exclusive local control.
In Vermont"0 and Maine, 21 statewide controls are implemented for com-
mercialz and industrial developments and subdivisions above a minimum
acreage.? In addition, these states have supplemental definitional require-
ments such as a minimum number of units within the development, the
development's elevation, or the amount of ground space covered by struc-
tures within the development, which also provide for the exercise of state
control. Florida24 has chosen to adopt the terminology of the American Law
Institute's Model Land Development Code.? Statewide controls are imple-
mented only as to "areas of critical state concern"26 and "developments of
20. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 6001, et seq. (1973), as amended, (1974 Cum. Supp.).
21. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§ 481-88 (Supp. 1973).
22. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has held that the term "commercial" embraces
residential developments of a commercial nature, i.e., residential lands subdivided and of-
fered for re-sale to the public. In re Spring Valley, 300 A.2d 736, 742 (Me. 1973). The Court
looked to the legislative history of the Site Location Law, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §§
481-88 (Supp. 1973) and found that the term was intended to describe the motivation for the
development rather than the type of activity to be performed on the property after it is
developed. In re Spring Valley, 300 A.2d 736, 742-46 (Me. 1973). In Vermont, the term
"subdivision" means partition for the purpose of resale and therefore encompasses commer-
cial residential developments. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001 (19) (1974 Cum. Supp.). It is
worthy of note that both the judiciary in Maine and the legislature in Vermont have reached
the developer who does not build or construct any improvements but who merely subdivides
and offers the unimproved property for sale to individual owners. See In re Spring Valley,
300 A.2d 736, 745 (Me. 1973); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6081 (1973).
23. In Vermont, the minimum acreage is ten acres for lands located within a municipality
which has adopted permanent zoning and subdivision by-laws and one acre if within an area
not subject to such by-laws. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 6001 (3) (1974 Cum. Supp.). In Maine,
the minimum is twenty acres regardless of location. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, § 482-2
(Supp. 1973).
24. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 380.012, et seq. (1974).
25. ALI MODEL CODE, Art. 7.
26. FLA., STAT. ANN. § 380.05 (1974); ALI MODEL CODE § 7-201. The Florida statute states
that an area of critical state concern may include:
(a) An area containing, or having a significant impact upon, environmental, histor-
ical, natural, or archaeological resources of regional or statewide importance.
(b) An area significantly affected by, or having a significant effect upon, an exist-
ing or proposed major public facility or other area of major public investment.
(c) A proposed area of major development potential, which may include a proposed
site for a new community, designated in a state land development plan.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.05(2). The Model Code provides essentially the same definition but
adds "any land within the jurisdiction of a local government that, at any time more than 3
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regional impact."
The major focus of this approach, regardless of the type of definitional
criteria employed is to give the state a voice, and in most cases, overriding
control in decisions concerning location of certain developments of signifi-
cant potential harm. The state involvement has taken the form of a permit
system." Applications for a development permit are made to the local
regulatory body which is to undertake consideration of the application in
light of certain social, economic and environmental factors articulated in
the statute. The action of the .body is reviewable by a specially-created
state-level board whose decision is binding upon both the developer and
the locality. The parties are afforded a hearing at both the local and state
levels with procedures ranging from an informal approach to strict adher-
ence to rules of court. In some instances, appeal of the state board's deci-
sion may be taken to the judicial system upon points of statutory construc-
tion and intent.
The basic objective of this approach is to subject all potentially damag-
ing developments to government examination at the state level without
causing an unnecessary amount of paperwork and bureaucratic review for
developments of only local significance. The reasonableness of the relation
between the definitional criteria employed and the damage foreseen by
unchecked development, must be established. The basic assumption that
there is a nexus between these two factors is subject to some challenge.
Assuming the validity of this basic assumption, the choice of definitional
criteria represents the varying needs of the states. In Vermont and Maine,
the pressure for development was not from mounting population but from
large-scale recreational and second-home projects, which threatened the
basically rural character of the state. In Florida, the shortage of drinking
water in 1971 clearly illustrates that the concern with development was
more a matter of population than size. The different problems that the
particular state hopes to meet are exemplified in its choice of definitional
criteria.
The choice also illustrates a number of additional considerations. A
minimum acreage requirement is definite and can be adjusted to a level
years after the effective date of this Code, has no development ordinance in effect." Al
MODEL CODE, § 7-201(3).
27. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06 (1974); ALl MODEL CODE § 7-301. Both statutes provide
essentially the same definition which includes "categories of development which because of
the nature or magnitude of the development or the nature or magnitude of its effect on the
surrounding environment, is likely . . .to present issues of state or regional significance."
Id. § 7-301(1).
28. VT. STAT. ANN. §§ 6081-91 (1973), as amended, (1974 Cum. Supp.); ME. Rav. STAT.
ANN. § 483 (Supp. 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06 (1974); ALI MODEL CODE § 7-303.
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so as to include a large number of possible proposals. As compared with
the more discretionary definition of a development of regional impact, the
opportunity for state involvement is increased. In Vermont and Maine, the
overwhelming majority of land was subject to no local zoning and subdivi-
sion by-laws and a need for greater state involvement existed which re-
quired a more comprehensive formula to determine areas of state control.
In contrast, localities in Florida have taken advantage of the state's zoning
enabling act and have developed both the administrative framework and
experience to deal with most land use problems. Therefore the scope of
state involvement was more limited and discretionary.
The flexibility in the definitional formula employed by Florida can be-
come a source of difficulty for a state unless accompanied by the prepara-
tion of guidelines and characteristics to assist both developers and local
governments in identifying developments of regional impact. Otherwise,
the flexibility becomes vagueness from the developer's point of view and
can be subject to judicial scrutiny as an arbitrary exercise of the police
power.2
The "development of regional impact" definition is tailored to meet the
problem of a single locality allowing a development in order to attract tax
revenue while having the burden spread to adjoining localities." In consid-
ering the developer's application under the existing zoning and subdivision
by-laws, the locality must also consider the social, economic and environ-
mental effects that would be felt by the surrounding region. Under the
Model Code proposal,3' the developer is given the option to have his permit
application considered under state guidelines if it qualifies as a develop-
ment of regional benefit.32 This proposal is well-structured to prevent a
local government from acting in its own best interest when in conflict with
the interest of the region as a whole."
A primary advantage of the definitional criteria approach to state land
29. See In re Spring Valley, 300 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973).
30. The Florida statute provides state involvement as to "any development which, because
of its character, magnitude, or location, would have a substantial effect upon the health,
safety, or welfare of citizens of more than one county." FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.06(1) (1974).
31. ALI MODEL CODE, Art. 7.
32. Id. § 7-301(4).
33. In Massachusetts, the use of exclusionary zoning had prevented the construction of low-
income housing despite the critical need for it. The legislature enacted the Zoning Appeals
Act, 40B MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 20-23 (1973), which established a Housing Appeals
Committee to hear appeals by developers who had been denied necessary local approval to
build subsidized housing. The state committee was given power to overrule the decision of
the locality whenever the needs of the region outweighed the considerations used in the local
decision.
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use control is its ability to meet immediate needs. There is no time lag
required for the preparation of detailed classification systems or capability
plans as exercise of state control is dependent upon neither. Action on an
immediate problem is not delayed by consideration of other areas which,
though potentially vulnerable, are not presently threatened. This approach
is also easily implemented by the existing bureaucratic framework. Exist-
ing local regulations, if any, are not superseded but remain in force, their
application subject to state-level review only as they affect the develop-
ments in question. Both Vermont and Maine have created independent
regulatory agencies at the state and local level to administer their program
but this is due to the absence of an existing framework, particularly at the
local level, rather than the demands of this approach. Implementation of
this approach in most states would resemble Florida with state review of
decisions made by existing local regulatorybodies. The emphasis on a local
role should encourage those localities which have not already done so to
develop land use controls. This is particularly true when a higher standard
for state involvement is demanded if the land in question is subject to local
land use control.
In addition to the permit system for developments of regional impact,
Florida has also incorporated provisions for state involvement in "areas of
critical state concern."3 The state land planning agency is given the au-
thority to recommend the designation of certain areas as areas of critical
state concern and to provide principles for guiding development within
that area. If the recommendation is adopted, the localities involved have
six months to establish development regulations governing the area. If
such regulations are not established locally or those submitted do not
conform with the state guidelines perviously set out, the state may act in
place of the locality and order implementation of its own regulations.
Unlike the Model Code, the Florida legislation limits the amount of land
that can be under designation at any one time to five percent of the state's
total area.
34. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.05 (1974). See also ALI MODEL CODE § 7-201. Virginia has
adopted the same concept in the Critical Environmental Areas Act, VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-
187 to -196 (1974 Cum. Supp.). The Act directed the Division of State Planning and Com-
munity Affairs to develop criteria for identification of critical areas, select critical environ-
mental areas within the Commonwealth, and recommend standards for development within
those critical areas. Subsequent attempts to implement this concept have not been success-
ful. Both S.B. 219 (Va. 1974 Sess.) and H.B. 420 (Va. 1974 Sess.) were defeated in committee.
See Section VIIH, supra.




Colorado has chosen a passive role of involvement in land use control.36
The Colorado Land Use Act "recognize[s] that the decision-making au-
thority as to the character and use of land shall be at the lowest level of
government possible consistent with the purposes of this [Act]. 317
The Act establishes a state land use commission which is directed to
prepare a statewide planning program, classifying the state into areas of
state, regional and local concern. In addition, the commission is directed
to develop model resolutions for use by local governments concerning zon-
ing, subdivision and development regulation.
The possibility for active state involvement in Colorado is limited. The
commission may request from the governor a cease and desist order against
any development in serious noncompliance with the state plan which has
not been restrained or adequately regulated by the local government.8
Upon review, the governor may direct the issuance of such an order which
the commission can enforce by suit for injunction in the local district court.
This model for state participation, like the one employed by Florida,
provides for state take-over of regulatory responsibility if the local authori-
ties fail to act in accordance with the state planning guidelines. State take-
over in Florida, however, is automatic upon default of the locality, not
within the discretion of state officials as in the Colorado model. In its
attempt to effectuate land use control "at the lowest level of government
possible," the Colorado legislature has so weakened the threat of state
involvement that the land use plan will have little influence, if any, upon
local decision-making.
The laudable portions of the Colorado Act provide for the formulation
of a statewide planning program which will provide guidelines to assist the
localities. It was accompanied by legislation39 providing both administra-
tive and financial support to local governments to assist in formulation of
their own land use plans. However, its inadequacies far outweigh any
benefits that the localities might voluntarily choose to enjoy. The commis-
sion is given the power to utilize an advisory committee," employ its own
staff, and contract for services from other state agencies and private groups
and individuals.4 The creation of this extra government expense and bu-
36. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 24-65-101, et seq. (1973).
37. Id. § 24-65-104(l)(b).
38. Id. § 24-65-104(2)(a).
39. Id. §§ 24-66-101, et seq.
40. Id. § 24-65-104(1)(c).
41. Id. § 24-65-103(3).
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reaucracy is of questionable value when the power to plan is not accompa-
nied with the power to act. When a state creates a program for comprehen-
sive statewide land use planning but leaves its implementation to the
discretion of local authorities, with only weak threats of state involvement,
the effectiveness of the planning program is seriously impaired.
4. Selective State Control According to Functional Criteria and Specific
Geographical Areas
This approach represents the present attitude of most states. Regula-
tions over specific geographical areas or specific types of developments are
enacted which provide for limited state involvement. The approach is
similar to the Florida model except the scope of state involvement is more
narrowly defined. Rather than outline broad criteria and descriptions for
areas of critical state concern and developments of regional impact, legisla-
tion using this approach seeks to identify areas of critical state concern by
their specific geographical location and developments of regional impact
by their functional definition.
Typical of this approach would be authority vested in a state regulatory
body to approve or disapprove specific developments. Washington42 re-
quires that prior to any siting or construction of a power plant, a permit
be obtained from the governor based upon the recommendation of a
specially-created, state-level council which considers the overall social,
economic and environmental impact upon the proposed location. In West
Virginia,4 3 it is unlawful for any person to use excavating equipment for the
purpose of prospecting or engage in surface mining without first having
obtained a permit from the Department of Natural Resources. Other states
contend that the areas requiring state involvement can be geographically
rather than functionally defined. Delaware44 has undertaken control over
all uses within its coastal zone. While local regulations, if any, are still in
effect, the state absolutely prohibits heavy industry and off-shore bulk
product transfer facilities within the coastal zone. All other manufacturing
uses are allowed only by permit from a state coastal zone control board.
The obvious advantage of this approach is the specialization that it
affords the regulatory body. The regulations imposed can be specifically
designed for the area and type of development involved. Each individual
project can be evaluated and controlled according to its particular pro-
posed use and the area's particular need. The function of regulation and
42. REv. CODE WASH. ANN. §§ 80.50, et seq. (1974 Supp.).
43. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-6-1, et seq. (1973 Repl. Vol.).
44. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§ 7001, et seq. (1974).
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review is assigned to a particular state agency or department, in most
cases, one specially created for the function. The limited scope of control
allows members of the regulatory body to become specialized with the area
or type of development it supervises.
If a state can realistically determine that its land use problems presently
fall within certain definite functional and geographical limits, and will
continue to do so in the foreseeable future, this approach will prevent
unnecessary state involvement in other areas which fall outside these lim-
its. Rarely can such a determination be made. This limited approach is
geared only toward meeting immediate needs and presently-identified
problems; it is neither designed for nor capable of providing a means of
identifying future land use concerns and developing a system to discover
their solution. As future needs present themselves, there is pressure to
legislate additional specifically limited solutions. With the system of piece-
meal control comes an expanding framework of piecemeal bureaucracy,
which further contributes to potential conflicts and a lack of coordination
among the various agencies.
In a state with strong opposition by local authorities to expanded state
involvement, state control limited along narrow functional or geographical
lines may at first glance seem appealing. However, such a measure can
provide only short-range answers to what most states are realizing is a
long-range problem. Limited impact upon local authority and decision-
making provides only limited control. A cost-benefit comparison for this
approach, like state planning without adequate implementation, might
show no state involvement as the preferred alternative.
5. State Control of Uncontrolled Areas
The rationale of statewide comprehensive land use control was to substi-
tute the judgment of state officials for that exercised by local authorities.
The rationale of "the uncontrolled areas" approach is to substitute state
judgment for no judgment at all. When zoning or subdivision authority has
been ineffectively operated or totally lacking at the local level of govern-
ment, some states have chosen to create and enforce a set of minimum
state standards for uncontrolled or under-controlled areas. Following this
approach,'a state usually administers land use controls in all or a portion
of the unregulated area at least until such time as the local government
enacts regulatory ordinances of its own.
In Oregon," the applicable provisions require all local governments to
adopt a comprehensive plan and the ordinances by which to implement
45. ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 215.505, et seq. (1974).
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and enforce it. Both the plan and enforcement ordinances must meet mini-
mum state guidelines. Should the locality choose not to act, the state land
use commission is authorized to develop a comprehensive land use plan for
the locality and the implementation tools necessary to effectuate it. The
locality is then required to reimburse the state for the cost of such serv-
ices." In Maine," this approach is taken only as to unorganized areas
which have no zoning power, not to the organized localities which have the
power but have chosen not to exercise it. The state exercises regulatory
power over the unorganized areas and sets minimum standards for devel-
opment. Once under state control, however, these standards continue to
apply even after the area has been organized into a local governing unit.
Municipal regulations supersede the state standards only if they are more
protective than the latter.
This approach to state involvement is effective to insure that some land
use regulation of previously unmanaged or under-managed areas will take
place. The threat of immediate state action unless local authority is exer-
cised usually produces the desired result. Unless related to a more encom-
passing program, this approach will be of only temporary and limnited
assistance, particularly as the state becomes more urbanized. It avoids
resolving the two most basic problems confronted in the area of land use
which the approaches featuring a greater degree of state involvement have
sought to resolve: (1) how to regulate projects of greater than local impact,
and (2) how to avoid parochial planning practices which are harmful to
areas outside the local jurisdiction.
C. IssuEs IN DETERMINING A STATE LAND USE PROGRAM
Active state participation in land use control is a recent novelty in state
government. The nature of the programs and policies employed vary from
state to state, and sometimes even from one institution within a state to
another. The decision to take an active role in land use management does
not imply a preference for a specific land use policy, but is merely a deci-
sion to construct a new means or process for land use decision-making. Of
course, environmentalists will seek greater input for natural and aesthetic
values while developers will argue for consideration of individual property
rights and economic incentives. But the decision of the state to exercise
its constitutional power over land use is an implementation of means, not
a committment to a policy goal.
46. ORE. Rzv. STAT., Chap. 80 § 50(1) (October 5, 1973), quoted in, ENvm. REP., State Solid
Waste-Land Use Laws, 1286:2108. In addition if the locality does not make the required
payment, the state treasurer is given the authority to withhold the sum from the locality's
share of liquor and cigarette taxes collected on its behalf. Id.
47. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 681, et seq. (1974), as amended, (Cum. Supp. 1975).
[Vol. 9:513
LAND USE
Once a decision favoring state involvement has been made, a number of
issues present themselves as to the proper approach for the state to pursue.
How the individual state perceives these issues and considerations will be
reflected in the approach it ultimately decides to follow.
1. Declaration of Legislative Intent
The legislative programs previously considered have all had one problem
in common, namely, how to translate the values and considerations upon
which the decision-making process is to rely into workable statutory lan-
guage. The answer rests less with the problem of word choice and imagina-
tive drafting than with the unambiguous resolution by the legislature of
the policy choices before it. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe48
demonstrates the value of a strong statement of legislative intent.
Petitioners, private citizens and conservation groups, challenged the con-
struction of an interstate highway through Overton Park as a violation of
federal statutes." Respondents argued that the proper role for the Secre-
tary of Transportation was to balance competing interests for which he was
given broad discretion. The Supreme Court, in holding for petitioners,
rejected this position and found that Congress intended to elevate the
protection of park lands to a status superior to other competing interests."
A clear statement of legislative intent enabled the Court to interpret the
otherwise arguable statutory language in favor of petitioners. Without an
equally clear statement on the part of state legislatures, states may find
48. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
49. Department of Transportation Act of 1966 § 4(f), 49 U.S.C.A. § 1653(f) (1975 Cum.
Supp.) provides:
It is hereby declared to be the national policy that special effort should be made to
preserve the natural beauty of the countryside and public park and recreation lands,
wildlife and waterfowl refuges, and historic sites. The Secretary of Transportation shall
cooperate and consult with the Secretaries of the Interior, Housing Urban Develop-
ment, and Agriculture, and with the States in developing transportation plans and
programs that include measures to maintain or enhance the natural beauty of lands
traversed. After August 23, 1968, the Secretary shall not approve any program or
project which requires the use of any publicly owned land from a public park, recrea-
tion area, or wildlife and waterfowl refuge of national, State, or local significance as
determined by the Federal, State, or local officials having jurisdiction thereof, or any
land from an historic site of national, State, or local significance as so determined by
such officials unless (1) there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such
land, and (2) such program includes all possible planning to minimize harm to such
park, recreational area, wildlife and waterfowl refuge, or historic site resulting from
such use.
See also Federal-Aid Highway Act § 18(a), 23 U.S.C.A. § 138 (1975 Cum. Supp.) (same
language).
50. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 412-13 (1971).
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statutory requirements such as "harmoniously fitting into the existing
natural environment"' are vulnerable to administrative abuse and judicial
attack.
2. Requirement of a Land Use Plan
In the land use decision-making process, some method is required to
balance the pressures and considerations for and against a specific pro-
posal. Regulation tends to make this balancing process proceed on a case-
by-case basis in a somewhat reactive manner whereas formal planning has
a more comprehensive and long-range character. But this balancing pro-
cess can be defined as planning regardless of whether or not it ultimately
results in a formal plan.
The absence of a formal plan upon which to base state regulatory deci-
sions is not fatal to the land use control statute so long as the statute does
contain some standards and policy formulations upon which the balance
can be achieved.52
States have approached the utility of a land use plan in various ways.
In Maine, there is no formal plan but only guidelines and considerations
articulated by the legislature in the statute.5 3 In Vermont, the statute
directs the preparation of a capability and development plan and a land
use plan.5 The permit system and the planning program have been en-
51. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. § 484-3 (Supp. 1973).
52. In re Spring Valley, 300 A.2d 736 (Me. 1973). In that case, the appellant/developer
challenged the constitutionality of the Maine Site Location Law, ME. REv. STAT. ANN., tit.
38, § 481-88 (Supp. 1973), as a violation of equal protection. He argued that the absence of a
development plan for the area in question made the decision on his application an arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of police power. The Maine Supreme Court rejected this argument
distinguishing the Site Location Law from the typical zoning ordinance which allows the
exercise of zoning power only when in accordance with a development plan. The Site Location
Law was not concerned with where a development takes place in general, but only that the
development take place in a manner consistent with the needs of the public. In re Spring
Valley, 300 A.2d 736, 753 (Me. 1973). The case law makes a distinction between regulatory
schemes which merely direct the pattern of growth and provide limits within which it can
exist and those which seek to stop all development within a given area. Statutes which merely
direct growth need only provide reasonable standards by which to make decisions while the
burden on the latter requires a more formal planning program. Id. See also In re Barker
Sargent Corp., 132 Vt. 42, 313 A.2d 669, 672 (1973). Closely related to this distinction is the
whole issue of how far regulation can go before it amounts to a "taking." See F. BossEum, ,
D. CALLiEs & J. BANTA, THE TAKING ISSUE: AN ANAYsIS OF THE CONSTrruTIoNAL Lmrs OF LAND
USE CONTROL (1973).
53. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. § 484 (Supp. 1973).
54. VT. STAT. ANN. § 6042 (1974 Cumin. Supp.).
55. Id. § 6043 (1974 Cum. Supp.).
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tirely separated. There is no reason to believe that the principles estab-
lished in the regulatory system will be incorporated into the land use plan.
Likewise, those involved in the regulatory process view the plans as advi-
sory and their application to decision-making within the discretion of the
regulatory body. 6 In Florida, the guidelines promulgated for areas of criti-
cal state concern become part of the planning program.57
Regardless of whether a plan is formally developed or adopted, there is
a need to balance input from opposing views in the decision-making pro-
cess. Only in this manner will the policy standards which result be a
reasonable exercise of the state's police power.
3. Role of the State
The most important dilemma in formulating a state approach to land
use control is to determine the extent of state involvement desired. Any
system of regulation imposes substantial costs. To be considered are the
expenses of an administrative framework as well as the expenses of the
developer in complying with bureaucratic red tape. Such compliance also
requires time, and due to the fact that most developers are working with
borrowed money during the application process, any delay is costly. Such
costs imposed on developers by land use regulations are more easily ab-
sorbed by developers of expensive housing or industrial developments than
by developers of housing designed for lower income groups.
In contrast to the costs involved, the state must weigh the benefit of a
particular approach to its present needs and future expectations. A system
of control which reaches too broadly and affects decisions which could be
made just as easily and wisely at the local level wastes taxpayer dollars
and is an additional source of taxpayer dissatisfaction. Every state engag-
ing in land use regulation has employed some formula for concentrating
its energies on the major decisions while leaving minor details to the locali-
ties.
Most commentators"8 now consider the states to be the logical govern-
mental unit to make these major decisions in land use. States can take a
broader approach to both planning and control rather than relying on the
highly fragmented character of local decisions. The states have a broader
interest in critical areas and objectives which local decisions fail to protect.
56. QUIET REVOLUTION, supra note 4, at 82.
57. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 380.05 (1974).
58. See ALI MODEL CODE, Art. 7, Commentary; COUNCI OF STATE GovEMENTs, LAND USE
PuzzLE (1974); E. HASKELL, STATE ENVmonRENTAL MANAGEMWNT 169-73 (1973); Quwr REVOLU-
TION, supra note 4, at 3-4; 46 STATE Gov'T passim (1973).
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Many of the traditional responsibilities of the state, including highway
construction, tax policy and pollution control are now being recognized for
their land use implications, and only at the state level can a comprehensive
and coordinated program be assembled. The most significant advantage
is that states are not dependent upon the property tax as the principal
revenue source and therefore, are not unduly influenced by large develop-
ment interests.
A program sufficiently limited in scope provides the persons and inter-
ests affected by a major land use decision with a voice in the outcome by
way of their elected state representatives. Such input is not always present
in a decision at the local level alone.
4. Role of Local Government
Local regulation of land use has been in existence for many years at least
in the urbanized areas of most states. These local systems of zoning and
subdivision control have been and continue to be adequate for controlling
the majority of small-scale developments taking place in urban centers.
Elimination of such systems is neither advisable nor, considering the
firmly entrenched local framework, possible. The state is confronted with
the alternatives of merging with local regulatory bodies or duplicating their
efforts.
Most states59 have chosen to create duplicating procedures in order to
eliminate the need to make any change in existing zoning and subdivision
regulations at the local level. By leaving the local framework intact, the
state reduces the number of potential enemies of new legislation. The
motive behind the regulatory systems in most states has been to prohibit
development which would otherwise occur. Such duplication serves this
goal, tending to make the overall system restrictive, as it operates to pre-
vent rather than encourage development.
As states move toward a more balanced role in land use regulation, the
goals become more a matter of directing development than preventing it.
The state system in these instances serves as a review of local action, not
only prohibiting adverse development encouraged by local decisions, but
also overruling exclusionary decisions not made in the regional or state
interest. As state land controls become more sophisticated and comprehen-
sive, the need for merger between state and local systems becomes more
apparent. The ideal system in these instances would provide a single ad-
ministrative framework with specific roles for both state and local govern-
59. See, e.g., HAW. REv. STAT. § 205-1, et seq. (1968), as amended, (1974 Supp.); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 10, § 6001, et seq. (1973), as amended, (1974 Cum. Supp.).
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ment with input from state, local and regional regulatory bodies at all
levels. 0
D. CONCLUSION
State governments are giving increased attention to adding a more com-
prehensive element to their existing land planning and management activ-
ities. Such new directions have been spurred on by the possibility of federal
legislation which would require statewide involvement in land use plan-
ning." Once the decision to become active on the state level has been
made, a state is faced with a number of options. These new strategies
reflect the different needs and concerns of the individual states. Active
state involvement is such a recent novelty that it is impossible to tell which
of the various approaches and programs outlined are the best or worst; at
present each can only be considered representative.
Regardless of the approach taken, an institutional structure which will
consider and reconcile the competing interests is needed to insure a ra-
tional pattern of development which protects social and environmental
values while halting the detrimental use of land.
IX. FEDERAL TAXATION AFFECTING LAND USE
The progressive income tax imposed by the federal government has
directive forces which interact with economic and social factors to contrib-
ute to the acquisition, use and disposition of land. By taxing, or refraining
from taxing certain behavior, Congress has effected a scheme of incentives
designed to meet various goals which it considers to be in the national
interest. Several of these tax incentives are examined as a means of achiev-
ing these socially desirable ends.' It must be recognized that dollars are
being spent indirectly and thus a tax expenditure occurs.
Proponents of tax incentives justify them on the basis of three major
propositions: (1) tax incentives encourage the private sector to participate
60. See generally ALI MODEL CODE, Art. 7.
61. See generally Section XI, infra.
1. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government Policy: A Comparison
with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARv. L. REV. 705 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Surrey]. Surrey defines a tax incentive as a "tax expenditure which induces certain activities
or behavior in response to the monetary benefit available. . . ... Id. at 711. A tax expenditure
is a term "used to describe those special provisions of the federal income tax system which
represent government expenditures made through that system to achieve various social and
economic objectives." Id. at 706.
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in social programs; (2) they involve less government supervision, detail and
red tape; (3) they promote private decision-making.2
Leading tax authorities and economists4 have questioned the use of the
tax structure to indirectly finance social policy. In the view of one critic,
these tax incentives are inequitable, inefficient, and wasteful. 5 Tax incen-
tives are inequitable because they are worth more to high income taxpayers
than to low income taxpayers.' There is almost no incentive effect at lower
levels,7 and to the extent that the tax benefits are an inducement to middle
and upper bracket taxpayers, the incentive is an inefficient one.8 The waste
occurs because dollars are spent to induce higher bracket taxpayers to do
what they would have done anyway
If these criticisms are valid, achievement of socially desirable goals such
as land use control may well be jeopardized if too much reliance is placed
on tax incentives as an indirect means to this end. These considerations
provide a setting to examine more closely the present use of tax incentives
as a vehicle of land use control.
A. TAx INCENTIVES FOR THE DONATION OF LAND
An important goal with a tax-based incentive is the disposition of pri-
vately owned land for the public. Where land is donated to the public,
deference is given to the donor's stipulated use'" and he may be entitled
to a charitable contribution tax deduction under section 170 of the Internal
Revenue Code." The tax advantages of donating long term investment real
estate to a public charity or the government are twofold: the capital gains
are not realized and the donor receives a tax deduction based on the appre-
2. Id. at 715-19.
3. Id.
4. Taussig, Economic Aspects of the Personal Income Tax Treatment of Charitable
Contributions, 20 NAT'L TAX J. 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Taussig].
5. Surrey, supra note 1, at 726.
6. Id. at 720.
7. Id. Tax incentives do not benefit those who are outside the tax system because their
incomes are low or because they are exempt from tax.
8. Id. at 719-26.
9. Id.
10. In Archbold v. United States, 444 F.2d 1120 (Ct. Cl. 1971), the taxpayer had given land
to the United States for park purposes. When this purpose was threatened by the proposed
construction of a highway through the donated land, the donor was allowed to deduct legal
fees. The expenditures were held to be for the use of the United States and incidental to the
original gift since they were in direct response to attempts to convert the park land to highway
use.
11. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 170(c).
[Vol. 9:513
LAND USE
ciated value of the property." The Tax Reform Act of 1969's has increased
the significance of the incentive to donate land to the public. The changes
in the Internal Revenue Code made the holding of real estate as a tax
shelter less favorable.' 4 The donation of long term capital gain appreciated
property to the public makes it possible for the investor to withdraw from
his tax shelter with favorable tax consequences.
Congress has chosen to grant deductions to induce taxpayers to donate
land to the public. The justification is that the private donation of land is
a socially desirable activity 5 and should be encouraged by giving the tax-
payer favorable treatment. Furthermore, these donations relieve the state
and federal governmentsfrom the responsibility of providing these lands
and facilities by direct expenditures." The use of the tax structure as a
technique to achieve social policy has been criticized as a wasteful indirect
expenditure." The present deduction under section 170 offers a dual bene-
fit when long term appreciated investment property is donated to the
public.' 8 This revenue loss is wasteful if the middle and upper bracket
taxpayers would have donated the same amount of land regardless of the
tax benefits. The taxpayers in these two brackets are private landowners
in a financial position to donate land to the public. They are also the ones
seeking to avoid adverse tax consequences upon the disposition of their
investment property. If one of the tax benefits is sufficient to induce the
donation, the other has failed as an inducement and is merely a windfall
to the taxpayer. To accurately measure the efficiency of each tax benefit
as an incentive, they must be examined both separately and as joint in-
ducements. To the extent they operate jointly, it must be ascertained
whether the retention of the less efficient is feasible in terms of dollars
12. Id. § 170(b)(1)(D). This charitable deduction is limited to thirty percent of the donor's
adjusted gross income, rather than the usual fifty percent adjusted gross income limit. If the
fair market value of the property exceeds the thirty percent limit, a five year carryover is
available. Id.
13. Act of December 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 526, amending INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954.
14. The tax benefits were diminished by the limitation on the use of accelerated deprecia-
tion, a tightening of the rules to recapture excess depreciation upon sale of the investment,
and making the untaxed half of long term capital gains a tax preference item. Infra notes 76-
78.
15. Tracy, Charitable Gifts of Appreciated Property, 25 Sw. L.J. 10, 712 (1971)
[hereinafter cited as Tracy].
16. Id. Donated park land, recreation areas, and school sites are a few examples in which
the government could avoid direct expenditures for the land.
17. Surrey, supra note 1, at 726.
18. The donor receives the tax deduction based on the appreciated value of the donated
property and there is no realization of capital gain.
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spent. Maintenance of the present system is not justified "if it can be
shown that the amount of giving encouraged by the tax incentives is small
when compared to the revenue loss involved.""9
Some of the waste and inefficiency of the charitable contributions de-
duction has been diminished by judicial scrutiny of the circumstances
surrounding the donation. Recently the Tax Court of the United States9
and the Ninth Circuit" have closely scrutinized the donor's motives for the
charitable contribution for which he seeks a tax deduction. "If the pay-
ment proceeds primarily from the incentive of anticipated benefit to the
payer 'of an economic nature' it is not a gift." The congressional policy
of encouraging donations is inhibited by this subjective criterion if the
incentive effect is operative and the scrutiny of motives creates uncertainty
as to the receipt of the tax benefits sufficient to result in a reluctance to
donate. 24 Three types of donation situations can be distinguished in this
respect: (1) where the tax incentive is fully operative as a motivating force
for the donation; (2) where the tax incentive is inoperative as an induce-
ment; (3) where the tax incentive is a partial inducement and some antici-
pated economic benefit forms the rest of the motivation.
19. Tracy, supra note 15, at 712 et seq.
20. Wardwell v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 443 (1960), rev'd, 301 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1962). The
Tax Court adopted strict criteria for donative intent under section 170, citing Commissioner
v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278 (1960). In that case the United States Supreme Court considered
the issue of donative intent required for a gift under section 102 of the Internal Revenue Code.
Critics of the Tax Court's position contend that section 102 is an exclusion from income
section which should be construed narrowly, while section 170 is a deduction section designed
to encourage donations, thus the same test should not apply to both sections. Despite this
criticism, and the disapproval of the First Circuit, Crosby Valve & Gage Co. v. Commissioner,
380 F.2d 146 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 976 (1967), and the Eighth Circuit, Wardwell
v. Commissioner, 301 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1962), the Tax Court has continued to apply the
Duberstein rationale to section 170 cases. Karl D. Pettit, 61 T.C. No. 67 (Feb. 7, 1974).
21. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the Duberstein "anticipated economic benefits" test for
section 170 in DeJong v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 373 (9th Cir. 1962). In that case, which
involved section 170, the court introduced another Duberstein test of "detached and disinter-
ested generosity." This latter criterion as applied to section 170 has been criticized as too
subjective and the Ninth Circuit has since refrained from basing its section 170 decisions on
a "detached and disinterested generosity" test. The Ninth Circuit retained the "anticipated
economic benefits" test. Stubbs v. United States, 428 F.2d 885 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 1009 (1971); Transamerica Corp. v. United States, 392 F.2d 522 (9th Cir. 1958). The
Tax Court recently cited both tests in Karl D. Pettit, 61 T.C. No. 67 (Feb. 7, 1974).
22. Wardwell v. Commissioner, 35 T.C. 443, 450 (1960), rev'd, 301 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1962).
23. S. REP. No. 1584, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952); S. REP. No. 1567, 75th Cong., 3d Sess.
14 (1938).
24. Comment, Disinterested Generosity: An Emerging Criteria of Deductibility Under Sec-
tion 170, 1968 UTAH L. Rav. 475, 480-81.
LAND USE
When a tax incentive is fully operative in a land donation situation, the
economic benefits test of donative intent should not inhibit the donation
of land to the public. The uncertainty can be eliminated by manipulating
the timing and circumstances of the donation. The taxpayer who is moti-
vated by one or both of the previously discussed tax benefits under section
170 should be able to portray the proper charitable intent. Economists25
and tax experts" contend that the tax incentive has its most potent effect
on higher bracket taxpayers. The taxpayers in these brackets desire the
favorable tax benefits which are so important to them that they will take
steps to assure that the court will not find outside benefits amounting to
a quid pro quo. The very tax advantages that induced them to donate the
land will induce them to keep both their subjective motives and the objec-
tive situation void of "anticipated economic benefits."
The section 170 tax benefits are inoperative as incentives to taxpayers
who are compelled to donate their land either by local ordinance or as a
prerequisite to improving their economic position. Recently the Tax Court
has denied charitable deductions when the donors were compelled by local
ordinances or subdivision regulations to donate land prior to subdivision
approval.? The "anticipated economic benefits" criterion for donative in-
tent operated to prevent the donors from receiving possibly three benefits
from the one donation under circumstances where the tax incentives were
inoperative: (1) the non-realization of capital gains; (2) the charitable
contribution tax deduction; (3) economic enrichment as a result of compli-
ance with the ordinance. Thus a scrutiny of motives reveals that the donors
would have donated the land anyway and under such circumstances the
tax benefits, if granted, would constitute an unnecessary loss of revenue.
When land donations are induced partially by the deduction and par-
tially by the anticipated economic benefits, the courts' close scrutiny of
donor's motives would inhibit land donations by creating uncertainty as
to the receipt of the tax benefits.2 Thus in situations where land donations
are not required to obtain the desirable economic benefits, but the court
could find a reciprocal relationship between donation and the favor re-
25. Taussig, supra note 4.
26. S. SuRREY, W. WARREN, P. McDANiEL, & H. AULT, FEDERAL INCOME TAxAroN 612 et seq.
(1972).
27. Perlmutter v. Commissioner, 45 T.C. 311 (1965). The taxpayer conveyed land for
schools and recreation facilities pursuant to the subdivision regulations of the county's plan-
ning and zoning board. The Tax Court denied the deduction based on the Duberstein ration-
ale and found that without the transfers, the taxpayer would have considerable difficulty
obtaining approval of the subdivision plans. Accord, Karl D. Pettit, 61 T.C. No. 67 (Feb. 7,
1974).
28. See note 24 supra.
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ceived, the prospective donor may be reluctant to donate. The subjectivity
of the intent evaluation is evident in determining whether the economic
motives are primary.29 Any incentive effect operating would be wasted if
the donor were deterred by the uncertainty. It then becomes a policy deci-
sion as to which course the law will follow when motives are a mixture of
tax incentives and economic expectations. Tax benefits can be denied at
the cost of a possible decrease in land donations, or any donative intent
will suffice at the cost of allowing some taxpayers treble benefits.
Congress should make the decision as to the caliber of donative intent
required under section 170 with a focus on the efficiency of the tax benefits
as inducements. Congress should reexamine the use of the tax structure
and particularly the charitable contributions deductions as a technique to
achieve the goal of inducing private individuals to donate land to the
public. The present system allows people to "give" land and the deduction
reinforces the giving attitude. From a philosophical view this is better than
the image of the government as a "taker" especially when what is taken is
land with its limited quantity and revered uniqueness. Also, if the govern-
ment acquires land for the public use and pays "just compensation", it
would be burdened with a clumsy condemnation process and perhaps
spend more money than the value of the charitable deduction. Even if
these arguments in favor of the retention of the charitable contributions
deduction and the non-realization of capital gains upon the donation of
real estate are accepted, these tax incentives must be examined as induce-
ments to see if the amount of giving is small compared to the dollars spent
by allowing some taxpayers dual and treble benefits for their one donation.
As a tax incentive these benefits have been criticized as ineffective."0 If the
criticisms of waste and inefficiency are valid, then the goal of obtaining
more land for the public use is inhibited and could be better achieved by
direct expenditures. This latter approach has the advantage of being more
flexible. The government could choose the sites for the public land rather
than indirectly spend funds to get parcels of land which the donors have
chosen to give.
Land use is greatly affected by who owns the land and for what purpose.
The federal government has used its tax system to induce the private
sector to donate land to the public sector. Whether proper land use is
achieved by having more public land and whether it should be acquired
through tax deductions are difficult policy questions to answer. Land use
is a critical issue and is affected by the indirect expenditures of the tax
system. There is a danger that the effect of these latent expenditures will
29. See note 22 supra.
30. Surrey, supra note 1.
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be overlooked or relied upon too heavily by those who formulate land use
policy. Thus, it is a prerequisite to proper land use planning to recognize
the effect and efficiency of tax incentives which encourage the donation of
land to the public.
B. TAX INcENTIvES IN AGRICULTURAL LAND
Agriculture has remained a major element in Virginia's economy, with
the average farm consisting of one hundred ten acres." Two provisions of
the Internal Revenue Code specifically deal with land in agriculture. They
are Section 175, Soil and Water Conservation Expenditures, and Section
182, Expenditures by Farmers for Clearing Land. This latter provision is
of special importance to Virginia farmers since it was enacted to benefit
small farmers.
Measuring the incentive effect of the deductions under sections 175 and
182 on agricultural development and conservation is extremely difficult.
The tax deduction is only one factor to be considered in deciding to make
the capital outlay. The utility of the expenditure as it effects farm yield
and the availability of direct governmental subsidies are considerations
which may over-shadow the tax benefits.32 Furthermore, these Code sec-
tions are unable to adapt the inducements to the needs of farmers in
various geographical locations. This inflexibility is the result of an attempt
to induce farmers to follow proper land use measures while avoiding a
major revenue loss to the government through deductions. The tight draft-
ing of these Code sections prevents unintentional tax windfalls, but it also
excludes many potential beneficiaries, thus reducing the incentive effect.
1. Soil and Water Conservation (Section 175)
The Internal Revenue Code offers a tax incentive to farmers designed to
encourage proper soil and water conservation methods, thus conserving
natural resources.3 Section 175 of the Code provides a tax deduction for
expenditures incurred on land used in farming for the purpose of soil and
water conservation by a taxpayer in the business of farming.3 It is limited
to those in the business of farming because Congress considered such ex-
penditures by farmers to be beneficial to the whole nation., Without this
31. 23 ENCLYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Virginia 39, 45 (1968).
32. Note, Taxation Affecting Agricultural Land Use, 50 IowA L. REv. 600, 603-04 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Taxation Affecting Agricultural Land Use].
33. Hearings on H.R. 8300 Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 83d Cong., 1st
Sess., pt. 2, at 921-59 (1953) [hereinafter cited as 1953 Hearings].
34. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 175(a).
35. 1953 Hearings, supra note 33, at 947.
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preferential treatment, farmers would be forced to capitalize such expendi-
tures since they are long term improvements which enhance the value of
the land. 8 The prerequisite that expenditures be on "land used in farm-
ing" is intended to exclude expenditures during the preparatory stage, thus
limiting the deduction to conservation measures implemented when the
soil is either ready to receive the crop or while the crop grows.3 7 The Code
requires that the land have been used in farming by the taxpayer or his
tenant before or simultaneously with the conservation expenditure.18
Congress has limited the deduction granted under section 175 to a maxi-
mum of twenty-five percent of gross income from farming during the tax-
able year with the excess to be carried over into successive tax years. 9
Section 175 provides a non-exclusive list of qualifying expenditures,"0 but
they must not be depreciable items." Expenditures for depreciable im-
provements to land such as those made of masonry or concrete are ex-
cluded from section 175 treatment and must be depreciated under section
167 of the Code over their useful life.42 Thus while an earthen dam or
ditch for conservation would qualify,4" one of tile or cement would not.
This restriction may actually work against proper conservation methods."
For instance in 1954, "35 percent more water was lost when transported
by earthen irrigation ditches than when transported by underground
concrete pipes or by ditches lined with tile or cement."45 Many farmers
recognize the conservation and economic value of modem, permanent
installations but are unable to invest in them "because of the large initial
expenditure which cannot be deducted as an expense except over a lengthy
depreciation period."4
Section 175 should be amended in regard to soil conservation to include
depreciable items which are more efficient than their non-depreciable
counterparts.17 Farmers would be financially able to invest in the more
36. RESEARCH INsTrrurE OF AMERICA 5 TAX COORDINATOR N-1311.1 (1975).
37. Behring v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 1256 (1959).
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.175-4(a)(2) (1963).
39. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 175(b).
40. Id. § 175(c)(1).
41. Id. § 175(c)(1)(A)&(B).
42. Treas. Reg. § 1.175-2(B)(1) (1968).
43. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 175(c)(1).
44. Comment, Sections 175 & 182: Farmers' Deductions for Capital Improvements to
Land, 19 HASTINGs L.J. 446, 453 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Sections 175 & 182; Farmers'
Deductions].
45. Id.
46. Hearings on H.R. 8300 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 2114,
2348 (1954).
47. Sections 175 & 182: Farmers' Deductions, supra note 44, at 454.
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efficient conservation methods. This would bring greater economic return
to the farmers through increased production and the whole nation would
benefit from the more efficient conservation of soil and water.
2. Expenditures by Farmers for Clearing Land (Section 182)
Under section 182 of the Internal Revenue Code a taxpayer engaged in
the business of farming may elect to deduct expenses incurred in clearing
land for the purpose of making the land suitable for use in farming." An
immediate deduction is allowed in lieu of capitalizing these initial prepara-
tory expenses, thus giving farmers a present benefit. The total deduction
allowable in any one taxable year under section 182 is limited to $5000, or
twenty-five percent of the taxable income derived from farming, whichever
is the lesser amount." Unlike section 175, no carryover to future tax years
is allowed. This results in a loss of the deduction for small farmers, who
lose any amount by which land-clearing expenditures exceed twenty-five
percent of farm income." Since the farm is in its preparatory stage, unless
the farmer has other farms, there will be little or no taxable income at a
time when clearing expenses are greatest.
The purpose of section 182 is not to initiate land conservation, but rather
to benefit small farmers by giving them a tax advantage equal to that
enjoyed by large farmers in the clearing of land.2 Small farmers, unable
to afford depreciable equipment, were forced to contract to have land
cleared. 3 Under section 182 they are now able to deduct the contract price
within the prescribed limits. Despite the avowed purpose of section 182,
the large farmer benefits disproportionately. This restricts the tax advan-
tage to a particular class of farmer and presumably restricts the incentive
effect on agricultural land use. 4
An amendment to section 182 providing for a carryover of the excess
expenditures and a percentage limitation based on gross farm income
rather than taxable income would accord more fully with the purpose of
section 182. 51 The class benefited would be larger and the potential for
incentive effect would be increased. This is in accord with the philosophy
48. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 182(a). See Section HI F, supra n.140 and accompanying text.
49. INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 182(b).
50. Taxation Affecting Agricultural Land Use, supra note 32, at 606.
51. Sections 175 & 182: Farmers' Deductions, supra note 44, at 459.
52. 108 CONG. REc. 18, 126-27 (1962)(remarks of Senator Williams).
53. Id.
54. Taxation Affecting Agricultural Land Use, supra note 32, at 606.
55. Sections 175 & 182: Farmers' Deductions, supra note 44, at 460.
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behind any tax deduction: that it should theoretically produce an incentive
effect commensurate with the tax savings to the individual taxpayer. 6
C. TAX INCENTIVES IN TIMBERLAND
Timber is an important natural resource in Virginia, with two-thirds of
the land under forest cover.57 Tax incentives regarding timber are of great
interest to Virginians who use or contemplate the use of land for growing
trees to be sold in the ordinary course of business. 5 To benefit timber
owners and to encourage good forestry practices, Congress has enacted
section 631(a) and (b) of the Internal Revenue Code.59 These sections en-
courage the utilization of forestland by granting capital gains treatment
to certain transactions.
A taxpayer who has owned, or has held a contract right to cut timber for a
period of more than six months before the beginning of the taxable year may
elect under section 631(a) to consider the cutting of such timber during such
year for sale or for use in the taxpayer's trade or business as a sale or exchange
of the timber so cut.60
The difference between the fair market value of the timber and the ad-
justed basis for depletion of such timber may be treated as a capital gain. '
Capital gain treatment is advantageous to the taxpayer because only half
of the net long-term capital gain is taxed, although the other half is treated
as a tax preference item.
Unlike section 631(a) which allows the taxpayer to make an election of
its provisions, section 631(b) provisions are mandatory. 2 Under that
section, if the owner disposes of timber held for more than six months and
retains an economic interest in the timber, it is a capital gains transac-
tion. 3
The congressional purpose in enacting and retaining section 631 is to
encourage the cutting and reforesting of timberland.6 Favorable capital
gain treatment promotes harvesting of trees, for without section 631, the
sale of timber in the ordinary course of business would give rise to ordinary
56. Taxation Affecting Agricultural Land Use, supra note 32, at 606.
57. 19 ENCYCLOPEDIA BarrANNicA, Virginia 153, 154 (1974).
58. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 1221(1).
59. Taxation Affecting Agricultural Land Use, supra note 32, at 606.
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.631-1(b)(1) (1975).
61. Id. § 1.631-1(d)(1).
62. Id. § 1.631-2(a).
63. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 631(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.631-2(a) (1961).




income. There is some doubt as to whether section 631 encourages refores-
tation. The advantageous capital gains treatment results in increased
profit potential which should encourage reforestation, but there are no
obligations to do so." One suggestion designed to assure reforestation is to
give capital gains treatment only if additional trees are planted within a
specified period." Under the obligation to reforest, timberland owners
would be encouraged to use their land to benefit the whole nation.
D. TAx INCENTIVES IN HoUSING
Congressional policy since 1949 has been to realize "the goal of a decent
home and suitable living environment for every American Family." 7 This
avowed national goal has not been achieved; both public and private at-
tempts have been ineffective."8 One author is convinced that the failure to
provide sufficient and adequate housing in part stems from incentives in
tax legislation." Prior to 1969, real estate speculators found the tax treat-
ment of investment real estate to be very beneficial due to the accelerated
depreciation allowed"0 and the long term capital gain treatment upon
sale.' Accelerated depreciation hindered the decent housing goal by en-
couraging minimum maintenance and frequent turnover of ownership of
multi-family residential housing especially in low income areas.72 Frequent
turnover in ownership results because the building's actual loss in value
due to deterioration is usually less than that allowed by the Internal Reve-
nue Code. 3 Thus when a building has been fully depreciated by one inves-
tor, he can sell it at a profit to another investor who is entitled to depreciate
it also. The investor's gain on the sale is subject to tax but at the favorable
long term capital gains rate. This vicious cycle which focuses on rapid and
immediate deductions is not conducive to the more permanent capital
improvements essential to housing developments. An investor-landlord
contemplating a sale in the immediate future will not be inclined to make
capital expenditures.
65. Taxation Affecting Agricultural Land Use, supra note 32, at 608.
66. Id.
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (1970).
68. 12 U.S.C. § 1701t (1970).
69. Sporn, Some Contributions of the Income Tax Law to the Growth and Prevalence of
Slums, 59 COLUM. L. REv. 1026, 1027 (1959) [hereinafter cited as Sporn].
70. INT. RPv. CODE OF 1954, § 167.
71. Id. § 1231(a).
72. Comment, Low Income Housing: Section 236 of the National Housing Act and the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, 31 U. Pri. L. R.v. 443, 446 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Low Income
Housing].
73. Sporn, supra note 69, at 1037.
74. Low Income Housing, supra note 72, at 446.
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Congress enacted the Tax Reform Act of 196911 and diminished the tax
benefits in investment real estate by limitations on the use of accelerated
depreciation,7 tightening of the rules to recapture excess depreciation
upon the sale of the investment, 7  and making the untaxed half of long
term capital gains a tax preference item.7 1 Congressional intent was to
induce investment in housing, particularly in moderate and low income
multi-family housing. This was accomplished by allowing the double de-
clining balance depreciation method for new residential construction," and
by integrating the recapture section 1250(a) (1) (C) (ii) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code with the National Housing Act sections 221(d)(3) and 236 to
effect a tax incentive scheme.
[I]n the case of section 1250 property constructed, reconstructed, or ac-
quired by the taxpayer before January 1, 1976, with respect to which a mort-
gage is insured under section 221(d)(3) or 236 of the National Housing Act
. . . [the applicable percentage for recapture is] . . . 100 percent minus one
percentage point for each full month the property was held after the date the
property was held 20 full months.0
Section 221(d)(3) of the National Housing Act was created to insure
mortgages "to assist private industry in providing housing for low and
moderate income families and displaced families.""s Two important com-
ponents of section 221(d)(3) are no longer available. They are the below
market interest rate (BMIR) loans and rent supplements under which "the
FHA actually pays to the owner of the property a portion of the rent of
eligible tenants. ' '8 2 The National Housing Act section 236 provides for
government insured loans to private investors for the construction of rental
housing" for lower income families or elderly or handicapped families."
The section 236 program also includes interest reduction payments that
75. Act of December 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 526 amending INT. REV. CODE
OF 1954.
76. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(0).
77. Id. § 1250(a).
78. Id. § 57.
79. Id. § 1670j)(2)(B). Residential rental housing is defined as that which produces 80
percent or more of its gross rental income from residential rental units. Id.
80. Id. § 1250(a)(1)(C)(ii).
81. 12 U.S.C. § 1715L (1970).
82. Rehabilitation Projects and Middle and Low Income Housing: A Panel Discussion,
N.Y.U. 29th NST. ON FED. TAX. 1159, 1163 (1971).
83. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1(j)(1) (1970).
84. "Provided, That lower income persons who are less than sixty-two years of age shall
be eligible for occupancy in such a project, but not more than 10 per centum of the dwelling
units in any such project shall be available for occupancy by such persons." 12 U.S.C. §
1715z-1(j)(5)(C) (1970) (emphasis in original).
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reduce the effective interest rate to as low as one percent per year., The
purpose of the reduced borrowing rates is to induce investors to accept the
risks involved and also to make lower rental charges possible. The fate of
section 236 is presently in limbo. It remains a part of the National Housing
Act and Congress has continued to appropriate funds. This money is being
held in abeyance and the program remains inoperative as the result of an
indefinite moratorium initiated by the Secretary of Housing and Urban
Development, who is charged with the administration of section 236.6
On January 8, 1973, then Secretary of HUD Romney issued orders to all
regional HUD offices terminating the Section 235, 236 and 101 programs. The
orders provided that as of January 5, 1973 no more applications would be
accepted for projects under the programs. . . .8
The issue of whether the Secretary of HUD has the discretion and au-
thority in the administration of section 236 to suspend its operation was
decided in favor of the Secretary by the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia. 8  The moratorium continues and the administrators of HUD
maintain that section 236 is one of several programs 9 which serves neither
the purpose nor the people intended and does not return the value for the
money spent."0
Thus section 1250(a)(1)(C)(ii) of the Internal Revenue Code has been
greatly limited in its potential to induce investors to build low and moder-
ate income housing. Present investors are unable to receive any BMIR
loans or rent subsidies under Section 221(d)(3) or any mortgage insurance
or interest reduction payments from "moratoriumed" section 236 of the
National Housing Act. Furthermore, the favorable depreciation recapture
rule under section 1250(a)(1)(C)(ii), which applies to projects under sec-
tions 221(d)(3) and 236, is only available until January 1, 1976 unless
Congress extends it further.91 The recapture rule is favorable to the investor
85. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1(c) (1970).
86. Remarks made in a telephone conservation with Mr. R. Coy Morell, Deputy Area
Director of HUD, Richmond, Virginia, January 30, 1975.
87. Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 362 F. Supp. 1363, 1366 (D.D.C. 1973). Some of the reasons
underlying the suspension were given in "Remarks Prepared for Delivery by George Romney,
Sec. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 29th Annual Convention Exposi-
tion of the National Assoc. of Home Builders, January 8, 1973." Id. at 1372 n.27.
88. Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1974), rev'g 362 F. Supp. 1363 (D.D.C.
1973).
89. Sections 235 and 101 of the National Housing Act were also suspended at this time.
The rent supplements under section 221(d)(3) are also moratoriumed.
90. See note 86 supra.
91. Congress extended the operation of § 1250(a)(1)(C) (ii) from January 1, 1975 to January
1,1976.
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because it provides that there will be no recapture of depreciation upon a
sale after a ten year holding period.92
The inoperative status of important parts of section 221(d)(3) and the
moratorium of section 236 affects the tax incentive scheme in section 1039
of the Internal Revenue Code.93 That section grants a deferral of the income
tax on the realized proceeds from the sale of a qualified housing project if
the proceeds are reinvested in another qualified housing project. Section
1039(b) (1)(A) defines qualified housing in terms of projects with mortgages
insured under sections 221 (d) (3) or 236 of the National Housing Act. With-
out these latter two provisions fully available the thrust of section 1039 is
lost as an inducement to investors.
New residential rental property still receives more favorable tax treat-
ment than commercial investment property." Investors in new residential
rental property are entitled to use the double declining balance method to
compute depreciation 5 and there is no recapture after 16 years and 8
months. This is in contrast to the treatment afforded investments in new
non-residential real property which can only be depreciated at 150 percent
of the straight line depreciation" and are subject to full recapture of the
excess depreciation without regard to the length of the holding period.
Prior to 1969, an investor could avoid all recapture by holding section 1250
property for ten years.9 The Tax Reform Act has thus extended the period
for recapture by 6 years and 8 months on residential rental property. This
in effect makes ownership turnover more costly and hopefully will alleviate
some of the unfavorable effects upon rental housing which are engendered
by rapid depreciation and frequent ownership turnover.
In 1969 Congress added section 167(k) of the Internal Revenue Code
which offered a tax incentive to strike at the housing shortage from the
perspective of rehabilitating previously constructed low income housing.
Under section 167(k) the taxpayer can elect to depreciate his expenditures
92. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1250(a)(1)(C)(ii).
93. Section 1039(b)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code requires an approved disposition,
which means a sale or disposition of the units in the project to the tenants, occupants or
organizations formed for their benefit.
94. New residential real property can be depreciated at 200 percent of the straight line rate;
new non-residential real property at a 150 percent rate, and used residential real property at
a 125 percent rate.
95. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(j)(2)(A).
96. Id. § 1250(a)(1)(C)(iii).
97. Id. § 167(j)(1).
98. Id. § 1250(a)(1)(C)(v).
99. Id. § 1250 (a)(2).
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to rehabilitate his low income rental project under the straight line method
using a useful life of 60 months and no salvage value."' This is beneficial
to the taxpayer because without section 167(k) these expenditures would
be chargable to the capital account. Congress imposed limitations on sec-
tion 167(k) tax savings by making recapture and tax preference rules appl-
icable.'0' Unlike section 1039, section 167(k) is not explicitly dependent on
sections 221(d)(3) and 236 of the National Housing Act. The Internal
Revenue Code provides for a definition of "low income rental housing"
which would be consistent with the policies of the Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968.102 Section 167(k) was to have become inoperative
as to expenditures for rehabilitation after Jaunuary 1, 1975, but Congress
extended the time provision so section 167(k) will remain operative to
induce rehabilitation of low income rental housing until at least January
1, 1976.
As to both sections 1250(a)(1)(C)(ii) and 167(k), Congress appears to be
acting very cautiously in perpetuating the tax incentives to build and
rehabilitate low and moderate income housing. This is indicated by the
extension of these provisions for one year only. This caution can not en-
tirely be due to HUD's position on sections 221(d)(3) and 236 of the Na-
tional Housing Act because section 167(k) is not dependent on these pro-
grams. This Congressional caution is hopefully attributable to a period of
re-evaluation and re-assessment of the viability of these tax provisions as
tax incentives and of the feasibility of writing tax provisions to coincide
with HUD programs.
The goal of decent and adequate housing for every American family
reflects an important national policy of land use. To realize this goal, a vast
amount of land must be dedicated to housing. In attempting to achieve
this goal, the tax incentives of the Internal Revenue Code and sections
221(d)(3) and 236 of the National Housing Act concur to induce the con-
struction of multi-family units.' °3 The Internal Revenue Code has always
encouraged owner occupied housing through the failure to tax imputed
income arising from home ownership and the tax deduction granted for
mortgage interest.' 4 While these latter tax incentives remain effective,
inflation is putting the single family dwelling beyond the reach of many
American families. Furthermore, with a limited amount of land space
100. Id. § 167(k) (1).
101. Treas. Reg. § 1-167(k)-l(a)(3) (1972).
102. INT. Rzv. CODE OF 1954, § 167(k)(3)(B).
103. The Act requires the housing project to "include five or more dwelling units ..
12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1(j)(5)(B) (1970).
104. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 163(a).
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available, multi-family units do provide housing for more people per acre
than single family dwellings. Yet the tax provisions favoring multi-family
housing for low and moderate income families are almost completely ino-
perative. To achieve the housing goal in light of the present economic
condition, the federal government must consider what people can afford
and also proper utilization of our land resources. This would point to the
conclusion that the federal government should design viable multi-family
HUD programs and integrate federal tax incentives to encourage private
investment in these programs.
E. CONCLUSION
Congress has chosen to use its power to tax for more than revenue collec-
tion. Clearly, the taxing power may be used as a vehicle to encourage or
discourage certain forms of economic and social conduct. These indirect
expenditures have far-reaching effects on land use and often are more
inefficient in terms of time and money spent than the programs fostered
by direct expenditures. As a uniform law, the Internal Revenue Code can-
not be adapted to local conditions in various parts of the United States. It
can reveal laudable congressional policy and goals in land use, but it can-
not mold inducements to fit particular conditions and means that are
required to reach those goals. Furthermore, to fulfill its revenue collecting
function, the Code must be specific, definite, and exacting, and this may
inhibit the incentive effect by reducing those eligible to take advantage of
the tax benefits. Of those who are eligible, many will be unable to meet
the statutory requirements because other considerations may out-weigh
the tax benefits. Tax statutes are vulnerable to interpretation by the courts
as is exemplified in the land donation cases, and to administrative policies
as exemplified by the moratorium on section 236 of the National Housing
Act.
Perhaps these tax expenditures serve their greatest land use function in
the beliefs and attitudes they encourage. The focus on mutual giving on
the part of the government and the citizen can create a sense of participa-
tion because the citizen has directly contributed to the improvement of
land uses. Whether the price for cultivating this attitude is too high or the
method too restrictive is a matter that deserves re-evaluation by Congress
in light of the critical and complex land use and economic problems the
nation must resolve.
X. FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL AUTHORITY AFFECTING
LAND USE
Increasing concern over the degradation of our environment has led most
observers to the conclusion that land use practices and environmental
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problems have an exceedingly complex relationship.' Indeed, one observer
has noted:
Ecologically irresponsible land use practice arising from generally ineffective
land use control-aside from the "growth ethic"-is the basic environmental
problem facing America. Land use patterns are the generators, the root
causes, of the environmental degradation symptoms of polluted air, polluted
waters, and other problems to which we have given infinitely more attention.2
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) presently administers a bat-
tery of statutes aimed at the problems of air, water, solid waste and noise
pollution. Through these statutes, EPA has authority to establish land use
controls, primarily through the use of an environmental standard-setting
process which imposes constraints upon land use.
The initial focus of environmental protection was on technological
source controls. It has become increasingly apparent that even if environ-
mental standards can be achieved with source technology, their mainte-
nance will require a broader program, presumably involving more exten-
sive land use control. The purpose of the following discussion is to examine
the disaggregated character of land use control provisions in the statutes
administered by EPA. The most distinct problem is the limited, indirect,
or implicit land use authority of the statutes themselves. They generally
lack a mechanism for coordinating land use and pollution control decisions
on the state and federal levels and a process for balancing competing
environmental objectives. Additionally, the statutes provide no compre-
hensive technique for balancing environmental considerations and the
pressures for economic growth and development.
The degree to which EPA will actively implement land use controls in
the future is not clear. However, unless environmental-land use considera-
tions are welded into a comprehensive planning process, the result will be
haphazard and irrational growth leading to further degradation of the
environment. 3
1. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, LAND USE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: AN
ANTHOLOGY OF READINGS (1973).
2. Hansen, A National Land Use Policy: Toward a New Land Ethic, in ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION AGENCY, LAND USE AND THE ENVIRONMENT: AN ANTHOLOGY OF READINGS 119 (1973)
(footnote omitted).
3. This conclusion was amplified in VIRGNIA ADVISORY L ISLATiVE CouNcIL, LAND USE
POLICIES, H.D. 26 at 11-12 (1974):
The Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Quality Improvement Act [Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972] in particular will have substantial impact
on land use in Virginia because regulations promulgated or proposed by the Environ-
mental Protection Agency to implement these laws will require states to have sufficient
control over land use so as to prevent air and water quality standards promulgated
1975]
672 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:513
A. THE CLEAN AIR AcT
In response to the growing national problem of air pollution Congress
enacted the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970.1 Previous efforts in the
area of clean air legislation had met with inconclusive results.5 The legisla-
tion was significant because it gave EPA the authority to enforce air qual-
ity standards, including the authority to require land use controls. Pur-
suant to the Act, EPA has published national primary and secondary
ambient air quality standards for six air pollutants.' Primary standards are
designed to provide a margin of safety to the public health. The secondary
standards are intended to protect the public welfare from any adverse
effects associated with the presence of pollutants in the ambient air., These
standards are to be achieved and maintained by means of state implemen-
tation plans approved or modified by EPA.8 The state implementation
plans were submitted to EPA nine months after publication of the stan-
dards with the requirement that primary standards be achieved "as expe-
ditiously as practicable" but no later than three years from the approval
of the plan. Secondary standards must be achieved within a "reasonable"
amount of time.' By providing EPA authority to issue compliance orders
under those Acts from being violated by development within the state. While these
regulations do not require states to adopt any particular land planning mechanism or,
indeed, to undertake any type of land use planning at all, they do require states to
have control over land use so as to prevent the construction or alteration of a source of
air or water pollution when the construction or alteration would result in violation of
the air or water quality standards. Such authority may be exercised by a state or local
government totally apart from any type of land planning considerations, but rational
and effective implementation of a variety of public policies will require state and local
governments to give serious consideration to the appropriate planning of land use to
assure that water and air quality standards can be met while some reasonable level of
growth and development is accommodated.
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (1970).
5. See Air Quality Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485; Clean Air Act of 1963,
Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392. Both acts left the major regulatory responsibilities to the
state and local governments. See generally Trumbull, Federal Control of Stationary Source
Air Pollution, 2 ECOLOGY L.Q. 283 (1972).
6. Primary and secondary ambient air standards have been established for sulfur oxides,
particulate matter, carbon monoxide, photochemical oxidants, hydrocarbons and nitrogen
dioxide. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 50.4 to .11 (1974).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b), (1)-(2) (1970). The public welfare is broadly defined to include
effects on soils, water, crops, vegetation, manmade materials, animals, wildlife, weather,
visibility, and climate, damage to and deterioration of property, and hazards to transporta-
tion, as well as effects on economic values and on personal comfort and well-being. Id. § 1857h
(h).
8. Id. § 1857c-5. EPA will promulgate an implementation plan for a state if one is not
submitted or is inadequate.
9. Id. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(A)(i).
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or bring civil suit against any person violating the implementation plan,"°
the Act assures more effective federal enforcement. Citizen suits are au-
thorized to enforce provisions of the Act or demand fuller compliance by
EPA."
Implementation plans submitted by the states will be approved if they
include
emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliance with such
limitations, and such other measures as may be necessary to insure attain-
ment and maintenance of such primary or secondary standard, including,
but not limited to, land-use and transportation controls.'2
Significantly, the statutory language is not mandatory but requires land
use controls as necessary to achieve the national standards. However, the
land use controls may be required not only for achievement of air quality
standards but also for their maintenance. The effect is to give EPA discre-
tion regarding the timing and necessity of land use controls.
EPA has generally not required land use controls in state implementa-
tion plans. In Delaware Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. EPA,"3 the citizens
group argued that the Delaware implementation plan for meeting the ni-
trogen dioxide standard was not as expeditious as practicable and that the
plan should include land use and transportation controls. The court re-
fused to hold that the plan failed to carry out the "statutory mandate
regarding land use and transportation controls." Noting that the statute
would require such controls if they were necessary to insure maintenance
of air quality standards, the court stated:
It is arguable that land-use and transportation controls are mandated by the
statute both for attainment and for maintenance. The agency charged with
administration of the statute, however, apparently construes it as not man-
10. Id. § 1857c-8.
11. Id. § 1857h-2. Such suits may be brought against any person (including the United
States) or government agency who violates an emission standard or limitation or an order
issued by EPA or the state. The EPA Administrator is also subject to suit when he fails to
perform a non-discretionary duty under the legislation. The federal district courts have juris-
diction without regard to citizenship or amount in controversy. The plaintiff citizen must give
sixty days notice to EPA or the state prior to commencing suit unless the action involves
emission of hazardous air pollutants or violation of EPA compliance orders. The action must
be brought in the judicial district where the violation occurs and the court is authorized to
award reasonable expert witness and attorney's fees to successful litigants.
12. Id. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(B). It has been argued that technological controls are preferable to
land use controls because they are more economical. See 5 ENv. RPM.-CuRR. DEV. 1248 (1974).
13. 480 F.2d 972 (3d Cir. 1973).
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dating land-use and transportation controls for attainment if other measures
will suffice. In this instance we defer to the expertise of the agency."
A review of the regulations on approval and promulgation of implementa-
tion plans as of December 5, 1974, indicates that few states have submit-
ted, or been required to submit, plans involving land use controls.'" It
would seem that EPA has focused on technical controls, i.e., pollution
removal devices, for the achievement of the national standards.
As a technique to assist in achieving air quality standards the statute
also provides for pre-construction review of new polluting sources. The
state implementation plan must provide a procedure for review prior to
construction or modification of new sources to which a federal standard of
performance'6 applies.'7 Adequate authority is necessary to prevent con-
struction if the state determines that attainment or maintenance of a
national air standard will be jeopardized.' 8 The requirement will have the
effect of restricting economic opportunity within air quality control re-
gions. This may cause a conflict with local policy makers. An industry
facing such a construction ban could argue that alternatives such as
stricter emission requirements in other sectors or construction bans else-
where should be utilized. The regulations issued pursuant to this section
are contradictory but lead to the conclusion that a state may ban construc-
tion if air quality standards or the state's own control strategy is threat-
ened.'9
The land use mechanisms contemplated by the statute are not clear
from its legislative history. The House version of the statute contained no
reference to land use controls."0 The Senate version provided for the control
of new sources of air pollution to the extent necessary to prevent interfer-
ence with the attainment and maintenance of national standards., It is
14. Id. at 978 n.21.
15. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 52.50-52.2628 (1974).
16. Standard of performance is defined as "a standard for emissions of air pollutants which
reflects the degree of emission limitation achieveable through the application of the best
system of emission reduction .... 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6(a) (1) (1970).
17. Id. § 1857c-5(a)(2)(D).
18. Id. § 1857c-5(a)(4). For an in-depth analysis of Virginia's implementation plan and pre-
construction review see Section VII C, supra.
19. Compare 40 C.F.R. § 51.11(a)(4) (1974) dealing with interference with national stan-
dards with 88 51.18(a)-(d) which refer to interference with the national standards or the
state's control strategy. See Mandelker and Rothschild, The Role of Land-Use Controls in
Combating Air Pollution Under the Clean Air Act of 1970, 3 EcoLoG L.Q. 235, 261-3 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as Mandelker].
20. H.R. REP. No. 1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1971).
21. S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 87 (1970). The Senate generally indicated the
breadth of land use control envisioned by the Act:
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apparent that Congress conceived of land use controls in general terms but
there is no guidance to the states or EPA as to the types of land use controls
intended.
The pre-construction review concept was significantly extended as a
result of Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. EPA." The court
ordered EPA to disapprove state implementation plans which did not in-
clude transportation controls for the achievement and maintenance of pri-
mary air quality standards by May 31, 1975.Y As a result EPA published
regulations 4 designed to deal with the problem of air pollution from indi-
The Committee acknowledges that this would require each region to make difficult
judgments about the siting of facilities which may emit pollution agents, including
decisions to prohibit the location of new sources which . .. would contribute to a
violation of a regional air quality standard. These factors would necessitate long term
decisions about the growth and development of such region. Id. at 12-3.
22. 475 F.2d 968 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
23. The primary land use impact of transportation controls is the emphasis on mass transit
as an alternative to reliance on the automobile. EPA regulations list "[m]easures to reduce
motor vehicle traffic" and "[e]xpansion or promotion of the use of mass transportation
facilities" as transportation controls. 40 C.F.R. §§ 51.1(n)(7), (8) (1974). Proposed measures
include elimination of free parking in heavily traveled downtown areas, commuter taxes and
expensive surcharges on parking areas to discourage long-term parking. The problems raised
by these approaches have been described in this way:
In addition to the anticipated political reaction, the transportation control plans
pose many legal and practical problems for state and local government. Local govern-
ment must have the legal and constitutional bases for discriminating between free
parking for residents and no free parking for non-residents. They must have the legal
authority for the imposition and collection of daily parking surcharges. City merchants
and minority group leaders are beginning to complain that such bans on free parking,
plus high daily surcharges, may injure severely the economies of central core cities, not
to mention the heavier travel and air pollution in shopping centers in outlying areas
unaffected by transportation control strategies. Baliles, Air Quality Control in the 70s:
State Viewpoint, 7 NATURAL REsouRcEs LAWYER 193, 195 (1974).
Virginia is required by EPA to include in its implementation plan the construction of sixty
miles of bicycle paths in Northern Virginia (National Capitol Interstate Region) as a trans-
portation control measure. See 40 C.F.R. § 52.2442 (1974). There is serious question whether
the State Highway Department has the authority to condemn land solely for the purpose of
constructing bicycle paths. See VA. CODE ANN. § 33.1-89 (1970 Repl. Vol.) (Highway Depart-
ment power of eminent domain). Compare Terry v. McClung, 104 Va. 599, 52 S.E. 355 (1905)
with Virginia Hot Springs Co. v. Lowman, 126 Va. 424, 101 S.E. 326 (1919).
24. 40 C.F.R. § 52.22 (1974). EPA will not implement indirect source regulations for at least
six months as a result of an appropriations bill. The bill would prohibit EPA from using any
of its funds to regulate parking facilities. The regulations were scheduled to take effect
January 1, 1975. This hiatus may cause a period of hasty construction prior to full implemen-
tation. 5 ENv. Rpmr.-CuRR. DEV. 1295 (1974). See Comment, Proposed Indirect Source Regula-
tion: A PartialIntegration of Land Use and Air Quality Planning, 3 ENv. L. RsP. 10178 (1973);
Comment, Litigation Under the Clean Air Act, 3 ENv. L. REP. 10007, 10016 (1973).
1975]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
rect sources, i.e., those developments that attract sufficient motor vehicle
activity to threaten a national air quality standard. Such sources include
highways, sports arenas, shopping centers and educational facilities. This
extension of authority over indirect sources, consisting of pre-construction
review, carries EPA directly into the jurisdiction of local zoning authori-
ties. The regulations do provide that the authority may eventually be
delegated to a local agency other than the state air pollution board.2 How-
ever, the delegation raises the problem of regional perspective which may
not be within the authority of the local agency.26
Each state implementation plan must contain a control strategyl to
guarantee that growth and development in areas identified as having the
potential for exceeding any national standard within [the next ten years
will not cause air pollution levels to exceed the national ambient air qual-
ity standards. 8 This forces the state agency to engage in long-range land
use planning with regard to projected population growth, industrial activ-
ity and motor vehicle traffic expected over a ten year period. The regula-
tion is indicative of an incipient shift of emphasis from the achievement
of national air quality standards to their maintenance.
EPA authority was further defined in Sierra Club v. Ruckelshaus8 where
the court held that the Act was based on a policy of non-degradation of
existing clean air. Thus, a regulation permitting states to submit plans
which allow pollution levels of clean air to rise to the secondary standard
was contrary to the legislative policy of the Act and invalid. Pursuant to
the ruling, EPA issued regulations" which permit the construction of a
pollutant source in an area having air cleaner than the national standards
only after a showing that the construction will not cause a significant
25. 40 C.F.R. § 51.18(e) (1974).
26. Mandelker, supra note 19, at 265-67.
27. A state's control strategy is defined as:
a combination of measures designated to achieve the aggregate reduction of emissions
necessary for attainment and maintenance of a national standard, including but not
limited to, measures such as . . . (9) [a]ny land use or transportation control mea-
sures not specifically delineated herein. 40 C.F.R. § 51.1(n) (1974).
28. The control strategy must also include:
the degree of emission reduction necessary to offset emission increases that can reason-
ably be expected to result from projected growth of population, industrial activity,
motor vehicle traffic, or other factors that may cause or contribute to increase [sic]
emissions. Id. § 51.12(a).
29. 344 F. Supp. 253 (D.D.C. 1972), aff'd by an equally divided Court sub. nom., Fri v.
Sierra Club, 412 U.S. 541 (1973).
30. 40 C.F.R. § 52.21 (1974). There is a possibility of relitigation of the significant deterio-
ration issue. Sierra Club alleges that the regulations are still not in compliance with the Act.
5 ENv. RPTR.-CuRR. DEv. 1235 (1974).
676 [Vol. 9:513
LAND USE
deterioration of existing air quality. The preamble to the regulations re-
jected the argument that there should be a nationwide standard of "signifi-
cant deterioration." The agency realizes that socio-economic considera-
tions are a part of determining the deterioration increments. EPA's posi-
tion is not that all growth should be precluded but that growth should
occur in an environmentally acceptable manner. The scope of the regula-
tions may undercut that position since, according to the preamble, con-
struction of a source will not be allowed if it will violate an air quality
increment either in the area where it is to be located or in any neighboring
area in the state.3'
Indirect source regulations will create problems primarily by precipitat-
ing conflicts between state agencies and local government. The localities
depend upon economic development for employment, tax revenues and an
indication of local political success. Placement of development according
to its effect on air quality will cause complaint from local governing bodies
and shift the attention of interested citizens' groups from zoning boards
to the state air pollution agency. The responsibility for determining growth
patterns is now placed with a state agency rather than the traditional local
political process. Haphazard spurts of growth in certain areas may be
encouraged by the significant deterioration concept since there is no mech-
anism for determining which or how many sources may use up the deterio-
ration increments. Effects of urban sprawl must be gauged carefully to
ensure non-interference with significant deterioration. In view of the en-
ergy shortage, power plants might not be built in rural areas to serve the
needs of the cities due to significant deterioration problems. Since there is
no mechanism for resolving conflicts between indirect source regulations
and significant deterioration, growth in certain areas may come to an
abrupt standstill.32
A similar conflict exists between the pre-construction review of station-
ary sources of air pollution and significant deterioration. New sources will
be prohibited in highly industrialized urban areas having significant air
quality problems. Development will face a limited ban in more rural areas
with clean air. The cross effect will be a concentration of new sources in
bands between the two areas. Growth pressures will increase in suburban
areas and difficult zoning problems will multiply.3 Encouragement of
31. 39 Fed. Reg. 42510 (1974).
32. Baliles, Air Quality Control in the 70s: State Viewpoint, 7 NATURAL RESoURCES LAWYER
193, 196-201 (1974).
33. F. Bosselman, D. Feurer, and D. Callies, EPA Authority Affecting Land Use 9-13,
March 12, 1974 (report prepared for EPA, available from National Technical Information
Service) [hereinafter cited as EPA Authority].
1975]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
growth at urban fringes runs counter to the land use objective of preventing
sprawl. The conflict may frustrate other federal policy objectives by pre-
venting job-creating development in depressed rural areas and the inner
cities."
The statute's emphasis on transportation controls, primarily limitation
of automobile commuting and emphasis on mass transit, will have signifi-
cant land use ramifications. If reduction of private automobile travel in
central business districts does not change traditional American reliance on
the auto, economic activity may simply be shifted to the suburbs where
air quality limitations on accessability are less stringent., On the other
hand, development may be recentralized to create settlement patterns
more amenable to bus and rail transit. 8 A conflict in the objectives of the
Act could be reached when developments to serve the needs of commuters
sprout along the right-of-way of existing mass transit.17
As a result of expectations that national ambient standards will be
achieved through available technology, EPA has begun to re-evaluate the
relation of land use to the maintenance of air quality." There are several
suggestions as to the type of land use controls EPA could require under the
Clean Air Act. 9 One possibility is to redefine air quality control regions
which presently encompass a variety of pollution levels. A narrower
delineation could take into account existing land uses, meterological and
topographic conditions, and population concentrations. Existing pollution
conditions could be countered by encouraging or prohibiting certain types
of sources or uses. Another technique would be to divide the regions into
34. Reilly, National Land Use Policy, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 1415, 1433-34 (E.
Dolgin and T. Guilbert ed. 1974) [hereinafter cited as Reilly].
35. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, LAND USE POLICY AND PROGRAM ANALYSIS No. 1, INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN STATE LAND USE PLANNING 10 (1974).
36. Reilly, supra note 34, at 1433. Another factor influencing the recentralization of devel-
opment patterns is the present need to conserve petroleum.
37. EPA Authority, supra note 33, at 12.
38. Michael Glenn, an EPA spokesman, recently cited a shift in emphasis from pollution
abatement to pollution prevention. The shift is prompted by a feeling in the agency that
present pollution problems will be solved by current programs. More emphasis will be placed
on the control of new pollution sources through land use. 5 ENV. Rvm.-CumR. Dsv. 1047 (1974).
However, the land use sanctions of the Act are presently under attack from another quarter.
The Department of Commerce has proposed amendments which would prohibit land use and
transportation controls unless "all reasonable steps" are taken to minimize the adverse eco-
nomic impact of the controls. Indirect source controls would be utilized only after motor
vehicle emission controls have become fully effective in an area and the use of parking
surcharges would be prohibited. The proposed amendments would add that the Act does not
require establishment of standards by the states more stringent than the national standards.
This would strike a blow at the significant deterioration concept. Id. at 1263-64.
39. EPA Authority, supra note 33, at 39-49.
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districts which are assigned allowable levels of pollution density. The emis-
sion density zoning concept would be open to attack on equal protection
grounds since a handful of developers could preempt the allowed levels for
a district, but the answer would be to institute a system of transferable
emission rights where each parcel of land is alloted an allowable emission
density. Developers could then buy up emission rights in order to construct
their facility."
Presently implemented pre-construction review requires only that the
new source not threaten ambient air quality standards or contribute to
significant deterioration. The permit procedure may do little more than
authorize construction on a first come, first served basis. EPA might re-
quire the state agency to identify development potential and prepare a
plan designating the most appropriate sites for the expected types of devel-
opment.
Arguably, air pollution control is not a viable vehicle for land use man-
agement.4 The degree to which EPA will retrench its position on land use
40. Emission density zoning has been instituted in Oregon. The procedure involves alloca-
tion of emissions to proposed new sources. Trade offs are allowed in order to acquire an
increased emissions allocation. 5 ENv. RPrR.-CuRR. DEv. 1277 (1974).
41. On the one hand, air pollution considerations are appropriate for land use because they
foster regional thinking and reinforce a movement toward state control of land use decisions
having more than local significance. Moreover, they compliment an existing movement to-
ward classification of development by performance standards rather than the use concept of
zoning. See Reilly, supra note 34, at 1433. However, the single purpose objective of air quality
has led one authority to conclude:
The Clean Air Act is directed toward the reduction of air pollution to appropriate
levels, and makes this goal its single and paramount objective. A program based on
attainment of a single environmental objective is ill-suited to the exercise of land use
powers, which ordinarily are applied to achieve many different developmental and
environmental goals. Indeed, accommodating competing and even conflicting growth
and development objectives is one of the earmarks both of land-use control programs
and of the comprehensive planning process which in theory they are intended to imple-
ment. Strict implementation of a single-minded approach to air pollution to the exclu-
sion of possible land-use and development criteria thus would be inconsistent with the
statutory framework under which land-use controls are usually exercised. Mandelker,
supra note 19, at 272.
The objective of pollution control is relatively simple, and planning by states based solely on
pollution impact can lead to one-sided land use reform. For example, Delaware's prohibition
of heavy pollution industry from its coastal zone did not save the area from condominium
and leisure home development. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, ch. 70, §§ 7001-03 (1975). Another
authority has called for a separate organizational structure to balance pollution objectives
and land use priorities:
A need remains for more trustworthy intermediate institutions to impose a discipline
upon federal activity affecting land use and to articulate land use priorities in the light
of prevailing needs and circumstances. Coherent directions cannot be expected from
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controls under the Clean Air Act is not clear. It will depend heavily on the
success of technological controls in achieving and maintaining the national
air standards. Other significant factors will be the results of research on
the complex relationship between environmental quality and land use and
the form and content of any subsequent national land use policy legisla-
tion.
B. FEDERAL WATER POLLUTION CONTROL ACT AMENDMENTS OF 19722
1. In General
Federal efforts in the control of water pollution were previously unsuc-
cessful because of inadequate enforcement procedures and the ambiguous
concept of ambient water quality. 3 With the passage of the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments on October 18, 1972, Congress put into
force a statutory structure designed to achieve the goal of water quality
sufficient for protection and propagation of wildlife by July 1, 1983, and
elimination of discharge of pollutants into navigable waters by 1985.11
These goals are to be implemented by a variety of research and construc-
tion grants, planning procedures and enforcement measures. The thrust of
the Act is that any discharge into navigable waters is unlawful without a
permit." Toward this end, two sets of criteria are defined: (1) effluent
limitations, which are restrictions on quality and concentration of pollu-
tants discharged,46 and (2) water quality standards developed by the states
special review procedures or public works priorities or pollution control policies alone.
Once it is accepted that there is no clear consensus on the optimal patterns of develop-
ment, it would appear necessary to pay considerable deference ot those most inti-
mately affected by land use decisions. In most instances this means local residents
acting through a government that represents enough of them to see fairly to their
interests (which will be varied and conflicting), and to be able to acquire some compe-
tence in dealing with the problems entrusted to it. Reilly, supra note 34, at 1435.
42. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251-1376 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
43. See Comment, The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 1973
Wis. L. Rxv. 893. For a discussion of the political battle which led to the passage of the
Amendments see Note, The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972:
Ambiguity as a Control Device, 10 HARv. J. LEGIS. 565 (1973).
44. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1251(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975). The application of the Act was recently
extended to include discharge of pollutants into non-navigable tributaries of navigable
streams. United States v. Ashland Oil & Transport. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (1974).
45. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
46. Id. § 1362(11); 40 C.F.R. §§ 401-432 (1974). Effluent limitations must be achieved by
1977 which require the "application of the best practicable control technology" to point
sources and secondary treatment of wastes by publicly owned treatment plants. By 1983
effluent limitations will be achieved for point sources which require application of the best
technology "economically achievable" and which result in "reasonable further progress to-
ward the goal of elimination of all pollutants." Publicly owned treatment plants must provide
[Vol. 9:513
LAND USE
based upon the uses contemplated for the waters involved.47
In order to assist the states EPA has the duty of publishing standards
of performance for named point sources of pollution,"8 effluent standards
and prohibitions for toxic substances and guidelines for pretreatment of
pollutents 9 With regard to enforcement procedures, EPA may require
record-keeping or installation of monitoring equipment from the owner or
operator of any point source and has a right of entry to check effluents,
records and monitoring equipment. If any person violates any condition or
limitation in a permit, EPA has the option of issuing compliance orders or
bringing a civil action." Persons and governmental agencies which violate
the conditions of the Act are also subject to citizen suits. 1
Water quality standards adopted by the states under previous legislation
are retained and the Act makes provision for non-degradation of existing
clean water. Thus, the land use effect is similar to that of the Clean Air
Act. New development will not be able to enter areas where it would
interfere with the achievement of water quality standards and will be
discouraged in areas where it would degrade clean water. Moreover, if EPA
determines that discharge from point sources, even with the application
of technical effluent limitations, interferes with the achievement and
maintenance of water quality objectives, more stringent effluent limita-
tions will be applied including "alternative effluent control strategies.""2
These alternative strategies are not defined in the Act, but the legislative
history indicates an interest in land disposal techniques. 3 EPA appears to
have the authority under these circumstances to require land disposal of
the pollutants through sanitary landfill or some other technique.
by 1983 the "best practicable waste treatment technology available." 33 U.S.C.A. § 1311(b)
(Cum. Supp. 1975).
47. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975); 40 C.F.R. § 120.1 to .2 (1974).
48. A point source is defined as:
any discernible, confined and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to any
pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock,
concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which
pollutants are or may be discharged. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1362(14) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
49. Id. §§ 1314, 1316-17.
50. Id. §§ 1318-19.
51. Id. § 1365. The framework for citizen suits is basically the same as that under the Clean
Air Act. See note 11 supra. Suits by state governors against the Administrator are authorized
without regard to notice limitations for failure to enforce effluent standards in another state
when the failure causes adverse effects in the plaintiff state.
52. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1312(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975). Before implementation of the more stringent
limitations or alternative control strategies, EPA is required to hold a public hearing to
determine the socio-economic effects.
53. See H.R. REP. No. 911, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 108 (1972).
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2. State Continuing Planning Process
In order to enforce the water quality standards each state must submit
a Section 303 continuing planning process subject to approval by EPA. The
emphasis is on planning rather than required methods of control. Signifi-
cant elements of the plan are a priority ranking of waste treatment works
required to meet the effluent limitations and a provision for controlling the
disposition of residual waste from water treatment processing. The latter
will normally mean some form of land disposal for sludge." There is no
specific enforcement mechanism for Section 303 plans, but no permit pro-
gram will be approved unless the state has such a plan.5 The plan must
also identify those waters in the state for which effluent limitations are not
stringent enough to achieve the water quality standards. The state will
then determine the total maximum daily pollutant and thermal load nec-
essary to reach the required water quality standards and include the calcu-
lation in the plan."
The regulations issued by EPA to guide the formation of Section 303
plans reveal more clearly the relationship to land use planning. One of the
goals of the process is to encourage water quality objectives which coordi-
nate with overall state policies, including those for land use. The plans are
required to identify the method by which the Section 303 plan is coordi-
nated with land use planning." This requirement integrates land use plan-
ning with environmental concerns.
A critical portion of the Section 303 plan is the designation of drainage
basins within the state and the preparation of water quality management
plans for those basins. The basins are divided into segments, either water
quality or effluent limitation, and each segment classification must reflect
an allowance for anticipated economic and population growth over a
five year period." A suggested possibility for land use control is a closer
54. Even though Section 303 of the Act does not contain the mandatory language of the-
Clean Air Act with regard to state implementation plans, Mr. Bosselman argues that EPA
cannot carry out its statutory mandate without the power to control location of point and
non-point sources and the location of land sites for disposal of pollutants. See EPA Authority,
supra note 33, at 93-96. For Virginia's existing implementation see Section VII B, supra.
55. Lack of a state plan would mean permits issued directly by EPA. See 40 C.F.R. § 130.60
(1974).
56. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1313(d) (Cum. Supp. 1975). A related provision of the Act requires an
annual inventory which describes the water quality of all waters in the state and a description
of all non-point sources of pollution as well as the costs of programs to control them. Id. §
1315. Non-point source pollution is the run-off and siltation from agricultural, mining, con-
struction and forestry activities.
57. 40 C.F.R. §§ 130.10(d), 131.309(b) (1974).
58. The required content of basin plans is contained at;40 C.F.R. §§ 131.300 to .310 (1974).
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refinement of water quality segments in which the stringency of review for
development is tied to existing water quality. An alternative is to require
state growth control plans which provide incentives for industry and at-
tendant population to locate where discharge will not interfere with water
quality.5
The basin plan must also establish discharge load and thermal load
allocations for point and non-point sources. Each discharge load allocation
must incorporate an allowance for anticipated economic and population
growth for a five year period." In some areas this may either stifle in-
dustrial growth, or limit development to certain light industry.
The Section 303 planning process must provide controls for non-point
sources of pollution if the governor of the state determines they are neces-
sary." A recent study62 concluded that non-point source pollution is in
many areas the major contributor to degradation of water quality. The
study recommended dealing with non-point problems by application of
land management practices that prevent the generation and run-off of
water pollutants. Although the Section 303 plan is not specifically required
to contain land use controls for non-point sources, it is conceivable that
such controls could be required in the future. This would demand compre-
hensive land use planning by the state. EPA could require a discharge
permit system for those developments or activities likely to result in non-
point source pollution.63
3. National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES)
After a public hearing, EPA may issue a permit for the discharge of
pollutants into navigable waters upon the condition that the discharge
meet all applicable requirements of the Act. 4 After promulgation of guide-
All basin plans must be submitted by July 1, 1975. Any segment where water quality stan-
dards will not be reached even after application of effluent limitations is a water quality
segment. A segment where the water quality meets or is expected to meet water quality
standards after application of effluent limitations is an effluent limitations segment. Id. §
130.11. Basin plans must also assess present municipal needs and forecast the growth or
decline of population over a twenty year period. Id. § 131.303.
59. EPA Authority, supra note 33, at 97-99.
60. 40 C.F.R. § 131.305 (1974).
61. Id. § 130.23. EPA is required to publish guidelines for the control of non-point source
pollution. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1314(e) (Cum. Supp. 1975). The guidelines were expected by Janu-
ary, 1975. 5 ENv. RPTR.-CuRa. DEV. 1170 (1974).
62. 5 ENv. RpTR.-CuRR. Dxv. 1170 (1974).
63. EPA Authority, supra note 33, at 101-04.
64. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1342(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975). Environmental impact statements must be
filed prior to the issuance of such permits. Id. § 1371(c)(1). As of January 8, 1975, no citizen
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lines for the monitoring and reporting of discharge applications, EPA will
approve state permit programs if the state has adequate enforcement au-
thority. However, even after approval, EPA must receive a copy of each
application for a permit and may object to its issuance. Applicants for a
permit must provide a certification from the state that the discharge will
comply with the standards of the Act.6"
The critical section of the system with regard to land use provides that
if conditions of a permit for a publicly owned treatment plant are violated,
the state or EPA may initiate a court action to restrict or prohibit the
introduction of new pollutants into the treatment plant.66 The dramatic
consequence would be an abrupt halt to development in the area of the
treatment plant. Rather than await this eventuality, EPA could attach as
a condition to issuance of a permit a ceiling on the wastewater capacity of
treatment plants or require a building permit program which limits new
construction to those buildings which can meet standards of performance
for disposal of sewage."
4. Grants
EPA is authorized to make grants to any state, municipality, or inter-
state agency for the construction of publicly owned waste treatment
works. 8 The primary land use effect is the accommodation or perhaps even
encouragement of new development. The grants are conditioned on inclu-
sion in and conformity with the state Section 303 and areawide waste
treatment management plans. The planned treatment works must show a
direct relation of size and capacity, including sufficient reserve capacity,
to the needs to be served. Additionally, industrial users of the publicly
suits had been filed against dischargers who were not issued NPDES permits by the statutory
deadline of December 31, 1974. EPA expects all NPDES permits, approximately 65,000, to
be issued by July, 1975. 5 ENV. RPTR.-CuRR. DEv. 1395 (1975).
65. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1341(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
66. Id. § 1342(h); 40 C.F.R. § 124.71(d) (1974).
67. EPA Authority, supra note 33, at 114-18. Admitting the problem of EPA's authority
to actually require a broad plan, Mr. Bosselman suggests:
As there are so many aspects of residential, commercial, industrial, and other kinds
of development and activities which affect water quality ... one of the most effective
ways EPA could deal with the overall problems is to condition the issuance of NPDES
permits for municipal treatment plants on a requirement that the municipality not
only control issuance of permits for new development ... but that the municipality
also undertake a program to study patterns of growth and development within their
jurisdiction for the purpose of establishing policies and guidelines to determine what
optimum levels and kinds of growth and development can and ought to be allowed.
Id. at 117-18.
68. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1281(g)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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owned treatment works must pay both a share of the construction costs
and user charges. 9 This requirement may have an indirect land use effect
by encouraging industry to locate elsewhere due to the economic cost.
Before approval of the grant the applicant must demonstrate to EPA
that "alternative waste management techniques" have been studied and
evaluated." A recent memorandum from EPA indicates that applicants
must consider land application as an alternative waste management sys-
tem. If it can be shown that land treatment is the most cost-effective
alternative, proposals for other systems will be rejected.71 EPA is in a
position, then, to require applicants to have sufficient land use authority
to designate areas for the disposal of sludge.
The requirement that the size and capacity of the proposed plant relate
to the needs to be served has caused problems. It has been suggested that
this gives EPA authority to require applicants to furnish information about
present development and projected growth in the area and perhaps have
authority to enforce a growth control plan.72 This may well be the answer
since a recent Council of Environmental Quality study concluded that
EPA may be funding the future development of vacant land. Interceptor
sewer lines with huge excess capacity to serve dense populations antici-
pated for vacant but developable land are frequently designed in response
to local development pressure. To forestall this situation, the study recom-
mended that the excess capacity costs of municipal treatment works be
financed solely by local funds. 3
5. Areawide Waste Treatment Management Plans
Section 20811 of the Act provides a level of planning and enforcement
which holds the most promise for state land use consistent with environ-
mental objectives. The thrust is two-fold, to commence by planning for
areas with serious water problems and eventually have the state oversee
the same comprehensive planning on a state-wide level. Each state is
required to identify and designate areas which as a result of urban-
industrial concentrations have substantial water quality control prob-
lems.7" A representative organization, including elected officials from local
69. Id. § 1284(a)(1)-(6), (b)(1).
70. Id. § 1281(g)(2)(A).
71. 5 ENV. R'rn.-CuRR. DEV. 1180 (1974).
72. EPA Authority, supra note 33, at 65-68. The requirement of a growth control plan
would be indirect, through the requirement for an NPDES permit. See discussion in note 67
supra.
73. 5 ENV. Rpm.-CuRR. Dav. 877 (1974). For reactions to the study see id. at 1133.
74. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1288 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
75. Id. An urban-industrial concentration is an area which because of substantial concen-
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governments, capable of developing an effective waste treatment manage-
ment plan for the area is then designated." Existing regional agencies may
also be designated to carry out the plan. If an area is not designated, the
local elected officials may choose any agency and have it develop and
implement an areawide plan. The state is required to implement the re-
quirements of the areawide planning process in all areas not designated. 7
The plan developed for the area must include an identification of treat-
ment works necessary to meet anticipated municipal and industrial waste
treatment needs over a twenty year period, including an analysis of alter-
native waste treatment systems. Construction priorities for these treat-
ment works should be established. A program must be established to regu-
late the location, modification and construction of any facilities which may
result in any discharge in the area. The plan must also include a process
to identify non-point sources of pollution such as farming, timber-cutting,
mining and construction activity, and procedures (including land use re-
quirements) to control them.78 After approval of the plan by EPA there will
be no grants for construction of municipal treatment works or issuance of
permits under NPDES unless in conformity with the plan. Federal funding
is available for the development and operation of the areawide plan.
trations of population, manufacturing production or other factors has a substantial water
quality problem. 40 C.F.R. § 126.10 (1974). Senator Muskie has declared that EPA is depart-
ing from the intent of the Act by limiting Section 208 to areas with substantial water quality
problems. Muskie claims that area wide planning must be implemented wherever the 1983
goals of the Act are not attainable or wherever the goals appear to be threatened. 5 ENV.
Rm.-CuaR. Dav. 1381 (1975). The designation of Section 208 planning areas is proceeding
slowly. One of the reasons was suggested by a speaker at a meeting of the Association of State
and Interstate Water Pollution Control Administrators on January 15, 1975: "It is now evi-
dent that the complex political issues in the truly large metropolitan urban industrial areas
are impeding designation and development of Section 208 planning and management
agencies." 5 ENv. RPTR.-CURR. Dav. 1483 (1975).
76. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1288 (a)(2)(B)(Cum. Supp. 1975); 40 C.F.R. § 126.11 (1974). In designat-
ing the agency the Governor must consider (1) the coordination of the agency's legal authority
with land use planning, and (2) the relationship of the agency with other regulatory agencies
which possess zoning and subdivision controls.
77. 33 U.S.C.A. § 1288(a)(4), (6) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
78. Id. § 1288(b)(2)(A)-(K). The importance of Section 208 planning is evident from the
legislative history:
Adjacent communities and industries are under no mandate to coordinate land use or
water quality planning activities. This results in poor overall performance and the
proliferation of many direct and indirect discharge sources into receiving waters. Such
diffuse and divergent problems not only intensify pollution problems but they prevent
the use of economies of scale, efficiency of treatment methods, and, most importantly,
coherent, integrated and comprehensive land use management. S. RaP. No. 414, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 36-37 (1971).
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Two critical connections to land use in the areawide plan are the pro-
jected treatment works analysis and the regulatory mechanism for the
location of facilities which result in any discharge. "Facilities" are not
defined in the Act but presumably they may range from an industrial plant
to a parking lot storm drain. 9 This gives the areawide agency substantial
control over the tempo of growth and development in the area. In deciding
where sewers will be located the agency will, to a large extent, determine
where industry will locate. Industry in turn affects the distribution of
housing and other related activities. 0 It has been suggested that the agency
could seek coordination with the zoning structure and limit the amount of
development in the area so as not to overload the treatment works. An
alternative method would involve the assignment of a limit on the amount
of effluents permissably discharged from any parcel of land.8
The problem of non-point source pollution is pervasive but guidelines for
control have not yet been issued by EPA. Suggested approaches are to
establish either standards of performance for various types of non-point
sources or a permit procedure. EPA could also establish guidelines which
designate areas not suitable for non-point sources, for example, certain
slopes which are off-limits to strip mining."2
The total scope of planning under Section 208 areawide plans is not
clear,"' but it will presumably become more concrete in order to meet the
objectives and deadlines of the Act. A recent EPA draft strategy paper
indicates that funding has been set for the implementation of state-wide
79. EPA Authority, supra note 33, at 79-80.
80. COUNCIL OF STATE GovERNMENTs, LAND USE POLCv AND PROGRAM ANALYsis No. 1, INTER-
GOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS IN STATE LAND USE PLANNING 8-9 (1974).
81. EPA Authority, supra note 33, at 80-83. Relating growth to the capacity of the sewage
treatment plant has been held constitutional. In Golden v. Planning Bd. of Ramapo, 30
N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291 (1972) the town implemented a "phased growth" plan by which
residential development was to proceed according to the availability of adequate municipal
facilities. The plan was adopted for the purpose of preventing premature subdivision and
urban sprawl. For an excellent analysis see Bosselman, Can the Town of Ramapo Pass a Law
to Bind the Rights of the Whole World?, 1 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 234 (1973).
82. EPA Authority, supra note 33, at 84-85.
83. One commentator has evaluated the problem in this way:
It is difficult to imagine how a successful water pollution control strategy of this
magnitude could be effective without extensive reforms in the state land use guidance
system, or apart from other conservation, social, and economic objectives. In fact, the
statewide and areawide planning efforts directed pursuant to § 208 are not tied solely
to water quality standards, but could include a variety of economic and social consider-
ations. In any event, current EPA policy minimizes the land use requirements of water
pollution control, although the planning process directed by the Act is both statewide
in scope and susceptible of broad-gauge application. Reilly, supra note 34, at 1431.
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Section 208 plans, including the acquisition of additional legislative au-
thority to deal with non-point sources, by 1981.11
C. OTHER LEGISLATION
1. Solid Waste Disposal Act
The 1965 Solid Waste Disposal Act, 5 as amended by the Resource Re-
covery Act of 1970, resulted from a finding that the economic and popula-
tion growth of the nation had led to a "rising tide of scrap, discarded, and
waste materials." 6 The legislation provides for a national research and
development program for improved waste management techniques and
technical and financial assistance to state and local governments. Congress
recognized that the problem of solid waste disposal is primarily a state
concern but the Act specifically encourages interstate, intermunicipal and
regional cooperation."
EPA is authorized to make planning grants to state, regional and local
agencies for the development of solid waste disposal plans and the study
of waste disposal practices in adjacent areas. Applying agencies must
prove that they will consider all factors in developing a comprehensive
areawide plan; moreover, EPA must be assured that the planning will not
duplicate related state and local planning activities.88 Grants for demon-
stration of resource recovery systems and construction of new solid waste
disposal facilities are also authorized. The grants are conditioned on the
existence of an areawide plan for solid waste disposal and consistency of
the facility with the plan and EPA guidelines issued pursuant to the legis-
lation. 9 EPA could use its grant conditioning authority to require a com-
prehensive land use plan for the area served by the waste disposal facility. 0
EPA is required to issue guidelines for solid waste disposal and recovery
systems which are "consistent with public health and welfare, and air and
84. 5 ENv. RPTR.-CuRR. DEv. 1515 (1975).
85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3251 et seq. (1970).
86. Id. § 3251(a)(2).
87. Id. § 3254. Interstate, intermunicipal and regional cooperation is also encouraged by
the different funding amounts under the legislation. Planning grants encompass two-thirds
of the cost for one municipality but three-fourths of the cost if the applicant area is larger.
Id. § 3254a. Construction grants provide a federal share of one half the cost for one municipal-
ity but three-fourths if the applicant agency controls an interstate or intermunicipal area.
Id. § 3254b.
88. The factors to be considered include "population growth, urban and metropolitan
development, land use planning, water pollution control, air pollution control, and the feasi-
bility of regional disposal and resource recovery programs." Id. § 3254a (b)(2), (c).
89. Id. § 3254b.
90. EPA Authority, supra note 33, at 130.
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water quality standards and adaptable to appropriate land use plans."'"
This requirement has been seen as the source of a federal regulatory system
for solid waste disposal with unknown land use ramifications.2 Since the
statute provides no enforcement provisions for the guidelines, EPA has
questionable authority for requiring comprehensive land use planning ex-
cept with regard to construction grants for solid waste disposal facilities.
2. Noise Control Act
The Noise Control Act 4 is primarily aimed at the study of noise control
and the setting of technical emission standards by EPA for construction
and transportation equipment and other machinery. Additionally, EPA
must identify major sources of noise, evaluate techniques for control and
publish information on the levels of noise necessary to protect the public
health and welfare." Arguably, this requirement could enable EPA to con-
trol the siting of industry through buffer zones and minimum acreage
requirements."
EPA has more substantial authority over the noise created by aircraft
91. 42 U.S.C. § 3254c(a) (1970) (commonly called § 209 guidelines). Guidelines have been
issued dealing with sanitary landfill and incineration. 39 Fed. Reg. 29333-37 (1974). The
guidelines, even if they required more comprehensive land use planning, are mandatory only
for federal agencies and those agencies seeking solid waste disposal grants. 42 U.S.C. § 3254e
(a)(1) (1970).
92. See 1 F. GRAD, TREATISE ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAw 4-49 (1973). See generally Bryson,
Solid Waste and Resource Recovery in FEDERAL ENVmONME TAL LAw 1290, 1294-99 (E. Dolgin
and T. Guilbert ed. 1974).
93. Problems may still arise by conditioning construction grants on adherence to the guide-
lines:
If EPA seeks to impose guidelines which require substantial planning efforts di-
rected not only at solid waste recovery and disposal systems but also at sources of solid
wastes, state and local agencies may refrain from seeking grants to avoid what may
be viewed as onerous guidelines.
However, where EPA can tailor Section 209 guidelines with land use requirements
which may be imposed under the Clean Air Act or Water Pollution Control Act, there
is a better chance that local governments, which would be required to comply with Air
and Water Act requirements, could be persuaded to adopt Solid Waste Act guidelines.
EPA Authority, supra note 33, at 122.
94. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4901-18 (1973).
95. Id. § 4904.
96. EPA Authority, supra note 33, at 122. However, the authority of EPA under section
4904 is merely advisory and there is no mechanism for compelling the states to adopt EPA
guidelines on major sources of noise pollution. New York has proposed regulations which
would limit the noise emitted by various classifications of land use. 4 ENv. RrTR.-CuRR. D.v.
841 (1973).
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and airports.97 In conjunction with the Federal Aviation Administration"
the agency is required to study the technical aspects of aircraft noise
caused by their flight pattern or design. Moreover, EPA must study the
levels of cumulative noise exposure around airports and recommend mea-
sures available to airport owners and municipal governments to control the
effects of aircraft noise.9 It is difficult to predict the ultimate scope of this
interagency requirement; however, proposed regulations by EPA have in-
volved airport zoning which would limit the amount of development near
future airports and place building requirements on present adjacent devel-
opment.'0 Other suggested measures are limiting airport siting to rural
areas and setting minimum acreage requirements."'
Another related statute, the Airport and Airway Development Act of
1970,112 administered by the Department of Transportation, requires appli-
97. The Federal Aviation Administration in conjunction with EPA has full control over
aircraft noise, pre-empting state and local control. Therefore, a city ordinance cannot prohibit
jet traffic during certain hours of the day. Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S.
624 (1973).
98. The Administrator of the FAA is reqtfired to consult EPA for regulations concerning
the control of aircraft noise and sonic boom to carry out his responsibilities for the certifica-
tion of airports and aircraft. Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1431 (Cum. Supp.
1975). Citizen suits are authorized under the same requirements as the Clean Air Act and
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments to enforce regulations issued pursuant
to the Noise Control Act and jointly issued by EPA and FAA. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4911 (1973).
99. 42 U.S.C.A. § 4906 (1973).
100. 39 Fed. Reg. 6142 (1974). The text of the proposed regulations indicates an extensive
program:
The achievement and maintenance of noise exposure limits for communities around
airports will require a comprehensive program:
(b) To design or modify the total operating plan of the airport so as to minimize
the extent of the airport noise impact zone and tailor its shape to avoid existing noise-
sensitive land uses.
(c) To prevent buildup of new housing or other noise-sensitive land uses in present
and anticipated future noise impact zones and, where necessary, resolve by land use
measures (soundproofing or conversion) those few impacted areas where the noise
exposure cannot be adequately decreased by other means. Id.
101. Some form of airport zoning rather than minimum acreage requirements is recom-
mended because:
Minimum acreage requirements may have very limited usefulness for noise problems
arise not only from movement of aircraft within an airport itself but also from aircraft
approaching or leaving airports along particular flight paths. It would not be feasible
to impose minimum acreage standards sufficient to require an airport authority to
include adequate land along runway approach paths so development could not occur
until planes were high enough that noise would not longer be a problem. EPA Author-
ity, supra note 33, at 126-27.
102. 49 U.S.C.A. § 1701 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1975). See Citizen's Airport Comm. v. Volpe,
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cants for airport planning and construction grants to take appropriate
action to restrict the use of land in the area of the planned airport.' °3
3. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972
As a result of pressing concern over the ecological devastation of the
nation's coastal areas, Congress enacted the Coastal Zone Management
Act of 1972,101 to be administered by the Department of Commerce. The
legislation is a prime example of the "carrot and stick" principle by which
a comprehensive land use plan for the coastal zone is urged upon states
through the enticement of federal funding. For coastal states' 5 which
apply, the Act provides grants for two-thirds of the cost of development
and implementation of comprehensive coastal zone management plans.
The planning grants require the applicant state to identify the boundaries
of its coastal zone and define permissible land and water uses within the
zone which impact on coastal waters.' 0 The thrust of the Act is revealed
351 F. Supp. 52, 58-63 (1972) where the Secretary's approval under the Act of a county airport
was challenged for failure to evaluate adequately adverse environmental and land use effects.
103. 14 C.F.R. § 151.26 (1974):
The [applicant's] statement must include information on-
(1) Any property interests (such as airspace easements or title to airspace) acquired
by the sponsor to assure compatible land use, or to protect or control aerial approaches;
(2) Any zoning laws enacted or in force restricting the use of land adjacent to or in
the vicinity of the airport, or assuring protection or control of aerial approaches,
whether or not enacted by the sponsor; and
(3) Any action taken by the sponsor to induce the appropriate government author-
ity to enact zoning laws restricting the use of land adjacent to or in the vicinity of the
airport, or assuring protection or control of aerial approaches, when the sponsor lacks
the power to zone the land.
104. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1451-64 (1974). Responsibility for administration of the grants has been
delegated to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The Congres-
sional purpose of placing at the state level decisions presently under local control is revealed
in the language of the Act:
The key to more effective protection and use of the land and water resources of the
coastal zone is to encourage the states to exercise their full authority over the lands
and waters in the coastal zone by assisting the states, in cooperation with Federal and
local governments and other vitally affected interests, in developing land and water
use programs for the coastal zone, including unified policies, criteria, standards, meth-
ods, and processes for dealing with land and water use decisions of more than local
significance. Id. § 1451(h).
105. "Coastal state means a state of the United States in, or bordering on, the Atlantic,
Pacific, or Arctic Ocean, the Gulf of Mexico, Long Island Sound, or one or more of the Great
Lakes." Id. § 1453(c).
106. Id. § 1454(b)(1)-(2). The Act defines the coastal zone as:
[Tihe coastal waters . . . and the adjacent shorelands . . . strongly influenced by
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through a further requirement that the management program include "an
identification of the means by which the state proposes to exert control
over . . . land and water uses. . .. "10 This assumption of authority by
the state in the coastal zone will conflict directly with the land use control
of municipalities and localities. However, the legislative history indicates
a desire for such state level assumption of land use power motivated in part
by developmental abuses in coastal zones under local control. ' It is ques-
tionable whether state control will terminate the abuses since local officials
may actually administer the program.' °9 On the other hand, performance
under the program is continually reviewed by the Department of Com-
merce and funding will be cut off if states deviate from the conditions of
the Act."'
The administrative grants, which amount to two-thirds of the cost of
administering the state program, also carry conditions for a comprehensive
land use program. After public hearings and approval by the governor, the
state must designate a single agency to carry out the plan insuring that
sufficient coordination exists with local governments, state and regional
agencies. The agency must have sufficient legal authority:
(1) to administer land and water use regulations, control development in
order to ensure compliance with the management program, and to resolve
conflicts among competing uses; and
(2) to acquire fee simple and less than fee simple interests in lands, waters,
and other property through condemnation or other means when necessary to
achieve conformance with the management program."'
The state has three choices of techniques for the control of land and water
uses: (1) state established criteria locally implemented, but subject to
review and enforced compliance; (2) direct state land and water use plan-
ning and regulation; and (3) state review of proposed developments,
agency projects, or land and water use regulations for compliance with the
management plan. Moreover, the state must insure that local land use
each other and in proximity to the shorelines of the several coastal states, and includes
transitional and intertidal areas, salt marshes, wetlands, and beaches .... The zone
extends inland from the shorelines only to the extent necessary to control shorelands,
the uses of which have a direct and significant impact on the coastal waters. Id. § 1453
(a).
For more detail on boundary setting and permissible uses see 40 Fed. Reg. 1683 (1975).
107. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1454(b)(4) (1974).
108. S. REP. No. 753, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 5-6 (1972).
109. See Comment, Environmental Land Use Control: Common Law and Statutory
Approaches, 28 U. MiAmi L. REv. 135, 188 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Comment].
110. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1458 (1974).
111. Id. § 1455(d).
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regulations do not unreasonably restrict uses of benefit to the region.'12
Management programs must also provide for "adequate consideration of
the national interest involved in the siting of facilities necessary to meet
requirements which are other than local in nature." ' This requirement
has been evaluated as a subsidiary purpose of the Act, to discourage paro-
chialism by the states in the use of their coastal zones."' For example, if a
state prohibits new industry in its coastal zone, the industrial development
which requires a coastal environment will eventually spill over into the
coastal areas of adjacent states. Presumably the requirement would also
apply to a planned development which promises substantial multi-state
benefit.
As a further stimulus the state will gain substantial control of federal
activities in the coastal zone through the management program. Federal
agencies conducting activities or development in the coastal zone must
insure consistency with the state management program. Additionally, ap-
plicants for federal licenses or permits to conduct activity affecting land
use in the coastal zone must obtain state certification. The requirements
of the Clean Air Act and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments are to be incorporated into the plan.1 This has been interpreted to
mean that state air quality control agencies could preempt local land use
powers in the coastal zone.'
Virginia has applied for and received a federal planning grant under the
Act. The Division of State Planning and Community Affairs (DSPCA) has
been designated the responsible agency for receipt and administration of
the grant, with the Virginia Institute of Marine Science (VIMS) acting in
an advisory capacity. ' The planning program has two broad objectives:
(1) to provide a broad assessment of existing conditions in the Common-
112. Id. § 1455(e).
113. Id. § 1455(c) (8).
114. Power, The Federal Role in Coastal Development, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
792, 834 (E. Dolgin and T. Guilbert ed. 1974).
115. 16 U.S.C.A. § 1456(c)-(f) (1974). A federal activity which threatens to conflict with
state management programs developed under the Act is offshore oil leasing under the Outer
Continental Shelf program. Proposed amendments would require state approval of the federal
permits for such leases. 5 ENV. RTpm.-CuRR. DEv. 1274-75 (1974). See notes 128-33 and accom-
panying text infra.
116. Mandelker, supra note 19, at 271.
117. Virginia Division of State Planning and Community Affairs and Virginia Institute of
Marine Science, Final Application for Initial Development Grant, Coastal Zone Management
Program, May, 1974 (mimeographed, available from DSPCA) [hereinafter cited as Final
Application].
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wealth's coastal zone, including potential problems and public viewpoints;
and,
(2) to stress the importance of involving local governments in the Coastal
Zone Management Program."'
Within this framework the plan sets forth more concrete objectives di-
rected toward specific problem areas."'
Citizen participation in the development of the management program
will be encouraged through the existing regional planning district commis-
sions (PD Cs). '12 The PDCs in the nine planning districts comprising the
coastal zone planning area will appoint regional advisory committees
(RACs) representing major governmental, commercial and citizen inter-
ests.'"' These committees will be the linchpin of the planning process as
they are responsible for articulating the land policy goals of their respective
districts.'12 Additionally, they will participate in a series of seminars ar-
ranged for public education and comment. 'n One member of each RAC will
serve with representatives of eight state agencies on Virginia's Coastal
118. Haulman, Virginia's Coastal Zone Management Program, LAND: ISSUES AND PROBLAIS
(VPI Extension Service No. 3 March, 1975).
119. The objectives are: (1) to progressively improve and maintain the water quality of the
estuarine waters, bays, and seas; (2) to identify and protect groundwater sources and sup-
plies; (3) to preserve, to the maximum extent possible, the coastal wetlands; (4) to improve
and maintain commercial and sport life; (5) to utilize marine resources at or below a level of
maximum sustainable yield; (6) to identify and manage areas vital to wildlife; (7) to minimize
the irreversible use of non-replenishable natural resources; (8) to identify and protect the
significant aspects of the social heritage of the Commonwealth; (9) to enhance public and
private recreational opportunities; (10) to locate new development in an orderly pattern that
allows for efficient utilization of land and water resources; (11) to provide efficient mobility
within and through the coastal zone; (12) to maintain channels for marine transport while
providing positive solutions to the removal of dredged spoil; (13) to develop an efficient, yet
environmentally safe, means for cargo transport within major ports; and (14) to encourage
economic growth while safeguarding and maintaining use options to the maximum extent
possible. Final Application, supra note 117, at 23-24.
120. Id. at 5, 51-56. See VA. CODE ANN. § 2.1-63.5 (Cum. Supp. 1974), §§ 15.1-1403 to
-1405 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
121. Final Application, supra note 117, at 51-52.
122. More specifically, the RAC's duties are:
[To be] responsible for reviewing base data generated at either the state, regional, or
local levels for inclusion into the overall planning program; for articulating any existing
policies and procedures that now exist within their area dealing with resource
utilization; for scheduling meetings with other officials and citizens where information
can be exchanged; and for reviewing and commenting upon all material that is corre-
lated into what will evolve into the overall plan and program. Id. at 65.
At the same time VIMS and DSPCA will be compiling technical baseline data on the coastal
zone.
123. Id. at 53-55.
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Zone Advisory Committee.'24 This committee will meet at least semi-
annually to evaluate progress and formulate policy.
At present, DSPCA is directing its efforts toward five major problem
areas.' The primary concern is the increasing demand for commercial,
industrial, residential and recreational development in the limited area of
the coastal zone. These pressures are particularly acute in the urban cres-
cent of Washington-Richmond-Norfolk. Related problem areas are the
maximization of water quality, increasing demand for recreation areas
caused by expanded leisure time and the achievement of "maximum non-
conflicting simultaneous development" of the entire resource pool of the
coastal zone. 2 ' The problems are inter-related to a great degree. For exam-
ple, if wetlands are preserved to protect fisheries, a limitation is placed on
residential development and profits from waterfront acreage. Tourism
could be increased in water recreation areas if stinging nettles were brought
under control. However, the Mnemiopsis, a jellyfish preyed on by nettles,
would increase and make inroads on the population of larval oysters, a
staple of the area's commercial fishing interests.'
An evolving problem of pressing concern is the possibility of oil and gas
discoveries off the Virginia coastline. In such an event substantial financial
benefits would accrue to the state, jobs being created not only by the oil
industry but also by secondary supporting development. These benefits
must be balanced against concerns for serious environmental damage
caused by oil development in the outer continental shelf (OCS). DSPCA
has included as part of the planning program a study on optimum siting
of key activities for OCS development.2' The rationale for developing a
state control mechanism is to take such key decisions away from narrowly
conceived local interests.
A recent contingency study of OCS development for Virginia identified
expected problems for the area from the three mile limit inland.'2 ' Primary
concerns are the effects of large scale dredging, wetlands destruction and
oil spills, air and water pollution from industrial and secondary develop-
ment, and uncontrolled development (especially on the Eastern Shore).'"
124. Id. at 53.
125. Id. at 15-20.
126. Id. at 18.
127. Id. at 15.
128. Id. Appendix B at 5-9. One such problem has already arisen with the siting of a major
manufacturer of oil drilling platforms in Cape Charles on the Eastern Shore.
129. REPORT OF THE OUrER CONTINENTAL SHELF ADVIsoRY COMMITTEE, VIRGINIA AND THE
OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF: PROBLEMS, PossIBILTIES AND POSTURE, (November 1974).
130. Id. at 4.
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The study recommended compatibility between OCS development and the
Coastal Zone Management Plan and opposition to drilling until an effec-
tive oil spill cleanup association has been formed. More specific recom-
mendations included the restructuring of the Wetlands Act on a planning
basis rather than case-by-case reaction, and control of pipeline access to
keep the number of corridors to a minimum.3 ' The United States Supreme
Court has ruled that OCS lands (i. e., lands seaward of the three mile limit)
are owned and may be leased by the federal government.' The study,
anticipating this result, recommended creation of an office to coordinate
contacts between state and federal agencies and industry in the OCS area.
Moreover, the study supports federal legislation that would require sharing
of monies received from OCS leasing."'
Virginia's Coastal Zone Management Plan is still in a nebulous, forma-
tive stage. The ultimate degree of state land use control in the coastal zone
is difficult to foresee. There has been no unequivocal commitment from the
legislature for strong state control.'34 Moreover, it is not clear whether the
planning program is aimed at eventual federal funding of a strong manage-
ment program complying with requirements of the Act or a state funded
program with politically acceptable controls.' 1 Finally, prediction of the
extent of public reaction to encroachment on private property rights and
local political boundaries would be premature. One thing is cer-
tain-Virginia will require a more extensive program of control in the
coastal zone due to increasing development pressures and the exploration
of the outer continental shelf.'36
D. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY ACr OF 1969 (NEPA)
1. Background
By enacting NEPA137 Congress established a national policy for the pro-
tection and restoration of the environment, recognizing that federal agency
decisions have a substantial effect on the relationship between environ-
mental quality and the national welfare. The legislation specifically modi-
fied historical American ideology that virgin land may be developed with-
131. Id. at 5-6.
132. United States v. Maine, 43 U.S.L.W. 4363 (U.S. Mar. 17, 1975).
133. REPoRT, supra note 129, at 6.
134. See Haulman, supra note 118.
135. Interview with Keith Buttleman, Senior Environmental Planner, Commerce and Re-
sources Section, DSPCA, in Richmond, Virginia, March 15, 1975.
136. See Haulman, supra note 118.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq. (1970).
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out regard to environmental consequence." 8 Section 102(2) (C)' " which has
prompted voluminous litigation,' requires that all federal agencies evalu-
ate the environmental costs of a proposed project before it is begun. Before
making a detailed statement, the agency must confer with federal or state
agencies having environmental expertise on the probable impact of the
project. Copies of the environmental impact statement and statements
from the commenting agencies are then made available to the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) and the public. Copies of the environmen-
tal impact statement are appended to agency material relating to the
proposed project and accompany it through the "existing agency review
process."''
Both the procedural and substantive requirements of NEPA have occa-
sioned active judicial review. Indeed, the skeleton of a relatively simple
statute has been fleshed out through the courts rather than by administra-
tive or legislative action. The courts have recognized that the environmen-
tal impact statement analysis is not simply a bureaucratic exercise. It is a
full disclosure device for insuring that federal agencies consider environ-
mental factors in good faith and allow for public commentary on a pro-
posed agency action. In the seminal case of Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating
Comm., Inc., v. AEC,' Judge Wright criticized the Atomic Energy Com-
mission for formulating an agency review plan which provided for accom-
paniment of impact statements but did not mandate their consideration:
We believe the Commission's crabbed interpretation of NEPA makes a
mockery of the Act. What possible purpose could there be in the Section 102
138. See generally Redding and Parry, Land Use: A Vital Link to Environmental Quality
in LAND USE AND THE: ENVIRONMENT: AN ANTHOLOGY OF RADINGS 3 (1973).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2) (1970) states:
[Tbo the fullest extent possible...
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall-.
(c) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and
other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment, a detailed statement by the responsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should the proposal
be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environment and the
maintenance and enhancement of long-term productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which would be in-
volved in the proposed action should it be implemented.
140. See F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE NATIONAL
ENMmONMEWrAL PoUcy AcT (1973) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON].
141. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
142. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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(2)(C) requirement (that the "detailed statement" accompany proposals
through agency review processes) if "accompany" means no more than physi-
cal proximity-mandating no more than the physical act of passing certain
folders and papers, unopened, to reviewing officials along with other folders
and papers? . . . NEPA was meant to do more than regulate the flow of
papers in the federal bureaucracy. The word "accompany" in Section 102
(2)(C) must not be read so narrowly as to make the Act ludicrous. It must,
rather, be read to indicate a congressional intent that environmental factors
. . . be considered through agency review processes.la
Thus the procedural requirements of NEPA mean not only that the impact
statement should be prepared but that it should be functionally used in
the decision-making process.
Having fulfilled the procedural requirements, the final agency decision
may still be open to review under the substantive requirements of NEPA.
Previous opinion negated the proposition of a citizen's right to a clean
environment"' but recent case law has shown a tendency to review agency
decisions on the merits.' This trend opens a fertile field for challenge of
developments and agency actions which threaten existing land use or evi-
dence inadequate consideration of land use ramifications.
2. Environmental Impact Statements
a. Necessary Federal Involvement
Impact statements are required for "major Federal actions significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment. . . ."I" This calls for an
initial determination of sufficient federal involvement. Generally, federal
actions are considered to be those directly undertaken by federal agencies,
dependent upon federal funding assistance, or hinging on a federal permit
or license. 47 The courts have interpreted the requirement broadly to en-
courage environmental analysis.
143. 449 F.2d at 1117-18 (emphasis in original).
144. See, e.g., Virginians for Dulles v. Volpe, 344 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1972) where Judge
Bryan said at 578: "I do not interpret . . . [NEPA] as creating any substantive private
right." Accord, Tanner v. Armco Steel Corp., 340 F. Supp. 532 (S.D. Tex. 1972).
145. See Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473 . F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973); Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972); and discussion accompa-
nying notes 174-83 infra.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1970).
147. The CEQ guidelines provide
"Actions" include but are not limited to . . . [n]ew and continuing projects and
program activities: directly undertaken by Federal agencies; or supported in whole or
in part through Federal contracts, grants, subsidies, loans, or other forms of funding
assistance ... ; or involving a Federal lease, permit, license certificate or other entitle-
ment for use. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.5(a) (1974).
[Vol. 9:513
LAND USE
Once there is a finding of federal involvement the courts generally apply
a two-pronged test to determine (1) whether the federal action is "major"
and (2) whether it significantly affects the human environment. Arguably,
NEPA analysis should be triggered if either requirement is met.' As an
aid to potential litigants, either developers or those seeking to challenge
development, it has been suggested that the threshold for the test be cast
in terms of a dollar amount. Cases which exceed a certain cost would
automatically trigger NEPA requirements while those below the threshold
would shift the burden of proof to the complaining party. The procedure
would have the advantage of injecting certainty into the decision-making
But see Rucker v. Willis, 484 F.2d 158 (4th Cir. 1973) where the Fourth Circuit refused to
enjoin the granting of a permit by the Corps of Engineers for construction of fishing piers and
a boat basin on part of North Carolina's outer banks. No impact statement would be required,
the court said, because: (1) impact was limited to the immediate area; (2) marshlands or
shellfish beds were not threatened; and (3) since there were several other fishing piers, no
introduction of a previously non-existing use into the area. Judge Craven dissented, focusing
on Corps regulations effective three days after the permit's issuance which required a written
environmental analysis. He stated:
I do not know how many fishing piers are too many, but I think that too many may
substantially alter the environment of North Carolina's priceless Outer Banks. It is,
of course, true that the issuance of a permit by the Corps to construct a boat dock on
an inland waterway for a private homeowner is not major federal action requiring the
preparation of an impact statement. But what about the 500th such permit, or the
10,000th one? At some point "zoning" and environmental impact merge. Ecology is
largely a matter of land use. Id. at 164.
148. Compare ANDERSON, supra note 140, at 89-90:
Courts that have specifically considered this issue are divided but favor a two-test
standard. Numerous cases implicitly resolve the question, however, by simply assum-
ing that Congress intended NEPA to cover all pending federal actions that may cause
significant environmental effects. Thus the use of both "major" and "significantly
affecting" appears to have been for emphasis. On the one hand, federal action does
not technically become "major" just because it may be accompanied by significant
environmental effects; on the other, it makes little sense to find a project minor when
its effects are significant. (footnotes omitted)
with the view expressed in Seeley, The National Environmental Policy Act: A Guideline for
Compliance, 26 VAND. L. REv. 295, 302 n.41 (1973):
Superficially, it seems unlikely that a nonmajor action could have a significant effect
on the environment. This assumption fails to recognize the possibility of minor federal
participation in projects having a significant environmental impact-a federal re-
search grant of a few thousand dollars to study erosion control during the construction
of a major state or municipally funded facility. This example may be analyzed either
by reasoning that the federal action does not significantly affect the environment or
by making the simpler determination that the action is not major. The 2-tiered level
of NEPA inquiry simplifies the decision-making process by requiring no agency action
for nonmajor actions, negative declarations for major actions without significant ef-
fects, and a full-scale statement only for major actions with signficant effects.
For a lengthy analysis of the case law interpretation see ANDERSON, supra note 140, at 73-96.
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process. "9 To make such a plan more comprehensive, perhaps an environ-
mental court system could be established to deal initially with agency
decisions to file or not file environmental statements. Minimum standing
requirements and court costs would encourage citizen challenges and honor
more broadly the environmental mandate of NEPA.'50 In time, the body
of environmental litigation could be shifted to such courts.
Specific situations have arisen around the question of timing of federal
involvement. For example, should an impact statement be filed when the
state, local, or private agency is taking environmentally harmful action
prior to federal funding? In Thompson v. Fugate'5 ' the plaintiffs sought to
enjoin the condemnation by the Virginia State Highway Department of
Tuckahoe Plantation, a registered national historical landmark. The con-
demnation was for an 8.3 mile segment, completing a 75 mile circumferen-
tial beltway for the City of Richmond. Defendant Highway Department
argued that environmental impact analysis was not required because fed-
eral approval and funding for the project had not yet been sought. Judge
Robert Merhige responded:
The meeting of federal requirements for 21 miles of a 29.2-mile highway
project in order to partake of the federal financial allotments for that 21-mile
segment, and at the same time circumvent the need to protect the national
environment to the fullest extent possible on the remaining 8.3-mile segment
by labeling it as a separate project, is to engage in a bureaucratic exercise
which, if it is to succeed, must do so without the imprimatur of this Court-a
task which is doomed to failure unless and until a superior court deems
otherwise.'
149. Comment, supra note 109, at 170-71.
150. It may be objected that such a requirement would encourage spurious suits. See Izaak
Walton League v. Macchia, 329 F. Supp. 504, 513 D. N.J. 1971) where the court stated:
We do not share the fear of some earlier decisions that liberalized concepts of "stand-
ing to sue" will flood the Courts with litigation. However, if that should be the price
for the preservation and protection of our natural resources and environment against
uncoordinated or irresponsible conduct, so be it. But such seems most improbable.
Courts can always control the obviously frivolous suitor.
Section 9 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972 requires that the
President, acting through the Attorney General, report to Congress on the feasibility of a
separate environmental court system. Attorney General Elliot Richardson on October 11,
1973, submitted this report and recommended that no action be taken. The report was based
on a consensus of federal agencies and environmental protection groups. See Comment,
Attorney General's Report Rejects Establishing An Environmental Court, 4 ENv. L. REP.
10019 (1974). But see Whitney, The Case for Creating A Special Environmental Court
System, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473 (1973).
151. 347 F. Supp. 120 (E.D. Va. 1972).
152. Id. at 124. But see James River & Kanawha Canal Parks, Inc. v. RMA, 359 F. Supp.
611 (E.D. Va. 1973) where an expressway was originally financed by local bonds. A later
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The court enjoined federal approval, funding or condemnation until the
environmental impact analysis requirement was satisfied.
Restriction on agency action was carried a step further in Arlington
Coalition on Transportation v. Volpe"' where the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that an interstate highway project in the Arlington area
should be enjoined for reconsideration of environmental impact even
though funded and partially complete prior to the effective date of NEPA.
The Virginia State Highway Department argued that it should be allowed
to continue the project during the environmental assessment by the Secre-
tary of Transportation. The court rejected the argument on this rationale:
If we were to find-as we do-that federal law requires that the proposed
route for Arlington 1-66 be reconsidered, acquisition by the state of right-of-
way along the proposed route during the reconsideration would make pro-
ceeding with the proposed route increasingly easier and, therefore, a decision
to alter or abandon the route increasingly undesirable. Thus the challenged
activities of the state highway department would make a sham of the reconsi-
deration required by federal law.'8'
Thus, the restriction on environmentally harmful action extends from ap-
prehension of federal involvement through preparation of the impact state-
ment.
Not only will state action be enjoined pending environmental impact
analysis but the requirement extends to private development. In Silva v.
Romney,'55 the Department of Housing and Urban Development had
approved a mortgage guarantee of $4,000,000 and an interest grant of
$156,000 for a private developer of low and medium income housing units.
request for federal funds due to the rising costs was not considered sufficient federal involve-
ment.
153. 458 F.2d 1323 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000 (1972).
154. 458 F.2d at 1329 (footnote omitted). But see Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971)
(Ely I) where a block grant from the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration for con-
struction of a prison facility in the Green Springs area of Virginia was held to be federal
involvement warranting environmental analysis. However, the state agency was not enjoined
from continuing further with the plan. This was not the end of the Green Springs litigation.
The impact statement revealed that further construction delays were inevitable because of
adverse comments. The state agencies decided to withdraw their request for federal funds but
kept funds allocated for use on other projects. This action was challenged as a juggling of
funds to avoid NEPA requirements. In Ely v. Velde, 497 F.2d 252 (4th Cir. 1974) (Ely ]I) the
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court and found such state action a circumvention of
congressional policy. The decision left the state agencies with a choice. They could proceed
with construction regardless of environmental requirements, but return all federal funds
originally allocated for the project. Or, the state could keep the funds and await final environ-
mental analysis before proceeding.
155. 342 F. Supp. 783 (D. Mass. 1972).
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When challenged in the district court HUD was enjoined from participa-
tion pending environmental analysis, but the court refused to further en-
join the developer from cutting down trees in preparation for the project.
The First Circuit reversed and enjoined the developer on the rationale that
once there is a partnership between federal and non-federal entities, all
parties are subject to injunction. 5 '
Moreover, the court called for "status quo" regulations which would
define what action may be taken on a project while an impact statement
is being prepared, preferably forbidding those which would cause environ-
mental harm. Basing its plea upon the substantive mandate of NEPA, the
court dismissed temporary restriction of private action as the price of
federal regulation. Lack of such regulations would present the following
spectre:
Given the important goals of protecting the environment and providing
adequate housing for many lower and middle class Americans, status quo
regulations in a situation like the one before us could prevent the irony which
might occur where a partially built project which went ahead with little
concern for the environment could not be completed because federal funds
were denied to avoid subsidizing environmental harm, the twin results being
no housing and an impaired environment.'5 7
Status quo regulations would benefit the government by reassurance that
expensive environmental analysis would not be faulty because of further
actions of the developer. The developer, according to the court, would be
encouraged to undertake his own environmental studies, thus increasing
the chances of final approval. ' As a practical matter, the primary benefit
of such regulations to the developer would be a more realistic planning
framework for costs, the availability of materials and deadlines.
The highway cases and Silva indicate that NEPA can serve as a chal-
lenging device to state action and private development which poses the
threat of harmful environmental or land use impact. The problem is to find
156. Silva v. Romney, 473 F.2d 287 (1st Cir. 1973).
157. Id. at 291.
158. Id. The litigation did not end with the injunction from the First Circuit. In Silva v.
Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973), HUD and the developer were further enjoined because
the submitted impact statement was inadequate. Chief Judge Coffin, now noticably dis-
gusted, stated:
HUD has had nearly a year to prepare a satisfactory [impact statement] on a rela-
tively small project .... In the meantime, the developer, since earlier argument
before us, has stayed his hand. Now, with costs of construction rising, and costs of
delay accumulating, he faces further delay. And the appellants, sometimes excessive
in their demands, have nevertheless served the public purpose in pursuing this cause.
482 F.2d at 1287.
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a sufficient nexus between the state or private activity and federal action.
If the private citizen can pass the dual barriers of "federal action" and
standing, he can force observance of NEPA procedural requirements. How-
ever, unless the court adopts a standard of substantive review he may not
be able to stop the eventual completion of the project. Conversely, private
developers should be aware that federal licenses, permits or regulatory
activity carry the possible requirement of environmental impact analysis.
Failure by the relevant federal agency to comply with NEPA will mean
increased costs and delay for the proposed private action.
b. Adequacy
The contents of an adequate environmental impact statement are set out
in the CEQ guidelines.' 9 Adequacy of the statement has been further
described in this way:
(1) The statement must not contain unsupported conclusions. Any conclu-
sions in the statement must be supported by facts from which a reasonable
objective observer would reach the same results;
(2) the reasonable alternative presented may not be deemphasized by the
agency in an attempt to justify its course of action. The statement must
contain a text of reasonable alternatives with an accompanying discussion of
the environmental impact of each one. The depth of the discussion is gover-
ened by a "rule of reason" which weighs the depth of evaluation in proportion
to the degree of impact.'t 0
Attacks on environmental impact statements have generally been
prompted by the agency's failure to discuss adequately reasonable alterna-
tives to the proposed action or to give all the pertinent facts. '
Agencies are required by the guidelines to assess the land use effects of
proposed action. In describing the action agencies are cautioned to identify
the existing population and growth characteristics of the affected area as
well as any secondary growth impacts resulting from the proposed action.
When evaluating the relationship of the action to land use plans in the
affected area (including those developed pursuant to the Clean Air Act and
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972) the agency
must identify inconsistencies and proposals for reconciliation."' 2
159. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8 (1974).
160. Comment, supra note 109, at 182. For analysis of the case law see ANDERSON, supra
note 140, at 200-23.
161. See, e.g., National Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir.
1972) (failure to discuss alternatives).
162. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.8(a)(1),(2) (1974).
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The guidelines recognize that major federal actions (e.g., highways, air-
ports and sewer systems) often induce secondary effects of associated in-
vestment and altered patterns of social and economic activity. These ef-
fects are often more profound than the primary impacts of proposed federal
action and must be included in the impact statement.' 3 In Keith v.
Volpe,'" the court cautioned federal officials to include in their impact
statement an analysis of the land use effect of an interstate highway in the
Los Angeles Basin. Even though the basin was already highly developed,
the court noted that construction of the freeway could conceivably lead to
attendant commercial and industrial development which would increase
automobile-created air and noise pollution.
3. Standing and Substantive Review
The recognition of private citizens' standing to sue has been the primary
reason for judicial review of agency action under NEPA. The basic issue
of standing is "what must be alleged by persons who claim injury of a
noneconomic nature to interests that are widely shared."' To obtain judi-
cial review of federal agency action, the plaintiff must allege that he was
"adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of
the relevant statute." 66
In Sierra Club v. Morton,"7 a case not involving suit under NEPA, the
Supreme Court developed a test for the sufficiency of allegations to obtain
review of federal actions. The United States Forest Service and the Depart-
ment of the Interior had approved plans for recreational development of
Mineral King Valley and access road construction in the Sequoia National
Park. The Sierra Club sought to enjoin the federal agency action claiming
that it had "a special interest in the conservation and the sound mainte-
nance of the national parks, game refuges and forests of the country."' '
163. Id. § 1500.8(a)(3)(ii).
164. 352 F. Supp. 1324, 1335 (C.D. Cal. 1972). It is generally held that the federal agency
must prepare the impact statement. See Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412
(2d Cir. 1972). But see Iowa Citizens for Environmental Quality, Inc. v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 849
(8th Cir. 1973) (permissible for state highway department to prepare statement for federal-
aid highway project). Under the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974, 42
U.S.C.A. 44 5301 et seq. (Cum. Supp. 1975), as amended, Pub. L. No. 93-383, HUD has
shifted the responsibility for environmental analysis to local agency applicants for federal
funds. See Comment, Controversial NEPA Implementation at HUD: Shifting Environmental
Review Responsibilities to Local Grant Applicants, 4 ENv. L. REP. 10193 (1974).
165. Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) (footnote omitted).
166. Administrative Procedure Act § 10, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
167. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
168. Id. at 730.
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The Court applied a two-pronged test: (1) was there injury in fact, and (2)
was the injury to an interest arguably within the zone of interests protected
by the violated statute. The Court held that Sierra Club's claim to stand-
ing must fail because there was no specific claim of injury to individual
members of the club. The "zone of interests test" was not dealt with.
However, it is generally recognized that the public right to participate in
the Section 102 (2)(C) review process and comment on proposed agency
actions is violated by failure to file an environmental impact statement. 69
Thus, NEPA satisfies one level of the standing inquiry.
The Court in Sierra Club did not define what would be a sufficient
allegation of "injury in fact."'7 This question was dealt with in James
River & Kanawha Canal Parks, Inc. v. RMA.111 The plaintiffs, a Virginia
non-profit corporation interested in the preservation and restoration of the
James River and an individual group member, sought to enjoin the pro-
posed construction of a limited access expressway into the downtown area
of Richmond pending environmental analysis. The court stated that the
corporation did not have standing on its own because it had "no more than
a public interest in the development of the area.' 7 2 The individual plain-
tiff, the court noted, did have sufficient standing and the corporation could
represent his interests. The court reasoned:
Deaton alleges that he is a resident of the City of Richmond and that he has
used and enjoyed the James River and Kanawha Canal for recreational activ-
ities and for its aesthetics and that he intends to do so to an even greater
extent in the future if the acts of the defendants do not make this impossible.
As unspecific as this allegation may be, it shows a personal involvement with
the area affected by the Downtown Expressway and thus states an injury in
fact sufficient to support standing.'"
Thus, in order to force federal compliance with NEPA it is probably best
to allege adjacent property ownership or recreational use of the affected
area.
The public does have standing to force agencies to file an impact state-
ment prior to commencing a project. However, once a reasonably sufficient
169. ANDERSON, supra note 140, at 36-39.
170. In United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) the Court held that a group of law
students had standing to challenge an increase in freight rates by the ICC which would
indirectly result in discrimination against recyclable goods. The students argued that the
increased freight rates adversely affected the environmental quality of the surrounding recre-
ational areas of which they were frequent users.
171. 359 F. Supp. 611 (E.D. Va. 1973).
172. Id. at 625.
173. Id.
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impact statement has been filed, will the public have standing to request
judicial review of the agency decision to continue with the project? The
basic question is whether Section 101 (b)'74 of NEPA creates substantive
rights to a clean environment, conferring upon the courts a duty to exam-
ine agency decisions. In Citizen's Airport Committee v. Volpe,' the plain-
tiffs challenged approval by the Secretary of Transportation of the con-
struction of a county airport. Rejecting the argument that NEPA places
substantive duties on agencies, the court stated that NEPA is simply a
procedural statute "designed to ensure that environmental factors are con-
sidered by agencies in all of their acts.""'7 However, the court went on to
examine the impact statement and the agency decision under the require-
ments of the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970. The Court
concluded that the Secretary had not acted in an arbitrary and capricious
manner and that the decision to continue the project was supported by
valid reasons.' 71
The Fourth Circuit squarely confronted the issue of whether a court can
discharge its function merely by determining that the agency had acted in
a procedurally correct manner by filing a reasonably sufficient impact
statement. In Conservation Council v. Froehlke,7 1 involving the challenged
construction of a dam in North Carolina, the court held:
.. .District Courts have an obligation to review substantive agency deci-
sions on the merits to determine if they are in accord with NEPA.
174. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970) provides:
In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the continuing responsi-
bility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means ... to improve and
coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the
Nation may-
(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment for
succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and cultur-
ally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation,
risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage,
and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety
of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit high
standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attaina-
ble recycling of depletable resources.
175. 351 F. Supp. 52 (E.D. Va. 1972).
176. 351 F. Supp. at 58.
177. See note 102 and accompanying discussion supra.
178. 340 F. Supp. 222 (M.D. N.C. 1972), rev'd per curiam, 473 F.2d. 664 (4th Cir. 1973).
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The review is a limited one for the purpose of determining whether the
agency reached its decision after a full, good faith consideration of environ-
mental factors made under the standards set forth in §§ 101 and 102 of
NEPA; and whether the actual balance of costs and benefits struck by the
agency according to these standards was arbitrary or clearly gave insufficient
weight to environmental factors. 79
In the Fourth Circuit, then, the courts must engage in "substantial in-
quiry" into the agency analysis and the merits of its decision.
The view of the Fourth Circuit was followed in Cape Henry Bird Club
v. Laird.8 ' The plaintiffs challenged further construction on the Gathright
Dam project in western Virginia even though an environmental impact
statement had been filed. The court engaged in a searching analysis of the
agency's decision-making process "to determine if the agency's decision
was arbitrary and capricious when viewed in terms of the data and infor-
mation supplied and set forth in the [impact statement]." '181 The court
held that there had been no arbitrary or capricious action but that the
impact statement must be supplemented in various respects.
Therefore, it seems that the "zone of interests" test for standing can also
be satisfied under Section 101 of NEPA. There is a public interest in
agency decisions to go forward with a project after procedural requirements
are met and the courts will engage in substantive review of those decisions.
It is significant to note that the Cape Henry dam project was also chal-
lenged under provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972.111 There is no question of standing under the sub-
stantive rights created by the pollution control acts. Thus, a citizen can
buttress a challenge to ongoing agency action by claiming violations of
both NEPA and the pollution control statutes. It should be emphasized
that substantive review does not insure denial of a project's eventual com-
pletion. However, the doctrine has been heralded as the harbinger of a
second generation of NEPA cases in which the courts will decide whether
the Act is a bureaucratic tool or a true commitment to national
environmental quality. 18
179. 473 F.2d at 665, quoting Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346,
353 (1972). The Eighth, Seventh, and possibly the District of Columbia Circuits have also
adopted the doctrine of substantive review. For an excellent analysis of the principle cases,
the circuits and their reasoning see Yarrington, Judicial Review of Substantive Agency Deci-
sions: A Second Generation of Cases Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 19 S.D.L.
REv. 279 (1974).
180. 359 F. Supp. 404 (W.D. Va. 1973), af'd, 484 F.2d 453 (4th Cir. 1973).
181. 359 F. Supp. at 410.
182. See Ohio ex rel. Brown v. Calloway, 497 F.2d 1235 (6th Cir. 1974) (FWPCA give
standing to intervene in a dam construction project).
183. See Yarrington, Judicial Review of Substantive Agency Decisions: A Second Genera-
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4. NEPA As A Land Use Planning Device
Although NEPA has been lauded as the best available land use planning
mechanism,"4 its viability as a framework for a national land use-
environmental plan is open to serious doubt. Primarily NEPA is a reactive
statute. It provides relief from profound environmental harm but public
commentary and the impact analysis is invited when the project has been
selected and probably funded. Opposing factions of biased agencies and
enraged environmentalists do not create the atmosphere of contemplation
necessary to define a comprehensive land use plan. Consideration of com-
munity, economic and conservation needs should be a condition precedent
to good land use planning. Such is not provided by NEPA's reactions to
agency initiatives.
Moreover, NEPA applies only to "federal actions." Although the courts
are prone to interpret the term broadly, many state and local developmen-
tal activities which dramatically affect land use are not subject to NEPA
requirements. This leaves a breach which must be filled by a more inter-
mediate, state-level decision-making process.'1
Lastly, the present controversy over substantive review of agency deci-
sions leaves the national commitment to environmental quality in some
doubt. If courts do not engage in substantive review, it has been argued
that NEPA is little more than a rubber stamp for federal agency deci-
sions.'88 The Fourth Circuit has decided in favor of substantive review.
While such judicial analysis will certainly prevent environmental ca-
tastrophes, it will not provide the security and stability of long-range land
use planning.
E. CONCLUSION
The nexus between land use and environmental quality is extremely
complex. Land use decisions inevitably effect the environment; constraints
placed on land, based on environmental considerations, can have far-
reaching economic and social effects. Land use regulation is normally the
tion of Cases Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 19 S.D.L. REv. 279 (1974). The
author concludes:
If Section 101 (b) creates no judicially enforceable obligations on the part of federal
agencies that are enforceable by the judiciary, then Congress created a national
policy that nobody has the power to enforce. Such a result defies logic, and it would
in many ways render NEPA a meaningless statute. Id. at 294.
184. See ROCKEFELLER TASK FORCE, THE USE OF LAND: A CITIZEN'S PoucY GUIDE TO URBAN
GROWTH, 195-99 (W. Reilly ed. 1973).
185. See generally Section VIII, supra.
186. Comment, supra note 109, at 184.
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product of various unrelated state and local institutions whose authority
is constricted to certain policy objectives. EPA has the authority, either
directly or indirectly, to require the states to consider land use control
measures as additional means to reach and maintain environmental stan-
dards. However, the injection of pollution abatement concern as the pri-
mary factor in the land use decision-making process will not provide an
adequate fulcrum to appropriately balance the factors of economic growth
and social concern. The need remains for encouragement of comprehensive
planning on the state level which considers all factors affecting land use.'87
EPA's statutory authority raises the possibility of a national environ-
mental land use plan without the benefit of further federal legislation.
However, there is no existing viable framework on the federal level, other
than the agency itself, to coordinate the various pollution statutes.'" More-
over, the implementation of the statutes through single purpose state agen-
cies provides for little coordination of different environmental concerns at
the state level. For Virginians this could mean a significant narrowing of
land use options and development possibilities.
EPA has the authority, either through statutory mandate or the "carrot
and stick" approach of federal funding, to require comprehensive land use
planning based on environmental objectives. A coordinating mechanism
for such planning at the state or local level is still not present. Also, the
federal funding approach is inherently limited by the states' freedom to
reject the funds and the conditions attached. Due to manpower/funding
constraints and the probability of national land use regulation in the fu-
ture, it is foreseeable that EPA will limit its role to a research assistance
and planning agency.' 9 However, EPA is taxed with the ultimate responsi-
bility of achieving and maintaining a clean environment. As the statutory
deadlines approach, it may become necessary to consider national land use
control by means of the existing environmental legislation.
187. An EPA official recently stated that the agency is "increasingly counting on" state
planning efforts to help carry out the pollution mandates and that federal land use legisla-
tion would strengthen these efforts. EPA feels the legislation should include criteria requiring
the states to consider environmental criteria in their planning. EPA also desires review power
over federal guidelines for state land use programs. 5 ENv. Rpm.-CuRR. DEv. 1330 (1975).
188. Other suggested coordinating frameworks are NEPA, the A-95 Clearinghouse Process,
and the Integrated Grant Administration Program. For a review of the marked limitations of
these procedures see EPA Authority, supra note 33, at 166-74.
189. See EPA Draft Strategy Paper, Land Use. Implications and Requirements of EPA
Programs (1974). This paper encourages an evaluation by EPA regional offices and state
implementing agencies of the relationship between environmental programs and land use.
However, EPA reserves the right to challenge state land use decisions which threaten environ-
mental standards.
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XI. PROSPECTIVE FEDERAL LAND USE LEGISLATION
To encourage state-level regulation of land, several measures establish-
ing grant-in-aid programs to assist the states have been introduced in both
the Senate and the House of Representatives.' The most recent, the Land
Use Policy and Planning Assistance Act,2 (commonly referred to as S. 168),
was introduced by Senator Jackson during the Ninety-third Congress on
January 9, 1973. The majority of the Senate Committee on Interior and
Insular Affairs reacted favorably to this measure. The Committee Report
asserts that legislation is "critically needed to assist local, State and the
Federal government to move from an era of chaotic, ad hoc, short-term,
case-by-case, crisis-to-crisis land use decision-making to an era of long-
range planning and management which is based on democratic processes
and a full appreciation of all legitimate private and public aspirations and
needs."'3 The Committee concluded that it would be impossible for most
states to institute a state land use program in less than five to ten years.4
S. 268 would provide the financial and technical assistance to the states
that would enable them to develop land use programs more rapidly than
they could if forced to go it alone.5
1. Many of our elected representatives in Congress have recognized that our advanced
technology and expanding population are placing unprecedented demands on our land base
and have attempted to expedite this trend toward state-level land use planning and regula-
tion. One of the prime movers of federal legislation to encourage this state-level control is
Senator Henry M. Jackson of Washington.
Senator Jackson cites a startling array of facts in support of his position:
Over the next 30 years, the pressures upon our finite land resources will result in the
dedication of an additional 18 million acres or 28 thousand square miles of undeveloped
land to urban use. Urban sprawl will consume an area of land approximately equal to
all the urbanized land within our major cities, the equivalent of the total area of the
States of New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island. Each decade,
new urban growth will absorb an area greater than the entire State of New Jersey. Vast
areas of land are required to meet plans for industrial expansion. In the next two
decades, one industry alone-the electrical power industry-will need three million
acres of new rights-of-way for additional high voltage transmission lines and more
than 140,000 acres of potential prime industrial sites for over two hundred new major
generating stations, and will require immense acreages of land to be disturbed by strip
mining for coal. In short, between now and the year 2000, we must build again all that
we have built before. We must build as many homes, schools, and hospitals in the next
three decades as we built in the previous three centuries. Letter from Senator Henry
M. Jackson, November 13, 1974.
For a comprehensive legislative history of congressional proposals concerning land use see S.
REP. No. 197, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 84-85 (1973).
2. S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Seass. (1973).
3. S. REP. No. 197, 93d Cong., 1st Seass. 37 (1973).
4. Id. at 37.
5. Id. at 38.
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The Land Use Policy and Planning Assistance Act passed the Senate on
June 21, 1973, by a vote of 64 to 21.6 The House counterpart to S. 268, H.R.
10294, was reported out by the House Interior and Insular Affairs Commit-
tee on January 22, 19747 only to be defeated on a procedural motion in the
House on June 11, 1974.1
A similar version of the Land Use Policy and Planning Assistance Act
will be introduced by Senator Jackson in the Senate and Representative
Morris Udall in the House during the Ninety-fourth Congress.' The fact
that S. 268 passed the Senate so handily combined with a larger Demo-
cratic majority in the Ninety-fourth Congress leads to speculation that
federal land use legislation is forthcoming. Those connected with land use
planning and management should be aware of this likelihood and its prob-
able consequences. The final version of any land use measure should
closely resemble S. 268; therefore, this discussion will examine its provi-
sions and probable effects.
A. SUMMARY OF THE MAJOR PROVISIONS OF THE LAND USE POLICY.
AND PLANNING ASSISTANCE ACT
The Act declares that there is a national interest in a more efficient
system of land use planning. Land use decisions of wide concern have often
been made "on the basis of expediency, tradition, short-term economic
considerations, and other factors which too frequently are unrelated or
contradictory to sound environmental, economic, and social land use con-
siderations."'" The purpose of the Act is to provide federal technical assis-
tance and a grant-in-aid program to the states to assist in developing their
capacity for land use planning and management." The Secretary of the
Interior is granted authority to administer the aid to states which meet the
6. 119 CONG. REc. 11,663 (daily ed. June 21, 1973). Virginia Senators Byrd and Scott voted
against the measure.
7. The provisions of H.R. 10294 do not differ in any major area from the provisions con-
tained in S. 268. H.R. 10294 was drafted by the Environment Subcommittee under the
leadership of Congressman Morris K. Udall of Arizona.
8. 120 CONG. REc. 5041 (daily ed. June 11, 1974). The Nixon Administration, at one time
a staunch adovocate of land use legislation, had withdrawn its support of the bill. The White
House reversal brought charges of "impeachment politics" from Senator Jackson and Repre-
sentative Udall. They asserted that Nixon, desperately needing conservative backing in his
struggle to stay in office, was exchanging his support of land use for conservative support on
the impeachment issue. See The Washington Post, June 13, 1974, at 2, col. 1.
9. Letter from Senator Henry M. Jackson, November 13, 1974; Letter from Representative
Morris K. Udall, November 19, 1974; to the University of Richmond Law Review, on file T.C.
Williams Law Library.
10. S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(a) (1973).
11. Id. § 102(b). The Act authorizes $100 million a year for eight fiscal years to assist states
in developing land use programs. Id. § 608(a).
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requirements of the Act.'2 The administration of the program is in the
hands of the newly created Office of Land Use Policy Administration. This
office is established within the Department of the Interior.'3 To maintain
their eligibility for funding, the states must establish both a land use
planning process and a land use planning program.
1. Statewide Land Use Planning Process
To remain eligible for grants under the Act, each state must develop "an
adequate statewide land use planning process" within three fiscal years
from enactment.'" "The process is designed to ensure that the State land
use program required by the fifth fiscal year and the policies it will contain
are developed in a systematic, rational and democratic manner and upon
a base of professional expertise and useful data and information."' 5
There are four major components of the process: (1) an inventory of state
economic, environmental and social requirements to serve as a data base
for informed land use decision making;"6 (2) establishment of a single state
agency having authority to develop and administer the state land use
program;'7 (3) establishment of methods to identify those areas of more
than local significance which will be subject to the land use program;'" (4)
formulation of a program to regulate land sales or development projects.'9
As a result of this process, the states will have a real knowledge of their
available resources and an awareness of the demands that will be made
upon them in the future.
12. Id. § 201(a).
13. Id. § 304(a). The choice of the Department of the Interior as the parent organization is
criticized because of the Department's lack of experience in land use planning in Note, The
Land Use Policy and Planning Assistance Act of 1973: Legislating a National Land Use
Policy, 41 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 604, 613 (1973).
14. S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 202(a) (1973).
15. S. REP. No. 197, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 91 (1973).
16. S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 202(a)(1)-(7) (1973).
17. Id. § 202(b). Section 202(c) grants to the states the authority to designate the agency
"participating in programs pursuant to Section 701 of the Housing Act of 1954, as amended,
and, where such State is a coastal State, the planning agency participating in programs
pursuant to the Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, as the eligible State Land use
planning agency required by subsection (b) of this section."
18. Id. § 202(a)(8).
19. Id. § 202(d). Each state is asked to develop a program of regulation in this area within
three years. Decision-making concerning the other four categories of critical areas and uses
of more than local concern is not required until the fifth year when the state land use program
is due to be completed.
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2. Statewide Land Use Program
To remain eligible for further funding, each state must have "developed
an adequate State land use program" within five years of the enactment
of S. 268.0 Five critical areas of statewide significance must be regulated
under a state's program.2 The Act defines these areas and uses as: (1) areas
of critical environmental concern;2" (2) key facilities;" (3) development of
public facilities or utilities of regional benefit;2" (4) large scale develop-
ment;2 (5) land sales or development projects." These areas are of more
than local significance "because decisions concerning them have impacts
on citizens, the environment, and the economy totally out of proportion to
the jurisdiction and the interests of the local decisionmaker."*'
The majority of the Committee asserts that the Act will not force a local
government to make "sweeping changes" in its "traditional responsibility"
of land use regulation. Decisions of local significance will still be made at
the local level. Only on occasions when the land use decision has an impact
beyond the boundaries of the locality, as designated in the five areas above,
will state review under the Act be required.2s
To insure state flexibility in developing procedures and methods, the Act
20. Id. § 203(a).
21. S. REP. No. 197, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1973).
22. S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(a)(3)(A) (1973). Section 601(i) of the Act defines
"areas of critical environmental concern" as areas designated by the states where "incompati-
ble development could result in damage to the environment, life or property, or the long term
public interest which is of more than local significance." Specific examples include shore-
lands of rivers, lakes and streams; significant wildlife habitats; areas of unstable geological
ice or snow formations; watershed areas; and, significant agricultural and grazing lands and
forest lands.
23. Id. § 203(a)(3)(B). Section 601(j)(1) of the Act defines "key facilities" as "public
facilities, as determined by the State, or non-Federal lands which tend to induce development
and urbanization of more than local impact." Examples are major airports, highway inter-
changes and frontage access streets, major recreational lands and facilities, and facilities for
the development, generation and transmission of energy.
24. Id. § 203(a)(3)(C).
25. Id. § 203(a)(3)(E). § 601(k) of the Act defines "large scale development" as "private
development on non-Federal lands which, because of its magnitude or the magnitude of its
effect on the surrounding environment, is likely to present issues of more than local signifi-
cance in the judgment of the State." Examples are industrial facilities or major subdivisions
where large vehicular traffic and population densities are expected.
26. See note 2, supra. Section 601(1) requires the state to regulate the "sale and improve-
ment" of subdivisions of fifty or more lots which are located more than ten miles beyond the
boundries of any general purpose local government possessing the authority to regulate land
sales and development activities.
27. S. REP. No. 197, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1973).
28. Id. at 40.
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establishes two techniques for implementing the land use planning pro-
gram: (1) direct state planning; or (2) local government planning subject
to guidelines and review by the state. 9 Under the latter method, the locali-
ties "continue to exercise all their land use powers and, through guidelines,
criteria, and an appeals process," the state "would exercise guidance and
oversight over the local efforts."3 Whichever technique is chosen, the state
retains the power to prohibit the use of land within the five areas or uses
of more than local concern.3 ' The method of implementation must include
an appeals process to resolve conflicts over a decision of a locality regarding
any area or use under the state land use program. This appeals process is
also available for the resolution of conflicts caused by decisions of the state
land use planning agency. 2
3. Administration of the Act
The Act establishes the Office of Land Use Policy Administration13 and
provides that the President appoint a Director of the Office.3 4 The function
of the office is to administer the grant-in-aid program;3 maintain studies
of land resources and their use, and of methods employed by state and
local government to implement the requirements of the Act;3 cooperate
with the states in developing standard methods for collection, classifica-
tion and dissemination of data;37 and to establish and operate a Federal
Land Use Information Data Center."
The Act further directs the Secretary of the Interior to establish an
Interagency Advisory Board on Land Use Policy.3' The principal functions
of the Board are to facilitate communication among agencies on land use
impacts of federal activities;4 render advice to the Secretary concerning
29. S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(c) (1973).
30. S. REP. No. 197, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 100 (1973).
31. S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 203(d) (1973).
32. Id. § 203(e).
33. Id. § 304(a).
34. Id. § 304(b). The President must secure the advice and consent of the Senate.
35. Id. § 304(c)(7).
36. Id. § 304(c)(2).
37. Id. § 304(c)(3).
38. Id. § 304(c)(4).
39. Id. § 305(a). Section 305(b)(2) requires representatives from the Departments of Agri-
culture, Commerce, Defense, Health, Education and Welfare, Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, Treasury, Transportation, and Atomic Energy Commission, Environmental Protection
Agency, Council on Environmental Quality, Council of Economic Advisors, and Office of
Management and Budget to sit on the Board.
40. Id. § 305(c)(1).
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his duties under the Act;4' and assist the Secretary and the heads of the
participating agencies in the review of the statewide land use processes and
programs.4
2
4. The Federal Role
For the most part, the federal review of state programs for developing a
"planning process" and a "land use program" does not invite scrutiny of
the substance of that process or program. Under the Act, "the Federal
review would be concerned primarily with whether an adequate statewide
planning process is being developed" within five fiscal years. After this
initial period, federal review consists of determining whether the state is
demonstrating "good faith efforts to implement the purposes, policies and
requirements of the State land use program."" The program must also be
reviewed and approved by the Governor. 5 The statewide land use planning
process requirement compels the state to coordinate its planning with
other governmental planning activities and programs. The state must im-
plement those methods necessary to insure coordination with the state
land use program. This implementation is subject to federal review."8
The procedure for reviewing the state land use process and program is
administered through an interagency procedure coordinated by the Secre-
tary of the Interior. The heads of federal agencies having programs with
significant land use impact are represented on the Interagency Advisory
Board on Land Use Policy and review state processes and programs. 7
The Secretary of Housing and Urban Development is directed to study
the large-scale development and key facilities components of the state land
use programs and certify that the various states are participating in the
programs established under Section 701 of the Housing Act of 1954.8 The
Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency is required to de-
termine whether the state land use programs are compatible with the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, the Clean Air
Act, and other pollution abatement statutes and whether "those portions
41. Id. § 305(c)(2).
42. Id. § 305(c)(3).
43. S. REP. No. 197, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 66 (1973).
44. S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 204(2) (1973).
45. Id. § 204(4).
46. Id. § 204(5).
47. Id. § 306(a).
48. Id. § 306(c). Section 204(6) states that to be eligible for grants under the Act, a state
must be "participating on its own behalf in the programs established pursuant to Section 701
of the Housing Act of 1954 (68 Stat. 590, 640), as amended," and, if applicable, "the Coastal
Zone Management Act of 1972 (86 Stat. 1280) . .. ."
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of the State land use program which will effect any change in land use
within the next annual review period are in compliance with and will not
cause violation of the standards, criteria, emission or effluent limitations,
monitoring requirements, or implementation plans required by such
laws."49 The Secretary of the Interior has the duty to insure that the state
has not omitted from its program any areas of critical environmental con-
cern of more than statewide significance." These are the principal excep-
tions to the procedural rather than substantive nature of review require-
ments.
Should the Secretary of the Interior, as a result of the interagency re-
view, determine that a state is ineligible for grants under the Act, an
appeals process is provided for the state. An ad hoc hearing board is ap-
pointed by the President.' The board is composed of "one knowledgeable,
impartial Federal official,"52 a governor of a neutral state,"3 and "one
knowledgeable, impartial private citizen, selected by the other two mem-
bers." This hearing board then determines the correctness of the Secre-
tary's finding.
5. Other Considerations Embodied in the Act
Title IV of the Act is concerned with federal-state coordination in the
land use planning of federal and adjacent non-federal lands." Joint
federal-state committees, composed of representatives of affected federal
agencies, state agencies, local governments, private property owners, and
user groups, are to be established by the Secretary of the Interior to study
and make recommendations for the solution of conflicts between uses of
federal lands and uses of adjacent non-federal lands. 7
Indian land imposes a barrier to effective land use programs. This land
remains largely unplanned because state and local governments lack the
authority to develop land use programs for it, and the Indian people lack
the financial resources to accomplish the task themselves. The Act pro-
vides a grant-in-aid program to assist Indian tribes in developing land use
49. Id. § 306(b)(2).
50. Id. § 204(1).
51. Id. § 306(0(1).
52. Id. § 306(f)(1)(A).
53. Id. § 306(f)(1)(B).
54. Id. § 306(f)(1)(C).
55. Id. § 306(f)(2).
56. Id. § 401(a).
57. Id. § 403.
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programs, similar to the state land use programs, for reservation and other
tribal lands.
The Act authorizes over $1 billion to carry out its purposes during the
eight years following its enactment59 with $800 million of that total to be
allocated as grants to the states."0 The federal government pays 90 percent
of each eligible state's cost of developing a land use program during the
first five years."t Federal funding for the next three years amounts to two-
thirds of the cost of administering the program. 2
6. The Issue of Crossover Sanctions
During debate on the Senate floor, Senator Jackson introduced an
amendment to S. 268. This amendment would have imposed "crossover
sanctions" against states which refuse to implement state planning pro-
grams that comply with the Act. These crossover sanctions would reduce
federal grants to recalcitrant states in other areas of federal financial assis-
tance. 3
The proposed amendment to S. 268 contained the same sanctions as a
previous land use bill, S. 632, which passed the Senate during the Ninety-
second Congress. 4 These sanctions also appear in a land use bill intro-
duced by the Nixon Administration in the Ninety-third Congress. 5 How-
ever, the amendment to S. 268 was rejected by a 44 to 52 vote. 6 The
attempt to reinstate these sanctions was the most debated topic during the
Senate's four day discussion of S. 268.Y
Thus, there is nothing compulsory in S. 268.8 It is a completely volun-
tary measure. As long as a state does not accept any grants authorized by
the Act, it is not required to comply with the Act's provisions. It is perfectly
acceptable for a state to participate for a short period of time and then
58. Id. §§ 501-10.
59. Id. § 608.
60. Id. § 608(a).
61. Id. § 606(a).
62. Id.
63. See S. REP. No. 197, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 105 (1973) for a history of crossover sanctions
contained in previous land use bills. The proposed amendment to S. 268 provided that if a
state did not comply with its provisions, funds from the Airport and Airway Development
Act, the Federal Highway Act and the Land and Water Conservation Fund would be with-
held.
64. S. 632, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 307(c)-(e) (1973). See note 63 supra.
65. S. 924, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 205(c)-(e) (1973).
66. See 119 CONG. REc. 11518 (daily ed. June 20, 1973).
67. Id. at 11506-18.
68. See 120 CONG. Rc. 5030 (daily ed. June 11, 1947) (remarks of Representative Udall).
1975]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
withdraw after determining that it no longer wishes to adhere to the regula-
tions set forth in the Act.
B. OPPOSITON TO S. 268 AND H.R. 10294
The introduction of the Land Use Policy and Planning Assistance Act
evoked passionate debate in Congress. Although there were many argu-
ments voiced in opposition to this measure, they may be narrowed into four
major objections.
The first objection is that the Act preempts state and local control over
land use planning. Opponents argued that S. 268 "would shift the tradi-
tional responsibilities from the local and state governments to the federal
government."69 The Act, it was claimed, would "alter and destroy the
historic right of the state and local government to zone and regulate land
use within their own jurisdictions."7 To qualify for a grant under the Act,
each state must establish a statewide planning process and a statewide
planning program and develop substantive policies to guide land use. This
process is subject to review by the Department of the Interior. If the state's
progress is deemed inadequate by the Department, it loses its eligibility
for further funding. Thus, it is argued, by participating under the Act, a
state is relinquishing to the federal government the right "to direct and
affect the State planning process and its implementation." For these
reasons, opponents declare that the Act is merely the first step to more
public control over the use of private property.
Another objection to the Act centers around its effect on private prop-
erty.2 The argument is as follows: the Act grants the power to regulate
private property to the state, but there is no provision detailing to what
extent the use of property may be restricted without compensating the
owner for loss of value. In other words, when does the regulation of private
property become a "taking"? 3 The fifth and fourteenth amendments to
the Constitution provide that "private property" shall not "be taken for
public use, without just compensation."7 Against this backdrop, the Act
69. S. REP. No. 197, 93d Cong., 1st Ses. 154 (1973).
70. Id.
71. 120 CONG. REC. 5020 (daily ed. June 11, 1974) (remarks of Representative Clawson).
See 120 CONo. Rac. 5021 (daily ed. June 11, 1974) (remarks of Representative Broyhill).
72. S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sees. § 203(f) (1973) states:
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as enhancing or diminishing the rights of owners
of property as provided by the Constitution of the United States or the constitution of
the State in which the property is located.
73. S. REP. No. 197, 93d Cong., 1st Sees. 155 (1973).
74. U.S. CoNST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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requires the state to control the use of land which is critical or of more than
local concern. This regulation, opponents argue, could "entail restriction
of use of private land to the point that no use or no economic use would
be allowed."' '75
The third major argument in opposition to the Act concerns the scope
of authority granted to the states. The Act delineates the five categories
of areas which are of more than local concern and requires that these areas
be included in the state's land use program. Although the state must
control the use and development of only these five areas, opponents assert
that the categories are so broadly defined that "every square foot" of many
states could fall within the definitions." To illustrate the total extent of
federal pre-emption, opponents point to the definition of areas of "critical
environmental concern.""7 As defined in the Act, this definition encompas-
ses all fragile or historic lands.78 Also included are all so-called natural
hazard lands, such as flood plains and areas subject to weather disasters. 79
Finally, all agricultural lands, forest lands, grazing lands, and watershed
lands are subject to state control." Opponents of the Act argue that "[t]he
breadth and scope of such a definition is impossible to accurately calcu-
late.""'
A final argument voiced concerns the economic ramifications of enact-
ment of S. 268. The Act would establish large bureaucracies at both the
state and federal level. The state land use agency is required to employ an
adequate staff of trained professionals as well as individuals possessing the
technical skills needed to operate the agency in an efficient manner.82
Proposed development on any lands mentioned in the Act cannot proceed
until it is deemed to be in compliance with the state program. In the
meantime, the local community is "forced to sit idly by, as housing be-
comes scarce, employment opportunities decline, and the local tax base is
undermined."' 3 The Act, declare its opponents, places a lid on future eco-
nomic development.
75. H.R. REP. No. 798, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 74 (1974). For example, if a locality desires open
space in an area and the land in question is privately owned, the landowner would bear the
cost of the open space and not the locality.
76. S. RE. No. 197, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 168 (1973).
77. See note 22 supra.
78. S. 268, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 601(i)(1) (1973).
79. Id. § 601(i)(2).
80. Id. § 601(i)(3).
81. S. REP. No. 197, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 158 (1973).
82. 120 CONG. REC. 5022 (daily ed. June 11, 1974) (remarks of Representative Broyhill).
83. Id.
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C. CONCLUSION
A prediction that some type of land use legislation will be forthcoming
from Congress is not bold speculation. Even some of the most vocal oppo-
nents of the Land Use Policy and Planning Assistance Act recognize the
importance of a more intensive regulatory scheme over the use of land. 4
Just how the plan should be implemented is the question before Congress.
One can venture a guess on what provisions of the Act are susceptible to
change and whether any new considerations will be embodied in future
legislation.
Nowhere in S. 268 is the federal government required to establish a land
use program for federal lands. In the western states, anywhere from 29
percent to 95 percent of each state's land mass is held in trust or owned
by the federal government.85 Nationwide, one-third of all land is federally
ovned.8 It seems illogical to require state and local governments to exert
control over areas of critical environmental concern when the owner of one-
third of all the land is subject to no regulation. This vital omission should
be remedied in future land use legislation.
In the formulation of any new land use initiative, a strong drive by
proponents to institute crossover sanctions can be expected. If a voluntary
bill such as S. 268 were enacted, many states would not participate, thus
frustrating efforts for a national policy. Crossover sanctions would virtually
require adherence to the legislation.
The broad definitional standards set forth in the Act are susceptible to
change. These definitions are likely to be narrowed and made more certain.
An alternative suggestion is that the definitions be made discretionary
rather than obligatory." Also subject to change is the provision authorizing
the Secretary of the Interior to determine if a state has omitted from its
program an area of critical environmental concern of more than statewide
significance.8 This is the only substantive review power granted to the
Secretary under the Act and it was subjected to strong criticism from
opponents.
No matter what the specific provisions of future land use legislation,
there is one certainty that will pervade any action. The complexities of
modern society will pressure the states to play a larger role in the regula-
84. See 120 CONG. REc. 5023 (daily ed. June 11, 1974) (remarks of Representative Clawson).
85. S. REP. No. 197, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1973).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 162.
88. See note 50 supra.
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tion of land which is critical or of more than local concern. It seems likely
that congressional initiative will require this expanded role in the near
future.
XII. CONCLUSION
The growing pressures generated by an ever increasing population, sky-
rocketing land and building costs, dwindling energy supplies, environmen-
tal and social concerns, evidence the urgent need to define our land use
problems and work toward a comprehensive and coordinated resolution.
This note has endeavored to explore the level of progress Virginia and the
nation have achieved toward this goal.
Many valid questions have been raised; however, satisfactory solutions
are not forthcoming. Part of the reason is confusion and overlap as to
specific responsibilities. Governmental responses to land use problems
come from so many different levels and directions that too often cross
purposes are at work; inconsistent policy and duplication of effort results.
The complicated web of governing bodies with land use related responsibil-
ities in Virginia is a prime example. The Commonwealth must expedi-
tiously re-evaluate its land use policy with uniformity of purpose and iffi-
ciency of administration in mind.
A. CONSIDERATIONS
Ideally, the individual property owner should be able to resolve land use
problems through private mechanisms. Unfortunately, the personal con-
cerns of the private landholder often conflict with the broader considera-
tions most beneficial to society at large. In addition, lack of funds and
expertise would likely present insurmountable obstacles to successful land
use control through private volition.
Another alternative is local control, the predominant situation in Vir-
ginia. The strongest argument in its favor is that the day-to-day problems
encountered in land use require the peculiar knowledge which only local
officials possess. However, numerous arguments have been advanced
against local control. The major criticism concerns the high potential for
bias and self-serving attitudes which may guide the actions taken by local
officials. For example, a strong factor influencing local land use decisions
is the tax base, which frequently dictates that a high percentage of land
be zoned for industrial use. Although such zoning may not be fatal to
comfortable and safe living standards in the particular community, the
impact on neighboring communities is usually overlooked. Indeed there are
many land use decisions that have no critical ramifications beyond the
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boundaries of the locality and are best left to local officials to decide. But
for those problems that have broader consequences some input from out-
side the locality is necessary.
Those who favor local land use control, but recognize that certain prob-
lem areas require a broader perspective, would probably support some
form of regional land use planning. A flaw in the regional approaches
attempted thus far is that regional planning agencies are comprised mostly
of representatives from localities, who tend to act with the best interests
of their local constituents in mind. Analagous to the problem of local
control, bordering regions frequently will not be consulted or considered in
the decision-making process. Another impediment is that the typical ena-
bling statute authorizes local governments to operate regional planning
agencies only with the consent of all the governmental units within the
region. Therefore each locality can withdraw from and refuse to recognize
any regional board.
Considering all the complex issues involved the state may be the lowest
level at which any constructive land use policy can be formulated for
problems that have greater than local significance. The essential benefit
in having land use policy determined at this-level is the relatively unbiased
role the state could play. With its broader political base of operation, it
need not concern itself as much with the pressures inherent in a locally
operated system. Freedom from exclusive accountability to constituents of
a particular locality allows more objective decision-making. Proper consid-
eration can be given to individual localities, distinct regions or areas and
the state as a whole, before undertaking a particular course of action.
Virginia, however, has failed to establish any form of administrative
framework with even a minimal program guided by generally stated policy
goals. There is no centralization of policy among the individual agencies
that affect land use, so each unit follows a course of action best suited to
its limited sphere of concern. A general policy-making body should be
instituted to aid the agencies identifying and preventing potential prob-
lems, rather than merely reacting to and remedying existing ones. In
adopting a statewide approach for this limited purpose, neither regional
nor local control would be ousted, but would merely be integrated into a
single unified system insofar as broad-based policy considerations are con-
cerned.
B. FEDERAL INVOMITEMENT
The highest level of government involvement would naturally be the
federal government. It is already involved in the land use area, at least
indirectly, with numerous acts dealing with pollution of the environment.
[Vol. 9:513
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In addition, new incentives have appeared to help the state develop their
own capacity for land use planning and management in the form of pro-
posed federal legislation. If the proposal becomes law, in order to receive
technical and financial assistance, the participating states will be required
to establish both a land use planning process and program. There would
be nothing compulsory about this legislation; it would be entirely up to the
individual states to determine whether they want to participate or not.
However, due to the carrot and stick nature of the legislation, substantial
pressure will indirectly be brought to bear on the state governments to
participate.
Although on its face the proposed federal legislation appears unintru-
sive, opponents object to an increased federal role in the resolution of land
use problems since it would ultimately lead to more federal control over
the use of private property. Another criticism concerning instituting a
federal land use program is that the federal government is too far removed
from the areas of activity to provide anything more than a very general set
of guidelines for dealing with problems. However, countervailing pressures
that have been felt in Congress insure that it is only a matter of time before
a reasonable facsimile of the above mentioned federal legislation becomes
a reality; therefore Virginia will have an additional incentive to establish
a statewide land use plan.
C. ROLE OF THE STATE AS A POLICY MAKING BODY
Outlining the specific functions of a statewide land use policy-making
body is beyond the scope of this conclusion, but some suggestions may be
worthy of consideration. The problems of land use planning should be
defined at the outset. Then each problem should be matched with that
level of governmental involvement that can most effectively and equitably
structure and implement a solution. The state's primary function should
be to organize and coordinate the land use activities at the various levels
within its boundaries. The idea is not to have one all powerful land use
legislator, but rather to have a director who is close enough to the problems
to recognize them, but far enough removed to provide an unbiased plan of
attack. When a regional plan contains unfavorable repercussions, the state
should make suggestions for change. If these suggestions go unheeded, the
state should step in and see that the situation is rectified. Besides acting
as a clearinghouse for ideas, the state should provide the necessary guid-
ance and means to implement its policy when appropriate.
Whether or not the above suggestions are adopted, Virginia must recog-
nize the gravity of the situation in the land use area and set about estab-
lishing some form of plan before the federal government forces a more
restrictive plan on the state. And, in light of the conflicting interests and
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complicated issues involved, it is inevitable that the courts will be called
on to play an increasingly important role in the land use area. In a recent
New Jersey case the court's decision effectively banned restrictive zoning
throughout the state. The court, in reaching its decision, paid little atten-
tion to the defendant's claim that the legislature, not the courtroom, was
the proper forum for the issue. A strong argument can be made against the
courts legislating through their decisions in this area, especially consider-
ing pressures on their time and lack of expertise. Whether the encroach-
ment is by the federal government in name of the national interest or by
the courts for the protection of constitutional rights, Virginia must realize
it is on the brink of losing its regulatory power over land. Whatever system
is undertaken, the most important thing now is that the state and local
governments respond to existing pressures and work within some orderly
state-controlled land use program before they are harnessed with a more
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A. INTRODUCTION
The Appendix is not intended to be a comprehensive study of
land-use law. Its purpose is to provide an inventory of pertinent
Virginia and Federal legislation and, in a brief manner, comment
on their effect upon land use. The discussion of the various statutes
has been limited to literal interpretations. In some instances an
overview of a group of statutes has been attempted, followed by
specific interpretations of individual statutes deemed of practical
importance to the Virginia attorney. The categories in which the
Appendix has been divided were chosen in an effort to facilitate the
legal practitioner's initial examination of a particular area.
Much of the land-use legislation, both state and federal, affects
all three of the major categories in which the Appendix is divided:
Residential, Commercial & Industrial, and Agricultural. The sec-
tions on Zoning and Building Permit Requirements (section B), and
State and Federal Acts Dealing With Pollution (section G), bear
upon all categories of land-use. Therefore it is advised that special
attention be paid to these sections regardless of the type of land-use
in which you are interested. It must also be noted that all references
to statute sections or titles are made to the Code of Virginia, unless
specifically designated as federal law, Virginia Uniform Statewide
Building Code (VUSBC) or local ordinance.
B. ZONING AND BUILDING PERMIT REQUIREMENTS
1. Zoning-§§ 15.1-486 to -498
§ 15.1-486-permits the governing body of any county
or municipality to divide the land by districts and
may regulate, restrict, permit, prohibit and deter-
mine the use therein.
§ 15.1-487-requires in the case that no local planning
commission exists, that the governing body appoint
a zoning commission to carry out the functions men-
tioned in § 15.1-486.
§§ 15.1-494 to -495-requires that a board of zoning ap-
peals be appointed in each locality that has enacted
zoning ordinances. This board hears and decides ap-
peals from determinations made by administrative
officers in carrying out the zoning ordinances. Vari-
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ances are allowed in special cases. The board also has
the power to decide the district boundary where any
dispute exists.
§ 15.1-496-explains the procedures for making applica-
tions to the board of zoning appeals for special excep-
tions, for appeals of decisions, and for the prevention
of construction of a building in violation of a zoning
ordinance. Special attention should be made to the
varying time limits set out in this section for each of
the above proceedings.
§ 15.1-497-permits an appeal from the board of zoning
appeals if made within 30 days of that board's deci-
sion. This is accomplished by filing a petition within
such 30 days in the circuit court of the city or county.
The circuit court "may reverse or affirm, -wholly or
partly, or may modify the decision brought up for
review."
2. Special Use Permits
§ 15.1-430(i)-defines a "'special exception' or a 'special
use,' as a use not permitted in a particular district
except by a special use permit granted under the.pro-
visions of this chapter and any zoning ordinance
adopted herewith."
§ 15.1-491(c)-provides that the governing body of any
city, county or town may reserve to itself the right to
issue, upon application, a special exception or use
permit.
3. Building Permits and their Requirements
§§ 55-765, -766, -766.1-require building permits for any
construction, improvement or repairs where the cost
equals or exceeds particular dollar amounts as set out
under these sections. The amount is $250.00 in cer-
tain localities and $500.00 in others. Permits can be
obtained from the commissioner of revenue or direc-
tor of finance in the locality.
§ § 32-9, -9.1-empowers the State Board of Health to reg-
ulate and prescribe standards for sewage disposal and
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solid waste disposal and prohibits any county, city or
town from issuing building permits until compliance
with such standards is assured.
§§ 32-406 to -410-authorizes the State Board of Health
and localities to adopt and enforce regulations deal-
ing with plumbing.
4. Uniform Statewide Building Code-§§ 36-97 to -119
§ 36-99-requires that the Building Code prescribe con-
struction standards in order to promote health, safety
and welfare. Where practical, the Code should re-
quire certain levels of performance facilitating the
use of new building materials and methods. Only
where generally recognized standards are not avail-
able will the Building Code require the use of specific
materials or building methods.
§ 36-103-exempts any building for which a permit was
issued, or construction commenced or completed, or
for which working drawings were prepared in the year
prior to the effective date of the Building Code (Sept.
1, 1973).
§ 36-104-makes available to the public copies of the
Building Code which may be obtained from the State
Board of Housing.
§ 36-105-requires local enforcement of the Building
Code. If the county or municipality has no building
department, it must enter into an agreement with
another municipality or a State agency for Code en-
forcement.
§ 36-106-makes violation of the Building Code a mis-
demeanor with a fine up to $500.
§ 36-114-requires the State Building Code Technical
Review Board to rule on appeals.
§ 36-116-requires that an appeal from the Review Board
be to the State Supreme Court.
§ 36-119-exempts from the operation of the Building
Code regulations pertaining to mobile homes or in-
dustrial housing prescribed by the State Corporation
Commission; see § 36-73.
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5. Noteworthy Sections of the Existing Virginia Uniform
Statewide Building Code (VUSBC) (available in pamph-
let form on request -to the State Board of Housing)
VUSBC § 100.1-makes this Code applicable to "the
construction, alteration, addition, repair, removal,
* demolition, use, location and occupancy and mainte-
nance of all buildings and structures. . . in the State
of Virginia."
VUSBC § 200.2-provides that this Code will not over-
ride any local zoning ordinances or provisions of the
Virginia Code.
VUSBC § 318.0-does not exempt historic buildings per
se, but does require that they receive special consid-
eration and need not comply with the Code if found
to be safe by a building official.
VUSBC § § 106.0 to 106.2-provides that buildings exist-
ing before the Code's enactment but to which altera-
tions or repairs are made after the enactment may
come under the VUSBC. If the repairs or alterations
exceed 50% of the value of the building prior to such
repairs or alterations, then they must comply fully
with the VUSBC.
VUSBC § 106.3-provides that where repair costs are be-
tween 25% to 50% of the value of the building, it is
left to the building official's discretion as to what
extent the VUSBC provisions must be met.
VUSBC § 106.4-provides that where repair costs are less
than 25% of the value of the building, the VUSBC
does not have to be complied with if the structure is
safe.
VUSBC § § 106.5, 106.6-require full compliance with the
VUSBC where the building's floor space is increased
or number of stories increased, or where its occu-
pancy or use is changed.
C. RESIDENTIAL LAND USE
1. General Provisions
§ 15.1-427-requires the governing body of any county or
municipality to create a local or regional planning
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commission to assist it.§ 15.1-465-requires the governing body to adopt ordi-
nances regulating subdivision development of land.
§ 15.1-466-sets out the provisions for such ordinances.
2. Compliance with Zoning Laws
See section on Zoning and Building Permits.
3. Owners Desiring to Subdivide and Develop-§§ 15.1-465
to -485
§ 15.1-475-requires that owners of the land desiring to
subdivide submit a plat for approval to the local gov-
ernmental body-usually the local or regional plan-
ning commission if one exists. There is a right to
appeal to the circuit court of the area when no re-
sponse is received within 60 days or where a disap-
proval is "arbitrary or capricious." Such appeal must
be preceded with 10 days written notice to the local
commission or body.
§ 15.1-476-See this section for the plat requirements.
§ 15.1-480-requires that plans and specifications for
gas, water, sewer or electric light or power works,
pipes, wires, fixtures or systems to be constructed
under streets or alleys be submitted to the local gov-
erning body for approval.§9 15.1-481 to -485-cover procedures for the vacation
of the plat or any part thereof.
4. Compliance with Uniform Statewide Building Code and
Building Permit Requirements
See section on Zoning and Building Permits
5. Virginia Housing Development Authority Act-§ § 36-55.24
to -55.52
§ 36-55.25-declares that this Act was passed to promote
the construction of or rehabilitation of "sanitary and
safe residential housing at prices or rentals which
families of low and moderate income can afford."
§§ 36-55.31, -55.32, -55.33-give the HDA authority to
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make mortgage loans and temporary construction
loans.
§ 36-55.39-sets out the requirements of qualifying for
the loans.
6. Virginia Fair Housing Law-§§ 36-86 to -96-set out Vir-
ginia's policy on fair housing. It controls such unlawful
practices as discrimination, unenforceable restrictive cove-
nants based on public policy, and unfair practices of lend-
ing institutions.
7. Tax Incentives-Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1250-affords
favorable treatment to new residential construction by al-
lowing Double Declining Balance depreciation on such
construction. Residential construction is defined here as
housing which produces 80% of its income from residen-
tial rental units.
8. Condominium Act-§§ 55-79.39 to -79. 103-covers every-
thing from creation to termination of condominiums, in-
cluding recordation of the instruments, ownership inter-
ests, and management provisions.
§ 55-79.58-explains the required contents of plats and
plans and their recordation.
9. Mobile Homes
a) Industrialized Building Unit and Mobile Home Safe-
ty Law-§ § 36-70 to -85.
§§ 36-76, -77-make available to the public from the
State Corporation Commission in pamphlet form all
of the rules and regulations prescribing standards for
mobile homes.
b) Special Permits Required
§ 58-766.2-requires a permit before locating a mobile
home permanently on any lot.
§ 58-766.3-requires compliance with certain health re-
strictions and that a permit be obtained from the
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local commissioner of revenue or director of finance
before a mobile home be located on a lot as a resi-
dence. No mobile home may be moved until the local
property tax assessed against such mobile home is
paid.
D. COMMERCIAL AND INDUSTRIAL LAND USES
1. Local Planning Generally-§§ 15.1-427 to -503.2-specifi-
cally designate the powers and procedures which local
governments may exercise while acting under their zoning
authority. Some specific highlights are:
§ 15.1-427-requires the local governments to create local
and regional planning commissions.
§ 15.1-446-confers upon local governments the respon-
sibility for creating a comprehensive land use plan in
the city, county or town in question.
§ 15.1-465-requires counties and other municipalities
to 4dopt ordinances regulating subdivision and de-
velopment of land.
§ 15.1-475-commands owners of land wishing to sub-
divide to submit a plat of the proposed subdivision to
the local planning commission.
§ 15.1-480-calls for owners of land desiring to construct
gas, water, sewer, electric light or power works to
present such plans to the local governing body.
§ 15.1-486-confers zoning powers on local governments
and permits the local governments to regulate non-
agricultural sedimentation and erosion.
2. Land
a) General-§§ 10-1 to -17-vest the power over the su-
pervision, use and preservation of natural resources in
the Department of Conservation and Economic
Development.
b) Forestry-§ § 10-32 to -90.29-include all statutory
provisions in the area of forestry reserves, reforesting




§ § 10-46 to -50-provide for local municipalities to ac-
quire land for timber growth and provide for payment
of fire protection.
§§ 10-51 to -54.1-allow the State Forester to render
technical assistance to any local government or per-
son for the preservation or replacement of trees.
§ 10-74.1 to -83.01-include specific requirements as to
seeding and reforestation on property which has been
significantly lumbered.
33 10-90.2 to -90.29-enunciate the public policy of this
State to encourage reforestation and in furtherance of
this objective allow the Division of Forestry to re-
forest private land at reduced costs.
c) Tax Incentive-INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 631-encour-
ages good forestry practices by granting capital gains
treatment to certain transactions involving the cutting
and use of timber land.
d) Mining-§ §45.1-180 to -225-provide extensive stat-
utory coverage in this area of land use.
38 45.1-181 to -182-extensively set out the information
which must be provided by each operator before he
will be issued a permit.
§ 45.1-180 to -197.2-regulate surface mining in general,
while § § 45.1-198 to -225 deal with coal mining opera-
tions specifically. Both areas have the same require-
ments, e.g., requirement of a permit to mine, a recla-
mation plan, a bond to ensure performance of the
reclamation plan, and provisions for construction and
examination of refuse piles, water and silt retaining
dams.
§§ 21-2 to -112.20:1-deals with the designation by lo-
calities of Soil Conservation Districts and formulate
the Erosion and Sediment Control laws and should
be read together with mining legislation. (See Agri-
cultural Use, infra.)
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e) Mining (Federal)
i) National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321 et seq. (1970).
ii) Wilderness Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1970).
iii) National Historic Preservation Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 470 et seq. (1970).
3. Water
a) Industrial Water Pollution Highlights-§§ 62.1-44.2
to -44.34-embody the basic provisions for the pro-
tection of the State's waters; the State Water Control
Board has powers to create rules, regulations and
orders which directly concern the quality of water.
Some specific statutory highlights:
§ 62.1-44.3-defines pollution broadly, enabling the
Water Control Board to exercise equally broad pow-
ers over activities conducted on land.
§ 62.1-44.15-gives to the Board the power to issue spe-
cial orders to "owners" to: construct facilities in ac-
cordance with approval plans and to conduct studies
in furtherance of water quality; force compliance
with a certificate for waste discharge; force compli-
ance with Board directives; cease and desist water
pollution.
§§ 62.1-44.16, 62.1-44.17, and 62.1-44.19-designate the
procedures by which an "owner" may obtain licens-
ing in regard to "industrial waste," "other wastes,"
and "sewage," respectively.
§§ 62.1-44.83 to -44.107-encompass the Board's power
to control, with the Department of Health, the con-
struction of wells and to designate an area where the
groundwater levels are in jeopardy as "critical
groundwater areas." (Underground water preserva-
tion).
§ 62.1-44.100-requires an application for a permit in an
area designated "critical groundwater area," and
within this section the Board has broad powers to
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issue or deny the permit where the application re-
veals a wasteful use or a significant potential for ad-
versely affecting present uses in these areas. Substan-
tial control over commercial and industrial uses is
inherent.
b) Wetlands
§ 62.1-13.9-requires the owner of "wetlands"-ripar-
ian owners and owners of subaqueous land-to obtain
a permit before using or developing this property. If
the local government has adopted § 62.1-13.5 (Wet-
land Zoning Ordinance) they will administer the per-
mit; otherwise, applications must be made to Vir-
ginia Marine Resources Commission, 2401 West Ave-
nue, P.O. Box 756, Newport News, Virginia 23607,
Telephone No. 804-245-2811.
§ 28.1-108-provides for the delegation of subaqueous
land to riparian owners for their personal oyster
grounds.
§ 28.1-109-provides that all subaqueous beds not as-
signed to riparian owners are to be held for the State
and leased by the Commission to commercial diggers.
§ 62.1-3-requires a permit to be obtained from the Com-
mission for any major disturbance of subaqueous
lands.
§ 62.1-4-gives the Commission the power to lease the
State's subaqueous lands for mineral exploration and
extraction. (But not on the Continental Shelf).
§ 62.1-13.1 to -13.20-include provisions which: (a) de-
fine wetlands; (b) sets the standards of development;
(c) empowers the Marine Resources Commission to
reverse the ruling of a local Wetland Municipality
Board.
§ 62.1-116-requires an application to build a dam, cut
canals, piers, etc. The Army Corps of Engineers exer-
cises concurrent jurisdiction over Wetlands with
State boards, especially in regard to any encroach-
"ments into the water by man-made structures.
§§ 62.1-190 to -193-apply to dredging sand and gravel.
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§§ 62.1-194 to -196-govern such offenses as: throwing
garbage into waters; discharge of oil into waters; ob-
structing or contaminating state waters.
c) Wetland and Water Use (Federal)
i) Refuse Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970).
ii) Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ § 1151-1175 (1970); concurrent jurisdiction with
State Water Control Board. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et
seq. (Supp. 1975).
iii) River and Harbor Appropriation Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 403 (1970) (requiring consent for activities
which may result in any discharge into navigable
waters).
iv) Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3251 et
seq. (1970) (providing for research and develop-
ment programs for improved waste manage-
ment; no enforcement provisions).
v) Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.
C.A. § § 1451 et seq. (providing funds or grants for
for those states who initiate such plans over land
and water use).
4. Air
a) Industrial Air Pollution-§ § 10.17.9:1 to -17.30-allow
the State Air Pollution Control Board to require that
''owners" cease and desist pollution; to comply with
construction permits (whether new facilities or alter-
ations of existing facilities); and to comply with air
quality standards. The term "owners" is broad enough





i) National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321 et seq. (1970).
ii) Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1857 et seq. (1970)-
provides that the EPA publish air quality stand-
ards. While the EPA is given authority to enforce
its regulations, state implementation plans are
encouraged and where in existence are to be used
(See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 10-17.9:1 to 10-17.30).
iii) Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4901 et seq.
(1973)-the significance of this Act is its possible
impact in the area of industrial zoning.
5. State Corporation Commission-gains its source of power
from the Virginia Constitution, with a review of its de-
cisions only by the Virginia Supreme Court. Besides hav-
ing charter powers over all corporations in Virginia, it ex-
ercises stringent regulatory control over the railroad com-
panies and utility companies, especially in regard to elec-
tric utilities. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 56-265.1(b), -265.3, -46.1.
§ 62.1-81 to -83-empower the State Corporation Com-
mission with licensing and governing authority over
hydroelectric dams on waters of the state and within
the state. By definition, waters of the state are those
which affect interstate commerce, while waters
within the state are those which do not.
§ 36-70 to -85-empower the SCC to exercise regula-
tory authority over industrialized building units and
mobile homes. Such authority is similar to that exer-
cised by the State Board of Housing over buildings in
general.
§§ 36-81 to -83-authorize the SCC to establish health
and safety standards and places the enforcement re-
sponsibility upon the SCC and local building offi-
cials. Violation of any regulations is a misdemeanor
and carries with it a fine of up to $500.00. Regulations
are embodied in a booklet entitled Virginia Industrial
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Building Unit and Mobile Home Regulations which
is available from the Commission or local building
departments.
§ 12.1 - (The Outer Continental Shelf Act of Vir-
ginia) over which the SCC had regulatory powers will
not go into effect as a result of the March 17, 1975
decision by the United States Supreme Court that
the individual states do not have control over their
continental shelf. The Department of the Interior will
designate regulations and guidelines for oil and gas
drilling on the United States' continental shelf off the
coast of Virginia.
E. AGRICULTURAL LAND USE
1. Environmental Checklist
§ § 62.1-44.2 to -44.3-provide for the protection of the
State's waters, and under these sections the State
Water Control Board has the potential power to pro-
ceed against farmers for any activity which results in
any form of water pollution, e.g., spraying, run-off,
etc.
§§ 21-2 to -112.20:1-embody the statutory provisions for
implementing erosion and sediment control through
the Soil and Water Conservation Commission.
§ § 21-2 to -89-provide for the administration of con-
servation and flood control areas; set up the proce-
dural aspects of the Conservation Commission; and
formulate a framework whereby a particular district
acquires substantial land use regulatory powers, in-
cluding control over various agricultural practices.
§ § 21-89 to -89.15-formulate the mechanism for enforc-
ing any "land disturbing activity" (grading, clearing,
excavation). Certain owners are required to apply for
permits. Activities such as farming, surface mining





a) State-§§ 58-769.4 to -769.15:1-provide for "special
assessments" for property devoted to agricultural,
horticultural, forest and open-space uses. The various
localities can pass ordinances directing the taxing of-
ficial to base his assessment solely on the qualified
land's use and not upon a possible higher market
value when used for other purposes.
b) Federal
i) Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 175-provides a tax de-
duction for expenditures, incurred on land used in
farming, for the purpose of soil and water conser-
vation by a taxpayer in the business of farming.
ii) Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 182-allows one en-
gaged in the business of farming to elect whether
to deduct currently or capitalize the expenses in-
curred in clearing land for the purpose of making
the land suitable for use.
F. MISCELLANEOUS
1. Historical Landmarks
§§ 10-135 to -138.1-create the Virginia Historic Land-
marks Commission with its concomitant powers and
duties, and explains the membership, appointments,
terms, vacancies, compensation and expenses of the
Commission.
§ 10-139-requires that when a site or building has been
designated as a certified landmark, notice of this fact
will be given by the Commission to the local tax-
assessing official as prima facie evidence that the
value of such property for commercial, residential or
other purposes is reduced by reason of its designa-
tion.
§ 10-140-requires that when the Commission establishes
a historic district, it shall notify the local tax-
assessing official of this establishment together with
restrictions which are applicable to properties located
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in the local district and of the fact that commercial,
industrial and certain other uses within such district
are restricted. The tax assessing official shall take
these factors into consideration in assessing the prop-
erties.
§ 10-141-limits the authority of the Commission to des-
ignate historic landmarks where the local officials
have failed to make any such designation.
§ 10-142-when the Commission, with the consent of the
landowner, designates a historic landmark, it may
seek and obtain from the landowner reasonable re-
strictions on the property to preserve its historic fea-
tures. The agreement between the Commission and
the landowner as to restrictions must be in writing
and recorded in the local clerk's office.
2. Parks and Recreational Land Uses
88 10-21.4 to -21.11-establish the Commission of Out-
door Recreation and explain its purpose. The preced-
ing sections also specify the members, appointment,
terms, vacancies, compensation and expenses of the
Commission. §§ 10-21.8 and 10-21.9 specify the pow-
ers and duties of the Commission.
§ 10-21.12-expressly authorizes the Commission to ac-
quire fee simple title to tracts and to acquire by gift
or purchase (1) fee simple title to land to use such
land for farming or to reserve the timber rights there-
on or, (2) easements in gross or other such interests
in real estate to maintain the character of such land
as open-space land.
88 10-167 to -173-enumerate the declaration of policy
and purpose of the "Scenic Rivers Act."
§ 10-174-states that whenever a river or section of a
river is designated as a scenic river, no dam or other
structure impeding the river's natural flow shall be
constructed or operated in or near the river without
specific authorization by an act of the General As-
sembly.
§ 10-175-enables the Commission of Outdoor Recrea-
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tion to acquire either by gift or purchase any real
property or interest therein which the Commission
considers necessary or desirable for the protection of
any scenic river.
3. State Department of Highways and Transportation
§§ 33.1-62 to -65-empower the State Highway Com-
mission to designate any highway as a scenic highway
or as a Virginia byway and define these terms.
§ 33.1-66-empowers the Commission to purchase or ac-
quire by gift such land or interest in order to main-
tain the preservation of natural beauty adjacent to
scenic highways.
G. STATE AND FEDERAL ACTS DEALING WITH POLLU-
TION
1. State
a) Air-§§ 10-17.9:1 to -17.30-set forth a policy to regu-
late air pollution in the Commonwealth.
§§ 10-17.9:1 to -17.17-set forth the public policy of
achieving and maintaining levels of air quality that
will protect human health and define the terms to be
used in the chapter. The State Air Pollution Control
Board is the focal point of this regulatory system
under the preceding sections which specify the mem-
bership, terms, vacancies, qualifications, compensa-
tion and expenses of the Board members.
§ 10-17.18-delegates to the Board the power to regulate
sources of air pollution and gives the Board power to
promulgate rules and regulations to affect air pollu-
tion control.
§ 10-17.18:1-confers on the Board the power to issue
special orders to owners (1) to cease and desist pollu-
tion; (2) to construct facilities in accordance with
approved plans and specifications; (3) to comply with
all terms and provisions promulgated by the Board.
These special orders, with the exception of enumer-
ated emergency situations, are to be issued after a
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hearing with reasonable notice to the affected owners
of the time, place and purpose of the hearing and will
become effective not less than five days after service.
§ 10-17.18:2-decisions of the Board pursuant to hearings
are in writing and shall contain explicit findings of
facts and conclusions.
§ 10-17.19-allows the Board to create local air pollution
control districts to augment its regulatory power.
§ 10-17.21-requires that any owner who is causing or
may cause air pollution problems shall on request
furnish the Board with plans, specifications and in-
formation required by the Board.
§ 10-17.22-requires that any person authorized by the
Board may at reasonable times enter any establish-
ment or upon any property, public or private, for the
gathering of information.
§ 10-17.23-enables the Board to seek compliance of its
rules by injunction, mandamus or other appropriate
remedies.
§§ 10-17.23:1 to -17.28-deal with procedures for judicial
review of Board regulation, appeals from Board deci-
sions and stays of special orders pending appeal.
§ 10-17.29-requires that any person convicted of violat-
ing a Board rule, regulation or order is guilty of a
misdemeanor and liable to a fine of not more than
$1,000 for each violation. Each day of continued vio-
lation after conviction is considered a separate of-
fense.
This section does not affect the right of a person to
claim property damages or other relief.
b) Water
i) Wetlands Act-§§ 62.1-13.1 to -13.20
H3 62.1-13.1 to -13.20-declare that the policy
of Virginia is to preserve the unique char-
acter of the wetlands and establish the




§ 62.1-13.5-a model wetlands zoning ordi-
nance which any.,county, city or town may
adopt. This ordinance specifies the permit-
ted uses of and activities on wetlands if an
application for such use or activity is for-
warded to the Commission and the Virginia
Institute of Marine Science along with a
non-refundable processing fee. Not later
than 60 days after receipt of the applica-
tion, the wetlands board will hold a public
hearing on the application. A notice of this
hearing is to be published by the Board at
least once a week for two weeks prior to the
hearing. The applicant will receive notice of
the meeting by mail not less than 20 days
prior to the hearing. The Board will make
its determination within 30 days of the
hearing and the Board may require a rea-
sonable surety bond to secure compliance
with the permit.
§§ 62.1-13.11 to -13.15-deal with procedures
for an appeal from a decision of the wet-
lands board.
§ 62.1-13.18-states that any person who will-
fully or negligently violates any order, rule
or regulation of the Commission or board
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. Following
conviction, every day the violation contin-
ues is a separate offense.
§ 62.1-13.20-declares that this chapter does
not affect any project commenced prior to
July 1, 1972. However, any project which,
although commenced before July 1, 1972, is
suspended or delayed does come within the
provisions of this section. Also exempted
from this section are projects whose plans
were filed with the appropriate agency be-
fore July 1, 1972.
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ii) State Water Control Board-§§ 62.1-44.2 to
-44.34
§§ 62.1-44.2 to -44.3-declare the policy of the
Commonwealth to (1) protect existing high
quality State waters; (2) safeguard the
clean waters of the State from pollution; (3)
prevent any increase in pollution and (4)
reduce existing pollutants. These sections
establish the State Water Control Board
and define the terms used in this chapter.
§ 62.1-44.4-states that the right to continue
polluting the waters is not gained through
prior conduct. Waters whose existing qual-
ity is better than the established standard
will be maintained at the higher quality
level.
§ 62.1-44.5-states that an owner, without a
Board-issued certificate, is violating public
policy if that owner (1) discharges into
State waters inadequately treated sewage,
industrial wastes, or other wastes, or any
noxious or deleterious substances; or (2)
otherwise pollutes the waters.
§ 62.1-44.15-enumerates the powers and
duties of the Board as to the issuance of
certificates, cease and desist orders and
other administrative functions.
§ 62.1-44.15:1-limits the power of the Board
to require construction of sewerage systems
or sewage treatment works.
§ 62.1-44.16-requires that any owner who op-
erates any establishment where there is a
potential for, or where there is actual dis-
charge of industrial waste, shall provide
facilities approved by the Board to control
these wastes. This section sets forth the




§ 62.1-44.17-applies to all other wastes and
sets forth administrative procedures.
§ 62.1-44.18-notes that all sewerage systems
are under the joint supervision of the State
Department of Health and the Board. All
owners of any such sewerage systems or
sewage treatment works from which sewage
is discharged into State waters are required
to furnish, when requested by the Board,
certain information concerning their opera-
tion.
§ 62.1-44.19-requires that approval of plans
and specifications must be received by the
"owner" from the Board before any owner
erects, constructs, opens, expands or oper-
ates a sewerage system or sewage treatment
works designed to serve more than 400 per-
sons and which will have a potential or ac-
tual discharge into State waters. This sec-
tion specifies the procedure for review of the
plans and specifications.
§ 62.1-44.20-states that any person authoriz-
ed by the Board may, at reasonable times
and under reasonable circumstances, enter
any establishment to gain information in
the enforcement of the provisions of this
chapter.
§ 62.1-44.21-demands that an owner supply
the Board, upon request, with information
to determine the effect of his discharge
wastes in State waters.
§§ 62.1-44.22 to -44.30-deal with enforcement
and appeal procedures.
§ 62.1-44.32-requires that any owner who vio-
lates any provision of this chapter be sub-
ject to certain fines. Each day of continued
violation is a separate offense.
§ § 62.1-3 to -5-deal with the authority requir-
ed for use of subaqueous lands and the pro-
cedure for applying for such use.
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§§ 62.1-116 to -127-deal with applications for
leave to build a dam, cut canals, etc., and
the procedure for applying for such use.
§§ 62.1-190 to -193-make it unlawful to re-
move, in any manner, sand or gravel from
any lands which abut any of the waters of
the Commonwealth. Violation is a misde-
meanor. Exemptions from this chapter are
given in § 62.1-193.
iii) The Groundwater Act of 1973-§§ 62.1-44.83 to
-44.107-declare the public policy that right of
reasonable control of all ground-water resources
within Virginia belongs to the state and specify
the regulations on Virginia's groundwater re-
sources.
c) Land (Erosion)
i) Soil Conservation Districts Law-§§ 21-1 to
-112.20:1
§ 21-2-provides that land use practices con-
tributing to soil waste and erosion be dis-
couraged and discontinued and that appro-
priate soil conservation practices be devel-
oped.
§ 21-6-establishes Virginia Soil and Water
Conservation Commission.
§ 21-10- enumerates the duties of the Com-
mission.
§ 21-12 to -52-deals with procedures for es-
tablishing soil conservation districts and
their supervision.
§§ 21-53 to -65-enumerate the powers of the
soil conservation districts and supervisors.
§ § 21-66 to -89-empower and establish guide-
lines for land use regulations formulated by
the supervisors of the district.
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§ § 21-90 to -112-provide for a board of adjust-
ment to be established under the supervi-
sors of any district with authority to adopt
any ordinance prescribing land use regula-
tions in accordance with the provisions of
§§ 21-66 to -81.
ii) Erosion and Sediment Control Law-§§ 21-89.1
to -89.15-acknowledge that the rapid shift in
land use from agricultural to non-agricultural
uses has accelerated the prQcesses of soil erosion
and sedimentation making it necessary to estab-
lish a statewide coordinated erosion and sedi-
ment control program. The above sections detail
the function of the program.
iii) Open Space Land Act-§ § 10-151 to -158
§ 10-152-authorizes the acquisition or desig-
nation of property for use as open-space
land.
§ 10-158-authorizes acquisition of fee simple
title by any public body subject to preserva-
tion of farming or timber rights.
2. Federal
a) Noise Control Act-42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4901, et seq.
(1973)
§ 4901-declares the policy of the United States to pro-
mote an environment free from noise that jeopardizes
health and welfare.
§ 4903(b)-Presidential authority to exempt certain ex-
ecutive activities or facilities from compliance with
regulations.
b) Clean Air Act-42 U.S.C. §§ 1857-1858
§ 1857-states Congressional findings of the growing
danger that air pollution presents to our society and
states the purposes of the Act which are: (1) to pro-
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tect and enhance the Nation's air resources; (2) to
provide technical and financial assistance to control
air pollution; (3) to initiate and accelerate a research
program to prevent and control air pollution; and (4)
to encourage and assist the development and opera-
tion of regional air pollution control programs.
§ 1857c-5-provides that the Environmental Protection
Agency will promulgate an implementation program
to control national primary and secondary air quality
standards for a state if one is not submitted to the
Administrator or is inadequate.
§ 1857c-5(a) (2) (A) (i) -states that implementation plans
to control secondary standards of air quality must be
implemented within a reasonable time after approval
of plans. Primary standard plans must be imple-
mented not later than three years from approval of
the plan.
§ 1857c-8-grants authority to EPA to issue compliance
orders or bring civil suits against any person violating
the implementation plan.
§ 1857h-2-authorizes citizen suits to enforce provisions
of the Act.
§ 1857c-5(a) (2) (B) -sets forth requirements for approv-
al of state implementation plans.
§ 1857c-5(a)(2)(D)-requires that the state implementa-
tion plan provide a review procedure prior to con-
struction or modificatioii of new sources.
§ 1857c-5(a)(4) -permits a state to prevent construction
if it determines that national air standard will be
jeopardized.
40 C.F.R. § 52.22 (1974)-applies regulations published
by EPA to air pollution from indirect sources.
40 C.F.R. § 51.12(a) (1974)-requires that each state's
plan contain a strategy to control areas with the po-
tential of exceeding air control standards.
c) Water
i) Federal Water Pollution Control Amendments of
1972-33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251 et seq. (Supp. 1975)
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§ 1251(a) -enunciates the public determina-
tion to achieve the goal of a water quality
sufficient for protection and propagation of
wildlife by July 1, 1983, and to eliminate
the discharge of pollutants into navigable
waters by 1985.
§ 1311(a)-makes any discharge into navigable
waters unlawful without a permit.
§§ 1362(11) and 1363(a) define two sets of
criteria toward the achievement of clean
water.
§ 1362-provides definitions of pertinent terms
used in the new water pollution amend-
ments.
§§ 1314, 1316-17-requires EPA to publish effl-
uent standards and prohibitions for toxic
substances and guidelines for pretreatment
of pollutants.
§ 1318-9-permits EPA to issue a compliance
order or bring a civil suit to remedy a per-
mit violation.
40 C.F.R. § 130.22 (1974)-provides that no per-
mit will be approved unless a state submits
a planning process subject to EPA ap-
proval.
33 U.S.C. §1313-requires that the states plan-
ing process include a determination of the
total maximum daily pollutant and ther-
mal load necessary to assure reaching the
required water quality standards.
40 C.F.R. §§ 131.100 et seq. (1974)-contain the
requirements for plans for drainage basins.
40 C.F.R. § 131.305 (1974)-requires that each
discharge load and thermal load allocation
incorporate an allowance for anticipated
economic and population growth for a five
year period.
33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)-permits EPA to issue a
permit for the discharge of pollutants into
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navigable waters if all applicable require-
ments of the Act are met.
§ 1341(a)-makes state certification as to com-
pliance with the Act necessary for approval
of permits.
§ 1342(h)-permits civil action to be initiated
by EPA or the State if conditions of a per-
mit for a publicly owned treatment plant
are violated.
§ 1281(g)(1)-notes that EPA is authorized to
make grants to any state, municipality or
interstate agency for the construction of
publicly owned waste treatment works.
§ 1288-requires designation by each state of
urban industrial concentrations that have
substantial water quality control problems.
ii) Solid Waste Disposal Act-42 U.S.C. §§ 3251 et
seq. (1970).
§ 3254(b)-provides for grants to state, region-
al and local agencies for development of
solid waste disposal plans conditioned on
existence of federally approved plans con-
sistent with EPA guidelines.
iii) Refuse Act of 1899-33 U.S.C. § 407 (1970)-
makes it unlawful to discharge from any wharf,
manufacturing establishment or mill of any kind
any refuse matter other than that which flows
from streets and sewers which passes into a
liquid state into any navigable waters of the
United States.
iv) River and Harbor Appropriation Act-33 U.S.C.
§ 403 (1970)-makes Congressional authoriza-
tion necessary for the construction of any ob-




d) Land-Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972-16
U.S.C.A. § 1451 et seq. (1974).
§ 1454-provides for grants for two-thirds of the cost of
developing and implementing coastal zone manage-
ment plans for coastal states that apply.
§§ 1454(b)(1)-(2)-require that applicant for grant iden-
tify the boundaries of its coastal zone and define per-
missible land and water uses within the zone which
border on coastal waters.
§ 1454(b) (4) -requires that management program in-
clude an identification of the means by which the
state proposes to exert control over land and water
uses.
§ 1458-requires funds to be terminated if states deviate
from the conditions of the Act.
§ 1455(d) -establishes administrative proceedings for
implementation of the land use control plan.
§ 1455(e)(2)-requires that local land use regulations not
unreasonably restrict uses of benefit to the region.
§ 1455(c)-requires management programs to provide for
adequate consideration of the national interest in-
volved in the siting of facilities necessary to meet
requirements which are more than local in nature.
§§ 1456(c)-(f)-demand that requirements of Clean Air
Act and Federal Water Pollution Control be incorpo-
rated into the plan.
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